Peo in Interest of HH

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 16, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1760
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1760 Peo in Interest of HH 07-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1760 La Plata County District Court No. 25JV30000 Honorable Kim S. Shropshire, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of H.H., a Child,

and Concerning C.H.,

Appellant,

and

J.L.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE TOW Harris and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 16, 2026

Koy Dingboom Oates, LLC, Jeffrey C. Koy, Lauren Dingboom, Jordan Oates, Catherine Kleindl, Englewood, Colorado, for Appellee the People of the State of Colorado

Josie Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant Genevieve Manco, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Thorton, Colorado, for Appellee J.L. ¶1 C.H. appeals the judgment determining that he was not the

legal father of H.H. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 C.H. and H.W. (mother) began their relationship in 2009 and

engaged in a commitment ceremony at some point in 2011 or 2012

while they were living in Oregon, a state that does not recognize

common law marriage. Later, mother also had a relationship with

J.L., which resulted in a pregnancy. C.H. and mother continued

their relationship; C.H. was present at the child’s birth and listed

on the child’s birth certificate. After the child’s birth, mother and

C.H. began raising the child together, though C.H. made it clear to

the child that he was not the child’s biological father. C.H., mother,

and the child lived in multiple states until eventually settling in

Colorado to allow the child to be closer to J.L.’s relatives.

¶3 In 2024, mother passed away. The child was in C.H.’s care for

a week, but then C.H. was arrested after he allowed the child to ride

on top of C.H.’s vehicle while C.H., who was intoxicated at the time,

drove the vehicle around a parking lot. In connection with these

charges, a protection order prohibited C.H. from having contact

1 with the child. As a result of this incident, the child was placed

with J.L.’s parents.

¶4 In 2025, J.L.’s parents reported they could no longer care for

the child. Based on this development, the La Plata Department of

Human Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect

concerning the child. The Department also sought to determine the

child’s paternity under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA),

§§ 19-4-101 to -130, C.R.S. 2025, and named both C.H. and J.L. as

respondents in the petition.

¶5 Later, the juvenile court held a paternity hearing. C.H.

claimed that he and the child’s mother were common law married.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court invited the

parties to file briefs on the issue. After considering the evidence

and the post-hearing briefs, the court determined in a written order

that J.L. was entitled to the biological presumption and that C.H.

was not entitled to any parentage presumption. Accordingly, the

court adjudicated J.L. the child’s legal father.

2 II. Parentage Presumptions

¶6 C.H. contends that the juvenile court erred by failing to

consider whether he was entitled to the birth certificate or holding

out presumptions. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 We review de novo whether the juvenile court applied the

correct legal standard. People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56,

¶ 42. But we defer to the court’s factual findings if they are

supported by the record. Id. As pertinent to this case, we apply

clear error review to a court’s factual findings underlying the

determination of whether a common law marriage existed. In re

Marriage of LeFleur, 2021 CO 3, ¶ 50. But we review the court’s

ultimate determination of whether parties were common law

married for an abuse of discretion. Id.

¶8 A juvenile court may determine a child’s parentage as part of a

dependency or neglect proceeding, People in Interest of J.G.C., 2013

COA 171, ¶ 10, but must follow the procedures outlined in the UPA

when doing so, People in Interest of O.S-H., 2021 COA 130, ¶ 40.

¶9 Under the UPA, the juvenile court must first determine

whether one of the statutory presumptions of parentage in section

3 19-4-105(1) applies. People in Interest of C.L.S., 313 P.3d 662, 666

(Colo. App. 2011). As pertinent to this appeal, a person is a

presumed parent if (1) the person and the parent who gave birth to

the child were married and the child was born during the marriage,

(marriage presumption); (2) “[a]fter the child’s birth, the person and

the parent who gave birth to the child have married” or attempted

to do so, and the person is, with their consent, named on the child’s

birth certificate (birth certificate presumption); or (3) “the person

receives the child into the person’s home and openly holds out the

child as the person’s natural child,” (holding out presumption).

§ 19-4-105(1)(c)(II), (d). A biological father is also a presumed

parent (biological presumption). See § 19-4-105(1)(f).

¶ 10 Second, if a presumption arises, it may only be rebutted by

clear and convincing evidence. § 19-4-105(2)(a); K.L.W., ¶ 70. If

competing presumptions arise, the court must then “resolve the

competing parentage presumptions and determine which should

control based on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.”

See K.L.W., ¶ 70. The result of this process is to render one person

the child’s legal parent, while the other person becomes a

“nonparent.” C.L.S., 313 P.3d at 667.

4 B. Analysis

¶ 11 C.H. argues that the juvenile court erred when it did not make

detailed findings as to each presumption and that he was entitled to

both the birth certificate and holding out presumptions. We discern

no reversible error.

¶ 12 We begin by observing that both the marriage presumption

and the birth certificate presumption require the parties to have

been married (the former requiring marriage before the child’s birth

and the latter requiring it after). In its written ruling, however, the

juvenile court only explicitly addressed the marriage presumption.

In doing so, however, the court made extensive findings regarding

the issue and concluded that no such marriage existed. Thus, the

court held that C.H. had failed to establish that he was entitled to

the marriage presumption.

¶ 13 On appeal, C.H. does not assert that he is entitled to the

marriage presumption. Rather, he contends that the juvenile court

should not have stopped there — that it should have gone on to

consider the applicability of the birth certificate and holding out

presumptions. We conclude that any error in not expressly

addressing the birth certificate presumption was harmless. And we

5 conclude that C.H. did not preserve his claim related to the holding

out presumption.

1. Birth Certificate Presumption

¶ 14 First, we note that in his post-hearing briefing on the common

law marriage issue, C.H. explicitly invoked the marriage

presumption — and only the marriage presumption — arguing that

C.H. and mother were common law married before the child was

born. Nevertheless, we also note that at the conclusion of the

hearing, the court observed that it “would need to make that finding

[whether there was a common law marriage] for at least the

presumption under (1)(c)(II)” — the birth certificate presumption.

Thus, the court was aware that the birth certificate presumption

was at issue in the case.

¶ 15 We therefore turn to whether the juvenile court erred when it

determined that C.H. and mother were not common law married.

We conclude it did not.

¶ 16 Notably, C.H. does not appear to argue that the juvenile court

applied the wrong legal test to the question of whether C.H. and

mother were common law married. Nor could he, as the court

correctly stated that proof of a common law marriage requires

6 “mutual consent or agreement of the couple to enter the legal and

social institution of marriage, followed by conduct manifesting that

mutual agreement.” Hogsett v. Neale, 2021 CO 1, ¶ 49. Instead,

C.H. appears to challenge the court’s determination of the facts

underlying the claim, contending that the evidence that he and

mother held themselves out as married was “unrefuted.”

¶ 17 But C.H. ignores the fact that the juvenile court heard

evidence that would support a determination that C.H. and mother

had, in fact, neither agreed to be married nor held themselves out

as such. Specifically, the court noted that (1) “they did not

commingle what limited assets they had, nor did they proactively

engage in financial relationships that required absorbing the

liability of the other”; (2) C.H. testified that mother listed her status

as single in subsidized housing and Medicaid applications; and

(3) C.H. reported that mother “always” filed her taxes as single.

Perhaps most compellingly, the court found that C.H. and mother

acted with the intent “to not be perceived as married [toward]

specific agencies and people such that their benefits and financial

stability would not be negatively impacted.”

7 ¶ 18 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s factual

findings, we cannot say they are clearly erroneous. See LeFleur,

¶ 50. And in light of these findings, we discern no abuse of

discretion in the court’s determination that C.H. and mother were

not common law married. See id.

¶ 19 Finally, because the parties were never common law married,

C.H. cannot establish that he is entitled to the birth certificate

presumption. Any absence of an explicit analysis of that

presumption thus does not require reversal.

2. Holding Out Presumption

¶ 20 As to C.H.’s claim that he is entitled to the holding out

presumption, we conclude that he did not preserve this argument.

¶ 21 We acknowledge that neither the Department nor the guardian

ad litem raise lack of preservation. (Both parties acknowledge,

however, that the trial court did not explicitly analyze this

presumption — without apparently recognizing that this void

resulted from the fact that the court had no reason to know this

presumption was relevant given the lack of any discussion of or

reliance on it by C.H.) Nevertheless, we generally limit our appellate

review to issues presented to and ruled on by the juvenile court.

8 People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14. And we have an

independent obligation to determine whether an issue was

preserved and thus is properly before us. People v. Carter, 2021

COA 29, ¶ 13.

¶ 22 Notably, C.H. does not identify where in the record C.H.’s

reliance on the holding out presumption was preserved — or even

mentioned. Nor can we identify any invocation of this presumption

in the transcript of the hearing or any filing C.H. submitted to the

juvenile court. Indeed, the transcript of the hearing demonstrates

unequivocally that C.H.’s parentage claim relied only on the

marriage and birth certificate presumptions, which in turn rested

on his claim that he and mother were common law married.

¶ 23 To preserve an issue, a party must present the court with an

adequate opportunity to make findings of fact and legal conclusions

on a particular claim. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133,

¶ 18. Doing so requires the party to present the “sum and

substance” of the argument later raised on appeal. Berra v.

Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010).

And raising an argument under one presumption does not preserve

an argument that a different presumption applies. See In re Estate

9 of Ramstetter, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 67 (“A party does not preserve an

issue merely by advancing a related theory before the district

court . . . .” (quoting U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Pilatus Bus.

Aircraft, Ltd., 582 F.3d 1131m 1142 (10th Cir. 2014))).

¶ 24 Because C.H. did not argue before the juvenile court that the

holding out presumption arose, he has not preserved that argument

for appeal. We thus decline to address it.

III. Weighing Competing Presumptions

¶ 25 C.H. also contends that the juvenile court erred by failing to

weigh the competing presumptions. However, we have concluded

that the juvenile court did not err when it determined that no

presumptions of parentage apply to C.H. Thus, there were no

competing presumptions to resolve. See § 19-4-105(2)(a)

(explaining that a court need only consider the weightier

considerations of policy and logic when two or more presumptions

arise and conflict with each other). The court, therefore, did not

err.

IV. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE BROWN concur.