Peo in Interest of GL

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 18, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0070
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0070 Peo in Interest of GL 06-18-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0070 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JD571 Honorable Lisa Gomez, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of G.L.,

Juvenile-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE YUN Lipinsky and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 18, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

McCabe Law, Alison Gordon, Boulder, Colorado; Stinson Law Office, Amy Maas, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant ¶1 G.L. appeals the district court’s restitution order in the

amount of $2,400 for dismissed charges in Denver Juvenile Court

Case No. 24JD402. He contends that the court erred by (1) “finding

that causation was proven” and (2) “imposing restitution for

damages not caused by the conduct essential to the charges.” We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2024, G.L. entered a global plea agreement

resolving charges in two separate cases, Denver Juvenile Court

Case Nos. 23JD571 and 24JD402. In Case No. 23JD571, G.L. was

charged with third degree motor vehicle theft. See § 18-4-409(4)(a),

C.R.S. 2025. Later, in Case No. 24JD402, G.L. was charged with

third degree motor vehicle theft and second degree trespass to a

motor vehicle involving a different victim. See § 18-4-409(4)(a);

§ 18-4-503(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶3 Under the global agreement, the prosecution dismissed the

charges in Case No. 24JD402. In exchange, G.L. pleaded guilty to

motor vehicle theft in Case No. 23JD571 under a deferred

adjudication, stipulated to one year of probation, and agreed that

restitution was reserved “for all original counts in [Case

1 Nos. 23JD571] and 24JD402.” The plea agreement did not provide

a factual basis for the charges, identify the victims, or include a

stipulation to causation for restitution in either case.

¶4 The prosecution filed a motion seeking $5,335.79 in

restitution, $3,795.42 of which was allocated to the victim in the

dismissed case, 24JD402 — the property manager for West Nevada

Townhomes (the property). The motion included the property

manager’s victim impact statement, which listed G.L.’s name in the

header. In the fillable section for the “effects of this crime on

you/your family,” the property manager wrote: “By Him stealing the

keys to the property + my car [he] has caused me overwhelming

[stress] + fear, my Boss no longer trust me . . . sleepless nights, my

relationships with my boss + tenants has been [severely damaged].”

In the fillable section for losses, the property manager also wrote,

“The keys he stole were the master keys to all the units, garages +

sprinkler rooms on the property. I have to pay my boss the full

amount.” He further said that, although the “keys to my car” were

returned, “the keys to the property” were not. As a result, the

property manager’s employer billed him for re-keying every unit on

2 the property. The victim impact statement included an itemized bill

totaling $3,795.42: $2,356.86 for re-keying and $1,438.56 for labor.

¶5 At the sentencing hearing, before accepting the global plea and

scheduling a hearing to determine the amount of restitution, the

district court confirmed that all parties had received the

presentence report and the restitution motion. The court said that

it would “dismiss 24JD402 with the knowledge that we’re going to

be addressing those victims” in 23JD571.

¶6 At the restitution hearing, the prosecution requested

restitution in the amount of $3,795.42 — the amount of losses that

the property manager reported in the dismissed case.1 The

prosecution offered the property manager’s victim impact

statement, the bill from his employer, and his testimony.

The property manager testified as follows:

• He resided onsite at the property, which he managed for his

employer.

1 Previously, the prosecution had also sought $1,540.37 in

restitution for the victim in Case No. 23JD571. At the time of the restitution hearing, G.L. and a codefendant in Case No. 23JD571 had repaid that victim $1,254.21.

3 • One night, while inspecting a unit with a broken window, he

set his “keys down by the broken window.” His keyring

included his car key fob and the property’s master keys.

• He saw G.L. in the unit during his inspection of the broken

window. He recalled that G.L. was a friend of the tenant’s

son, who lived there.

• After addressing the situation in the unit and notifying his

employer, he returned to his own unit. He left his keys at

the unit with the broken window.

• The next morning, he could not find his keys and

discovered that his car was missing from the garage.

• A day or two later, he recovered his car and key fob from an

impound lot, but the master keys were never returned.

There was no damage to the car’s steering column.

• His employer garnished his paychecks at a rate of $200 per

week for two months to cover the cost of re-keying the forty

units at the property. The property manager said he lost

his job in part because of the incident.

4 • On cross-examination, he admitted that he did not

remember where he had left his keys and he did not see

who took them, entered his garage, or took his car.

¶7 Based on the property manager’s testimony, the district court

found that the prosecution had proved causation for $2,400 in

restitution2:

In the course of his testimony, [the property manager] indicated that in responding to a domestic situation at the [property], he believes he either left the keys outside of the area where a broken window was and then subsequently testified he really did not recollect where the keys were, but, ultimately, was able to provide very credible testimony that he received a key fob back for his Mercedes, which was stolen. The only way to operate that Mercedes was to have the key fob. The key fob happened to be attached to at least three master keys for the [property,] which he managed and that, as a result of the conduct of that motor vehicle theft, he was determined to be liable for the cost associated with replacing the 40 locks that those master keys had access to.

....

2 The court declined to order the full $3,795.42, noting that

$1,438.56 of this amount was for “labor to remove and replace the locks,” performed by a salaried employee.

5 Because, frankly, had his keys . . . not been taken, had his car not been taken, [the property manager] may very well still be employed . . . , may very well not have had to pay the amount of money that he had to pay by garnishment, and we wouldn’t be here.

[The property manager] testified that the only way to operate his motor vehicle was through the fob. The fob was present — the keyboard — the dashboard was not damaged. The person who had the fob, in my estimation, is the person who stole the vehicle. [G.L.], in the course of his plea, agreed to restitution in this case. That is the causation that I’m finding.

¶8 G.L. now appeals.

II. Analysis

¶9 G.L. argues that the district court erred by ordering restitution

because proximate cause was not established. He specifically

argues that neither the plea agreement nor the evidence presented

at the restitution hearing supported the court’s causation finding.

Additionally, he argues that, even if causation was established, the

“court was legally prohibited from imposing restitution for damages

not caused by the conduct essential to the charges” of third degree

motor vehicle theft and second degree trespass to a motor vehicle —

6 namely, the damages caused by the missing master keys. We

disagree with both contentions.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 10 Whether a district court has authority to impose restitution for

losses suffered as a result of dismissed charges is a question of law

that we review de novo. People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 23 (citing

Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 11). We likewise review de novo

the parties’ obligations under a plea agreement. Id. at ¶ 24.

¶ 11 In the restitution context, when a defendant challenges the

court’s determination that he proximately caused the victim’s

losses, we generally review for clear error. Martinez v. People, 2024

CO 6M, ¶ 32. But “we consider the challenge’s substance, not its

form,” to determine the appropriate standard of review. Id. at ¶ 20.

When, as here, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the restitution order — that is, a challenge to

the quantum of evidence provided by the prosecution to the court —

we review de novo. See id. at ¶¶ 19-22; People v. Moss, 2022 COA

92, ¶ 11. In other words, “our de novo determination is whether the

prosecution presented sufficient evidence to convince a reasonable

fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence” that the defendant’s

7 conduct was a proximate cause of the victim’s losses. Moss, ¶ 11.

When conducting this review, we determine “whether the evidence,

both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, establishes by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused that

amount of loss.” People v. Barbre, 2018 COA 123, ¶ 25.

¶ 12 We also review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.

People v. Henry, 2018 COA 48M, ¶ 13. When construing a statute,

our goal is to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. People v.

Webb-Johnson, 113 P.3d 1253, 1253 (Colo. App. 2005). To

determine the General Assembly’s intent, we first look to the

statute’s language, giving words and phrases their plain and

ordinary meanings. Henry, ¶ 14.

B. Relevant Law

¶ 13 The purpose of restitution “is to make the victim whole by

placing the victim in the same financial position that he was in

before the defendant’s unlawful conduct.” People v. Ragsdal, 2025

COA 9M, ¶ 29. Under section 19-2.5-1104(1), C.R.S. 2025, in a

juvenile delinquency case, the district court must enter a

sentencing order requiring the juvenile to pay restitution when the

8 juvenile has damaged a victim’s property. Restitution in juvenile

delinquency cases must be imposed in the same manner as that

required by the restitution statute governing adult criminal

prosecutions. § 19-2.5-1104(2).

¶ 14 As relevant here, restitution means “any pecuniary loss

suffered by a victim,” including, but not limited to, “all

out-of-pocket expenses . . . proximately caused by an offender’s

conduct and that can be reasonably calculated and recompensed in

money.” § 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2025. “Proximate cause in the

context of restitution is defined as a cause which in natural and

probable sequence produced the claimed injury and without which

the claimed injury would not have been sustained.” People v.

Dyson, 2021 COA 57, ¶ 13 (quoting People v. Rice, 2020 COA 143,

¶ 24, overruled on other grounds by, People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75).

¶ 15 The prosecution bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence “the amount of restitution owed and,

generally, that the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of

the victim’s loss.” Henry, ¶ 15; see Barbre, ¶ 30. “A fact is

established by a preponderance of the evidence when, upon

consideration of all the evidence, the existence of that fact is more

9 probable than its nonexistence.” People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366,

370 (Colo. 1991). This burden requires more than speculation, but

the prosecution need not prove restitution by the same quality of

evidence required in a criminal trial on the merits. People in

Interest of A.V., 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 24.

¶ 16 The prosecution is not limited by the rules of evidence in

meeting its burden of proof. People v. Ortiz, 2016 COA 58, ¶ 28; see

also CRE 1101(d)(3) (the rules of evidence do not apply to

sentencing). Under Colorado law, an award of restitution may be

based solely on a victim impact statement (which itself is hearsay).

Ortiz, ¶ 28; see also § 18-1.3-603(2), C.R.S. 2025 (“The court shall

base its order for restitution upon information presented to the

court by the prosecuting attorney, who shall compile such

information through victim impact statements or other means to

determine the amount of restitution . . . .”); A.V., ¶ 33 (“To meet its

burden of proof, a prosecutor may rely solely on victim impact

statements.”).

¶ 17 Even if the prosecution carries its burden of proof, the district

court “may not order restitution for injury or losses proximately

caused by conduct that forms the basis of only the dismissed

10 charge[s]” unless the prosecution and the defendant “strike a plea

agreement that extends the scope of the restitution order to

include . . . dismissed counts.” Roddy, ¶¶ 28, 32; see also

§ 18-1.3-603(11) (“Absent an agreement between the defendant and

the prosecution at the time the plea is entered, a court may not

impose restitution for pecuniary losses proximately caused by

conduct exclusively related to dismissed charges.”); People v. Sosa,

2019 COA 182, ¶ 29 (noting the defendant may enter “into a plea

agreement pursuant to which dismissed or uncharged counts will

be considered for purposes of restitution”).

¶ 18 In sum, the district court may order restitution for pecuniary

losses suffered by the victim in a dismissed case if (1) the defendant

explicitly agrees at the time of the plea agreement to pay restitution

for his dismissed charges and (2) the prosecution proves at the

restitution hearing that it is more probable than not that the

defendant’s conduct caused the victim’s losses.

C. Discussion

¶ 19 As an initial matter, we agree with G.L. that his plea

agreement did not constitute a stipulation that his alleged conduct

in the dismissed case caused losses to the property manager. The

11 plain language of his plea agreement — “reserving restitution for all

original counts in [23JD571] and 24JD402” — simply preserved the

prosecution’s ability to seek restitution for the dismissed charges.

It did not admit or resolve causation. See Roddy, ¶ 24 (“Our task is

not to rewrite the bargain in question, but to interpret it

consistently with the reasonable intent of the parties in light of the

defendant’s right to be treated fairly by the government.” (citation

omitted)). Thus, while the plea agreement allowed the court to

consider restitution for losses related to the dismissed charges, the

prosecution still bore the burden of proving at the restitution

hearing that it was more probable than not that G.L.’s conduct

caused the property manager’s losses.

¶ 20 This conclusion is supported by Colorado case law permitting

a defendant to challenge proximate cause even when they agreed at

the time of their plea agreement to pay restitution for dismissed

charges. See Martinez, ¶¶ 6-8, 33-43 (allowing a defendant who

agreed by plea to pay restitution for dismissed charges to challenge

proximate cause); Rice, ¶¶ 18-19 (concluding the defendant did not

waive his right to challenge causation by signing a plea agreement

that said “[d]ismissed counts will be considered for sentencing and

12 restitution purposes”); A.V., ¶ 16 (acknowledging that “simply

stipulating to a factual basis [in a plea] may be insufficient to waive

causation where the issue of causation is not specifically identified

or discussed”). Thus, the court could not rely on the plea

agreement alone as proof that G.L.’s conduct was a proximate cause

of the property manager’s losses.

¶ 21 Because the plea agreement did not relieve the prosecution of

its burden of proof, we next consider whether the prosecution

presented sufficient evidence at the restitution hearing for the court

to find that G.L. proximately caused the property manager’s losses.

G.L. argues that the record did not support the court’s reasoning

for finding causation because the evidence at the hearing did not

establish that G.L. was the person who took the key fob or stole the

vehicle. Specifically, G.L. emphasizes that the property manager

testified to seeing G.L. at the unit where the property manager

might have left his keys but conceded that he did not see G.L. with

his keys, with his car, or in his garage. We are not persuaded.

¶ 22 Viewing both the direct and circumstantial evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, Barbre, ¶ 25, there was

sufficient evidence presented at the hearing for a reasonable fact

13 finder to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that G.L.

took the keys. The property manager testified that he left his

keyring near a broken window in the unit he was inspecting, saw

G.L. in that same unit, and discovered his car missing from the

garage the next morning. The prosecution also introduced, without

objection, the victim impact statement. The header of the

statement identifies G.L. as the “[d]efendant,” and the property

manager wrote that “the keys he stole were the master keys to all

the units, garages, and sprinkler rooms on the property.” He

further described the losses he suffered as a result of G.L. “stealing

the keys to the property and my car.” Although this statement is

arguably inconsistent with the property manager’s

cross-examination testimony that he did not see who took the keys,

entered the garage, or took the car, it was for the district court to

resolve conflicts in the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses,

and determine the weight to give each piece of evidence. See A.V.,

¶ 29; People v. Poe, 2012 COA 166, ¶ 14. Our sufficiency review

does not extend to making such determinations. Thus, considering

the property manager’s testimony and the victim impact statement

together, we cannot say there was insufficient evidence to support

14 the court’s finding that G.L.’s conduct caused the property

manager’s losses.

¶ 23 Given the evidentiary support for the court’s causation finding,

we turn to G.L.’s argument that the court was “legally prohibited

from imposing restitution for damages not caused by the conduct

essential to the charges” — third degree motor vehicle theft and

second degree trespass to a motor vehicle. See § 18-4-409(4)(a);

§ 18-4-503(1)(a). He contends that taking the master keys was not

an element of either offense, and thus not a compensable loss,

because the “prosecution did not charge G.L. with theft of the

[property’s] master keys.”

¶ 24 Neither the restitution statute nor case law supports this

narrow view of compensable losses. The statute must be “liberally

construed” to achieve its purposes, including “to provide for and

collect full restitution for victims of crime.” § 18-1.3-601(1)(g)(I), (2),

C.R.S. 2025; see also Sosa, ¶ 14 (“We liberally construe the

restitution statute to accomplish its goal of making victims whole

for the harms suffered as the result of a defendant’s criminal

conduct.” (citation omitted)); People v. Knapp, 2020 COA 107, ¶ 90

(recognizing that victims are entitled to be put in the same financial

15 position they would have been in had the crime not occurred). The

General Assembly defined restitution not by reference to the

elements of the charges, but by the conduct underlying the

convictions or plea agreement. § 18-1.3-602(3)(a). Divisions of this

court have routinely affirmed restitution awards for losses that do

not directly correspond to the elements of an offense. See Moss,

¶ 18 (restitution “must be tied to unlawful conduct” but need not be

tied “to a specific element of the crime”); People v. Knapp, 2020 COA

107, ¶ 83 (upholding restitution for schoolbooks the victim no

longer needed because the defendant’s assault caused the victim to

drop out of school); People v. Courtney, 868 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Colo.

App. 1993) (upholding restitution for lost tools in the trunk of a

fraudulently obtained vehicle).

¶ 25 To facilitate his theft and trespass of the car, G.L. took the

keyring with the key fob and master keys. This act — a necessary

step in stealing the car — set in motion a “natural and probable

sequence [that] produced the claimed injury”: the need to re-key the

units. Dyson, ¶ 13 (quoting Rice, ¶ 24). The prosecution was not

required to separately charge G.L. with theft of the master keys

because this conduct was integral to the theft of the vehicle. Nor

16 does G.L. argue that any intervening event broke the causal chain.

See Martinez, ¶ 83. Accordingly, the court did not err by ordering

restitution for the cost of re-keying, as G.L.’s conduct proximately

caused this loss.

III. Disposition

¶ 26 The restitution order is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.