25CA0465 Peo in Interest of CLH 08-21-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0465 Montrose County District Court No. 23JV30029 Honorable D. Cory Jackson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of C.L.H. Jr., Jas.L.H., and Jax.L.H., Children,
and Concerning A.L.R. and C.M.H. Sr.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Welling and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 21, 2025
Julie R. Andress, County Attorney, Montrose, Colorado, for Appellee
Alison A. Bettenberg, Guardian Ad Litem
Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, Colorado, for Appellant A.L.R.
Just Law Group LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant C.M.H. Sr. ¶1 A.L.R. (mother) and C.M.H. Sr. (father) appeal the judgment
terminating their parent-child legal relationships with C.L.H. Jr.,
Jas.L.H., and Jax.L.H. (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In September 2023, the Montrose County Department of
Human Services (the Department) received a report that law
enforcement had conducted a welfare check at father’s home and
observed an infected wound on the youngest child’s chin. After the
child was admitted at the hospital, the caseworker suggested a
safety plan to father, but he refused and threatened to discharge
the child from the hospital. Based on concerns of medical neglect,
as well as father’s substance use, the Department removed the
children and filed a petition in dependency or neglect.
¶3 The parents admitted to the petition, and the juvenile court
adjudicated the children dependent or neglected. The court then
held a dispositional hearing and adopted treatment plans for the
parents. The parents’ treatment plans required them to cooperate
with the Department and treatment providers, address their
substance abuse and mental health issues, attend family time,
1 participate in parenting education and life skills, provide a safe and
stable home for the children, and comply with their criminal cases.
¶4 In August 2024, the Department moved to terminate the
parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court held a three-day
evidentiary hearing. The juvenile court granted the Department’s
motion and terminated the parent-child legal relationships between
the parents and the children under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S.
2025.
II. Mother’s Appeal
¶5 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by admitting into
evidence the children’s hair follicle test results. We need not reach
the merits of mother’s contention because assuming that the
juvenile court erred, any error is harmless.
¶6 An error in the admission of evidence is harmless if it does not
affect a party’s substantial rights. See CRE 103(a); C.R.C.P. 61. An
error affects a substantial right if it can be said with fair assurance
that it substantially influenced the case’s outcome or impaired the
basic fairness of the trial. People in Interest of R.J., 2019 COA 109,
¶ 22.
2 ¶7 At the termination hearing, the juvenile court admitted
documents showing that all three children tested positive for
methamphetamine in September 2023, shortly before the
Department initiated this case. It is undisputed that the children
were in father’s care during this time. The caseworker testified
that, when the test results came back positive, the Department
knew that father was responsible for the children’s exposure
because mother “had not even been in the State.” Ultimately, father
admitted that he had exposed the children to methamphetamine,
resulting in the positive test results.
¶8 Therefore, the record shows that father, not mother, exposed
the children to methamphetamine. Neither the Department nor the
guardian ad litem argued that mother had exposed them, and the
juvenile court did not mention the children’s drug tests in its ruling,
much less attribute their positive results to mother’s actions. We
therefore cannot see how this evidence could be used against
mother to justify termination. Indeed, on appeal, mother provides
no explanation as to how this evidence caused her any prejudice.
¶9 And regardless of the court admitting this evidence, the record
supports the juvenile court’s ruling to terminate mother’s parental
3 rights. The court acknowledged mother’s inpatient treatment, but it
had concerns with mother’s ability to remain sober given her long
history of use. At the time of the termination hearing, mother did
not have a job, nor did she have a place to live where the children
could live with her. Mother acknowledged that she did not have
permanent housing, admitting she did not know long it would take
for her to secure a job and stable housing following inpatient
treatment and a period of time at sober living. The court also noted
that mother had failed to make all family visits. The court reasoned
that the recent engagement — while commendable — was “simply
too late in the case to know whether” mother’s treatment would
rehabilitate her “and address the issues that led this case to open.”
¶ 10 Therefore, we conclude that any putative error in the
admission of this evidence is harmless, and we reject mother’s
contention.
III. Father’s Appeal
A. Fit Within a Reasonable Time
¶ 11 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
he could not become fit within a reasonable time. We disagree.
4 1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 12 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
under section 19-3-604 is a mixed question of fact and law. People
in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s
factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal
conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,
2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
¶ 13 To terminate parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the
juvenile court must find, among other things, that (1) the parent is
unfit and (2) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change
within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(II), (III). A parent is unfit
if the parent’s conduct or condition renders the parent unable or
unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care. People in
Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). When
deciding whether a parent can become fit within a reasonable time,
the court may consider whether any change has occurred during
the proceeding, the parent’s social history, and the chronic or
long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition. People in
Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003).
5 2. Analysis
¶ 14 The juvenile court found that father was unfit based, in large
part, on his substance abuse issues. See § 19-3-604(2)(e) (a parent
may be unfit based on “[e]xcessive use of intoxicating liquors or
controlled substances”). Although the court recognized that father
had made some progress by entering an inpatient treatment facility
forty-five days before the termination hearing, it did not believe that
he could become fit within a reasonable time. See People in Interest
of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. 1998) (even “increased
compliance” over the course of a case may not justify additional
time). In doing so, the court noted father’s overall lack of progress
over nearly sixteen months and the children’s need for permanency,
and it concluded that it was not in the children’s best interests to
“keep the case open to see if [father’s] late engagement [would]
permanently rehabilitate” him. See People in Interest of A.J., 143
P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006) (a court must consider the
child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs in
deciding what constitutes a reasonable time).
¶ 15 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. It is
undisputed that father had a long history of substance abuse and
6 that he was using methamphetamine when the children were
removed from his care. Father did not successfully comply with
outpatient treatment, and he admitted to using substances during
the case. Father tested positive for methamphetamine when he
entered inpatient treatment in December 2024. The caseworker
also testified that the children needed permanency as soon as
possible and that they could not wait for father to continue working
on his sobriety.
¶ 16 Although father made progress toward becoming fit during the
case’s final two months, the evidence indicates that he still had
work to do. The deputy director at father’s inpatient treatment
facility testified that father had successfully completed phase one
(detoxication) and moved on to phase two (cognitive behavioral
therapy) of the three-phase program. Still, the deputy director
noted that, after graduating, father would need to enroll in intensive
outpatient treatment and reside in a sober living facility. Likewise,
the caseworker testified that, even if father successfully completed
inpatient treatment, he still needed to demonstrate sobriety outside
of a structured program, which could take significant time
considering father’s history of substance abuse.
7 ¶ 17 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that he
could not become fit within a reasonable time because the record
shows that he made “substantial progress” during the case.
Specifically, he points to the evidence establishing his progress over
the case’s last two months, along with other favorable evidence,
such as evidence that he completed parenting education, had stable
housing, and performed well at family time with the children. He
also asserts that, because the record shows that he was on the
“cusp of becoming fit,” the children’s need for permanency was not
a “sufficient justification” to terminate his parental rights.
¶ 18 Although we acknowledge that there is evidence supporting
father’s position, there is also ample evidence, as described above,
supporting the juvenile court’s decision. We must therefore reject
father’s argument because it would require us to reweigh the
evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court,
which we cannot do. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133,
¶ 29.
8 B. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 19 Father argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that the
Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him and reunify
him with the children. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 20 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make
reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in
Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile
court’s factual findings for clear error and review de novo its legal
determination, based on those findings, as to whether the
department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.
¶ 21 In deciding whether to terminate parental rights, the juvenile
court must consider whether the department made reasonable
efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the parent with the
child. See §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025.
The reasonable efforts standard is satisfied if the department
provides appropriate services in accordance with section 19-3-208.
§ 19-1-103(114). These services may include (1) screening,
assessments, and individual case plans; (2) home-based family and
9 crisis counseling; (3) information and referral services; (4) family
time; and (5) placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).
2. Analysis
¶ 22 Relying on the caseworker’s testimony, the juvenile court
found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate father, but he did not adequately participate in the
services to become a fit parent. See People in Interest of A.V., 2012
COA 210, ¶ 12 (the court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to
participate in determining whether the department made
reasonable efforts). The record supports the court’s findings.
Among other things, the record shows that the Department
provided father with a substance abuse evaluation and referred him
to outpatient treatment services, but as described above, father did
not comply with those services. The Department also provided
father with sobriety monitoring, parenting classes, and supervised
family time.
¶ 23 Still, father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts because the
Department did not timely provide him with substance abuse
resources. We are not persuaded.
10 ¶ 24 In January 2024, father’s treatment provider closed, and some
of the therapists who had worked there formed a new business.
Father told the caseworker that he wanted to remain with his
therapist at the new business, but the caseworker said that the
Department could not pay for treatment services there because it
did not have a contract with the new business. The caseworker
offered to refer father to an approved provider so the Department
could pay for his treatment, but he declined.
¶ 25 Father asserts that the Department delayed his treatment
because it did not give him a clear answer on whether it would pay
for his services at the new business. To the contrary, the
caseworker testified that she specifically told father that the
Department did not have a contract with the new business and
offered to refer him to a different provider. Father chose to remain
with his therapist, even though he knew that the Department could
not fund those services. Under these circumstances, we cannot say
that the juvenile court erred by finding that the Department made
reasonable efforts.
¶ 26 Father also submits that the Department (1) delayed referring
him to inpatient treatment after he requested it in July 2024 and (2)
11 refused to pay for that treatment after his Medicaid lapsed. As to
the former, the caseworker testified that when she discussed
inpatient treatment with father in July 2024, he said that “he
wanted to prove to the Department that he could do it without being
in-patient.” As to the latter, the caseworker said that the
Department did not have additional funds to pay for inpatient
treatment services and had to rely on Medicaid for those services.
See § 19-3-208(2)(b)(V) (requiring departments to provide “[d]rug
and alcohol treatment services” only if additional funding is
available). Regardless, the caseworker testified that father did not
request inpatient services or tell her about the Medicaid issue until
November 2024, and she could not do anything at that point
because she did not have contact with father again until she
discovered that he was already enrolled in treatment.
¶ 27 Finally, father argues that the Department failed to develop an
appropriate treatment plan because the plan did not address
domestic violence. The caseworker testified that domestic violence
was not included as a separate component because it was not one
of the issues that necessitated the case’s filing. The caseworker
said that those issues became a concern later in the case but noted
12 that they could be addressed through father’s mental health
component and his individual treatment requirement. Therefore,
the record shows that, although the treatment plan did not include
a domestic violence component, the Department made efforts to
address those issues by providing father with mental health and
substance abuse services. We therefore discern no error.
C. Less Drastic Alternative
¶ 28 Finally, father submits that the juvenile court erred by finding
that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We
disagree.
¶ 29 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-
604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122
(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must
give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).
¶ 30 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately
meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.
A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the court considers a less drastic
13 alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best
interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order
termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we must
affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the
record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.
¶ 31 Initially, the Department placed the children with paternal
relatives, but it removed them in June 2024 and placed them in
foster care. The Department investigated maternal relatives for
placement, including two home studies in other states, but it did
not find any relatives who were appropriate and willing to accept
placement.
¶ 32 According to the caseworker, father requested that the
Department investigate his stepfather as a placement option after
the Department had already moved to terminate in August 2024.
The caseworker performed a preliminary background check and
discovered that stepfather had several referrals with his own
daughter for neglect and physical abuse. The Department also had
concerns that stepfather could not be a long-term placement
because he remained married to paternal grandmother, who had
14 her own serious substance abuse issues. Ultimately, the
caseworker admitted that she never reached out to stepfather
because there were too many issues that could not be mitigated.
¶ 33 In contrast, father testified he had asked the Department to
investigate stepfather when the children were removed from the
relatives in June 2024. Likewise, stepfather testified that he had
called the Department and left several messages asking the
Department to consider him as a placement option, but no one from
the Department ever returned his calls.
¶ 34 Stepfather testified at the hearing that he was still willing to be
a placement for the children. Stepfather said that he had a good
relationship with the children, but he admitted that he had not had
any contact with them since 2023. He did not know about any of
the children’s special needs and claimed that the children “never
needed any behavioral things.” And in stepfather’s opinion, father
had always met the children’s needs.
¶ 35 Based on this record, the juvenile court rejected less drastic
alternatives to termination. In doing so, the court rejected an APR
to stepfather as a less drastic alternative to termination because (1)
the Department ruled him out and (2) “based on his testimony, he
15 [did] not appear to be able to meet the children’s needs.” Finally,
based on the caseworker’s expert opinion, the court found that an
APR would not be in the children’s best interest because they
needed the permanency of an adoption. See People in Interest of
A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 41 (an APR to a relative is not a less
drastic alternative to termination when it does not provide adequate
permanency or otherwise meet the children’s needs).
¶ 36 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that
there was no less drastic alternative to termination for two reasons.
We disagree with both.
¶ 37 First, father asserts that the Department did not adequately
investigate a less drastic alternative involving “other members of the
[c]hildren’s extended family.” But father’s assertion fails because,
for purposes of less drastic alternatives, the Department only has a
duty to evaluate family members identified by the parents. See
People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 215 (Colo. App. 2007) (The
department is not obligated to “independently identify and evaluate
other possible placement alternatives.”). And father has not pointed
us to anything in the record to show that he suggested other family
members for placement.
16 ¶ 38 Second, father maintains that the Department did not
adequately evaluate stepfather. Although father and stepfather
testified about the Department’s lack of efforts in this area, the
caseworker provided contrary testimony that supported the court’s
decision. Because we cannot override the court’s credibility
determinations to reach a different decision, we reject father’s
assertion. See A.M., ¶ 15 (noting that witness credibility
determinations are left to the juvenile court’s sound discretion). In
any event, we also reject father’s assertion because, even assuming
that the stepfather was an appropriate placement option, the
juvenile court found, with record support, that an APR was not a
less drastic alternative because the children needed the
permanency of an adoption. See People in Interest of Z.M., 2020
COA 3M, ¶ 30 (An APR “is not a viable less drastic alternative if the
child needs a stable, permanent home that can only be assured by
adoption.”).
IV. Conclusion
¶ 39 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GROVE concur.