Peo in Interest of DEPH

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 27, 2024
• Docket: 24CA0812
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0812 Peo in Interest of DEPH 11-27-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0812 Adams County District Court No. 22JV30042 Honorable Emily Lieberman, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of D.E.P.H., a Child,

and Concerning C.R.P.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Tow and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 27, 2024

Heidi M. Miller, County Attorney, Conor Hagerty, Assistant County Attorney, Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 C.R.P.1 appeals the juvenile court’s judgment terminating their

parent-child legal relationship with D.E.P.H. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Adams County Department of Human Services

investigated reports that C.R.P. physically abused the then-five-

year-old child, causing approximately twenty bruises on his arm

and possible injury to his jaw. C.R.P. attempted suicide and was

hospitalized. The court granted the Department temporary legal

and physical custody of the child. After the Department filed a

petition in dependency and neglect, C.R.P. admitted the petition,

and the court adopted a treatment plan for them.

¶3 The treatment plan required C.R.P. to (1) maintain contact

with case professionals and sign releases of information; (2) engage

in life skills services; (3) complete a mental health evaluation and

follow through with any treatment recommendations; (4) engage in

a domestic violence educational program; and (5) participate in

family time with the child.

1 C.R.P. is identified as the mother in the case documents but uses

they/them pronouns in the opening brief, so we do too.

1 ¶4 Approximately ten months after the court adopted the

treatment plan, the Department moved to terminate C.R.P.’s

parental rights. About a month later, C.R.P. alleged the

Department was not providing reasonable efforts contending that,

because the Department was not providing appropriate

transportation and had placed C.R.P. in a “high risk track” for

supervised family time, it was not adequately supporting C.R.P.’s

access to family time with the child. The juvenile court disagreed

and terminated C.R.P.’s parental rights.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶5 C.R.P. contends that the juvenile court erred when it found

that the Department made reasonable efforts. Specifically, C.R.P.

asserts that the Department failed to assist them with

transportation and visitation. We are not convinced.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 As relevant here, before a juvenile court may terminate

parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, the

county department of human services must make reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate parents and reunite families. §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-1-

103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. “Reasonable

2 efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and care” to reunify parents

with their children. § 19-1-103(114).

¶7 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). Among the

services required under section 19-3-208 are screenings,

assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;

home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral

services to available public and private assistance resources; family

time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). But the parent is

ultimately responsible for using the services to comply with the

plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App.

2011).

¶8 Whether a department of human services satisfied its

obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and

law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the

juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its

legal determination, based on those findings, as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

3 B. Transportation Support

¶9 The caseworker, whom the court qualified as an expert in

social work with an emphasis in child protection, testified

concerning the many efforts she made to overcome C.R.P.’s

transportation barriers to complying with the treatment plan. The

juvenile court found, and the record supports, that C.R.P. often

chose not to accept the support.

¶ 10 Initially, C.R.P. reported that they had a friend who could help

with transportation, but that “fell through after a period of time.”

The Department also offered C.R.P. bus passes, but they never

accessed them. Later, C.R.P. reported that they could not take the

bus to family time due to their disabilities.

¶ 11 The Department then investigated a supervised parenting

provider located closer to C.R.P.’s home, but that provider had a

long waitlist. The caseworker spoke with C.R.P.’s attorney and

social worker about getting them “set up with Access-A-Ride,” but

C.R.P. did not complete medical documentation necessary to initiate

that service and did not follow up with the caseworker’s offer to help

with filling out that paperwork. The Department gave C.R.P. at

least one gift card for a ride service to and from family time. After

4 trying to use the card, C.R.P. canceled their ride because it would

not get them to the visit on time. Then, because C.R.P. would not

confirm that they would use a gift card to get to family time, no

further cards were provided. C.R.P. was also offered transportation

through life skills services, but they did not indicate that they were

willing to engage with life skills.

C. Family Time Support

¶ 12 When the case opened, the Department referred C.R.P. to

several supervised parenting time providers, but C.R.P. did not

engage with family time. See People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d

1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011) (the parent is ultimately responsible

for using services to comply with the plan). C.R.P. was inconsistent

with family time attendance, and behaved inappropriately when

they did visit the child. For instance, C.R.P. vaped during family

time, and once aggressively drove their car toward a family time

facilitator.

¶ 13 C.R.P. was later restricted to a high-risk track for supervised

family time at the Department, which included security due to

C.R.P.’s “violent threats or behaviors that have been observed.” The

5 high-risk track prevented C.R.P. from spending family time in a

public place or with a provider closer to their home.

¶ 14 The caseworker testified that she set up many meetings with

other professionals to “work with [C.R.P.] on their family time to

address any barriers and to support [C.R.P.] so they were able to

see [the child] consistently.” Specifically, the caseworker “had

discussions with [C.R.P] and their attorney around what . . . the

expectation was to drop down from the high-risk track.” Based on

agreements reached at the meetings, C.R.P. was removed from the

high-risk family time track. Still, after the Department referred

them to two different agencies, C.R.P. did not engage. See People in

Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12 (a court may consider a

parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining

whether the department made reasonable efforts).

¶ 15 The court’s findings are supported by the record, and we will

not disturb them. Based on these findings we conclude the court’s

determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to

provide C.R.P. with transportation assistance and to assist C.R.P.

with visitation was not erroneous.

6 ¶ 16 C.R.P. mentions other complaints about communication with

the caseworker and treatment providers. Because of our conclusion

above, to the extent C.R.P. points to these complaints as separate

claims of error, we need not address them. And, in any event, the

complaints are undeveloped. See Taylor v. Taylor, 2016 COA 100, ¶

13 (declining to address conclusory arguments unsupported by

substantial argument).

III. Disposition

¶ 17 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.