Peo in Interest of Deherrera

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: 26CA0670
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

26CA0670 Peo in Interest of Deherrera 07-09-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0670 Pueblo County District Court No. 26MH30042 Honorable Gregory J. Styduhar, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Jessica Esmeralda Deherrera,

Respondent-Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Pawar and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 9, 2026

Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, Kate H. Shafer, Special Assistant County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Respondent, Jessica Esmeralda Deherrera, appeals the district

court’s order authorizing the staff at the Colorado Mental Health

Hospital in Pueblo (the hospital) to involuntarily medicate her.

Because the appeal is moot, we dismiss it.

I. Background

¶2 In November 2025, Deherrera was committed to the

Department of Human Services after being found incompetent to

proceed in a criminal case. This was Deherrera’s second

hospitalization, having been found incompetent to proceed in the

same criminal case in 2023.

¶3 In January 2026, Deherrera was admitted to the hospital for

inpatient competency restoration treatment. She was diagnosed

with bipolar disorder with psychotic features and presented with

thought disorganization, paranoid delusional thought content,

mood lability, and incongruent affect.

¶4 In March 2026, Deherrera’s treating psychiatrist at the

hospital sought an order to involuntarily medicate her with two

antipsychotic medications and one mood stabilizing medication.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing, after which the court

made the findings required by People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973

1 (Colo. 1985), and entered an order authorizing the requested

medications.

¶5 Deherrera appealed the order, arguing that the district court

erred by finding that the evidence satisfied the Medina factors.

After the notice of appeal was filed but before briefing concluded,

the district court presiding over Deherrera’s criminal case issued an

order terminating her competency restoration commitment and

ordered the hospital to release her. This court then issued an order

directing Deherrera to show cause why the appeal shouldn’t be

dismissed as moot.

II. Compliance with C.A.R. 3.5(b)(4)

¶6 C.A.R. 3.5 was recently revised as follows:

If subsequent orders regarding medication or certification are entered by the district court, or if subsequent events affect the judgment from which appellant initially appealed, counsel for appellant must, within 14 days after entry of the subsequent order or occurrence of the subsequent event, file an appropriate notice or motion informing the Court of that subsequent order or event.

C.A.R. 3.5(b)(4). The written order terminating Deherrera’s

commitment to the hospital was issued on May 6, 2026, one day

before counsel filed Deherrera’s opening brief. However, counsel

2 never filed an appropriate notice or motion as required by C.A.R.

3.5(b)(4).

¶7 We are aware that counsel has twice previously been

admonished by divisions of this court for her failure to notify this

court of subsequent events that have affected the order being

appealed even though those events occurred before the opening

brief was filed. See People in Interest of Oderson, slip op. at ¶ 4 n.1

(Colo. App. No. 25CA2062, Dec. 24, 2025) (not published pursuant

to C.A.R. 35(e)) (counsel failed to alert the division that respondent’s

treatment was terminated two days after the notice of appeal was

filed); People in Interest of Johansson, slip op. at ¶ 10 n.1 (Colo.

App. No. 25CA2266, Feb. 5, 2026) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(e)) (counsel failed to alert the division that respondent’s

treatment was terminated eight days after the notice of appeal was

filed).

¶8 “We expect counsel to read, be familiar with, and comply with

the Colorado Appellate Rules.” Patterson Recall Comm., Inc. v.

Patterson, 209 P.3d 1210, 1220 (Colo. App. 2009). We therefore

remind Deherrera’s counsel for a third time of her professional duty

of candor to this court, Colo. RPC 3.3, and the obligation to include

3 all relevant facts in her brief, C.A.R. 28(a)(5). We likewise remind

counsel of the obligation to notify this court within fourteen days

after an event has occurred that affects the judgment on appeal.

C.A.R. 3.5(b)(4).

¶9 Counsel is admonished that future noncompliance with the

appellate rules may result in referral to the Office of Attorney

Regulation Counsel or other sanctions. See C.A.R. 38(a).

III. Mootness

¶ 10 Deherrera acknowledges that she has been released from the

hospital and is no longer subject to the involuntary treatment order

challenged on appeal. But in response to the show cause order, she

contends that the appeal shouldn’t be dismissed as moot because it

falls within various exceptions to the mootness doctrine, namely (1)

issues capable of repetition but evading review; (2) issues involving

matters of significant public importance; and (3) issues carrying

continuing collateral consequences. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 Whether a case is moot is a legal question that we review de

novo. DePriest v. People, 2021 CO 40, ¶ 8.

4 B. Analysis

¶ 12 A case is moot when a judgment would have no practical effect

on an existing controversy. People in Interest of L.O.L., 197 P.3d

291, 293 (Colo. App. 2008); see also People in Interest of

Vivekanathan, 2013 COA 143M, ¶ 14 (When a case is moot, “[a]ny

decision on the merits would result in an advisory opinion, and we

should not issue such opinions.”). On appeal, Deherrera asks us to

vacate the underlying order authorizing the involuntary

administration of medication. But because Deherrera’s treatment

has been terminated and she is no longer being medicated against

her will, granting the requested relief would have no practical effect,

rendering the issue moot.

¶ 13 We realize that there are exceptions to the mootness doctrine.

For instance, a court may resolve an otherwise moot case when the

issue involved is one that is capable of repetition yet evading review.

People in Interest of Ofengand, 183 P.3d 688, 691 (Colo. App. 2008).

Similarly, a court may decide a moot case involving issues of great

public importance or recurring constitutional violations. Id.

5 1. Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review

¶ 14 In Ofengand, a division of this court applied the exception for

issues capable of repetition but evading review in a mental health

appeal involving involuntary medication administration. Ofengand,

183 P.3d at 691. But the appeal in Ofengand involved a specific

procedural issue that was likely to arise in other cases — that is,

whether the patient validly waived her right to counsel. Id. at 691-

92. Deherrera doesn’t raise a similar issue in this appeal. Rather,

she asserts only that the district court erred by finding that

sufficient evidence supported the requirements for the involuntary

administration of medication. These determinations are fact-

specific and turn on Deherrera’s condition at the time of the district

court’s findings. See Vivekanathan, ¶ 14. Thus, our ruling would

have no practical effect on an existing controversy. See id.

¶ 15 Still, Deherrera asserts that this matter is capable of repetition

yet evading review because involuntary medication orders

“frequently terminate before an appeal can be fully briefed and

decided.” In support, she directs our attention to People in Interest

of Hoylman, 865 P.2d 918, 920 (Colo. App. 1993), in which a

division of this court observed that, “[b]y its nature, an order for

6 short-term hospitalization, entered in a proceeding in which a

respondent has been denied a hearing before a jury, will expire

before the review of such an order may be had before an appellate

court.” (Emphasis added.) We don’t read Hoylman to hold, as

Deherrera suggests, that any case involving a mental health order is

categorically exempt from the mootness doctrine. Rather, like

Ofengand, Hoylman involved a procedural issue — the denial of a

hearing before a jury — that was capable of repetition yet evading

review. See Vivekanathan, ¶ 10 (including Holyman in a list of

cases involving procedural issues that were capable of repetition yet

evading review).

¶ 16 Even if Hoylman could be read to suggest that all mental

health orders are reviewable because they often expire before an

appellate court can review them, such a proposition is no longer

true today. We consistently review orders for involuntary

administration of medication before they expire. See C.A.R. 3.5(j)

(mandating expedited resolution of appeals involving orders entered

in mental health proceedings). We therefore reject Deherrera’s

contention that this matter is capable of repetition yet evading

review.

7 2. Issues of Great Public Importance

¶ 17 Next, Deherrera asserts that this appeal shouldn’t be

dismissed because it involves an issue of great public importance —

namely, the significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted

administration of antipsychotic medication. See Ofengand, 183

P.3d at 691. While mental health cases have the potential to

deprive respondents of significant liberties, there is no broad public

issue on appeal. Rather, the only issue before us is whether the

evidence was sufficient to involuntarily medicate Deherrera against

her will. Because that issue is unique to Deherrera, it’s not a

question of a public nature. Cf. People in Interest of O.C., 2013 CO

56, ¶ 10 (issue of whether relatives may intervene as matter of right

in termination and placement hearings is a matter of great public

importance); Humphrey v. Sw. Dev. Co., 734 P.2d 637, 639 (Colo.

1987) (issue impacting water court jurisdiction is a matter of great

public importance). Thus, we conclude that the public importance

exception to the mootness doctrine doesn’t apply.

3. Collateral Consequences

¶ 18 Finally, Deherrera asserts that this appeal isn’t moot because

collateral consequences will persist beyond the termination of the

8 underlying commitment. Under the collateral consequences

exception to the mootness doctrine, a case is moot “only if it is

shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal

consequences will be imposed.” DePriest, ¶ 9 (treating collateral

consequences as an exception to the mootness doctrine). We aren’t

persuaded.

¶ 19 The collateral consequences exception to mootness is often

invoked in the criminal context to allow a defendant to appeal a

criminal conviction that has ongoing collateral consequences even

though the defendant has already completed the underlying

sentence. See id., ¶ 10 (“Even if a sentence has been fully served,

an appeal of the underlying conviction is not moot if there is a

possibility that the conviction will give rise to collateral

consequences.”). Drawing from this principle, Deherrera asserts

that the judicial findings underlying the challenged involuntary

medication order — that she suffers from a qualifying mental

illness, lacks insight into that condition, and is incapable of

effectively participating in treatment decisions — could be

considered in future competency, restoration, or involuntary

9 treatment proceedings, or in other matters involving her mental

health status and decision-making capacity.

¶ 20 But Deherra doesn’t cite to any authority, and we aren’t aware

of any binding authority, applying the collateral consequences

exception to mootness in an involuntary treatment proceeding on

the grounds that an involuntary medication order might adversely

affect future competency, restoration, or other matters involving a

person’s mental health status and decision-making capacity.

¶ 21 We therefore reject Deherrera’s contention and conclude that

the appeal is moot. As a result, we don’t address the merits of her

appeal.

IV. Disposition

¶ 22 The appeal is dismissed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.