24CA1084 Peo in Interest of CCN 07-09-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1084 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JD263 Honorable Bonnie McLean, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of C.C.N.,
Juvenile-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Freyre and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 9, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Katherine Wynn, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Springer and Steinberg, P.C., Harvey A. Steinberg, Taylor Ivy, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant ¶1 C.C.N., a juvenile, appeals his adjudication of delinquency for
one count of sexual assault on a child (pattern of abuse) and one
count of sexual assault on a child. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2018, after then-thirteen-year-old M.L. was admitted to a
mental health facility, she told her mother and her older sister, T.L.,
that her cousin, C.C.N., had sexually assaulted her multiple times.
T.L. then disclosed that C.C.N. had sexually assaulted her once.
After Sergeant Robert Fowler conducted an initial interview of M.L.,
the victims’ mother had the investigation closed.
¶3 In 2022, a friend helped M.L. reopen the investigation.
Detective Jake Swartz from the Aurora Police Department’s Crimes
Against Children Unit was assigned as the investigating detective,
and he arranged for M.L. to participate in a forensic interview.
Detective Swartz also interviewed T.L. Based on the victims’
disclosures, the prosecution charged C.C.N. with one count of
sexual assault on a child as a pattern of abuse relating to M.L. and
one count of sexual assault on a child relating to T.L.
¶4 The juvenile court held a one-day bench trial. M.L. testified
that C.C.N. had sexually assaulted her multiple times when she
1 was between four and nine years old. T.L. testified that C.C.N. had
sexually assaulted her once when she was six or seven years old.
C.C.N. testified that he never touched M.L. or T.L. inappropriately
and never had them touch him inappropriately. The juvenile court
adjudicated C.C.N. delinquent as charged and sentenced him to two
years of probation.1
II. Evidentiary Challenges
¶5 C.C.N. contends that the juvenile court erred by (1) admitting
M.L.’s hearsay statements and (2) excluding evidence that M.L. had
falsely accused her father of sexually assaulting her. We are not
persuaded.
A. Standard of Review
¶6 “A trial court has substantial discretion in deciding questions
concerning the admissibility of evidence.” People v. Eppens, 979
P.2d 14, 22 (Colo. 1999). We review a trial court’s evidentiary
rulings for an abuse of discretion. Zapata v. People, 2018 CO 82,
¶ 25. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly
1 On appeal, C.C.N. challenges only the evidence related to M.L. but
asks us to reverse his adjudications on both counts. Based on our disposition of the issues related to M.L., we necessarily affirm the adjudication as to T.L.
2 arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misconstrues or
misapplies the law. People v. Liggett, 2021 COA 51, ¶ 16, aff’d,
2023 CO 22. If the court erred, we consider whether the error was
harmless, reversing only “if the error ‘substantially influenced the
verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings.’” Hagos v.
People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12 (citation omitted).
B. Hearsay
¶7 C.C.N. contends that the juvenile court erred by admitting as
prior consistent statements (1) M.L.’s entire forensic interview and
(2) statements M.L. made to Sergeant Fowler. We perceive no
reversible error.
1. Applicable Law
¶8 Hearsay is any “statement other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). CRE 802
prohibits the admission of hearsay unless an exception applies.
¶9 In Colorado, a witness’ prior consistent statement may be
admitted in two ways. Eppens, 979 P.2d at 20. Such statements
may be admitted as substantive nonhearsay evidence under CRE
801(d)(1)(B) to rebut an express or implied charge of recent
3 fabrication or improper influence or motive. See id. Or such
statements may be admitted under the common law, outside of CRE
801(d)(1)(B), to rehabilitate a witness whose credibility has been
attacked. Id. at 20-21.
¶ 10 Because statements admitted under the common law cannot
be offered for their truth and are “only admissible for the
nonhearsay purpose of repairing a witness’ credibility,” they need
not comply with the requirements of CRE 801(d)(1)(B). Id. at 20.
Such statements are instead “governed by the general principles of
relevancy found in CRE 401, 402, and 403.” Id. at 21-22. To be
relevant, the evidence must “have some probative force bearing on
the credibility of the witness beyond the mere fact that the witness
has repeated on a prior occasion a statement consistent with [their]
trial testimony.” Id. at 22.
¶ 11 “Determining ‘how much of a prior consistent statement is
admissible is based upon its relevance and probative use,’” which
“turns on the scope of impeachment and the attack on the witness’s
credibility.” People v. Miranda, 2014 COA 102, ¶ 15 (citations
omitted), abrogated on other grounds by, Rojas v. People, 2022 CO
8, ¶¶ 41, 44. “If the impeachment goes only to specific facts, then
4 only prior consistent statements regarding those specific facts are
relevant and admissible.” People v. Clark, 2015 COA 44, ¶ 126
(citation omitted). But if the impeachment is “general and not
limited to specific facts, then the [fact finder] should have access to
all the relevant facts, including consistent and inconsistent
statements.” Id. (citation omitted).
2. The Forensic Interview
¶ 12 C.C.N. contends that the juvenile court erred by admitting
M.L.’s forensic interview because it was hearsay and was not
otherwise admissible under CRE 801(d)(1)(B) or the common law as
set forth in Eppens. On appeal, the People concede that M.L.’s
statements in the forensic interview constituted hearsay and that
CRE 801(d)(1)(B) does not apply. But they argue that the forensic
interview was admissible under Eppens to rehabilitate M.L.’s
credibility. We conclude that the court did not err by admitting the
forensic interview under Eppens.
a. Additional Background
¶ 13 At trial, M.L. testified that every time she saw C.C.N. when she
was between the ages of four and nine, he sexually assaulted her.
M.L. testified about five specific incidents:
5 • The first incident occurred in the basement of M.L.’s house.
She said C.C.N. “said if I didn’t lick his penis that he
wouldn’t play with me,” so she licked his penis while they
were sitting in a “princess ball pit.” She said the ball pit
was pretty big, but she was also four years old and really
small.
• The second incident involved M.L. and C.C.N. playing
hide-and-seek with another cousin when M.L. was four or
five years old. M.L. said that, while they were under the
basement stairs, C.C.N. made her touch his penis with her
hand.
• The third incident happened when M.L. and C.C.N. were
watching television in the basement. She said C.C.N. made
her take off all her clothes, but she was not sure if C.C.N.
took off his clothes.
• The fourth incident occurred when C.C.N. had two friends
show their penises to M.L. at a backyard gathering at an
aunt’s house.
• The fifth incident involved C.C.N. trying to put his penis
inside M.L.’s vagina, which she said “burned.”
6 ¶ 14 During cross-examination, defense counsel asked M.L.
whether “these allegations [came] out after [she was] admitted to a
mental health facility,” and M.L. responded, “Yes.” Counsel asked
whether M.L. had told the hospital that she previously disclosed the
abuse, and M.L. said, “Yes.” M.L. explained that she had previously
told her mother that C.C.N. “showed [her] his privates” when she
was five or six.
¶ 15 Then counsel asked how many times M.L. had seen C.C.N.’s
penis and asked her to describe it. M.L. said, “It’s a penis,” and
agreed with counsel’s characterization that it was “fairly normal.”
Counsel continued to ask M.L. what the size of C.C.N.’s penis was,
if it was “the shape of a mushroom,” and what the “tip of his penis”
looked like. M.L. could only say that it was a normal penis.
Counsel then asked, “[S]o what I’m trying to understand is, you
can’t actually describe the tip of his penis; is that accurate?” M.L.
responded, “Sure. Yes.”
¶ 16 Counsel also asked whether M.L. had previously told a social
worker that, during the third incident, C.C.N. had taken off his
7 clothes as well.2 M.L. said, “Maybe. I don’t remember exactly what
happened or what I told her.” Counsel later asked M.L. if it was
true that she had been able to describe C.C.N.’s body in the forensic
interview. M.L. responded, “I don’t think so.” Counsel asked if M.L.
told the social worker that C.C.N.’s body was different than it is
now, and M.L. said she did not “remember saying anything like
that.”
¶ 17 Counsel then played a portion of the forensic interview for
M.L. and asked, “Did you hear yourself describing [C.C.N.’s] body?”
M.L. agreed that she heard herself say that C.C.N. was white and
that he was skinnier before and that she heard herself describe his
hair. Counsel asked, “So, to be clear, you can describe [C.C.N.’s]
body but you don’t have the ability to describe his penis; is that
correct?” M.L. said, “[Y]es, I cannot describe his penis,” but
explained that there were pictures showing that C.C.N. is skinny,
white, and balding, but there were no pictures of his penis.
¶ 18 Counsel also asked M.L. if it was true that she told Sergeant
Fowler that C.C.N. had “never put anything in [her] body?” M.L.
2 Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears defense
counsel was referencing the 2022 forensic interview.
8 responded “No,” but explained, “I did not tell [Sergeant Fowler]
everything because that was the first time it was coming out, and I
was scared.” She also said, “I remember answering no to most of
[Sergeant Fowler’s] questions so I didn’t have to talk to him
anymore.” In response to counsel’s questions, M.L. admitted her
“statement did change” between 2018 and the 2022 forensic
interview but said that the forensic interview was “what [she’s]
sticking with today.”
¶ 19 During the direct examination of Detective Swartz, the
prosecutor moved to admit M.L.’s entire forensic interview. Defense
counsel objected, arguing that the exhibit was hearsay. The
prosecutor argued that the evidence was admissible under CRE
801(d)(1)(B), as a prior consistent statement under Eppens, or
under the “rule of completeness” because defense counsel played a
part of the interview during M.L.’s cross-examination. Defense
counsel responded that the interview contained statements that
were not referenced during cross-examination and “an entirely new
allegation.” The juvenile court admitted the entire forensic
interview without specifying the basis for its ruling.
9 ¶ 20 T.L. testified that C.C.N. sexually assaulted her once when she
was six or seven years old. T.L. said that someone came into her
bedroom and tried to touch her vagina over her clothes. T.L. did
not see the individual, but she knew it was C.C.N. by his breathing
and his long and clammy fingers, and because the light from the
door showed his tall frame.
¶ 21 C.C.N. testified that he has a genetic disorder that causes him
to be taller than average and have a small penis. He also said he
was uncircumcised. He then described the ball pit at M.L.’s house
as an enclosed space, roughly four feet wide by four feet long with a
portal door to get inside. C.C.N. said that at the time of the alleged
ball pit incident with M.L., he was six foot seven inches tall. C.C.N.
also said that the ball pit was on the main floor and that he was not
allowed in the basement.
¶ 22 C.C.N.’s father testified that the ball pit was originally for
C.C.N., but they gave it to M.L.’s family when he outgrew it, so it
was “not necessarily” a “princess ball pit,” and C.C.N. would not
have been able to fit into it. C.C.N.’s father also said that M.L. had
a reputation for dishonesty “[s]ince she was very young.” Defense
10 counsel also called M.L.’s cousin as a witness to testify that M.L.
had a reputation for dishonesty within the family.
¶ 23 In closing, defense counsel called M.L.’s credibility into
question by arguing that she said she had observed C.C.N.’s
genitalia at least ten and possibly more than twenty times and had
put “her mouth to the penis on several occasions,” yet she could not
describe it in detail. Counsel said that M.L. “was able to easily
describe . . . [C.C.N.’s] appearance . . . when she was in the
[forensic interview], but when confronted with [the] appearance of
the penis, . . . she could not make any concrete verbalization of that
penis.” Counsel contrasted M.L.’s testimony that C.C.N.’s penis
was not small and that M.L. failed to observe any difference
between C.C.N.’s penis and his friends’ penises with other
testimony suggesting that C.C.N. had small genitalia because of his
genetic condition.
¶ 24 Counsel also noted that other witnesses had testified that the
basement in M.L.’s house was “off limits,” that C.C.N. would not
have fit in the ball pit where some of the alleged abuse occurred,
and that the ball pit was not princess themed as M.L. had claimed.
Counsel argued that if M.L. was mistaken about that “simple,
11 important fact,” “then it is problematic to believe the rest of her
testimony.” Counsel also argued that M.L. could have been using
C.C.N. as a “scapegoat” to “displace some responsibility” from her
behavior that resulted in her admission to a mental health hospital.
¶ 25 In its judgment adjudicating C.C.N. delinquent, the juvenile
court explained that the trial “boil[ed] down to the credibility of the
witnesses” and even read aloud the pattern jury instruction on
assessing witness credibility. The court discussed M.L.’s forensic
interview in some detail, noting that M.L. was “far less nervous
during the [forensic] interview, and the facts and some of the details
were a lot more clear . . . than it was on the stand.” The court also
noted that, in the forensic interview, M.L. was “able to give much
more specific details . . . about what happened in the ball pit, much
more clarification about the fact that they weren’t both in the ball
pit, that [C.C.N.] was kind of sitting in the entrance into the ball pit,
and that’s when he made her touch — touch his penis.” The court
also said that, in the interview, M.L. gave more details about her
age when the assaults occurred, the type of sexual assaults that
occurred, and how many times the assaults occurred. The court
noted that the interview made it clear that the victims’ disclosures
12 occurred after the victims’ mother said she was going to ask C.C.N.
to babysit their younger sister.
¶ 26 The juvenile court ultimately found that the prosecution had
met its burden to prove the elements of the charged offenses. The
court focused on the victims’ credibility, explaining that M.L.’s
“testimony in court was clearly corroborated by the information that
she gave at the [forensic] interview.” The court found M.L. to be
credible and noted that “so much time has passed and [M.L.] was
very young when the alleged offense[s] occurred, and so the lack of
detail [was] not . . . negatively affecting her . . . credibility.” The
court found that the victims had no motive to lie, highlighting the
absence of any “ongoing family disputes” and the “alienation” both
victims suffered because of the disclosure, which the court found
“extraordinarily credible” and “not for their own attention or
self-serving.”
b. The Court Did Not Err by Admitting the Forensic Interview
¶ 27 C.C.N. contends that the juvenile court erred by admitting
M.L.’s entire forensic interview because (1) defense counsel did not
broadly attack M.L.’s credibility, and (2) the court relied on the
interview as substantive evidence. We perceive no error.
13 ¶ 28 We reject C.C.N.’s attempt to characterize defense counsel’s
attack on M.L.’s credibility as limited to impeaching M.L. with what
she said in the forensic interview about how C.C.N.’s “body was
different . . . than it is now.” C.C.N.’s theory of the case was that
M.L. had fabricated the sexual assault because she wanted to
deflect from her own behavior when she was admitted to a mental
health hospital. Thus, defense counsel broadly attacked M.L.’s
credibility throughout trial, generally challenging her veracity as
manifested in her inability to recall specific details of the assaults.
For example, counsel sought to undermine M.L.’s testimony about
where the abuse occurred — including the details of the ball pit size
and theme — as well as the physical attributes of C.C.N.’s body.
Counsel also questioned M.L.’s “reputation for being honest” and
presented multiple character witnesses to testify that M.L. had a
reputation for dishonesty within her family.
¶ 29 Defense counsel put M.L.’s credibility at the heart of the case.
That counsel played only a segment of the forensic interview at trial
does not alter our view that counsel’s attack was broad and
generalized; it was not limited to impeaching M.L. regarding specific
facts but was instead intended to undermine her testimony that any
14 of the assaults occurred. Because counsel engaged in an unlimited
and robust attack on M.L.’s credibility generally, and her testimony
concerning the details of the alleged assaults specifically, the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the entire
forensic interview for rehabilitative purposes. See Clark, ¶ 126; see
also Pernell v. People, 2014 COA 157, ¶ 39 (defense counsel’s
thorough cross-examination of the witness about her version of
events and her prior statements was “precisely the kind of attack on
a witness’s credibility that allows for the introduction of prior
consistent statements to rehabilitate that witness”), aff’d on other
grounds, 2018 CO 13.
¶ 30 Nor are we persuaded that the juvenile court relied on the
forensic interview as substantive evidence to determine C.C.N.’s
guilt. C.C.N. argues that M.L.’s testimony “consisted largely of
vague, non-specific one-word answers” and that the prosecution
needed the interview to “fill in the details.” But M.L. testified about
five distinct incidents that involved different places, circumstances,
and types of sexual assaults.
¶ 31 We acknowledge that, in its oral ruling, the court spent more
time detailing what M.L. said in the interview than what she
15 testified to at trial. But the full interview was not played at trial, so
it is understandable that the court would summarize the parts of
the video it viewed as rehabilitating M.L., given the broad attack on
her credibility and the circumstances surrounding her disclosure.
The court noted that this case centered on the credibility of the
victims’ disclosures, and the forensic interview made clear that the
timing of M.L.’s initial disclosure was not because of her mental
health crisis. For example, defense counsel argued that M.L.’s
inability to recall simple details about the ball pit made it
“problematic” to believe the rest of her story, but the court noted
the additional details M.L. provided in the forensic interview
clarified M.L.’s recollection of the ball pit incident.
¶ 32 Ultimately, the court concluded that the forensic interview
corroborated M.L.’s trial testimony and placed M.L.’s disclosure in
context. In particular, the forensic interview corroborated M.L.’s
trial testimony that she had disclosed the abuse to her mother
when she was five or six, before she was admitted to the mental
health hospital. Thus, we conclude that the court did not rely on
the forensic interview to fill in substantive evidentiary gaps or to
find an instance of abuse that M.L. did not testify about at trial;
16 instead, it relied on the interview to support its finding that M.L.’s
trial testimony was credible notwithstanding such gaps. See
Eppens, 979 P.2d at 20-21.3
¶ 33 To the extent that C.C.N. contends that the evidence should
have been excluded because it was unfairly prejudicial under CRE
403, we disagree. In deference to the juvenile court’s admissibility
ruling, we assume the maximum probative value and the minimum
unfair prejudice attributable to the disputed evidence. Yusem v.
People, 210 P.3d 458, 467 (Colo. 2009). Because defense counsel
so broadly attacked M.L.’s credibility, we conclude that the
probative value of the evidence for rehabilitative purposes was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.4 See
CRE 403; Eppens, 979 P.2d at 22; Yusem, 210 P.3d at 467.
3 C.C.N. argues that the prosecutor relied substantively upon the
interview when arguing C.C.N.’s guilt, but he does not point to any specific instances in the record to support his argument, and we note that the prosecutor did not mention the interview during closing argument. See People v. Rodriguez-Morelos, 2022 COA 107M, ¶ 49 (declining to address a defendant’s conclusory and underdeveloped argument), aff’d, 2025 CO 2. 4 To the extent C.C.N. argues that the forensic interview was
prejudicial because it contained a “new allegation,” he does not develop that argument on appeal, so we decline to address it further. See Rodriguez-Morelos, ¶ 49.
17 ¶ 34 In the end, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting M.L.’s complete forensic interview for
rehabilitative purposes. See Eppens, 979 P.2d at 20-21; Miranda,
¶ 15; Clark, ¶ 126.
3. Sergeant Fowler’s Testimony
¶ 35 C.C.N. contends that the juvenile court erred by admitting
Sergeant Fowler’s testimony regarding hearsay statements made by
M.L. We perceive no reversible error.
¶ 36 During Sergeant Fowler’s testimony, the prosecutor asked,
“What [did M.L.] describe to you happening by [C.C.N.]?” Sergeant
Fowler started to respond, “[M.L.] describe[d] multiple times
between the age — or between kindergarten and third grade,” but
defense counsel objected to hearsay. The prosecutor cited CRE
801(d)(1)(B)5 and Eppens. Defense counsel had “[n]o response,” and
the court overruled the objection. The prosecutor repeated his
question, and Sergeant Fowler responded, “[B]etween kindergarten
5 The prosecutor cited to CRE 801(b)(1), but the parties do not
dispute that he meant CRE 801(d)(1)(B).
18 and third grade, [M.L.] described [C.C.N.] forcing her to touch his
penis and him touching her vagina.”
b. Any Error in Admitting the Statements Was Harmless
¶ 37 Even assuming, without deciding, that the court erroneously
admitted M.L.’s statement to Sergeant Fowler, we conclude that any
error was harmless. Sergeant Fowler’s testimony was brief and
lacked detail about any particular instance of sexual assault. See
People v. Cardenas, 25 P.3d 1258, 1263 (Colo. App. 2000) (any error
in admitting hearsay testimony was harmless because the
statement was brief and general in nature). It was also cumulative
of M.L.’s testimony and the properly admitted rehabilitative forensic
interview. See People v. Caldwell, 43 P.3d 663, 669 (Colo. App.
2001) (the improper admission of a hearsay statement was
harmless because it was “cumulative of other properly admitted
evidence”). And when viewed in the context of Sergeant Fowler’s
complete direct examination, the question and answer appear
designed to explain how the investigation began. See People v.
Bowman, 812 P.2d 725, 727-29 (Colo. App. 1991) (any error in
admitting an investigating officer’s testimony about the defendant’s
statements to a social worker was harmless when the testimony
19 was admitted in part as background information to explain the
investigation). Accordingly, we conclude that any error by the
juvenile court in admitting the statement did not substantially
influence the verdict or affect the fairness of the trial proceedings.
See Hagos, ¶ 12.
C. Rape Shield Evidence
¶ 38 C.C.N. contends that the juvenile court erred by relying on the
rape shield statute, § 18-3-407(2) C.R.S. 2023,6 to exclude evidence
that M.L. had falsely accused her father of sexually assaulting her.
We perceive no error.
¶ 39 The purpose of Colorado’s rape shield statute is “to protect
sexual assault victims from humiliating public fishing expeditions
into their past sexual conduct.” People v. Cook, 2014 COA 33, ¶ 36.
To that end, the statute creates a presumption that evidence of
“specific instances of the victim’s . . . prior or subsequent sexual
conduct” is irrelevant except in certain instances. § 18-3-407(2);
6 Section 18-3-407, C.R.S. 2023, was in effect at the time of the
events at issue, and we refer to that version throughout this opinion. The statute has since been amended.
20 People v. Williamson, 249 P.3d 801, 802 (Colo. 2011). The term
“sexual conduct” encompasses “a broad range of behaviors related,
but not limited, to sexual contact and intercourse.” Williamson,
249 P.3d at 803.
¶ 40 There are several exceptions to the general prohibition against
admitting such evidence. As relevant here, a defendant may offer
“evidence that the victim . . . has a history of false reporting of
sexual assaults.” § 18-3-407(2); see People v. Lancaster, 2015 COA
93, ¶ 36. To introduce such evidence, the proponent must file a
written motion at least thirty-five days before trial, accompanied by
an affidavit containing an offer of proof regarding the relevancy and
materiality of the proposed evidence. § 18-3-407(2)(a). Typically,
the court holds a pretrial hearing to determine the admissibility of
the prior false accusations. § 18-3-407(2)(c). But “[a]n in camera
hearing may be held during trial if evidence first becomes available
at the time of the trial or for good cause shown.” § 18-3-407(2)(d).
2. Additional Background
¶ 41 During cross-examination, defense counsel asked M.L., “Did
you claim that your father had sexually assaulted you?” The
prosecutor objected, citing the rape shield statute. Defense counsel
21 argued that he was not asking about M.L.’s prior sexual conduct
but wanted to impeach M.L. with a prior false accusation. The
juvenile court sustained the prosecutor’s objection, concluding that
the evidence was covered by the rape shield statute, counsel had
not filed a written motion at least thirty-five days before trial, and
counsel could not “get around” the procedural requirement by
arguing that the evidence was for impeachment.
3. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Excluding Evidence of M.L.’s Allegedly False Accusation
¶ 42 C.C.N. contends that the juvenile court erred by concluding
that M.L.’s allegedly false accusation that her father sexually
assaulted her fell within the scope of the rape shield statute. He
argues that the purpose of the evidence was to impeach M.L. by
showing that she had a reputation for dishonesty, not to prove that
M.L. had engaged in any sexual conduct.
¶ 43 But the rape shield statute specifically covers the type of
evidence defense counsel sought to introduce at trial — a victim’s
“history of false reporting of sexual assaults.” § 18-3-407(2)(a); see
People v. MacLeod, 176 P.3d 75, 81 (Colo. 2008) (“In section 18-3-
407(2)(a), the statute lists every type of evidence that is
22 presumptively irrelevant unless a proponent makes a successful
offer of proof.”); People v. Ramcharan, 2024 COA 110, ¶ 30 (a party
can introduce evidence of a victim’s history of false reporting of
sexual assaults only by adhering to the procedure in section
18-3-407(2)). And the statute has no “purpose” exception.
MacLeod, 176 P.3d at 80. Its “broad, all-inclusive language” deems
such evidence presumptively irrelevant in any criminal prosecution,
subject to certain exceptions, regardless of whether the evidence is
offered for the truth of the matter asserted or for some other
purpose, such as impeachment. See id. at 80-81.
¶ 44 Thus, to introduce evidence that M.L. had previously made a
false accusation of sexual assault, C.C.N. was required to follow the
procedures outlined in the statute. See § 18-3-407(2)(a)-(c);
MacLeod, 176 P.3d at 82 (Generally, “[t]he procedural requirements
of a pretrial motion and an in camera hearing must be satisfied
before a [victim] can be compelled to answer questions in public
about the [victim’s] sexual history.”). It is undisputed that C.C.N.
made no attempt to follow the statutorily required pretrial
procedure.
23 ¶ 45 Yet C.C.N. argues that the court should have admitted the
evidence of M.L.’s prior false allegation because the court is allowed
to hold an in camera hearing during trial “if evidence first becomes
available at the time of the trial or for good cause shown.”
§ 18-3-407(2)(d). C.C.N. does not argue that the evidence first
became available at the time of trial, but he does argue that he has
shown “good cause” because, without the offered evidence, he was
not able to meaningfully cross-examine M.L. on her motive to lie.
¶ 46 Notably, defense counsel did not raise this argument before
the juvenile court. Because the argument is unpreserved, we review
for plain error. Hagos, ¶ 14. Plain error is error that is obvious and
substantial, such that it “undermine[s] the fundamental fairness of
the trial itself so as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the
judgment of conviction.” Id. (citation omitted). For an error to be
obvious, it must contravene a statute or rule, a well-settled legal
principle, or established Colorado case law. Campbell v. People,
2020 CO 49, ¶ 25. The error must be “‘so clear-cut, so obvious,’ a
trial judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection.”
Romero v. People, 2017 CO 37, ¶ 6 (citation omitted).
24 ¶ 47 C.C.N. cites no authority supporting his claim that simply
wanting to attack the credibility of a victim constitutes good cause
to offer rape shield evidence without following the necessary
procedural requirements. And we conclude that the recognition of
such an exception would effectively eviscerate the procedural
requirements and substantive purpose of the statute. Accordingly,
we perceive no error, plain or otherwise. See Hagos, ¶ 14.
III. Disposition
¶ 48 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.