25CA1836 Peo in Interest of DJC 04-16-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1836 El Paso County District Court No. 23JV30679 Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of D.J.C., a Child,
and Concerning B.W. and M.C.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE YUN Grove and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 16, 2026
Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Senior County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant B.W.
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant M.C. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, B.W. (mother) and M.C.
(father) appeal the judgment terminating their parental rights to
D.J.C. (the child). They each contend that they received ineffective
assistance of counsel and that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the El Paso County Department of Human Services (the
Department) made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them. Father
also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that he could
not become fit within a reasonable time. We disagree with each of
these claims and affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 The Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect
alleging that the child tested positive for methamphetamines at
birth. The petition further alleged that mother and father had an
ongoing dependency and neglect action with the child’s two older
sisters.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected and adopted treatment plans for both parents. The
Department later moved to terminate both parents’ parental rights.
Two years after the petition was filed, the juvenile court terminated
mother’s and father’s parental rights after a contested hearing.
1 II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶4 Mother and father contend that their respective counsel were
ineffective because they failed to subpoena the Department
caseworker to testify at the termination hearing. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
¶5 A parent has a statutory right to the effective assistance of
counsel in dependency and neglect proceedings. §§ 19-1-105(2),
19-3-202(1), C.R.S. 2025; A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶ 47. A parent
may raise an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on
appeal. People in Interest of C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 291 (Colo. App.
2007).
¶6 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
parent must show that (1) “counsel’s performance was outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance,” and (2) “there is
a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
A.R., ¶¶ 48, 60; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). “If the parent fails to establish either prong of this test,
the claim fails.” People in Interest of C.B., 2019 COA 168, ¶ 26.
2 ¶7 Applying this standard, we remand the case for further factual
findings only if the parent’s allegations are “sufficiently specific to
constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of
counsel.” A.R., ¶ 63. If the allegations lack sufficient specificity or
do not meet this standard, we may summarily deny the claim. Id.
B. Additional Background
¶8 The caseworker was placed on administrative leave shortly
before the termination hearing began. Counsel for both parents
requested a continuance and expressed concern that his leave
might be tied to his performance in the case. Each attorney
represented that they intended to subpoena the caseworker and
asked the Department to provide information so he could be served
at home.
¶9 Rather than grant a continuance, the juvenile court set a
second hearing date and stated that either or both parents could
subpoena the caseworker “if they want[ed] to call him on rebuttal.”
¶ 10 The hearing ultimately spanned three days over three months.
Neither parent called the caseworker. Beyond the brief discussion
on the first day of trial, the record is silent as to any further efforts
by the parents’ counsel to subpoena him.
3 ¶ 11 The caseworker’s supervisor, however, testified on all three
days of the hearing. As relevant here, the supervisor testified that
the Department had (1) received a report that the caseworker
falsified records about contacts with children; (2) audited all the
caseworker’s cases; and (3) uncovered fraudulent activity in six of
those cases. The Department did not find fraudulent activity in this
case, but the audit revealed that the caseworker had failed to meet
obligations under several administrative regulations promulgated by
the Colorado Department of Human Services. See Dep’t of Hum.
Servs. Rules 7.301.22(B) and 7.304.64(A), 12 Code Colo. Regs.
2509-4. Specifically, the supervisor testified that the caseworker
had failed to regularly communicate with treatment providers,
submit family time plans to the court, or hold regular staffing and
family engagement meetings.
¶ 12 The caseworker was terminated from his employment the day
before the second day of the termination hearing.
C. Analysis
¶ 13 Both parents contend that there was “no justifiable reason not
to subpoena” the caseworker because his testimony was needed “to
address and resolve concerns about the caseworker’s conduct,
4 whether it impacted this case, and the completeness of the record.”
We need not consider the merits of parents’ complaints about their
attorneys’ performance, however, because we conclude that the
parents failed to allege with sufficient specificity that they were
prejudiced. See C.B., ¶ 6.
¶ 14 To show prejudice, a parent must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance or
unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. A.R., ¶ 60. To obtain a remand for an evidentiary
hearing, the parent must allege facts with sufficient specificity —
including, for example, the substance of any witness’s testimony
and how that testimony would have changed the result of the
proceeding. People In Int. of Ferguson, 2025 COA 82, ¶ 38 (citing
People In Int. of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 7). If the parent’s allegations
lack sufficient specificity, we may summarily deny the ineffective
assistance claim. C.H., 166 P.3d at 291.
¶ 15 Even assuming that trial counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, both parents have failed to
allege facts that, if proven, would demonstrate prejudice. Counsel
for both parents subpoenaed providers beyond those called by the
5 Department. In addition to the caseworker’s supervisor, counsel
elicited testimony from father’s substance dependence and
supervised family time providers, and from mother’s life skills,
therapeutic family time, domestic violence treatment, and sober
living providers. Neither parent explains with any specificity what
additional information the caseworker would have provided had he
been subpoenaed.
¶ 16 Critically, neither parent explains how direct testimony from
the caseworker about his own misconduct would have produced a
different outcome. The court, based on evidence presented by
parents’ counsel, stated that it was “furious with” the caseworker
due to his clear misconduct. Yet the court also found the
supervisor credible in her explanation of the Department’s audit
and found the treatment providers credible when they “came in here
and gave us the long and short.” Thus, even without the
caseworker’s testimony, the juvenile court had the information it
needed “to address and resolve concerns about the caseworker’s
conduct, whether it affected this case, and the completeness of the
record.”
6 ¶ 17 Because the parents’ allegations are not sufficiently specific or
compelling to constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective
assistance of counsel, we deny their claim. C.H., 166 P.3d at 291.
III. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 18 Next, both mother and father contend that the juvenile court
erred by finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate them. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 19 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not
complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the
plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the
parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a
reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of
E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 10.
¶ 20 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile
7 court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data
underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they
have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,
¶ 10. But we review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions
based on those facts. See id. In particular, the ultimate
determination of whether the Department provided reasonable
efforts is a legal conclusion we review de novo. People in Interest of
A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.
¶ 21 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the
sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to
assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,
249-50 (Colo. 2010).
B. Applicable Law
¶ 22 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under
section 19-3-604(1)(c), a department must make reasonable efforts
to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114),
19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. Reasonable
efforts means the “exercise of diligence and care” for a child who is
in out-of-home placement, and the reasonable efforts standard is
8 satisfied when services are provided in accordance with section
19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 23 The services that “must be available and provided” as
determined by individual case planning include: screening,
assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;
home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral
services to available public and private assistance resources; family
time services for parents with children in out-of-home placement;
and placement services including foster care and emergency shelter.
§ 19-3-208(2)(b). Additional services may be required if funding is
available, including transportation, childcare, diagnostic and
mental health services, drug and alcohol treatment services, and
family support services. § 19-3-208(2)(d).
¶ 24 Whether a department made reasonable efforts should be
“measured holistically.” People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11,
¶ 11. A parent is ultimately responsible for using the services
offered by a department, and the juvenile court “may therefore
consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment when
determining whether a department made reasonable efforts.” Id. at
¶ 12.
9 C. The Caseworker’s Misconduct Did Not Foreclose a Finding of Reasonable Efforts
¶ 25 Both parents claim the caseworker’s misconduct should have
led the juvenile court to find that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts.
¶ 26 But the juvenile court found that the Department made
reasonable efforts despite the caseworker’s misconduct. The court
found, with record support, that the Department maintained
regular contact with both parents; provided gas and phones; offered
to pay for mother’s sober living upon completion of inpatient
treatment; paid for repairs on father’s truck; facilitated family time;
and sent out “lots of referrals” for services, benefits, and resources
for both parents. The court also found that “reasonable efforts were
tempered by the parents’ inability, unwillingness to engage” in
services, and their decision to live far outside of town. Neither
parent contests these factual findings.
1. Father’s Reasonable Efforts Claims
¶ 27 Father contends that the caseworker’s “work on this case
should not be accepted to withstand a clear and convincing
burden.” The juvenile court, however, made clear that it did not
10 rely on the caseworker’s work — his notes or representations to
others — in making its decision. Father also asserts that he was
unable to complete treatment “due to communication issues and
case mismanagement.” The record belies this claim. Father’s
treatment provider established that father was discharged
unsuccessfully — after consultation with the caseworker — because
of his failure to consistently attend treatment or participate in
required urinalysis testing. Father further claims that the
caseworker failed to schedule regular family team meetings.
Section 19-3-208, however, does not require family team meetings
or case management. Moreover, father does not explain — and we
cannot discern — how family team meetings would have made a
difference when father himself testified that he did not follow
through with treatment and simply “forgot to do the class” that he
was referred to.
¶ 28 Father also claims that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts because it did not support family time in the
community or with a third-party supervisor. The record suggests
otherwise. Father offered uncontested testimony that he regularly
saw the children for six hours a week at a supervision center and in
11 the community. The juvenile court further found, with record
support, that the Department attempted to use third-party
supervisors for father’s family time but discontinued the
arrangement because the supervisors were not following the rules
or being protective of the children.
¶ 29 Father also claims that his family time “remained stagnated”
and should have expanded beyond the supervised level. The level of
supervision for family time, however, is within the juvenile court’s
purview, not the Department’s. People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d
1067, 1070-71 (Colo. App. 2005) (Family time orders are always
“subject to the continuing supervision and review by the trial court,
which, in the final analysis, retains ultimate decision-making
authority in the case.”). Moreover, father never asked the juvenile
court to liberalize his family time. In any event, the court found,
with record support, that it “just couldn’t liberalize and expand time
because, well, we still are concerned about his sobriety.”
¶ 30 We therefore discern no error in the juvenile court’s finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father,
notwithstanding the caseworker’s misconduct.
12 2. Mother’s Reasonable Efforts Claims
¶ 31 Mother contends that “through the inaction of the
caseworker,” the Department “did not meet its most basic
standards for case management, as laid out in Volume 7.” The
caseworker’s failure to meet those standards was uncontested.
¶ 32 Section 19-3-208 — not the Department’s regulations —
identifies the services required to satisfy the reasonable efforts
obligation. See People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo.
App. 2011); see also § 19-3-208(2)(b) (outlining required services);
§ 19-3-208(2)(d) (identifying additional services required if sufficient
funding is available). Nothing in section 19-3-208 requires the
Department to make monthly contacts with treatment providers,
provide comprehensive case management services, or facilitate
regular family engagement meetings. Mother cites no legal
authority for her suggestion that a caseworker’s failure to provide
these particular services constitutes a failure of reasonable efforts.1
1 To the extent father had concerns about the caseworker’s conduct,
the Children’s Code and Department regulations provide ways to address such concerns. See § 19-3-211, C.R.S. 2025; Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Reg. 7.606, 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-7.
13 ¶ 33 Mother argues that the caseworker’s poor communication
hindered the effectiveness of services provided to meet her basic
needs, in effect holding her “back from being able to work on other
needs and being successful in this case.” Mother’s life skills
provider testified that what the Department was supposed to be
helping mother with was a “source of confusion this entire time,”
and that the caseworker’s failure to communicate a clear answer
made it more difficult to determine what assistance mother needed.
The juvenile court, however, also heard from mother’s long-time
domestic violence treatment provider, who opined that mother had
“lots of options, choices, times” to complete her treatment plan.
The provider furthered testified that mother “had the support” and
that “[r]esources were available,” but that she made excuses “that
stopped that from happening.” Finally, the provider testified that
“ultimately, [mother]’s actions have led us to where we are today.”
We will not reweigh this evidence. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 256. The
juvenile court, as the trier of fact, is entrusted to weigh conflicting
evidence and assess witness credibility. See In re Marriage of Kann,
2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed
unbridled confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”);
14 see also Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo. 1999)
(recognizing “the trial court’s unique role and perspective in
evaluating the demeanor and body language of live witnesses” and
“discourag[ing] an appellate court from second-guessing those
judgments based on a cold record”).
¶ 34 Because mother does not dispute that the Department made
the appropriate referrals for services required under section
19-3-208, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err by finding
that the Department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation.
IV. Fit Within a Reasonable Time
¶ 35 Father also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding
that he could not become fit within a reasonable time. We are not
convinced.
¶ 36 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders
them “unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care
to include, at a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently
adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health
needs and conditions.” § 19-3-604(2). In determining whether a
parent’s conduct or condition is likely to change within a reasonable
time, “the court may consider whether any change has occurred
15 during the proceeding, the parent’s social history, and the chronic
or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition.” People in
Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24. A parent’s noncompliance
with a treatment plan generally “demonstrates a lack of
commitment to meeting the child’s needs and, therefore, may also
be considered in determining unfitness.” People in Interest of D.P.,
181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008). In determining unfitness, the
court may also consider the statutorily prescribed factors, including
the parent’s past involvement with a department of human services
or juvenile court, the parent’s use of illegal substances, and
whether a department provided reasonable efforts. § 19-3-604(2).
¶ 37 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific and must
be determined by considering the physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs of the particular child. S.Z.S., ¶ 25. When, as
here, the child is under six years old at the time the petition is filed,
the action is subject to the expedited permanency planning
provisions, and the court must consider the child’s need to be
placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as possible.
§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2025.
16 ¶ 38 The juvenile court found that father was unfit and unlikely to
become fit within a reasonable time. The court noted that the child
was two years old and that “a reasonable period of time has
passed.” The court further found that the child, who had
“extraordinary needs,” could not wait any longer for father to
become fit.
¶ 39 Father claims that he made “consistent, significant changes
during the course of the proceeding.” The record shows otherwise.
Father testified that he did not follow through with domestic
violence treatment and was not participating in treatment for
substance dependence or mental health. The caseworker’s
supervisor, an expert in child protection and child welfare, opined
that father demonstrated “minimal compliance” with the treatment
plan and exhibited the same problems — substance dependence
and domestic violence — that had necessitated Department
involvement nearly three years earlier.
¶ 40 To the extent father claims that he could have become fit
within a reasonable time with a different caseworker, we disagree.
The court found, with record support, that father’s substance
dependence — not any misconduct by the caseworker — prevented
17 him from engaging in treatment, progressing in family time, or
obtaining stability. And the court properly noted that the child’s
siblings had been the subject of multiple dependency and neglect
actions. See § 19-3-604(2)(i) (permitting the juvenile court to
consider a parent’s prior involvement with a department in
determining unfitness).
¶ 41 We therefore discern no basis for reversal.
V. Conclusion
¶ 42 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.