25CA0927 Peo in Interest of Feyintola 08-07-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0927 Pueblo County District Court No. 25MH30043 Honorable Amiel Markenson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of Gbenga Dipo Feyintola,
Respondent-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE J. Jones and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 7, 2025
Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, Kate H. Shafer, Special Assistant County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Tezak Law, P.C., Mary E. Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Gbenga Dipo Feyintola appeals the district court’s order
authorizing staff at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo
(the hospital) to involuntarily medicate him. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Feyintola was admitted to the hospital after being found
incompetent to stand trial in a criminal case. A staff psychiatrist
diagnosed him with an unspecified mood disorder. Although he
was initially restored to competency and discharged without
medication treatment, he was readmitted to the hospital in
December 2024, where he has remained since. Since being
readmitted to the hospital, Feyintola has exhibited a pattern of
refusing oral medications and solid foods, acting aggressively
toward others, and being placed on assault precautions.
¶3 In May 2025, the People filed a petition seeking authorization
to involuntarily medicate Feyintola with olanzapine (Zyprexa) and
lithium. Consistent with People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo.
1985), the petition asserted that (1) Feyintola is incapable of
effectively participating in decisions affecting his treatment; (2) the
requested treatment is necessary to prevent a significant and likely
long-term deterioration in his mental health condition and to
1 prevent the likelihood of him causing serious harm to others in the
institution; (3) a less intrusive treatment alternative is not available;
and (4) Feyintola’s need for treatment is sufficiently compelling to
override any bona fide and legitimate interest he has in refusing
treatment.
¶4 The district court held a hearing, at which both Feyintola and
the psychiatrist supervising his treatment testified.
¶5 The psychiatrist testified that the acute symptoms of
Feyintola’s mood disorder include pressured speech,
disorganization, paranoia, delusions, and agitation. Feyintola was
prescribed olanzapine and lithium on an emergency basis after
threatening another hospital patient.
¶6 The psychiatrist explained that olanzapine is an antipsychotic
medication used to treat delusions, paranoia, and acute agitation,
and lithium is a mood stabilizing medication that can improve
symptoms like pressured speech and thought disorganization. Both
medications may have side effects that medical staff monitor for by
“ask[ing] the patients if they are experiencing side effects and
observ[ing] them on the unit.”
2 ¶7 The psychiatrist said that after taking both emergency
medications, Feyintola started showing signs of improvement, such
as eating solid foods more regularly and demonstrating more logical
thinking. He also said Feyintola’s mood-disorder-related symptoms
have historically worsened when he is not adequately medicated,
and he opined that “[w]ithout the medications Mr. Feyintola will
continue to suffer from the symptoms of his mental illness which
will place him at increased risk of danger to himself and others.
With the medications, these symptoms can improve and Mr.
Feyintola can more appropriately care of himself.”
¶8 Much of Feyintola’s testimony focused on describing the side
effects he claimed to have experienced while taking the emergency
medications. The psychiatrist acknowledged that Feyintola
reported experiencing various side effects while taking the
emergency medications. However, the psychiatrist noted that while
neither he nor other medical staff had observed some of the side
effects Feyintola reported experiencing, they would continue to
monitor Feyintola for adverse side effects and attempt to mitigate
them with appropriate medication management.
3 ¶9 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted the
petition.
II. Discussion
¶ 10 A district court may order the involuntary administration of
medication to a patient only if the People prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, each of the four elements outlined in Medina.
Id. at 973. Feyintola doesn’t contest the first, second, or third
Medina elements. He contends only that the evidence presented at
the hearing was insufficient to prove the fourth Medina element.
We aren’t persuaded.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 11 When a patient challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting an involuntary medication order, we review the district
court’s legal conclusions de novo and defer to its factual findings if
they have record support. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, ¶ 8. We
view the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the
People as the petitioning party. People in Interest of Uwayezuk,
2023 COA 69, ¶ 57; People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7.
As the fact finder, the district court determines the sufficiency,
4 probative effect, and weight of the evidence, along with the
inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom. R.C., ¶ 7.
B. Analysis
¶ 12 The fourth Medina element evaluates whether the patient’s
need for treatment is sufficiently compelling to override any
legitimate interest in refusing treatment. Medina, 705 P.2d at 974.
In conducting this evaluation, a court determines — to the extent
permitted by the evidence — whether the patient’s refusal is “bona
fide and legitimate” and, if so, whether the patient’s prognosis
without treatment is “so unfavorable that [his] personal preference
must yield to the legitimate interests of the [S]tate in preserving the
life and health of the patient placed in its charge and in protecting
the safety of those in the institution.” Id.
¶ 13 Feyintola agrees the district court acknowledged that his
reasons for refusing medication — avoiding adverse side effects —
“might be bona fide.” See Uwayezuk, ¶ 62 (a desire to avoid adverse
effects can constitute a bona fide and legitimate reason to refuse
medication). However, he does not present any specific argument
regarding the court’s balancing of his interests against the State’s.
Instead, he merely asserts — in conclusory fashion — that the court
5 “erred in finding that his interests were outweighed by those of the
State.”
¶ 14 Reviewing the record as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the People, we conclude that sufficient evidence
supports the conclusion that Feyintola’s need for treatment
outweighs his interest in refusing it. The psychiatrist’s testimony
establishes that (1) the risk of adverse side effects from the
requested medications is treatable; (2) “objectively, [Feyintola]
tolerate[s] the medications well”; (3) without treatment, Feyintola
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25CA0927 Peo in Interest of Feyintola 08-07-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0927 Pueblo County District Court No. 25MH30043 Honorable Amiel Markenson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of Gbenga Dipo Feyintola,
Respondent-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE J. Jones and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 7, 2025
Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, Kate H. Shafer, Special Assistant County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Tezak Law, P.C., Mary E. Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Gbenga Dipo Feyintola appeals the district court’s order
authorizing staff at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo
(the hospital) to involuntarily medicate him. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Feyintola was admitted to the hospital after being found
incompetent to stand trial in a criminal case. A staff psychiatrist
diagnosed him with an unspecified mood disorder. Although he
was initially restored to competency and discharged without
medication treatment, he was readmitted to the hospital in
December 2024, where he has remained since. Since being
readmitted to the hospital, Feyintola has exhibited a pattern of
refusing oral medications and solid foods, acting aggressively
toward others, and being placed on assault precautions.
¶3 In May 2025, the People filed a petition seeking authorization
to involuntarily medicate Feyintola with olanzapine (Zyprexa) and
lithium. Consistent with People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo.
1985), the petition asserted that (1) Feyintola is incapable of
effectively participating in decisions affecting his treatment; (2) the
requested treatment is necessary to prevent a significant and likely
long-term deterioration in his mental health condition and to
1 prevent the likelihood of him causing serious harm to others in the
institution; (3) a less intrusive treatment alternative is not available;
and (4) Feyintola’s need for treatment is sufficiently compelling to
override any bona fide and legitimate interest he has in refusing
treatment.
¶4 The district court held a hearing, at which both Feyintola and
the psychiatrist supervising his treatment testified.
¶5 The psychiatrist testified that the acute symptoms of
Feyintola’s mood disorder include pressured speech,
disorganization, paranoia, delusions, and agitation. Feyintola was
prescribed olanzapine and lithium on an emergency basis after
threatening another hospital patient.
¶6 The psychiatrist explained that olanzapine is an antipsychotic
medication used to treat delusions, paranoia, and acute agitation,
and lithium is a mood stabilizing medication that can improve
symptoms like pressured speech and thought disorganization. Both
medications may have side effects that medical staff monitor for by
“ask[ing] the patients if they are experiencing side effects and
observ[ing] them on the unit.”
2 ¶7 The psychiatrist said that after taking both emergency
medications, Feyintola started showing signs of improvement, such
as eating solid foods more regularly and demonstrating more logical
thinking. He also said Feyintola’s mood-disorder-related symptoms
have historically worsened when he is not adequately medicated,
and he opined that “[w]ithout the medications Mr. Feyintola will
continue to suffer from the symptoms of his mental illness which
will place him at increased risk of danger to himself and others.
With the medications, these symptoms can improve and Mr.
Feyintola can more appropriately care of himself.”
¶8 Much of Feyintola’s testimony focused on describing the side
effects he claimed to have experienced while taking the emergency
medications. The psychiatrist acknowledged that Feyintola
reported experiencing various side effects while taking the
emergency medications. However, the psychiatrist noted that while
neither he nor other medical staff had observed some of the side
effects Feyintola reported experiencing, they would continue to
monitor Feyintola for adverse side effects and attempt to mitigate
them with appropriate medication management.
3 ¶9 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted the
petition.
II. Discussion
¶ 10 A district court may order the involuntary administration of
medication to a patient only if the People prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, each of the four elements outlined in Medina.
Id. at 973. Feyintola doesn’t contest the first, second, or third
Medina elements. He contends only that the evidence presented at
the hearing was insufficient to prove the fourth Medina element.
We aren’t persuaded.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 11 When a patient challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting an involuntary medication order, we review the district
court’s legal conclusions de novo and defer to its factual findings if
they have record support. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, ¶ 8. We
view the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the
People as the petitioning party. People in Interest of Uwayezuk,
2023 COA 69, ¶ 57; People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7.
As the fact finder, the district court determines the sufficiency,
4 probative effect, and weight of the evidence, along with the
inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom. R.C., ¶ 7.
B. Analysis
¶ 12 The fourth Medina element evaluates whether the patient’s
need for treatment is sufficiently compelling to override any
legitimate interest in refusing treatment. Medina, 705 P.2d at 974.
In conducting this evaluation, a court determines — to the extent
permitted by the evidence — whether the patient’s refusal is “bona
fide and legitimate” and, if so, whether the patient’s prognosis
without treatment is “so unfavorable that [his] personal preference
must yield to the legitimate interests of the [S]tate in preserving the
life and health of the patient placed in its charge and in protecting
the safety of those in the institution.” Id.
¶ 13 Feyintola agrees the district court acknowledged that his
reasons for refusing medication — avoiding adverse side effects —
“might be bona fide.” See Uwayezuk, ¶ 62 (a desire to avoid adverse
effects can constitute a bona fide and legitimate reason to refuse
medication). However, he does not present any specific argument
regarding the court’s balancing of his interests against the State’s.
Instead, he merely asserts — in conclusory fashion — that the court
5 “erred in finding that his interests were outweighed by those of the
State.”
¶ 14 Reviewing the record as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the People, we conclude that sufficient evidence
supports the conclusion that Feyintola’s need for treatment
outweighs his interest in refusing it. The psychiatrist’s testimony
establishes that (1) the risk of adverse side effects from the
requested medications is treatable; (2) “objectively, [Feyintola]
tolerate[s] the medications well”; (3) without treatment, Feyintola
will continue to suffer from the symptoms of his mental illness, and
will be at increased risk of danger to himself and others; and
(4) Feyintola’s need for the requested medications outweighs his
interest in refusing them. We conclude that this evidence clearly
and convincingly supports the court’s determination that
Feyintola’s interest in refusing medication must yield to the State’s
interests in preserving his health and protecting his safety and the
safety of those in the hospital. See Medina, 705 P.2d at 974.
¶ 15 We note that the hearing transcript is incomplete, presumably
because the device recording the proceedings stopped doing so
before the hearing concluded. Feyintola does not assert that the
6 missing portion of the hearing contains evidence requiring reversal.
Nor has he sought to settle the record. See C.A.R. 10(g)(1) (“If any
difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what
occurred in the trial court or a portion of the record is not in the
possession of the trial court, the difference must be submitted to
and settled by the trial court. The party moving to settle the record
must file a motion to stay the appellate court proceedings in the
appellate court while the trial court considers the motion to settle
the record.”). “Where the record is silent the law presumes
regularity.” People in Interest of I.S., 2017 COA 155, ¶ 11 (quoting
McClain v. People, 141 P.2d 685, 686 (Colo. 1943)); LePage v.
People, 2014 CO 13, ¶ 15 (“According to the presumption of
regularity, appellate courts presume that the trial judge did not
commit error absent affirmative evidence otherwise.”). Thus, absent
evidence to the contrary, we presume that the missing portion of
the transcript would show that district court did not err.
III. Disposition
¶ 16 The order authorizing the involuntary administration of
medication is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE KUHN concur.