25CA0250 Peo in Interest of CC 09-11-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0250 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JV30734 Honorable Elizabeth J. McCarthy, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of C.C., a Child,
and Concerning C.F.C.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division II Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Fox and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 11, 2025
Michiko Ando Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect case, C.F.C. (father) appeals
the judgment terminating his parent-child legal relationship with
C.C. (the child). We reverse.
I. Background
¶2 In September 2023, after receiving a report that the child was
born drug-exposed, the Denver County Department of Human
Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect.
The juvenile court granted temporary legal custody of the child to
the Department and the child was placed with his maternal cousin,
where he remained throughout the case.
¶3 When the child was born, father was living and working in
Florida. Aside from noting that he lived out of state, none of the
petition’s allegations related to father.
¶4 Father was notified of the proceedings and, in December 2023,
genetic testing confirmed his paternity. The juvenile court
adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and adopted a
treatment plan for father. The treatment plan required father to (1)
consistently spend time with the child to build a relationship and
learn the child’s needs; (2) obtain and maintain a verifiable source
1 of income and a suitable home; and (3) cooperate with the
Department.
¶5 Father returned to Colorado in May 2024. Less than four
months later, the Department asked the court to set a termination
hearing1 and later filed a motion to terminate father’s parental
rights. The court granted the motion after a hearing.
II. Statutory Criteria
¶6 The goal of a dependency and neglect case is to preserve the
parent-child relationship whenever possible. People in Interest of
C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 610 (Colo. 1982). And given that the
termination of a parent-child legal relationship affects a parent’s
fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of the child,
1 The Department’s request to set a termination hearing occurred at
a status hearing in August 2024. In a report prepared for that August hearing, the caseworker stated that [father] has been attending in person visits with [the child] consistently and has been fully engaged. He brings diapers and food as well as toys. [Father] and [the child] seem to enjoy a good relationship and are comfortable with each other. . . . [Father] currently has visits twice a week for 2 hours and he has consistently attended these visits. The family time supervisor reports he does very well during visits.
2 the state must exercise extreme caution in terminating parental
rights. K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695, 700 (Colo. 2006). For this
reason, a juvenile court must strictly comply with the statutory
termination criteria. Id.; People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M,
¶ 18.
¶7 A juvenile court may terminate a parent-child legal
relationship if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the
child was adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has
not reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved
treatment plan, or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent
is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to
change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
“The burden of proof lies with the party seeking termination.”
People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 8.
III. Analysis
¶8 Father argues that the juvenile court erred by finding him
unfit. We agree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶9 A parent is unfit if their conduct or condition renders them
unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care. § 19-
3 3-604(2); People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App.
2007). Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the
parent provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet the
child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs and
conditions. People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo.
App. 2006). A parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan
generally “demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the
child’s needs” and may be considered in determining unfitness.
People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 10 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. L.M.,
¶ 17. We review the court’s factual findings for clear error, but we
review its legal conclusions based on those facts de novo. S.R.N.J-
S., ¶ 10. Whether the evidence establishes that a parent is unfit is
ultimately a legal conclusion because its resolution requires
application of the evidentiary facts to the termination statute. Id. at
¶ 11.
4 B. Fitness
¶ 11 The Department did not allege that father had substance
abuse or mental health issues. He generally cooperated with the
Department, though his relationship with the primary caseworker
deteriorated after father accused the caseworker of making racially
discriminatory comments concerning his status as a Black single
father.2
¶ 12 The juvenile court’s finding of unfitness focused on two main
areas of concern: father’s stability and his ability to parent the child
full-time. We therefore look at each issue in turn to determine if
clear and convincing evidence supported the court’s finding of
unfitness.
2 The court found that the caseworker was not “acting with racial
animus.” We have no reason to question that finding, though we disagree with the court’s basis for it. The court appeared to rely, at least in part, on the caseworker’s testimony that she identified as “half [B]lack.” However, we note that color discrimination can occur between people of the same race or color. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977) (“[I]t would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of their group.”). Well-known studies have confirmed this concept. See, e.g., Simon Howard & Kalen Kennedy, The “Doll Studies,” Kenneth B. Clark and Mamie P. Clark, 1947, in Essays in Developmental Psychology 54 (Charles Golden ed., 2025), https://perma.cc/FPZ6-QJB3.
5 1. Stability
¶ 13 The juvenile court found that, at the time of the termination
hearing, father had appropriate and stable housing with a dedicated
space for the child. This finding was supported by the evidence.
¶ 14 Both the caseworker and the family time supervisor testified
that they did not have concerns regarding father’s home. And the
court admitted photographs of father’s home into evidence, which
reflected that he had a dedicated space for the child including a
toddler bed and age-appropriate toys.
¶ 15 Despite this evidence, the court expressed concern that it took
father the length of the case to obtain his own housing, stating
“[o]nly now, in the last month, does [father] have stable housing.”
In so finding, the court noted that father (1) was working in Florida
when the case began; (2) did not return to Colorado until eight
months after the petition was filed; and (3) upon his return to
Colorado, lived with roommates and refused to provide their
identifying information to the caseworker. The Department and
GAL argue that the evidence supports these findings and that the
findings prove that father was unfit.
6 ¶ 16 True, when the case began, father was working as a plumber
in Florida and did not return to Colorado until eight months after
the petition was filed. But, for approximately the first three
months, father was awaiting genetic testing to confirm paternity.
Once paternity was established, he completed his work
commitments in Florida, sold some property to obtain necessary
funds to relocate, and returned to Colorado. According to the
caseworker’s reports, while father was in Florida, he had regular
contact with the Department, the child, and the child’s placement
provider. Father returned to Colorado within two months of the
adoption of the treatment plan. The court did not explain why this
chronology proved that father was unfit — i.e., that father was
unable or unwilling to provide appropriate care for the child.
¶ 17 Once in Colorado, father promptly began renting a room in a
home with several roommates. A temporary caseworker visited the
residence and “felt it was appropriate safety-wise,” but father
acknowledged that his roommates would not pass background
checks, so he chose to exercise his visits in the community while he
worked to find a suitable residence for the child. Father remained
7 there until he obtained his own residence, with a year-long lease,
two months before the hearing.
¶ 18 The record shows that father had housing since moving to
Colorado. At the time of the hearing, father had a stable and
appropriate residence for the child. He also had social security
income and continued to work as a plumber. There was no
evidence presented that father could not meet the child’s financial
or housing needs. Thus, we cannot conclude that, simply because
it took father several months to establish appropriate housing for
the child, this proved by clear and convincing evidence that father
was unfit. See id. at ¶ 46 (holding that the juvenile court erred by
discounting evidence of a parent’s safe and stable residence based
on evidence of past housing struggles).
2. Ability to Parent the Child
¶ 19 The juvenile court also found that father had “not shown any
ability . . . to be a full-time parent to [the child].” As noted, when
the case began father resided out-of-state and had virtual visits
with the child. The court found, with record support, that father
generally ended the visits early. However, at that time, the child
8 was an infant, and the juvenile court acknowledged that the child
was unlikely to engage via video for a full hour.3
¶ 20 Once father relocated to Colorado in May 2024, he actively and
consistently engaged in in-person family time. See id. at ¶ 25
(finding that the father’s lack of visits with the children during the
first year the case was open because he lived in Mexico did not
render him unfit, as he consistently attended visits upon relocation
to Colorado). Indeed, the caseworker testified that during the eight-
month period between his return to Colorado and the termination
hearing, father missed a total of four of his twice-weekly visits —
3 In her May 2024 report to the court, the caseworker stated that
father has attended virtual visits with [the child] regularly; however, given [the child’s] age it has been very hard to engage and interact with him through a screen. [Father] has been reported to communicate with [the child] and ask his caregiver about how he has been doing. [Father] has been very proactive about getting visits set up and has reached out to [multiple] different people when he had an interruption in visits to get those rescheduled.
9 two due to medical procedures and two due to illness.4 (The
caseworker nonetheless characterized father’s visitation as “[v]ery
spotty” and “intermittent.” She faulted him for not scheduling his
medical procedures around his visitation schedule and for not
coming to visits when he was sick.) Thus, the evidence established
that father attended approximately ninety percent of his family
time. See id. at ¶ 24 (holding that a “few missed visits” were not
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
parent failed to provide reasonable parental care).
¶ 21 The Department had no concerns about father’s visits with the
child. The evidence was undisputed that father was attentive and
engaged at visits, that he did not need correction from the family
time supervisor, and that he and the child were bonded. The court
4 This testimony was consistent with the caseworker’s additional
testimony that “a handful of times,” father either canceled a visit or ended the visit early, although during that part of her testimony, the caseworker said that father had, in addition to canceling visits for medical appointments, also canceled or ended a visit early due to work obligations. The family time supervisor testified that she had no concerns about the number of visits that father missed and nothing in the record otherwise shows that the few missed visits for medical or work reasons affected father’s ability to meet the child’s needs.
10 noted that the family time supervisor “was impressed by [father’s]
parenting skills.”
¶ 22 Despite this evidence, the juvenile court found father to be
unfit because he (1) previously expressed interest in terminating his
rights; (2) was still only exercising supervised family time, and
(3) had not shown an ability to parent full-time.
¶ 23 During his testimony, father acknowledged that about six
months before the termination hearing, he had expressed concern
about his ability to care for the child because he was undergoing
testing for a serious medical condition that had also afflicted his
mother. But the test result was negative, and father testified that
he did not have health problems that would impact his ability to
care for the child. And father expressed his desire to parent the
child.
¶ 24 As for family time, the record shows that the Department
either disregarded, or delayed implementation of, the family time
supervisor’s recommendations.
¶ 25 The caseworker initially testified that there was “no
recommendation for [father] to have monitored or unsupervised
time.” That turned out to be false. The family time supervisor’s
11 reports showed that beginning in September 2024 — and in every
monthly report thereafter — the supervisor recommended
decreasing the level of supervision. When confronted with the
reports at the termination hearing, the caseworker admitted that
she did not recall the recommendations but then insisted she had
discussed the recommendations with others, just not with father or
his lawyer or during any regularly scheduled team meeting. The
caseworker agreed that the family time supervisor was “the person
in this whole case who’s had the most contact with” father and the
child, and that she relied on the supervisor’s recommendations
about visitation. Still, the caseworker did not explain why the
Department did not follow the supervisor’s repeated
recommendation to decrease the supervision level at visits.
¶ 26 The caseworker also testified that “there was an opportunity
for [father] to expand his visits” and that “he chose not to.” That
also turned out to be wrong. When father began in-person
visitation in May 2024, the Department allowed two-hour visits
twice a week. Almost immediately, the family time supervisor
recommended increasing family time. Father (through his lawyer)
followed up with his own request for additional time. The
12 Department did not approve expanded visits until October 2024, a
few months before the termination hearing. Visitation was
increased from four hours a week to six hours a week.
¶ 27 The court’s conclusion that father was unfit was based in large
part on its finding that father “is still having supervised parenting
time” and that the child needed a “full-time parent, not a parent for
six hours a week.” But the record demonstrates that any lack of
progress on that front was attributable to the Department. And,
maybe more importantly, there was no evidence that father could
not safely parent the child for more than six hours per week.
¶ 28 The primary caseworker who testified at the hearing had never
attended a visit between father and the child. The temporary
caseworker attended only one. The family time supervisor was
present at all of father’s visits from June 2024 through December —
approximately fifty, according to the evidence.
¶ 29 In her September 2024 report to the Department, the family
time supervisor reported that
[father] continues to be prepared with supplies for his son and engages with baby the entire parenting time. Continued follow through for parenting expectations and care of a young child. [Father] is always prepared with food
13 and drink for baby. [Father] sends home books to placement for [the child] and his big sister. [Father] consistently interacts and engages with son during scheduled visits.
¶ 30 The family time supervisor’s December “record of contact”
detailed father’s engagement with the child during the visit and
stated that “[father] continues to be prepared and ready for [family
time].” The only challenges listed were “[c]ommunicating with
[p]lacement and scheduling make up time.”
¶ 31 At the termination hearing, the family time supervisor
confirmed that “there [had] [n]ever been a time . . . where [she was]
concerned about the interaction with [the child] and [father]” or a
time “where [father] d[id] not attend to [the child’s] needs.” She
explained that the child “knows when he’s with [father] that [father]
will meet his needs and care for him and provide what [the child]
needs.”
¶ 32 The family time supervisor’s observations were not disputed.
The caseworker generically opined that father was not “able to have
[the child] full-time, unsupervised,” but she testified that her
opinion was based entirely on her (mistaken) belief that there was
never a “recommendation for [father] to have monitored or
14 unsupervised [family] time.” In that way, the caseworker conceded
that she was basing her opinion on the family time supervisor’s
assessment of father’s parenting abilities — she was just mistaken
about the supervisor’s assessment.
¶ 33 The uncontested evidence showed that father could provide
appropriate care for the child during all of the parenting time
allotted to him. The juvenile court, though, appeared to expect
father to prove his ability to care for the child full-time, rather than
requiring the Department to prove that, notwithstanding his
success at family time, father was unable or unwilling to provide
appropriate care on a full-time basis. In other words, the court
improperly shifted the burden to father to show fitness, rather than
requiring the Department to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he was unfit. See id. at ¶ 8; see also People in Interest of S.N-
V., 300 P.3d 911, 914 (Colo. App. 2011) (“The constitutional and
statutory due process requirements for a termination hearing place
no duty on a respondent parent.”). True, as the Department and
GAL assert, a parent is required to use the services provided by the
Department to comply with his or her treatment plan. People in
Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). But, as
15 discussed above, father engaged in the family time provided to build
a relationship with the child and learn his needs — the key
component of father’s treatment plan.
¶ 34 At the hearing, the Department and GAL argued that father
should have demanded expanded family time with lower
supervision, presumably so that he could have demonstrated his
ability to parent the child for longer periods. To the extent the
juvenile court adopted that view, it erred. It is not the parent’s
responsibility to demand appropriate family time. The Department,
not the parent, has the obligation to review the family time
supervisor’s reports and implement the recommendations if
appropriate in order to ensure the parent’s progress toward
reunification with the child. See § 19-3-208(2), C.R.S. 2025
(detailing the services the Department must provide as determined
by individual case planning, including family time, with the goal of
“speedy reunification of parents with . . . their children” in mind).
¶ 35 That leaves the Department and GAL’s argument that the
court’s unfitness determination is supported by evidence that father
failed to take an eight-hour parenting class or to prove that he had
a support system to help him care for the child.
16 ¶ 36 Father did not complete the class as required by his treatment
plan. However, the caseworker acknowledged that the family time
supervisor never raised any concerns about father’s parenting
ability or his need for a parenting class. Additionally, father has a
grown daughter who, at the time of the termination hearing, was
preparing to take the bar exam to become a licensed attorney.
Thus, father did not feel the class was needed, but he testified that
he would be willing to complete the class if necessary for the safety
of the child. While the juvenile court initially found that the lack of
completion of this one-hour, six-to-eight-week class was not
“conclusive” or “essential,” the court later focused on this as an
example of father’s failure to comply with his treatment plan. Due
to the limited scope of the class, the other evidence of father’s
parenting abilities, and the inconsistent nature of the juvenile
court’s findings, we cannot agree that father’s failure to complete
the class proves by clear and convincing evidence that he was unfit.
¶ 37 The Department and GAL also assert that father lacked a
support system because he was estranged from his older daughter
(she was angry upon learning that father had a second child), did
not provide the Department information about his fiancée, was
17 initially reluctant to involve other family members in the case, and
did not know the name of the neighbor whom he planned to hire as
a babysitter. But the record demonstrates that, at the time of the
hearing, father and his older daughter had reconciled, two of his
nephews testified and expressed their support for him and
willingness to assist with childcare, and he was able to provide the
name of his proposed babysitter (a neighbor who had cared for her
grandchild) during his testimony.
¶ 38 At the termination hearing, the Department’s counsel
encouraged the court to terminate father’s parental rights because
“he doesn’t really have a solid plan for taking care of [the child] for
the next 17 years.” We wonder what sort of seventeen-year plan
counsel thought father should have presented to the court to prove
his fitness. And we are troubled by the Department and the court’s
focus on the fact that father’s job might sometimes require him to
leave the child with family members or a babysitter. As another
division has aptly pointed out, “[M]ost (perhaps all) working parents
face [work-related] scheduling conflicts at one time or another.
Grappling with such conflicts doesn’t, on its own, make them legally
unfit.” S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 28.
18 ¶ 39 At any rate, the Department and GAL do not point us to any
authority requiring a parent to establish an outside support system
before they can be found fit, and we are not aware of any.
C. Harmless Error
¶ 40 While the Department and GAL encourage us to find any error
to be harmless, they develop no such argument. We therefore
decline to address this issue further. See People in Interest of D.B-
J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an
appellate argument presented without supporting facts, specific
argument, or supporting authorities).
D. Conclusion
¶ 41 After reviewing the record, we conclude that the juvenile court
erred by (1) determining that the Department proved by clear and
convincing evidence that father was unfit; and (2) shifting the
burden to father to prove his fitness. (We do not hold that father
was or was not a fit parent, only that the court erred by concluding
that the Department met its burden to prove father’s unfitness.)
19 IV. Disposition
¶ 42 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
juvenile court.5
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.
5 Because we have concluded that the juvenile court erred with
respect to its determination of unfitness, we need not address father’s other contention that the juvenile court erred by finding that he could not become fit within a reasonable time.