24CA1464 Peo in Interest of CKJD 03-06-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1464 Weld County District Court No. 20JV250 Honorable Anita Crowther, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of C.K.J.D., a Child,
and Concerning A.Q. and C.D.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM* Román, C.J., and Martinez*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 6, 2025
Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Ainsley Bochniak, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant A.Q.
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant C.D.
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, A.Q. (mother) and
C.D. (father) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child
legal relationships with C.K.J.D. (child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The child was born on May 10, 2020. Two days later, the
Weld County Department of Human Services (Department) received
a referral expressing concerns about domestic violence between
mother and father. The caseworker went to the hospital and spoke
with mother. She observed that mother had multiple bruises and a
scratch near her right collarbone. The caseworker also became
concerned about possible substance use by the parents. As a
result, the Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect
and the child was placed in foster care.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected and adopted treatment plans for the parents. Among
other things, the parents’ treatment plans required them to (1)
cooperate and communicate with the Department; (2) address
substance abuse issues; (3) learn and use additional parenting
skills to meet the child’s developmental needs; (4) address mental
health concerns; and (5) demonstrate an ability to provide
1 financially for the child’s basic needs. Mother’s treatment plan also
required her to demonstrate protective parenting capacity and
address the high levels of conflict in her relationship with father.
Father was further required to cooperate with any criminal case and
address conflict and anger issues in his relationship with mother in
order to demonstrate safe parenting when the child is in the home.
¶4 Three years after the petition was filed, the child was returned
to the parents’ custody. But two months later, the Department
received a referral with concerns about domestic violence between
mother and father in front of the child. The caseworker spoke with
mother, who reported the details of a domestic violence incident
and provided the caseworker with pictures of her injuries. Mother
was granted continued temporary custody of the child, and the
court ordered that the child not have any contact with father until
he contacted the Department and the guardian ad litem (GAL).
¶5 Father was later arrested for violating a protection order. At
the time of his arrest, mother and the child were with him. Based
on this information, as well as mother’s social media posts, the
Department developed concerns that mother was allowing the child
2 to have contact with father, in violation of the juvenile court’s order.
As a result, the child was returned to the foster home.
¶6 In January 2024, the Department moved to terminate both
mother’s and father’s parental rights. After a three-day hearing, the
juvenile court granted the motion.
II. Termination of Parental Rights
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶7 To terminate a parent’s rights, the court must find, by clear
and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) an appropriate treatment plan has not
been reasonably complied with or has not been successful; (3) the
parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s condition or conduct is unlikely
to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
¶8 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 17. A juvenile court’s factual
findings will not be set aside “unless so clearly erroneous as to find
no support in the record.” People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d
603, 613 (Colo. 1982). We review de novo the juvenile court’s legal
3 conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,
2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. The credibility of witnesses; sufficiency,
probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and
conclusions drawn from the evidence are within the discretion of
the juvenile court. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶
15.
B. Compliance with Treatment Plan
¶9 Both father and mother contend that the court erred by
finding that they did not comply sufficiently with their treatment
plan. Father argues that he complied with his treatment plan at
multiple points during the case. Mother asserts that, despite
barriers, she completed numerous treatment services over a four-
year span of the case. We discern no basis for reversal.
¶ 10 It is a parent’s responsibility to ensure compliance with, and
the success of, the treatment plan. People in Interest of A.H., 736
P.2d 425, 428 (Colo. App. 1987). A treatment plan is successful if it
renders a parent fit or corrects the conduct or condition that led to
state intervention. C.A.K., 652 P.2d at 611. Partial compliance, or
even substantial compliance, may not result in a successful plan
that renders the parent fit. People in Interest of D.M.W., 752 P.2d
4 587, 588 (Colo. App. 1987). If a child is under six years old when
the petition in dependency and neglect is filed, the court “shall not
find” that a parent has reasonably complied with or been successful
at a court-approved treatment plan if the parent (1) exhibits the
same problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate
improvement and (2) is unable or unwilling to provide nurturing
and safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional,
and mental health needs and conditions. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(B).
1. Father
¶ 11 The juvenile court acknowledged that father completed a
substantial amount of work during the four years the case was
open. But the court ultimately determined he had not complied
with his treatment plan. The court found that the case opened with
concerns of domestic violence and substance use and those issues
were still present at the time of the termination hearing.
¶ 12 Regarding issues of domestic violence, the court observed that
three years after the petition was filed the child returned home to
the parents. Just two months later, there was further domestic
violence, and the child was removed from father for a second time.
5 At that time, mother disclosed that additional domestic violence had
occurred after the child was returned home.
¶ 13 These findings were supported by the caseworker’s testimony
detailing mother’s statements that, after the child’s return home,
father beat and strangled her. As a result of this violence, mother
had significant bruising, chunks of her hair ripped out, and a
broken orbital socket. She told the caseworker she feared for her
life. The caseworker was concerned that the child heard, and
possibly saw, incidents of domestic violence because he talked
about hitting, kicking, and punching, and described seeing blood in
his mother’s hair. The child’s therapist testified to behaviors during
the child’s play that indicated he had witnessed domestic violence.
The court took judicial notice of father’s pending criminal charges.
Those charges included second degree assault, felony menacing,
third degree assault, false imprisonment, child abuse, and thirty-six
counts of violation of a protection order. Mother was a named
victim.
¶ 14 In terms of father’s substance use, the court recognized that
father had completed inpatient programs and relapse prevention
during which he had become more consistent with taking drug
6 tests; however, concerns remained regarding his sobriety. The
court’s findings were supported by the caseworker’s testimony
about suspicions of a relapse and drug use leading to the incident
of domestic violence when the child returned home. Both parents
had described to her father’s substance use as a trigger for
domestic violence, but mother denied any incidents of domestic
violence when father was sober.
¶ 15 The court also found that father had not successfully complied
with the treatment plan objective requiring him to provide for the
child’s basic needs, including food, clothing, housing, and access to
medical care. True, for most of the case, father had complied with
this objective. However, he was in custody at the time of the
termination hearing as a result of two criminal cases and was still
facing an issue of parole. Therefore, father had not complied with
the objective regarding criminal cases nor was he in a position to
care for the child.
¶ 16 The court concluded that it had no information as to when
father may be able to provide for the child’s needs. Father admitted
that he was not capable, at that time, of caring for the child.
7 ¶ 17 Because the court’s findings regarding father’s lack of
compliance with his treatment plan are supported by the evidence,
we will not disturb them or the court’s legal conclusions.
2. Mother
¶ 18 The juvenile court recognized mother’s substantial work
during the pendency of the case but ultimately determined that she
had not complied with her treatment plan. The court found that
mother’s treatment plan was put in place to address issues of
domestic violence, protective parenting capacity, and sobriety; yet
those issues persisted four years later.
¶ 19 The court acknowledged the cycle of domestic violence, and
that denial is a part of that cycle. Nevertheless, the court’s
concerns regarding mother’s ability to protect the child from
exposure to domestic violence were not alleviated. This finding is
supported by the evidence. Specifically, after the child was removed
from father’s care for a second time, mother retained temporary
custody. The caseworker expressed to mother the need to comply
with the juvenile court’s order, ensuring the child did not have any
contact with father outside of the Department’s oversight. Two
months later, mother and the child were seen with father, once
8 again raising concerns about mother’s protective capacity, and the
child was removed from mother’s care for a second time. The
caseworker testified and father admitted that he had contact with
the child while mother had temporary custody, in violation of the
juvenile court’s order.
¶ 20 The court also found that there were ongoing compliance
issues regarding mother’s use of marijuana and monitored sobriety.
Specifically, the court found the child was exposed to controlled
substances while in mother’s care, and there were indications that
mother believed she could continue to use marijuana without
affecting the child. In support, the caseworker testified that the
child’s statements, after his return to the parents and before his
second removal from mother, indicated he was exposed to drugs in
the home. After the child was removed from the home for a second
time, he was given a hair follicle test which was positive for
methamphetamine and THC. Due to the timing history, the
caseworker concluded that the child was exposed to drugs while in
mother’s care. When asked, mother could offer no explanation for
how the child could have been exposed to such substances. In the
termination report, the caseworker noted mother did not show
9 concern about this positive result or the possible short- and
long-term impacts of drug exposure to the child. The record also
reflected that mother had the ability to be sober, having submitted
negative drug tests; however, when she became stressed, she
returned to using marijuana. At the time of the termination
hearing, mother was again testing positive for THC and missing
drug tests.
¶ 21 Because the court’s findings regarding mother’s lack of
compliance with her treatment plan are supported by the evidence,
C. Fitness
¶ 22 Mother next asserts that the court erred when it found her
unfit. She seems to argue that, because she substantially complied
with her treatment plan, she should have been found to be a fit
parent. Additionally, she argues that poverty and a lack of
resources were the basis for the termination and, if she were given
more time to secure employment and housing, she would be a fit
parent. We discern no basis for reversal.
¶ 23 In determining parental fitness, the court must consider
whether the conduct or condition of the parent renders her unable
10 or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental care to include, at
a minimum, nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to
meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs and
conditions. § 19-3-604(2). In determining unfitness, the court may
consider whether a parent has been rehabilitated and whether the
child has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent
twenty-two months. § 19-3-604(2)(h), (k).
¶ 24 In determining that mother was unfit, the court found that an
appropriate treatment plan was adopted, was not reasonably
complied with and, most importantly, was not successful. In
particular, the court found that after four years there were still
concerns regarding mother’s ability to protect the child and ensure
he was not repeatedly exposed to domestic violence. As discussed
above, at one point, mother was in compliance with her treatment
plan and the child was returned to her. However, the child was
removed again because of an incident of domestic violence and
mother’s failure to follow the juvenile court’s order regarding
limitations on the child’s contact with father. The caseworker
testified that she did not believe mother to be a fit parent due to the
ongoing concerns of domestic violence and lack of protection of the
11 child. The psychologist that completed the parental competency
evaluation (PCE) stated that mother managed the abusive
relationship through “avoidance, including avoiding how it placed
her children in an unsafe situation.” This expert further discussed
how mother minimized the child’s trauma and had not gained the
awareness necessary to appropriately protect the child.
¶ 25 As noted, mother continued to use substances, including
when the child was returned home during the case. The
Department’s termination report stated, “There have been concerns
of [mother’s] lack of understanding of the THC use and being sober
around her child or having a sober caregiver.” It further stated that
although mother “had stopped using THC for a few weeks,” she
reported that “she only did [so] because she thought family time
would expand. When [mother] realized family time would not be
expanded, she started using THC again.”
¶ 26 The court found that, although mother consistently attended
family time, her time had not expanded, the child was struggling
with transitions, and the prognosis from the experts going forward
was discouraging. Mother’s family time remained therapeutically
supervised, and the child’s engagement with mother had not
12 increased. The caseworker testified that, during transitions for
family time, the child was dysregulated, crying, screaming and, at
one point, would hide under a chair and repeatedly scream “no.”
The psychologist testified, “there’s so much that’s still so severe
despite all of the recommendations [she] would normally
recommend. And this has gone on for so long, and it still hasn’t
changed.” She concluded that there was no viable path to
reunification and that it would be in the child’s best interest to
discontinue visits. In reaching this conclusion, the psychologist
considered the child’s reactions to visits as well as mother’s
“neglectful and parentification dynamics” that continued despite
interventions. The child was diagnosed with complex
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and his therapist testified
that he had likely been exposed to multiple traumas.
¶ 27 We are not persuaded by mother’s argument that she
“experienced numerous barriers” to successful completion of her
treatment plan. During mother’s temporary custody of the child,
the caseworker spoke with mother about applying for benefits and
attempted to provide clothes and toiletries to mother. The family
advocate sent mother a list of extensive resources near her, and the
13 Department helped with her rent. The Department also obtained a
life skills coach for mother to help with resumes, housing, applying
for housing, and working with a service that gives cars to parents.
The caseworker testified that there were no other services that
could be offered to mother that hadn’t previously been offered to
help her reunify with the child.
¶ 28 Because the court’s findings and conclusions that mother is
unfit are supported by the record, we will not disturb them on
appeal.
D. Reasonable Time
¶ 29 Each parent asserts the court erred by finding that they could
not become fit within a reasonable time. We disagree.
¶ 30 In determining whether a parent can become fit within a
reasonable time, the court may consider whether any changes
occurred during the dependency and neglect proceeding, the
parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the
parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d
351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). A reasonable time is not an indefinite
time, and it must be determined by considering the physical,
mental, and emotional conditions and needs of the child. People in
14 Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). When a
child is under six years old at the time of filing the petition in
dependency and neglect, the juvenile court must consider the
expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions, which require
that such children be placed in a permanent home as expeditiously
as possible. § 19-1-102(1.6), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 31 This case was open for 1,521 days, almost the child’s entire
life. The court found that keeping the case open longer, or allowing
the parents additional time, was not in the child’s best interest.
The court likewise found that the child was struggling. This was
evident in the testimony provided by the child’s therapist that (1)
the child’s play involved intrusion, violation, and intense fear
indicative of trauma and domestic violence; and (2) the child had
regressed to the age of approximately six months.
¶ 32 Multiple professionals testified about the child’s need for
permanency:
• The expert who completed the parent-child interactional and
father’s psychological evaluation testified that, from the child’s
perspective, “time is of the essence, and [f]ather’s problems are
chronic and slow to change.” He further testified that “if
15 things are continuing down the same path and there’s been
the same issues . . . he would say that time is up.”
• The caseworker testified that the child does not have time to
wait and see if mother can get long-term sobriety or the ability
to be protective of the child’s safety long-term. The caseworker
discussed concerns about the long-term effects the trauma
would have on the child the longer the case continued without
resolution.
• The child’s therapist indicated that, without permanency and
stability, the child would lack empathy, morality, and
consequences to social norms, as well as increased risks of
criminality, deviance, and issues in relationships.
¶ 33 Furthermore, the parents had four years to comply with their
treatment plans, and although the child had returned home at one
point in the case, he was removed from the parents for a second
time. In short, the concerns that led to the dependency and neglect
action remained at the time of the termination hearing.
¶ 34 Consequently, we conclude that the record supports the
juvenile court’s finding that the conduct or condition that rendered
the parties unfit would not change within a reasonable time.
16 E. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 35 Last, we reject mother’s contention that the court erred in
finding that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination,
specifically, allowing mother additional time or granting an
allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to the foster parents.
¶ 36 Implicit in the statutory scheme is a requirement that the
juvenile court consider and eliminate less drastic alternatives before
terminating parental rights. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d
1108, 1122-23 (Colo. 1986). If a proposed alternative is to be
viable, it must not only be adequate, it must be in the child’s best
interests. A.M., ¶ 27. “[L]ong-term or permanent placement with a
family member or foster family, short of termination, may not be a
viable less drastic alternative if it does not provide adequate
permanence that adoption would provide or otherwise meet a child’s
needs.” People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 41.
¶ 37 The court determined there were no alternatives short of
terminating the parent-child relationship that would adequately
serve the child’s best interests. The court noted that this is an EPP
case and found that keeping the case open or ending the case with
an APR would not give the child the stability he needs. The court
17 considered testimony from the child’s therapist regarding the child’s
complex PTSD diagnosis and extreme reactions to transitions. The
court found that the foster parents did not want an APR and were
able to provide the child with a permanent home.
¶ 38 The record supports the court’s finding. The child needed
permanency and stability. The caseworker specifically testified that
the child does not have time to wait for mother to comply with her
treatment plan. The caseworker opined that an APR to the foster
parents would not be in the child’s best interests because it would
leave open too much ambiguity for the child. The caseworker also
testified that the foster parents were not willing to accept an APR.
People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 920 (Colo. App. 2011) (a
juvenile court may consider whether the caregiver favors adoption
over an APR).
¶ 39 To the extent mother argues that the court erred by not
considering placement with the child’s younger siblings as a less
drastic alternative, her argument is not supported by the record.
Mother asserts that nothing shows that the Department
investigated whether the siblings’ kinship placement would be an
appropriate placement for the child in this case. On the contrary,
18 the kinship placement for the younger children specifically
indicated they were only an option for the two younger children and
did not have enough room for this child. Additionally, when the
child was removed from mother’s care for the second time, the
Department indicated that the foster home would be the “least
traumatic placement” for the child, but the Department would
consider an appropriate placement willing to take all three siblings
if found.
¶ 40 We perceive no error in the juvenile court’s determinations
that no less drastic alternatives existed, and that termination of
mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.
III. Disposition
¶ 41 We affirm the judgment.
CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.