25CA0515 Peo in Interest of DR 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0515 El Paso County District Court No. 24JV30415 Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of D.R., a Child,
and Concerning A.G. and C.R.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Kuhn and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Amy C. Fitch, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Josie L. Burt, Guardian Ad Litem
Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant A.G.
Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant C.R. ¶1 C.R. (father) and A.G. (mother) appeal the judgment
adjudicating D.R. (the child) dependent or neglected. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In April 2024, the El Paso County Department of Human
Services received a report that mother had given birth at home and
hadn’t received any prenatal or postnatal care. The parents had
two previous dependency or neglect cases involving children who
were born exposed to substances, one of which was still ongoing
when the child was born. The Department believed that the parents
were living with paternal grandmother when the child was born,
and a caseworker from the Department visited grandmother’s home
but didn’t locate the parents or the child.
¶3 The Department continued its efforts to locate the parents and
child, but the parents were “actively avoiding” contact. In May
2024, the caseworker located father in the county jail, but when the
caseworker spoke with him, he claimed that there “was no baby.”
The Department finally located the parents and child in June 2024,
removed the child from the parents’ care, and filed a petition in
dependency or neglect. The parents denied the allegations and
asked for a jury trial.
1 ¶4 The juvenile court held a jury trial over four days in October
and November 2024. At the trial, the Department presented
evidence from several witnesses who were involved in the parents’
previous cases, including mother’s and father’s treatment providers,
an intake caseworker, and an ongoing caseworker. The intake
caseworker also testified about her involvement with the intake in
this case.
¶5 After hearing the evidence, the jury found that the Department
had proved that the child was dependent or neglected under section
19-3-102(1)(b)-(e), C.R.S. 2025. Based on the jury’s verdicts, the
court sustained the petition, entered an adjudication, and adopted
treatment plans for both parents.
II. Admissibility of Facts Related to Previous Cases
¶6 The parents contend that the juvenile court erred by admitting
evidence of their previous dependency or neglect cases. We
disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶7 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
2 the evidence.” CRE 401. But even relevant evidence should be
excluded under CRE 403 “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
¶8 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible “to
prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in conformity with the character.” CRE
404(b)(1). Generally, when a party presents evidence of other acts
under Rule 404(b), the trial court should apply the four-part test set
forth in People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990).
¶9 In People in Interest of A.W., 2015 COA 144M, ¶¶ 19-23, a
division of this court determined that Rule 404(b) and Spoto didn’t
apply to evidence of a parent’s past treatment of her older children
when offered to establish “prospective harm.” Prospective harm
analysis requires a fact finder to predict whether the child will be
dependent or neglected if returned to the parents. People in Interest
of S.N., 2014 COA 116, ¶¶ 16-17. In assessing prospective harm,
the fact finder may consider the parent’s (1) past treatment of other
children; (2) condition, such as mental illness, physical disability,
or incarceration; and (3) conduct, such as drug use, physical abuse,
or violence. Id. at ¶ 18; see also People v. D.A.K., 596 P.2d 747,
3 749-50 (Colo. 1979) ( “[T]he child’s situation on the day of the
hearing cannot be viewed in a vacuum” and the evidence must be
“considered in the context of the child’s history as well as the
respondent parent’s prior behavior.”).
¶ 10 We review the juvenile court’s decision to admit evidence for
an abuse of discretion. People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178,
¶ 60. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law.
People in Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 9.
B. Analysis
¶ 11 Father’s attorney moved to preclude evidence of the two
previous dependency or neglect cases, asserting that the evidence
was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Relying on A.W., the juvenile
court denied that motion, determining that neither Rule 404(b) nor
Spoto applied. The court also determined, however, that it still
needed to analyze the evidence under Rule 403, and it found that
the probative value of the evidence wasn’t substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, considering that (1) the evidence
was “really recent” and had “similar allegations” and (2) any
4 prejudice could be “mitigated” by giving the jury a limiting
instruction.
¶ 12 Father’s attorney proposed a limiting instruction, which the
juvenile court edited and presented to the jury as follows:
You have heard evidence related to prior [dependency or neglect] cases involving [the parents] and children other than [the child]. This evidence is being offered for the limited purpose of showing prospective harm. This evidence may only be considered for that limited purpose. You cannot use this evidence to show bad character or propensity.
The court read the instruction to the jury before the testimony of
the parents’ treatment providers, the ongoing caseworker, and the
intake caseworker, and it also provided a written version before
deliberations.
¶ 13 At the trial, the Department presented evidence that the
parents had substance abuse and mental health problems that had
not been addressed during the previous cases. For example, the
record shows that the parents completed dual diagnosis evaluations
during the first case, and the evaluators diagnosed both parents
with substance abuse disorders and mother with bipolar disorder.
The evaluators recommended outpatient treatment and sobriety
5 monitoring, but the parents didn’t participate in either. The
Department filed the second case after the child at issue in that
case tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. The ongoing
caseworker in the second case testified that neither parent
participated in treatment during that case, and the parents
indicated that they weren’t participating because they “did not need
treatment.”
¶ 14 We conclude that the juvenile court didn’t abuse its discretion
by deciding that Rule 404(b) and Spoto didn’t apply to evidence
related to the parents’ previous cases. In this case, the Department
presented evidence that the parents had a history of substance use
and mental health problems and had not complied with mandated
treatment in the recent past. The jury could use this evidence to
predict whether it was likely or expected that the parents could
provide proper parental care if the child was returned to their care.
See S.N., ¶ 17; § 19-3-102(1)(b). This is precisely the type of
evidence that is admissible to establish prospective harm, see S.N.,
¶ 18, and, according to A.W., when a party offers evidence of
prospective harm, Rule 404(b) and Spoto don’t apply, see A.W.,
¶ 23.
6 ¶ 15 The parents assert that the Department couldn’t offer evidence
of their previous cases for purposes of prospective harm analysis
because the child wasn’t removed at birth. In support, the parents
note that the published cases focusing on prospective harm,
including A.W., involve children who were removed at birth. See
People in Interest of D.L.R., 638 P.2d 39, 40 (Colo. 1981); A.W., ¶ 4;
S.N., ¶ 2. To be sure, in such cases, because a child isn’t in the
parent’s care, the fact finder is generally required to use prospective
harm analysis. See A.W., ¶ 22. But nothing in our case law
prohibits the application of prospective harm analysis in
circumstances, such as those in this case, when a child isn’t
removed from a parent at birth. Cf. People in Interest of C.M., 2024
COA 90, ¶ 29 (recognizing the applicability of prospective harm
analysis in a case involving a child who wasn’t removed until thirty-
six days after birth). Indeed, we read A.W. to hold that Rule 404(b)
doesn’t apply to evidence of prospective harm because this type of
evidence isn’t offered to show that the parent acted in conformity
with a character trait on a “particular occasion.” Rather, this
evidence allows the fact finder to predict the home environment and
potential parental care to which a child might be exposed if
7 returned to the parent. See A.W., ¶¶ 21-22. We therefore reject the
parents’ assertion.
¶ 16 Because we conclude that the juvenile court didn’t err by
deciding that Rule 404(b) and Spoto didn’t apply, we don’t address
the parents’ contention that the evidence didn’t pass muster under
Spoto.
¶ 17 Finally, we reject the parents’ assertion that the evidence was
inadmissible under Rule 403. The evidence of the parents’
substance abuse and mental health problems was highly probative
of whether the child would lack proper parental care if returned to
the parents. And, because the court gave the jury a limiting
instruction, we must presume that the jury didn’t use the evidence
for an improper purpose. See A.W., ¶ 27. To the extent the parents
assert that the limiting instruction was insufficient to cure any
prejudice, we reject that argument in Part IV, below. We therefore
conclude that the parents weren’t unfairly prejudiced by the court’s
decision to admit the evidence relating to the previous cases. See
id. (presuming that the jury did not use the evidence for an
improper purpose because the parent failed to “indicate[] how the
8 jury did not abide by the limiting instruction” and the evidence was
“not so prejudicial that the jury could not follow th[e] instruction”).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 18 Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to support
the jury’s verdicts. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Analysis
¶ 19 As now relevant, a child is dependent or neglected if (1) the
child “lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions”
of a parent; (2) the child’s “environment is injurious to his or her
welfare”; (3) the parent “fails or refuses to provide the child with
proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any
other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being”;
or (4) the child is “homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled
with his or her parent . . . through no fault of [the] parent.” § 19-3-
102(1)(b)-(e).
¶ 20 An adjudication of dependency or neglect must be based on
existing circumstances and related to the child’s status at the time
of adjudication. People in Interest of A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186, 1192
(Colo. App. 2008). But that doesn’t mean that a fact finder must
determine that the child is receiving improper care at the time of
9 the hearing. People in Interest of S.X.M., 271 P.3d 1124, 1130 (Colo.
App. 2011). Rather, an adjudication may be based on past,
current, or prospective harm. See People in Interest of G.E.S., 2016
COA 183, ¶ 15.
¶ 21 “Whether a child is dependent [or] neglected presents a mixed
question of fact and law because it requires application of
evidentiary facts to the statutory grounds.” People in Interest of
M.M., 2017 COA 144, ¶ 17. To establish that a child is dependent
or neglected, a department must prove the allegations in the
petition by a preponderance of the evidence. See § 19-3-505(1),
(7)(a), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583
(Colo. App. 2009).
¶ 22 When determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
sustain an adjudication, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party and draw every inference fairly
deducible from the evidence in favor of the jury’s verdicts. S.G.L.,
214 P.3d at 583. We won’t disturb the jury’s verdicts if the evidence
supports them, even though reasonable people might arrive at
different conclusions based on the same facts. Id.; People in Interest
of T.T., 128 P.3d 328, 331 (Colo. App. 2005); see also Thomas v.
10 People, 2021 CO 84, ¶ 10 (an appellate court may not “invade the
jury’s province by second-guessing any findings that are supported
by the evidence”).
¶ 23 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Department and drawing every fairly deducible inference in favor of
the jury’s verdicts, we conclude that the record contains sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s determination that the child was
dependent or neglected under section 19-3-102(1)(b), (c), and (d).
See S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583.
¶ 24 First, the Department presented sufficient evidence to
establish that, based on mother’s substance use and mental health
problems, the child would lack proper parental care if she was
returned to mother. § 19-3-102(1)(b). As already discussed in Part
II, above, the Department presented evidence that mother was
diagnosed with a substance use disorder and bipolar disorder and
that she hadn’t completed any treatment. Mother’s treatment
provider, who was qualified as an expert in addictions and mental
health evaluations, opined that a person is very unlikely to
successfully address these problems without treatment. The
11 treatment provider also described the ways in which these disorders
can impact a person’s ability to parent a child, such as impairing
judgment and decision-making, delaying reactions, and
suppressing or elevating emotions.
¶ 25 Mother asserts that the child wasn’t dependent or neglected
because there was no evidence that she used substances during her
pregnancy or that substance use affected the child’s care while she
had custody of the child. Nothing in section 19-3-102(1)(b) required
the Department to establish that mother used substances during
her pregnancy. Cf. § 19-3-102(1)(g) (a child is dependent or
neglected when, among other things, the child “is born affected by
alcohol or substance exposure”). And because the Department
presented evidence of mother’s history of substance abuse to
establish prospective harm, it didn’t need to show that she was
using substances during her pregnancy or for the two months that
she was caring for the child. Although the jury could consider the
lack of evidence as to these two points, we disagree with mother
that, as a matter of law, the jury couldn’t find the child dependent
or neglected based on evidence of mother’s past substance use
under a prospective harm theory. See S.N., ¶ 18; T.T., 128 P.3d at
12 330 (the child was dependent or neglected under section 19-3-
102(1)(b) based on the mother’s past substance use because
“returning the child to mother was likely to be detrimental to him”).
¶ 26 Second, the evidence also showed that the child was in an
injurious environment based on the parents’ living situation. § 19-
3-102(1)(c). The intake caseworker testified about the home in
which the parents were living when the child was born and
indicated that it wasn’t appropriate for a child. The Department
also presented photographs of the home, which showed its
condition around the time that the child was born. And the jury
heard evidence that the parents had been evicted from that home
before the child was born and that they were either living in a
camper outside a friend’s home or inside that home with ten other
people. According to mother’s testimony, the people living in the
home were all recovering drug or alcohol users and didn’t have
stable employment. Thus, whether the child was living in the first
home, the camper, or the second home, there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to find that the child was in an injurious
environment. See People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 26 (an
13 injurious environment is a situation that is “likely harmful” to the
child).
¶ 27 Third, the Department submitted sufficient evidence to prove
that the child was dependent or neglected because mother failed or
refused to provide the child with proper medical care. § 19-3-
102(1)(d). The evidence was undisputed that the child was born at
home and mother didn’t take the child to the hospital or to a
doctor’s office after she was born. To be sure, the jury heard
testimony that the child’s birth was attended by a friend who was a
nurse and that the child was healthy despite the lack of medical
care. The jury also heard evidence that father delivered the baby
and that mother refused to call an ambulance and go to the
hospital because she knew that the Department would be notified
and would remove the child from her care. The caseworker also
testified that the Department had information that there had been
no prenatal or postnatal care, the newborn infant needed to be
medically evaluated, and concerns had been raised that the child
possibly had breathing problems.
¶ 28 Citing to section 19-3-103(1), C.R.S. 2025, mother maintains
that the child wasn’t dependent or neglected when mother failed to
14 “immediately” bring the child to a doctor because she had “valid
spiritual and personal beliefs that shaped her care of the child.”
Section 19-3-103(1) provides that “[n]o child who in lieu of medical
treatment is under treatment solely by spiritual means through
prayer in accordance with a recognized method of religious healing
shall, for that reason alone, be considered to have been neglected or
dependent within the purview of this article.” At most, mother
testified that she hadn’t taken the child to a doctor because she
wanted a doctor with “my beliefs and that coincides with . . . my
family heritage and [father’s] family heritage.” She didn’t testify
that the child was “under treatment solely by spiritual means
through prayer” or that she was doing so under a “recognized
method of religious healing.” Id. Section 19-3-103(1) therefore
doesn’t apply. What’s more, as noted above, the jury heard
testimony that mother failed to provide the child with medical care,
not because of her religious beliefs, but simply because she didn’t
want the Department to find out about the child. We therefore
reject mother’s argument.
¶ 29 In sum, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury’s verdicts under section 19-3-102(1)(b), (c), and (d).
15 Based on this conclusion, we don’t need to consider whether the
child was also dependent or neglected under section 19-3-102(1)(e).
See People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 29 (“[S]ection 19-
3-102 requires proof of only one condition for an adjudication.”),
aff’d on other grounds sub nom. People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S.,
2018 CO 31.
¶ 30 Finally, mother argues that the Department didn’t make
reasonable efforts, which “caused this case to reach the
adjudication stage.” In support, she cites section 19-1-115(6)(b)(I),
C.R.S. 2025, which requires, among other things, that a juvenile
court find that “reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal of the child from the home” before
awarding legal custody to a department. However, the Department
isn’t required to make reasonable efforts if “an emergency situation
exists which requires the immediate temporary removal of the child
from the home.” § 19-1-115(6)(b)(II).
¶ 31 Mother maintains that the magistrate erred by finding that an
“emergency situation” existed under section 19-1-115(6)(b)(II) and
therefore the Department needed to make reasonable efforts under
section 19-1-115(6)(b)(I). But mother’s argument isn’t properly
16 before us because (1) orders entered at the temporary protective
custody stage are interim orders not subject to appeal, see People in
Interest of M.W., 140 P.3d 231, 233 (Colo. App. 2006); and (2) even
if she could appeal the temporary order, she still needed to file a
petition for juvenile court review of the magistrate’s order before she
could appeal, see People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403
(Colo. App. 2006). As a result, mother’s reasonable efforts
argument necessarily fails. And mother hasn’t otherwise directed
us to any statute or case law that requires the juvenile court to
consider whether the Department made reasonable efforts before
the court can enter an adjudication order.
IV. Jury Instructions
¶ 32 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by failing to
provide the jury with definitions for “propensity” and “injurious
environment.” We disagree.
¶ 33 “When a term, word, or phrase in a jury instruction is one
with which reasonable persons of common intelligence would be
familiar, and its meaning is not so technical or mysterious as to
create confusion in jurors’ minds as to its meaning, an instruction
defining it is not required.” People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 45 P.3d 737,
17 745 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd, 70 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2003). “When
definitions are not provided in a jury instruction, the jury is
presumed to employ the common meaning of the words used.”
People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369, 379 (Colo. App. 2009).
¶ 34 A juvenile court must correctly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case. J.G., ¶ 33. We review de novo whether a
particular jury instruction correctly states the law. Day v. Johnson,
255 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 2011). However, we review the court’s
decision to give — or not to give — a particular instruction for an
abuse of discretion. J.G., ¶ 33.
¶ 35 Father’s attorney submitted a proposed limiting instruction for
the prospective harm evidence, which included the following
statement:
The evidence may not be used to argue that because one or both parents acted, or failed to act, in a particular way involving that other child, that he or she will likely act, or fail to act, in the same way toward [the child]. That would be an impermissible “propensity” argument.
The juvenile court removed these two sentences from the final
instruction and replaced them with the following: “You cannot use
this evidence to show bad character or propensity.” (CF, p 401.)
18 Father’s counsel objected to the change because “the jury may not
understand what propensity is[,] which is what the sentence before
is defining.” The court declined to define “propensity.”
¶ 36 We don’t see any abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s
decision to decline to provide the jury with a definition for
“propensity.” Mother hasn’t directed us to a published case
addressing whether a court errs by declining to provide a jury
instruction defining “propensity.” But cases from other
jurisdictions have defined “propensity” by using a common, rather
than a technical, meaning. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 1060,
1067 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (applying the definition of “propensity”
found in Webster’s Dictionary). And in any event, there is little
relevant difference between the common meaning and legal
definition for “propensity.” Compare Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://perma.cc/5XR4-DVNN (“an often intense natural
inclination or preference”), with Black’s Law Dictionary 1472 (12th
ed. 2024) (defining “propensity” as “[a] natural tendency to behave
in a particular way; esp., the fact that a person is prone to a specific
type of bad behavior”).
19 ¶ 37 Father’s counsel also submitted a proposed jury instruction
that stated, in pertinent part, the following: “An injurious
environment exists when the children are in a situation that is
likely harmful. Injurious means adverse, bad or damaging.
Environment means the circumstances, objects, or conditions by
which one is surrounded.” Mother’s attorney joined father’s
counsel’s request to define injurious environment for the jury. The
juvenile court rejected the proposed instruction because (1) “we
don’t have a standard definition for injurious environment”; (2) “the
ordinary person off the street can come up with a definition”; and
(3) “if the jury [was] hung up on this issue, they can ask a
question.”
¶ 38 The juvenile court didn’t abuse its discretion by declining to
define “injurious environment.” The injurious environment
instruction provided by the court tracked the statutory language
and the model jury instructions. See § 19-3-102(1)(c); CJI-Civ.
41:20 (2025). A previous version of the model instructions included
a definition for injurious environment, which has since been deleted
and not replaced. See CJI-Civ. 41:10 n.1 (2025). Because the
phrase isn’t defined by statute or model instruction, the jury could
20 give the phrase its ordinary meaning, which, as the court pointed
out, was “not so technical or mysterious as to create confusion in
jurors’ minds as to its meaning.” Thoro Prods. Co., 45 P.3d at 745.
Finally, the jury didn’t express any confusion about what the
phrase meant, and mother hasn’t explained on appeal “how the jury
would have attributed an incorrect meaning to it.” People v.
Claycomb, 2025 COA 36, ¶ 32.
¶ 39 In sum, we conclude that the juvenile court didn’t abuse its
discretion by declining to provide the jury with additional
definitions for “propensity” and “injurious environment” because
the ordinary meanings of those terms, which we presume the jurors
knew, adequately informed the jurors about those concepts. See
Walden, 224 P.3d at 379.
V. Expert Qualification
¶ 40 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred when it qualified
the intake caseworker as an expert. Again, we disagree.
¶ 41 Under CRE 702, an expert witness may be qualified to offer
expert testimony based on any of the five factors in CRE 702: (1)
knowledge; (2) skill; (3) experience; (4) training; or (5) education.
Huntoon v. TCI Cablevision of Colo., Inc., 969 P.2d 681, 690 (Colo.
21 1998). The decision to qualify a caseworker as an expert is left to
the juvenile court’s sound discretion, and we won’t disturb its
decision absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. People in
Interest of L.G., 737 P.2d 431, 435 (Colo. App. 1987).
¶ 42 The record shows that the intake caseworker had (1) a
bachelor’s degree in psychology and was working towards a
master’s degree in forensic psychology; (2) worked for the
Department as a caseworker for three years; (3) previously worked
with children in an inpatient treatment facility for about a year; (4)
completed the training and certification process for caseworkers in
Colorado, along with continuing education courses since becoming
certified; (5) participated in more than 500 intake assessments; and
(6) previously been qualified as an expert in child welfare. Focusing
on the caseworker’s leadership role, her three years of experience at
the Department, and her 500 intake investigations, the juvenile
court qualified her as an expert in child welfare based on her
knowledge, experience, and training.
¶ 43 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by qualifying the
caseworker as an expert in child welfare because the caseworker
didn’t have any “specialized knowledge” in child welfare and any
22 knowledge she did have was “fully supplied by the Petitioner in this
case.” Her argument fails for two reasons. First, in addition to her
knowledge, the court qualified the caseworker as an expert based
on her experience and training; mother forwards no argument as to
how the caseworker lacked the requisite experience or training to be
an expert in child welfare. Second, mother provides no authority
for the proposition that an expert can’t gain relevant knowledge by
working for a party in the case.
¶ 44 We therefore conclude that the court didn’t abuse its
discretion. See People in Interest of A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186, 1193
(Colo. App. 2008) (discerning no abuse of discretion in the court’s
decision to qualify caseworkers as experts in social work with an
emphasis in child protection).
VI. Scope of Cross-Examination
¶ 45 Mother maintains that the juvenile court erred by allowing the
county attorney to ask father questions on cross-examination that
were outside the scope of the direct examination. We disagree.
¶ 46 The juvenile court has discretion to “exercise reasonable
control over interrogation of witnesses and presentation of
evidence.” People v. Whitman, 205 P.3d 371, 378 (Colo. App. 2007).
23 Under CRE 611(b), “[c]ross-examination should be limited to the
subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the
credibility of the witness.”
¶ 47 On direct examination, father’s attorney asked him about the
child’s home birth in April 2024, events connected to the child’s
removal in June 2024, and father’s employment situation. On
cross-examination, father’s attorney objected to questions about his
other children and previous cases as outside the scope of direct
examination. Counsel also objected to a juror question about his
conversations with the caseworker.
¶ 48 Mother’s attorney didn’t join in these objections or otherwise
raise any issue with these questions as beyond the scope of the
direct examination. Although we are skeptical that one parent can
assert on appeal an issue that was only raised by the other parent,
we will address most of father’s counsel’s objections. However, we
decline to address father’s attorney’s objection to a juror question
about the child’s birth certificate because father’s attorney objected
on a different ground from the one mother now raises. See People v.
Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 37 (an issue is unpreserved if an objection
24 was made in the trial court but on grounds different from those
raised on appeal).
¶ 49 We reject mother’s argument for two reasons. First, because
CRE 611(b) allows the juvenile court discretion to permit a party to
ask about “additional matters as if on direct examination,” the
challenged questions were permissible even if they were outside the
scope of direct examination. Second, even assuming the court
erred, we discern no reversible error because the evidence was
either cumulative or played a minimal role in the Department’s
case. See People v. Casias, 2012 COA 117, ¶ 64. Mother provides
no explanation as to how this evidence prejudiced her.
VII. Disposition
¶ 50 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.