Peo in Interest of DLV

Opinion

26CA0398 Peo in Interest of DLV 09-03-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0398 El Paso County District Court No. 24JV30149 Honorable Diana May, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of D.L.V., a Child, and Concerning A.S., Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK

Pawar and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 3, 2026

Kenny Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Senior County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guadian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant

¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, A.S. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationship with D.L.V. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect regarding the then-newborn child. The Department alleged that mother and the child tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl, the child was experiencing withdrawal symptoms, and, shortly after the child’s birth, mother left the hospital against medical advice. The juvenile court granted temporary custody of the child to maternal grandfather under the Department’s protective supervision. The child remained in his care throughout the case. ¶3 Following mother’s admission, the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. Nine months later, the Department moved to terminate mother’s parental rights. Twenty-one months after the Department filed the petition, the juvenile court granted the motion and terminated mother’s legal relationship with the child.

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II. Less Drastic Alternatives ¶4 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court erred by finding that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. Specifically, mother asserts that an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to maternal grandfather was an available less drastic alternative in the child’s best interests. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. Implicit in these criteria is the requirement that the juvenile court consider and eliminate less drastic alternatives. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 19. In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

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conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 29. ¶6 A juvenile court may consider and weigh various factors in determining the viability of a less drastic alternative, including (1) whether an ongoing relationship with a parent would be beneficial to the child, see People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38; (2) whether the child is bonded with the parent, see People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009); and (3) whether an APR provides adequate permanence and stability for the child, People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910-11 (Colo. App. 2005). ¶7 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than adequately meet the child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests. A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the juvenile court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. ¶8 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34. Thus, when a juvenile court considers less drastic alternatives but

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instead finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, we’re bound to affirm the decision so long as the record supports its findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

B. Analysis

¶9 The juvenile court considered less drastic alternatives to termination, including an APR to maternal grandfather, but found that none of the alternatives were in the child’s best interests. In so finding, the court considered mother’s lack of involvement with the child, the absence of a bond between mother and the child, and the maternal grandfather’s preference for adoption and his reasons for such a preference. Above all, giving primary consideration to the child’s mental, physical, and emotional needs, including his need for stability, the court found that termination was in his best interests. Z.M., ¶ 29; A.M., ¶ 32. ¶ 10 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The caseworker, qualified as an expert in child protection, described mother’s nonparticipation during much of the case and the lack of a bond between her and the child. Specifically, before resuming family time one month before the second day of the termination hearing, mother hadn’t seen the child in over a year. And, even

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after resuming family time, she was late for every visit (sometimes by up to an hour), wasn’t prepared for the child’s needs, and showed him minimal affection. The caseworker also described mother’s lack of treatment plan compliance, including her lack of substance use treatment and documented sobriety throughout the case. Based on the foregoing, as well as the child’s young age and need for stability, the caseworker opined that there was no less drastic alternative in the child’s best interests. Similarly, maternal grandfather testified that he preferred adoption because of mother’s “habitual” substance use and his concern that an APR wouldn’t be sufficiently stable for the child. ¶ 11 Nevertheless, mother asserts that the court erred by finding that there was no less drastic alternative to termination because an APR to maternal grandfather would’ve preserved her bond with the child. In support, mother focuses on the family time supervisor’s testimony that she and the child had “a pretty good bond.” But, considering all the evidence presented, the juvenile court found that the child “d[id] not have a substantial bond with [m]other.” We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court merely because there might have been evidence

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supporting a different result. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15 (“[W]hen there is record support for the trial court’s findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review.”); see also People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 250 (Colo. 2010) (“[I]t is important to defer to the trial court, particularly when it hears contradictory testimony on material issues . . . .”). ¶ 12 Moreover, a child’s bond with a parent is just one factor, among many, that the court may consider when analyzing whether any less drastic alternatives are viable. See A.R., ¶ 38. And in this case the court considered, and rejected, an APR based on (1) mother’s instability, treatment plan noncompliance, and lack of a “demonstrated . . . desire to have a meaningful relationship with [the child]”; (2) the child’s need for stability and permanency; and (3) maternal grandfather’s preference for adoption. To the extent mother asserts that the court erred by considering maternal grandfather’s preference even though he “did not state that he would refuse to accept an APR agreement for the child,” we aren’t persuaded. See People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 920 (Colo. App. 2011) (allowing a juvenile court to consider the

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placement provider’s preference when analyzing the viability of less drastic alternatives to termination). We are similarly unpersuaded by mother’s argument that an APR to maternal grandfather was in the child’s best interests because maternal grandfather “had custody of the child’s older sibling through an APR agreement and . . . [m]other ha[d] not sought to modify or disturb that APR agreement since it was issued.” See People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[I]n deciding whether . . . less drastic alternatives exist, a trial court may recognize . . . differences between the children, and base its decision upon the best interests of the children.”). ¶ 13 Essentially, mother’s arguments ask us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, which we cannot do. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29. And because the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that there was no less drastic alternative to termination in the child’s best interests, we can’t disturb it. See B.H., ¶ 80.

III. Disposition

¶ 14 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.