Peo in Interest of DLT

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0633
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0633 Peo in Interest of DLT 09-04-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0633 Weld County District Court No. 24JV25 Honorable W. Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of D.L.T., a Child,

and Concerning A.T.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A Opinion by JUDGE BERNARD* Román, C.J., and Berger*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 4, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 This is a dependency and neglect case. A father, A.T., appeals

the judgment terminating his parent-child legal relationship with

his child, D.L.T. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services received a

report that the child’s mother had tested positive for illegal

substances and that the newborn child was experiencing

withdrawal symptoms. For the first seven weeks of the child’s life,

father and mother voluntarily worked with the department. The

department then filed a petition in dependency and neglect, alleging

father and mother were not following the agreed-upon safety plan.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected, and it adopted treatment plans for both parents. As is

pertinent to our analysis, the court ordered father to complete

mental health and substance abuse evaluations, comply with court

orders in his criminal cases, and establish a bond with the child

through regular family time.

¶4 The department later asked the juvenile court to terminate

father’s and mother’s parental rights. One year after the petition

was filed, the court terminated their parental rights following a

1 contested hearing. Only father has appealed the termination

judgment.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶5 Father’s sole claim on appeal is his counsel was ineffective

because counsel did not present evidence at the termination

hearing showing father had been complying with his treatment

plan. We disagree.

A. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶6 To successfully make an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

in a dependency and neglect case, a parent must show (1) counsel’s

performance was outside the wide range of professionally competent

assistance, and (2) the parent was prejudiced by counsel’s errors.

A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶ 48; People in Interest of C.H., 166 P.3d

288, 291-92 (Colo. App. 2007). Such a claim must allege facts with

sufficient specificity, including, for example, the expected names of

witnesses to be called, the expected substance of their testimony,

and a clear explanation of how their testimony would show trial

counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance. A.R., ¶ 48.

2 ¶7 To demonstrate prejudice, the parent must show a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance or

unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have

been different. Id. at ¶ 60.

¶8 If the parent’s allegations lack sufficient specificity, we may

summarily deny the ineffective assistance claim. See C.H., 166

P.3d at 291. In other words, a remand for an evidentiary hearing is

only required if the parent’s allegations are sufficiently specific and

compelling to constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Id.

B. Analysis

¶9 We conclude, for the following reasons, that father has not

raised sufficiently specific or compelling allegations to constitute a

prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel warranting

a remand for a hearing. See C.H., 166 P.3d at 291.

¶ 10 At the termination hearing, father’s counsel elicited testimony

from the caseworker establishing father was participating in

services required by his community corrections sentence, including

employment, monitored sobriety, mental health treatment, and

substance abuse groups. This evidence was uncontested. In

3 addition to cross-examining witnesses, counsel made a closing

statement.

¶ 11 Father does not explain how these actions were outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance or how — without

father’s engagement, assistance, or direction — more could

reasonably be expected of his counsel. See A.R., ¶¶ 48, 60. For

example, father did not appear at the termination hearing, and he

had not been in regular contact with either the department or with

his counsel for many months.

¶ 12 Importantly, it was father’s lack of a relationship with the child

— not the lack of testimony demonstrating his participation in

services through community corrections — that prompted the

juvenile court to find he had not complied with the treatment plan.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2024; see also People in Interest of A.N-B.,

2019 COA 46, ¶¶ 29, 31. True, the court noted father’s absence

from the termination hearing, characterizing it as a choice “not to

present that evidence to the [d]epartment or to appear today and

present that evidence to the court.” But the court went on to say,

with record support, “more importantly, he has no relationship with

the child. He’s had only two virtual visits since this case has been

4 filed. He has absolutely no relationship, no bond with the child,

and he frankly is a stranger to this child.”

¶ 13 Father does not point to any witnesses or evidence related to

his relationship with the child that counsel could have, but did not,

present to the juvenile court. See C.H., 166 P.3d at 291. In fact,

the caseworker testified there were no family time providers

assigned to father’s case because he had not attended any family

time opportunities after moving to community corrections. The

caseworker testified father had “only seen the child twice during the

history of the case,” both times via a virtual hookup while he was in

the county jail.

¶ 14 The caseworker testified father “did the best that he could”

during those two virtual visits, which were challenging because the

child was an infant. Nonetheless, the caseworker said she did not

“have any knowledge of how [father’s treatment] reflects into his

parenting as he has not seen [the child] throughout this case.”

¶ 15 It was not counsel’s fault that father did not develop a

relationship with the child or engage in family time. See People in

Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011)(it is a

parent’s responsibility to engage in the services necessary to regain

5 fitness). And father only provides a general assertion of prejudice,

unaccompanied by alleged facts, that, but for counsel’s allegedly

deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability the

outcome of the termination hearing would have been different. See

People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 35 (we won’t consider a

“bald assertion without argument or development”).

¶ 16 The judgment is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE BERGER concur.