Peo in Interest of HJH

Opinion

26CA0040 Peo in Interest of HJH 09-10-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0040 Mesa County District Court No. 24JV64 Honorable Brian J. Flynn, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of H.J.H., Child-Appellant, and Concerning K.F., Appellant, and T.H., Appellee, and B.H. and T.H., Intervenors-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI

Opinion by JUDGE GROVE

Gomez and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 10, 2026

Todd Star, County Attorney, John R. Rhoads, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee The People of the State of Colorado

Josie Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant Hand Law P.C., Mark R. Hand, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee T.H.

Forsgren & Poore, PLLC, Garrett Forsgren, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Intervenors-Appellees

¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, K.F. (mother) and the guardian ad litem (GAL) appeal the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental responsibilities as to H.J.H. (the child) to T.H. (father). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Mesa County Department of Human Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect regarding the then two-year-old child and his older brother, Ho.H., who has a different mother and is not affected by this appeal. The petition alleged that father was involved in a physical altercation while holding the child. The petition also alleged that the paternal grandparents found the child unresponsive and took him to the hospital, where he tested positive for THC; the Department suspected that he had ingested father’s medical marijuana because father stated that the child “must have gotten into [his] gummies.”

¶3 With respect to mother, the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected based on her no-fault admission. The court then adopted a treatment plan for mother by agreement of the parties. Father later agreed to a deferred adjudication, and the

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court adopted a treatment plan for him as a condition of the deferral.

¶4 Mother moved to have the child returned to her. Father, in response, asked that the child be returned to his care instead. The juvenile court then scheduled an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) hearing.

¶5 Sixteen months after the petition was filed, and after a three- day hearing, the juvenile court entered an APR and closed the dependency and neglect action.

II. Discussion

¶6 Mother and the GAL argue that the juvenile court erred by relying solely on the best interest factors from the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA) in determining that father should be the child’s primary custodial parent. They argue that the juvenile court did not apply the required provisions of the Children’s Code. We are not convinced.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the sound discretion of the juvenile court. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. When there

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is record support for the court’s findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review. Id. However, whether the court applied the correct legal standard presents a question of law that we review de novo. Id.

¶8 The tests for determining parenting time pursuant to the UDMA and the Children’s Code are not identical. L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1391 (Colo. 1996). In custody proceedings initiated pursuant to the UDMA, a district court must “determine [parenting time] . . . in accordance with the best interests of the child” applying the factors specifically enumerated in section 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2026. See L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1388.

¶9 But when allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency or neglect proceeding, the court “shall hear evidence of the proper disposition best serving the interests of the child and the public,” and consider the legislative purposes of the Children’s Code. L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1391 (citation omitted); see § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2026. The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing procedures through

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which the child’s best interests can be served. See § 19-1-102(1), C.R.S. 2026; L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995).

¶ 10 The Children’s Code does not prescribe any specific factors a court must consider in making its decision. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo. App. 2005). A juvenile court may consider provisions of the UDMA, including the best interest factors in section 14-10-124, so long as the court’s focus remains on the child’s safety and protection and not on the parents’ custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13.

B. Best Interest Factors

¶ 11 The juvenile court’s written order is consistent with many of the best interest factors from section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and (a.5). The court considered, among other things, • the wishes of the parents who each requested majority parenting time, see § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I);

• the wishes of the child regarding parenting time, concluding that the child was “not of sufficient age to express his wishes regarding parenting time,” see § 14-

10-124(1.5)(a)(II);

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• the relationship of the child with his parents and others, as well as his adjustment to the community, determining that the child’s “bond with his father and extended family is significant” and that the child “would suffer emotionally if moved out of the area,” see § 14-10-

124(1.5)(a)(III), (IV); and • father’s and mother’s ability to place the child’s needs above their own, finding that father “provided primary care for the child after [mother] moved to Pennsylvania,”

whereas mother “offered no support or willingness to be involved in the child’s life,” see § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(XI).

¶ 12 The court concluded that it was “clearly not in the [child’s] best interests to relocate to Pennsylvania,” and that it was “in the child’s best interests . . . to be with his father.”

¶ 13 In addition to considering these UDMA best interest factors, the juvenile court’s findings and order are consistent with the Children’s Code and its legislative purposes. The court’s order states that it had jurisdiction over the APR by virtue of the Children’s Code, as an “adjudication [was] entered as to [the] child[],” and specifically cited § 19-3-507(1)(a). See L.A.G., 912 P.2d

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at 1388 (Once a court accepts jurisdiction pursuant to section 19- 1-104, it “must determine the question of custody according to the provisions of the [Children’s] Code.”).

¶ 14 And significantly, the court’s written order focuses on the protection and safety of the child rather than the parents’ custodial interests. See H.K.W., ¶ 13. The court repeatedly considered the child’s safety and welfare, both as it related specifically to section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V), but also more generally. It “focused on the protection and safety of the child[], as well as [his] best interests,” and found that moving to Pennsylvania with mother “would be emotionally damaging” and “emotionally traumatic” to the child.

¶ 15 The juvenile court thus focused on the child’s welfare and safety in addition to the best interest factors from the UDMA. See § 19-1-102(1); L.G., 890 P.2d at 654. In other words, the court considered the legislative purposes of the Children’s Code because its ruling “encompass[ed a] determination of whether [the parenting time award] would best serve [the] child’s welfare and the best interests of society.” L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1393.

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C. Determination of the APR

¶ 16 Mother also argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion because its finding that father was a fit parent was not supported by the evidence. We disagree.

¶ 17 The juvenile court was not required to make parental fitness findings when it determined that father’s proposed APR served the child’s best interests. See § 19-3-507(1)(a). Nevertheless, the juvenile court found that father had “substantially complied” with his treatment plan, had “shown great progress,” and was thus a fit parent. The court also found that the relationship between the child and father was healthy and that the child had a “strong attachment[] to and loving relationship[] with [his] father.”

¶ 18 Moreover, the court found that there was “no conclusive evidence” regarding how the child had accessed marijuana or that its ingestion was the cause of the child’s medical issues. The court concluded that that there was “no reliable evidence presented” that the child was “at risk of ingesting THC” in the future in father’s care, “the primary reason for which this case was opened.”

¶ 19 The record supports the court’s findings. Father testified that he completed his treatment plan, including

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• two substance abuse evaluations;

• a mental health and psychological evaluation;

• individual therapy;

• domestic violence treatment;

• online parenting and co-parenting classes;

• signing all releases of information;

• a fatherhood program; and • compliance with probation.

¶ 20 The caseworker confirmed that father had completed the treatment plan. A “fatherhood navigator” testified that father successfully completed the fatherhood program and that he saw growth in father when it came to emotional regulation.

¶ 21 The caseworker testified that family time went well and that the child “enjoy[ed] being with his dad.” The foster parent, who provided primary care for the child for fifteen months, testified that she had “never seen anything negative” at visits with father and the child and that they “always show[ed] a lot of affection and love between them.” Father’s friend, who provided family time supervision, testified that the child had “nothing but excitement to

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visit his father” and that he “could see the love between both parties.”

¶ 22 Father testified that he took medical marijuana for a seizure disorder. He explained that although the child ingested marijuana, doctors did not conclude that the child’s medical issues were caused by marijuana ingestion. Even so, he explained that he kept his marijuana in a child proof container, stored it out of the child’s reach, and did not use around the child. The foster parent testified that the child did not smell of marijuana and that she had no “concerns” that the child had been “exposed to substances.” The foster parent concluded that she was not “concerned about [the child’s] safety with [father].” The caseworker, an expert in child welfare and protection, concurred.

¶ 23 To be sure, the record includes some evidence to the contrary, but we may not reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. See People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62 (it is not our role to reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court); see also B.R.D., ¶ 15 (when there is record support for the trial court’s findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review); In re

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Marriage of Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 504 (Colo. 1989) (an appellate court may presume that the trial court considered all of the evidence admitted).

¶ 24 Accordingly, because the juvenile court’s findings and conclusions were supported by the record, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion. We therefore affirm the court’s determination that it was in the child’s best interests to grant primary custody to father.

III. Motion to Strike

¶ 25 During the briefing of this appeal, the paternal grandparents, who had intervened during the dependency and neglect proceeding, filed an answer brief. Mother filed a motion to strike their answer brief, citing C.W.B., Jr. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, and asserting that the intervenors lacked standing to participate in the appeal. The motions division deferred ruling on the motion.

¶ 26 We now address the issue of the intervenors’ standing to participate in the appeal and conclude that they do not have standing.

¶ 27 By filing an answer brief, the intervenors attempted to support father’s request that we affirm the APR judgment. But the

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intervenors do not have a legally protected interest in the juvenile court’s APR judgment. Cf. C.W.B., ¶ 26 (foster parents lacked standing to appeal the juvenile court’s ruling because they did not suffer an injury in fact to a legally protected interest as a result of the court’s denial of a termination motion); see also Arapahoe Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. People in Interest of D.Z.B., 2019 CO 4, ¶¶ 10-11 (even though the foster parents had a statutorily granted right to participate in the termination hearing as intervenors, they lacked standing to appeal the termination judgment).

¶ 28 Therefore, we grant mother’s motion to strike the intervenors’ answer brief.

IV. Disposition

¶ 29 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.