Peo in Interest of DAC

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 6, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1049
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1049 Peo in Interest of DAC 02-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1049 Jefferson County District Court No. 23JV30141 Honorable Lindsay VanGilder, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of D.A.C., a Child,

and Concerning D.C.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE YUN J. Jones and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 6, 2025

Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Sarah Oviatt, Assistant County Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee

Jeffrey C. Koy, Lauren Dingboom, Jordan Oates, Guardians Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, D.C. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationship with D.A.C. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In May 2023, the Jefferson County Division of Children,

Youth, and Families (the Division) filed a petition in dependency

and neglect regarding the then-newborn child and alleging concerns

about mother’s substance use. The Division alleged that the child’s

umbilical cord tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl

and that mother admitted to daily fentanyl use. The juvenile court

granted temporary legal custody to the Division, and the child was

placed with her maternal aunts.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected. The court adopted a treatment plan that required

mother to, among other things, complete a substance abuse

evaluation, attend substance abuse treatment, participate in

random sobriety monitoring, attend supervised family time, and

cooperate with the Division.

1 ¶4 The Division later moved to terminate mother’s parental rights.

Approximately one year after the petition was filed, the juvenile

court granted the termination motion following a contested hearing.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶5 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by determining

that the Division made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and

reunify her with the child. We disagree.

A. Preservation

¶6 The Division contends that mother’s reasonable efforts

argument is unpreserved because she waited until the termination

hearing to raise it. Divisions of this court are split on whether a

parent must challenge a department’s reasonable efforts prior to the

termination hearing to preserve the issue for appellate review.

Compare People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 916 (Colo. App.

2011) (holding that a parent’s failure to object to services does not

bar appellate review of a reasonable efforts finding), with People in

Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 355-56 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining

to review a reasonable efforts finding because the parent failed to

object to services before the termination hearing). However, we

need not determine whether mother preserved her reasonable

2 efforts argument because even if we assume she did, we discern no

basis for reversal.

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶8 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court

must consider whether the department of human services made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024; S.N-V., 300 P.3d

at 911. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and

care” for children who are in out-of-home placement.

§ 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024. Services provided in accordance with

section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2024, satisfy the reasonable efforts

standard. § 19-1-103(114).

3 ¶9 Under section 19-3-208, a department must provide

screenings, assessments, and individual case plans for the

provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;

information and referral services to available public and private

assistance resources; family time services; and placement services.

§ 19-3-208(2)(b). And, if funding is available, section 19-3-208

requires a department to provide services such as transportation;

diagnostic and mental health services; and drug and alcohol

services. § 19-3-208(2)(d).

¶ 10 In determining whether a department made reasonable efforts,

a juvenile court should consider the totality of the circumstances

and account for all services and resources provided to a parent,

measuring them holistically rather than in isolation with respect to

specific treatment plan objectives. See People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35.

¶ 11 A parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to

obtain the assistance needed to comply with the treatment plan.

People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).

A juvenile court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to

participate in treatment as a factor in determining whether a

4 department made reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of A.V.,

2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

¶ 12 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile

court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal

determination that a department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parent. Id.

C. Analysis

¶ 13 The juvenile court found, with record support, that the

Division made reasonable efforts to provide rehabilitative services to

mother. Specifically, the caseworker testified that, when the case

was opened, she referred mother for a substance abuse intake and

evaluation at Creative Treatment Options (CTO), and that the

referral was still open at the time of the termination hearing. CTO

attempted to contact mother on numerous occasions throughout

the proceedings, but mother never set up the intake or completed

the evaluation. The caseworker also discussed inpatient treatment

and sober living options with mother, but mother said she was

unwilling to “be in a structured environment.” The record indicates

5 that the Division set up random urinalysis (UA) testing, but mother

never provided any UAs. The Division set up supervised family

time, initially requiring professional supervision but eventually

allowing kin to supervise. Even so, mother only saw the child eight

times throughout the year-long proceedings. The caseworker also

referred mother to CTO for a mental health evaluation, but mother

never scheduled the appointment. And although the caseworker

referred mother to the Public Nurse Collaboration Program, mother

declined the services they offered to her.

¶ 14 We acknowledge that, unfortunately, mother was assaulted

three months after this case was opened. As a result, she spent

approximately three weeks in a hospital and another six weeks in a

long-term care facility. But we are not persuaded by mother’s

argument that the Division failed to meet its reasonable efforts

burden because it did not provide appropriate services while she

was in long-term care or accommodations for her injuries.

¶ 15 First, the record indicates that the caseworker visited mother

at the long-term care facility and discussed treatment options.

Second, the Division coordinated kin-supervised family time while

mother was in the long-term care facility, and the child visited her

6 there on at least five occasions. Third, the caseworker testified that

although CTO typically requires an intake to be in-person, the

caseworker contacted CTO and requested an exception for mother

because she was in long-term care. CTO agreed to allow mother to

do her intake over the phone, and the caseworker provided mother

with the information she needed to set up the appointment.

¶ 16 We reject mother’s argument that the Division failed to meet

its reasonable efforts burden because the caseworker did not

arrange for mother to do her UAs at the hospital or long-term care

facility during the time she was there. When mother was at the

long-term care facility, her counsel told the court that she

“obviously” could not do UAs until she was discharged. In its ruling

on the termination motion, the juvenile court gave mother “some

leeway” for her missed UAs during the time she was in the hospital

and long-term care facility. And even excluding the nine weeks that

mother was in the hospital and long-term care facility, the record

indicates that the Division set up approximately ten months of

sobriety monitoring for her. Nonetheless, mother never provided

any UAs. See A.V., ¶ 12 (a parent’s unwillingness to participate in

services can be considered in determining whether a department

7 made reasonable efforts). Thus, we are not convinced that the

caseworker’s failure to attempt to arrange UAs at the hospital or

long-term care facility would have had any impact on the court’s

determination of whether the Division met its reasonable efforts

burden or, in general, the outcome of the case. See C.A.R. 35(c).

¶ 17 We also reject mother’s argument that the caseworker’s failure

to thoroughly discuss mother’s injuries with the medical providers

or request an evaluation from the long-term care facility constituted

a lack of “diligence and care” in determining what services mother

needed. Although her position is somewhat unclear, mother seems

to argue that if the caseworker had better understood mother’s

injuries, then the Division could have provided better services. But

mother does not identify what additional services were necessary to

rehabilitate her.

¶ 18 To the extent mother asserts that the Division should have

facilitated a brain injury evaluation to assess what additional

services were necessary, the record indicates that the caseworker

attempted to provide such an evaluation when mother requested it.

Specifically, the caseworker testified that mother’s counsel

requested a brain injury evaluation approximately five months after

8 mother’s discharge from long-term care, which was about two

months before the termination hearing. At that point, the

caseworker updated the referral to CTO so that it included a mental

health evaluation. She confirmed that the mental health evaluation

would include a brain injury assessment and that CTO would refer

mother to the Colorado Brain Injury Alliance if the assessment

indicated that mother needed such a referral. Moreover, the

caseworker referred mother to the Public Nurse Collaboration

Program “to discuss care coordination and offer additional referrals

if needed.” The Division also held a family engagement meeting to

discuss different treatment options for mother, and the public

nurse attended that meeting, but mother did not. Thereafter, the

caseworker referred mother to a disability advocate at Jefferson

County Human Services. But mother did not follow up with any of

these referrals, and she specifically declined the services offered by

the public nurse.

¶ 19 Based on the foregoing, we do not perceive any error in the

juvenile court’s determination that the Division made reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunite her with the child.

9 III. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 20 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by determining

that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. She

argues that, based on the Division’s failure to make reasonable

efforts to provide appropriate services, the court should have found

that giving mother more time to work on her treatment plan was a

less drastic alternative to termination. But this claim is predicated

on the argument that the Division failed to make reasonable efforts,

and we have rejected that argument. Thus, mother’s claim fails.

IV. Disposition

¶ 21 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE BROWN concur.