25CA1173 Peo in Interest of EED 01-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1173 Arapahoe County District Court No. 23JV89 Honorable Shay K. Whitaker, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of E.E.D., a Child,
and Concerning V.P. a/k/a V.D. and M.D.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 15, 2026
Ron Carl, County Attorney, Erinn Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant V.P.
Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant M.D. ¶1 V.P., also known as V.D. (mother), and M.D. (father) appeal
the judgment terminating their parent-child legal relationships with
E.E.D. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2023, the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services
(the Department) became involved with the family following reports
about the parents’ substance use and the family’s living conditions.
Soon after, the juvenile court granted the Department temporary
legal custody of the then-three-year-old child, and the Department
filed a petition in dependency or neglect. The court adjudicated the
child dependent and neglected and adopted treatment plans for the
parents.
¶3 The Department later moved to terminate parental rights.
More than two years after the Department filed the petition and
after a three-day evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court granted the
motion.
¶4 Mother and father appeal the termination judgment, though
for different reasons.
1 II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied
with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan, or the plan
has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves the
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the juvenile
court’s findings of evidentiary fact for clear error, but we review de
novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions based on those facts.
People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
¶7 The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency, probative value,
and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions
drawn therefrom are within the discretion of the juvenile court.
A.M., ¶ 15.
2 III. Mother’s Contentions
¶8 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
she (1) did not comply with her treatment plan and (2) was unfit
and could not become a fit parent within a reasonable time.
A. Treatment Plan Compliance
¶9 We first consider and reject mother’s contention that she
substantially complied with her treatment plan.
¶ 10 Mother’s treatment plan required her to demonstrate, among
other things, communication with the Department, sobriety,
stability, protective parenting, and legal compliance. The family-
time worker testified that mother’s family time remained supervised
throughout the case, and her engagement was “inconsistent.”
During visits, the family-time worker witnessed mother promising
the child that she would be returning home, which had a
demonstrably negative effect on the child, leading to days of
dysregulation, impacts on her school attendance, and changes in
her overall behavior. Despite direction from the family-time worker,
mother continued to make such promises to the child. One week
before the termination hearing, mother’s promises escalated to the
point that the Department involved law enforcement and ended the
3 visit early due to concerns about the child’s emotional well-being. A
caseworker opined that mother was not compliant with the
protective parenting objective of her treatment plan, in part,
because she was unable to recognize the negative impact her
inconsistent behavior and unrealistic promises had on the child.
¶ 11 Beyond mother’s inability to provide protective parenting, the
caseworker also described mother’s noncompliance with her other
treatment plan objectives. The caseworker specifically testified that
mother was unwilling to communicate with the caseworker during
the last six months of the case, refused to allow her to conduct a
home visit in the months before the termination hearing, stopped
attending therapy after a few sessions, did not demonstrate sobriety
throughout the case, and had outstanding warrants.
¶ 12 While mother points to evidence showing she complied with
some portions of her treatment plan, the juvenile court considered
this evidence and weighed it against the evidence showing mother
had not meaningfully engaged in the treatment plan. We, of course,
may not reweigh the evidence. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022
COA 133, ¶ 29.
4 ¶ 13 Because significant evidence supports the court’s finding that
mother did not substantially comply with her treatment plan, we
will not disturb the ruling.
B. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time
¶ 14 We next reject mother’s contention that the juvenile court
erred by finding that she was unfit and could not become fit within
a reasonable time.
¶ 15 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders her
“unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care to
include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently
adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health
needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2).
¶ 16 To determine whether a parent’s conduct or condition is likely
to change within a reasonable time, “the court may consider
whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the
parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the
parent’s conduct or condition.” S.Z.S., ¶ 24. A reasonable time is
not an indefinite time and must be determined by considering the
child’s needs. Id. at ¶ 25. When a parent has made little progress
on a treatment plan, the court is not required to give the parent
5 additional time to comply. See People in Interest of R.B.S., 717 P.2d
1004, 1006 (Colo. App. 1986).
¶ 17 Mother argues that because she substantially complied with
her treatment plan, she “could have become fit in a reasonable
time.” But, as discussed, the court did not find that mother
substantially complied with her treatment plan, and the record
supports that finding.
¶ 18 The caseworker opined that it would take mother “at least” six
to twelve months to become fit if she consistently and meaningfully
engaged in treatment but that mother had not demonstrated an
ability or willingness to do that during the two years the case had
been open. And the caseworker expressed concern about the
emotional dysregulation the child had experienced throughout the
case and testified that giving mother additional time to become fit
was not in the child’s best interests and would be detrimental to the
child.1
1 To the extent mother suggests the Department should have made
“accommodations” to arrange substance use testing that addressed her “cultural beliefs,” we don’t address that argument because it was not raised before the juvenile court. See Gebert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2023 COA 107, ¶ 25.
6 ¶ 19 Given this, the record supports the court’s finding that mother
was unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time. We therefore
will not disturb it.
IV. Father’s Contentions
¶ 20 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that
(1) his treatment plan was appropriate; (2) he did not comply with
his treatment plan and was unlikely to become fit within a
reasonable time; (3) the Department made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate him and reunify him with the child; (4) there was no
less drastic alternative to termination; and (5) a continuance of the
termination hearing was not appropriate. We address, and reject,
these contentions in turn.
A. Appropriateness of the Treatment Plan
¶ 21 During the two years that the case was open, father was in
and out of custody in various jurisdictions. Father now contends
that the juvenile court erred by concluding that his treatment plan
was appropriate because the plan did not “contemplate his
incarceration.”
¶ 22 Though the parties dispute preservation, we need not
determine whether father preserved his argument (or was required
7 to do so) because, even if we assume the argument was preserved,
we see no basis for reversal.
¶ 23 A treatment plan is appropriate if it is reasonably calculated to
render the parent fit to provide adequate parenting to the child
within a reasonable time, and it relates to the child’s needs.
§ 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025. We measure the appropriateness of a
treatment plan by its likelihood of success in reuniting the family,
“which must be assessed in light of the facts existing at the time of
the plan’s approval.” People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071
(Colo. App. 2005). A parent’s incarceration does not “prohibit the
creation and implementation” of an appropriate treatment plan, but
it may “render more difficult the crafting of a meaningful and
workable plan.” People in Interest of M.C.C., 641 P.2d 306, 309
(Colo. App. 1982).
¶ 24 Although father generally argues that the treatment plan did
not contemplate his incarceration, he does not dispute that all his
treatment plan components were necessary to address the child’s
needs. See People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶¶ 22-23
(directing the juvenile court to consider on remand whether the
parent’s treatment plan was inappropriate because it did not
8 include a component addressing domestic violence). Nor does
father explain how he could have addressed the identified safety
concerns without completing the treatment plan objectives. See id.
at ¶ 14 (“In determining whether a treatment plan is appropriate,
the court must consider whether the plan’s objectives adequately
address the safety concerns identified during the assessment of the
family.”). And father identifies no modifications to his treatment
plan that the Department could or should have made to address the
periods during which father was incarcerated.
¶ 25 While we recognize that father could not complete some of the
plan’s action steps while incarcerated, father was not continuously
incarcerated. Indeed, father ignores the five months that he was in
community corrections — where he had greater access to services,
including drug testing — and the fourteen months when he was out
of custody entirely, including the eight months before the
termination hearing. Given that father was not incarcerated during
the entire pendency of this case, we don’t see — and father doesn’t
say — how his treatment plan was inappropriate to render him a fit
parent in a reasonable time.
9 ¶ 26 Therefore, we conclude that father failed to establish that his
treatment plan was inappropriate.
B. Treatment Plan Compliance and Fitness
¶ 27 Father’s treatment plan required him to demonstrate, among
stability, protective parenting, and legal compliance.
¶ 28 A caseworker testified that father (1) often failed to respond to
Department communications or appear at scheduled meetings;
(2) did not complete a substance use and mental health evaluation;
(3) did not submit to drug testing other than in community
corrections; (4) was inconsistent with family time and had not seen
the child in seven months; (5) had not informed the caseworker
where he lived or provided recent proof of employment; and (6) had
an outstanding warrant. The caseworker opined that father had
not complied with his treatment plan objectives or become fit.
¶ 29 Father argues that he complied with the treatment plan by
pointing to his progress on some aspects of the treatment plan,
including employment and housing. Though the court
acknowledged some progress, after weighing all the evidence, the
court found no “indication . . . that [father] is sober” or “an
10 appropriate caregiver.” See People in Interest of K.T., 129 P.3d
1080, 1082 (Colo. App. 2005) (noting that unfitness may be
premised on a parent’s failure to document sobriety). Thus, it held
that father did not successfully complete his treatment plan.
¶ 30 Father briefly argues in the alternative that, “to the extent [he]
did not demonstrate fitness,” he could have become fit within a
reasonable time. But the court rejected this claim, given the
minimal progress father made during the case.
¶ 31 Because substantial evidence supports the court’s findings
that father did not successfully complete his treatment plan and
could not become fit within a reasonable time, we will not disturb
them.
C. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 32 The juvenile court found that the Department made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father, including submitting
referrals for father to complete his evaluations, engage in treatment,
and attend family time. Father disagrees and argues that the
Department did not make reasonable efforts because it failed to
(1) consistently communicate with him; (2) provide appropriate
family time; and (3) connect him with service providers.
11 1. Legal Principles
¶ 33 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court
must consider whether a department made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. See
§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.
2025. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and
care.” § 19-1-103(114). A department satisfies its reasonable
efforts obligation if it provides services in accordance with section
19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114). As necessary and appropriate, those
services include screenings, assessments, and individual case
plans; home-based family and crisis counseling; information and
referral services; family time services; and placement services.
§ 19-3-208(2)(b)(I)-(V).
¶ 34 When evaluating a department’s efforts, the juvenile court
should consider whether the services provided were appropriate to
support the parent’s treatment plan. People in Interest of E.D.,
2025 COA 11, ¶ 11. But the parent is ultimately responsible for
using those services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with
the treatment plan. Id. at ¶ 12. Thus, a court may consider a
parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining
12 whether the department made reasonable efforts. People in Interest
of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.
¶ 35 Whether a department made reasonable efforts is a mixed
question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146,
¶ 8. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error
and its legal determination based on those findings de novo. Id.
2. Communication
¶ 36 Father argues that the Department failed to properly
communicate with him during his incarceration, which resulted in
his inability to fully comply with his treatment plan.
¶ 37 While it’s true that the caseworkers had difficulty tracking
father while he was in custody and did not consistently meet with
father while he was incarcerated, the record reflects that the
caseworkers had several in-person meetings with father, reached
out to him via phone and text message on numerous occasions, and
conducted diligent searches to locate him. Yet, the caseworker
testified that father often ignored the Department’s attempts to
contact him, did not respond to communications, and did not
attend scheduled meetings. The caseworker said that the
Department tried to remain in contact with father and
13 communicated with his probation officer and the facilities where he
was incarcerated.
¶ 38 Because father failed to communicate with the caseworkers
when he was not in custody and failed to update the Department as
to his location throughout the case, we are unpersuaded that the
Department failed to use reasonable efforts to communicate with
father. See A.V., ¶ 12.
¶ 39 Father now also claims a “reliance interest” in the treatment
plan and argues that “the law of the case” and the Colorado
Department of Human Services rules required monthly in-person
meetings. But father didn’t raise these arguments before the
juvenile court, and we will not consider them for the first time on
appeal. See People in Interest of C.E., 923 P.2d 383, 385 (Colo. App.
1996) (holding that we do not consider issues raised for the first
time on appeal in dependency and neglect cases).2
2 Although we don’t address father’s arguments, we observe that
one of the rules father cites specifically exempts monthly face-to- face contact “[w]hen the [parent’s] whereabouts are not known despite efforts to locate the [parent],” as was periodically the case here. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Rule 7.204(B)(2)(c), 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-3.
14 3. Family Time
¶ 40 Father next claims that he did not receive family time during
the intermittent periods he was incarcerated during the case. But
the record shows that the Department was limited in its ability to
arrange family time during these periods. For instance, at least one
jail denied visitation. And the caseworker testified that some of
father’s periods of incarceration were too short to arrange family
time. The record also shows that father did not update the
Department as to his location and status, which affected the
Department’s ability to arrange family time.
¶ 41 What’s more, the caseworker testified that even when father
was not in jail, he was not consistent with family time. For
example, when father was placed in community corrections, his
failure to consistently communicate with the Department affected
its ability to arrange visits. And even when in-person visits were
scheduled, father failed to appear. Father claimed he could not get
passes to leave community corrections, but he only provided notice
of this barrier to the Department after he missed the visits. The
Department then tried to set up phone visits, but father ignored the
calls.
15 ¶ 42 Even after his release from community corrections, father
attended just three in-person family time sessions before he
stopped going. A couple of months later, father wanted to restart
family time. Though the parties dispute why family time did not
immediately restart, it was for the juvenile court to consider and
weigh the evidence. To the extent father asks us to reweigh or draw
different inferences from the evidence, we will not do that.
¶ 43 We are equally unpersuaded by father’s contention that the
Department “lumped [him] in” with mother when seeking to restrict
family time and “gave up” on scheduling visits due to the pending
termination hearing. One week before the termination hearing, the
Department sought a restriction of family time based on the child’s
severe dysregulation following family time and concerns for her
emotional well-being. In support, the family-time worker testified
that father missed more than half of his visits and had not seen the
child in almost five months. The court concluded that father had —
independent of mother — “inconsistency issues” that impacted the
child and justified the restriction.
¶ 44 The court properly considered the Department’s efforts to
arrange family time throughout the case — both when father was in
16 and out of custody. See People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022
CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35 (stating that a juvenile court’s determination of
whether a department made reasonable efforts must be based on
the totality of the circumstances). Because the record supports the
court’s conclusion that the Department made reasonable efforts, we
4. Connection with Service Providers
¶ 45 Father asserts that the Department failed to (1) provide him
with a referral to an evaluator closer to his community corrections
facility for completion of his substance use and mental health
evaluation; (2) timely communicate with the facility regarding
available services; and (3) offer housing assistance and resources
following his release.
¶ 46 But again, father was not in custody for portions of the case,
and he does not explain why he could not complete the previously
ordered evaluation when he was not in custody — including the
eight months between his release and the termination hearing.
And, in any event, the record shows that the caseworker tried, on
several occasions, to communicate with community corrections but
did not receive a timely response. Finally, father informed the
17 caseworker that he had a place to stay upon his release. See § 19-
3-208(2)(b) (requiring referrals to public and private assistance
resources only if they are determined to be necessary and
appropriate).
¶ 47 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
that the juvenile court did not err by finding that the Department
made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father and reunify him with
the child.
D. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 48 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding no
less drastic alternatives to termination existed. He maintains that
the court could have ordered an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) to his brother. We disagree.
¶ 49 Implicit in the statutory criteria for termination is the
requirement that the juvenile court consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122
(Colo. 1986). When considering less drastic alternatives, the court
bases its decision on the best interests of the child, giving primary
consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).
18 ¶ 50 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must be the “best”
option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27. For that reason, if the court
considers a less drastic alternative but finds that termination is in
the child’s best interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative
and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. We are bound by that
determination. See People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.
¶ 51 The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that no
available less drastic alternative would have met the child’s
physical, emotional, and mental health needs. The caseworker
described the child’s significant mental health needs, the negative
impacts caused by father’s inconsistent family time attendance, and
the child’s need for permanency and stability. The caseworker
questioned father’s ability to consistently attend visits if the court
ordered an APR and expressed concern that the “constant . . . in
and out” would be too much for the child to handle. And the
caseworker concluded that an ongoing relationship between father
and the child would be detrimental, and an APR was not in the
child’s best interests. Though father largely ignores this evidence, it
supports the court’s finding that no viable less drastic alternative to
19 termination existed. And because the evidence supports the
finding, we must affirm it. See id.
¶ 52 Still, father contends that an APR to his brother was a viable
less drastic alternative, and the Department should have done more
to investigate that option. But that argument doesn’t address the
court’s finding that no alternative would meet the child’s physical,
emotional, and mental health needs. Because the court found that
termination was in the child’s best interests, whether father’s
brother (or any relative) would accept an APR doesn’t matter. See
A.M., ¶ 27 (“[I]f a proposed alternative to termination is to be
deemed viable, it must not only be adequate, it must be in the
child’s best interests.”).
¶ 53 We conclude that the record supports the juvenile court’s
finding that an APR was not a viable less drastic alternative to
termination.
E. Continuance
¶ 54 At the time of the termination order, there was a pending
inquiry under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
(ICPC) to determine whether placement with father’s brother would
20 be suitable.3 Father asserts that “[a]ssuming that the juvenile court
could not rule that a less drastic alternative existed because an
ICPC had not yet been completed,” the court erred by denying his
request to continue the termination hearing. (Emphasis added.)
We disagree for two reasons.
¶ 55 First, father’s premise is incorrect. The completion of the ICPC
did not prevent the court from determining whether a less drastic
alternative to termination existed. And because the court
concluded that termination was in the child’s best interests, an APR
to any individual was not a viable less drastic alternative. Thus, the
ICPC status had no effect on that decision.
¶ 56 Second, the case had been pending for two years. In denying
the requested continuance, the juvenile court properly balanced the
need for orderly and expeditious administration of justice against
the facts underlying the request and the child’s best interests,
including her need for permanency. See People in Interest of R.J.B.,
2021 COA 4, ¶ 11. The court considered the request along with the
3 Father’s brother initially expressed interest in being a placement
option but then withdrew from consideration. On the second day of the termination hearing, the brother again expressed interest and the Department then initiated the ICPC.
21 child’s needs, including the “extreme negative impact” family time
had on her. Based on the evidence, we cannot say that the court
abused its discretion by denying the requested continuance.
¶ 57 Finally, to the extent father generally asserts a violation of his
procedural or substantive due process rights, he hasn’t developed
these arguments. We therefore do not consider them. See People in
Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to
address undeveloped arguments).
V. Disposition
¶ 58 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE KUHN concur.