Peo in Interest of CBB

Opinion

25CA2480 Peo in Interest of CBB 07-02-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2480 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JV31028 Honorable Laurie Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of C.B.B., a Child,

and Concerning S.A.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Grove, and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 2, 2026

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, S.A. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationship with C.B.B. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In December 2023, Denver Human Services (the Department)

filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning the then-

newborn child. The Department alleged concerns about mother’s

substance use; homelessness; pending criminal charges; mental

health issues; and medical conditions, including a traumatic brain

injury and uncontrolled seizures. The Department also noted that

the child was born with Down syndrome and needed to be on

oxygen.

¶3 The juvenile court granted temporary legal custody of the child

to the Department, and the Department placed her with her

paternal grandmother. The juvenile court adjudicated the child

dependent or neglected and adopted a treatment plan that required

mother to, in sum, address her substance use and mental health

issues; maintain stable housing; refrain from engaging in criminal

activity; demonstrate the ability to meet the child’s needs; and

attend family time.

1 ¶4 The Department later moved to terminate the mother’s

parental rights, and the juvenile court held a hearing on the

motion. Approximately two years after the case opened, the court

granted the termination motion.

II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶5 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds,

by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶6 The question of whether a juvenile court properly terminated

parental rights is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. Thus, we review the

court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. Id.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶7 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and

2 reunite her with the child. Specifically, she argues that the

Department failed to provide adequate family time. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶8 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court

must consider whether the department of human services made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest

of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). “Reasonable efforts”

means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in

out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025. Services

provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025, satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶9 As relevant here, a department must provide family time

services for parents with children in out-of-home placement if those

services are determined to be necessary and appropriate by the

individual case plan. § 19-3-208(1), (2)(b)(IV); People in Interest of

E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 14. The child’s health and safety are the

paramount concerns in determining whether, and what type of,

family time services are necessary and appropriate. See § 19-3-

208(2)(a); People in Interest of A.A., 2020 COA 154, ¶ 17.

3 ¶ 10 The juvenile court should analyze a department’s efforts by

considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan. People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. A parent is ultimately

responsible for using the services to obtain the assistance needed to

comply with their treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259

P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).

B. Analysis

¶ 11 The juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunite her with the

child. In sum, the court found, with record support, that the

Department made referrals and provided services related to

substance use, mental health, housing, life skills, and safe

parenting. It also found, with record support, that the caseworker

made ongoing efforts to locate mother and engage with her

throughout the case. However, the court concluded that mother’s

“lack of engagement in services and treatment . . . left the

Department unable to effectuate the goal of rehabilitating [her] to

safely parent the minor child.”

4 ¶ 12 Mother challenges the court’s reasonable efforts determination

only as it relates to family time. She does not assert that the

Department did not provide any family time services at all. Indeed,

the record indicates that the caseworker made at least four family

time referrals, but mother was repeatedly discharged from those

family time programs because of her lack of attendance and

inability to regulate her emotions during visits.

¶ 13 Rather, mother argues that the family time provided by the

Department was inadequate because (1) family time was

“unnecessarily” restricted and reduced throughout the case; (2) it

often occurred during the child’s medical appointments; and (3) the

caseworker did not make a new family time referral or arrange any

visits after learning that mother was in jail. We are not persuaded.

1. Restriction and Reduction of Family Time

¶ 14 First, the record belies mother’s contention that her family

time was “unnecessarily” restricted and reduced throughout the

case. Initially, the juvenile court ordered the Department to provide

supervised family time, but the court later increased the level of

supervision by ordering the Department to provide therapeutic

visits. The juvenile court made this change based on concerns for

5 the child’s safety — specifically, that mother put the child’s safety

at risk because she was unable to regulate her emotions, meet the

child’s medical needs, or properly feed the child. Although mother

initially objected to therapeutic visits and requested a contested

hearing on the restriction, she then changed her mind and waived

the hearing.

¶ 15 It is also true that the juvenile court initially ordered the

Department to provide two-hour visits twice a week but later

reduced the frequency and duration of mother’s family time.

However, the caseworker testified that the reduction was based on

mother’s inconsistent attendance and the child’s feeding schedule;

the child had to be fed with a feeding tube, and mother did not

know how to properly use it. Contrary to mother’s implication that

the Department did not provide her with the opportunity to learn

how to use the feeding tube, which deprived her of longer visits with

the child, the caseworker testified that she arranged for a nurse to

teach mother how to use the feeding tube during one of mother’s

visits. But even after the training, mother was unable to

demonstrate proper use of the feeding tube. The caseworker did

not arrange additional training for mother because the child started

6 using a different type of feeding tube about a year before the

termination hearing, and mother “ha[d] not been around” to learn

how to use it. Indeed, the caseworker testified that in the fifteen

months leading up to the termination hearing, she had only been

able to speak to mother a few times, and mother had not attended

any family time despite the family time providers’ repeated attempts

to contact mother to schedule visits.

¶ 16 In sum, the record indicates that the juvenile court properly

restricted and reduced mother’s family time based on the child’s

significant health and safety needs. See § 19-3-217(d), C.R.S. 2025

(a court may restrict family time if it is necessary to protect a child’s

safety or mental, emotional, or physical health); A.A., ¶ 17. Thus,

we reject mother’s contention that the juvenile court

“unnecessarily” restricted and reduced her family time.

2. Family Time During Medical Appointments

¶ 17 Next, while mother argues that her family time was deficient

because it “often occurred” during the child’s medical

appointments, we are not persuaded. In support of her argument,

mother points us to an April 2024 motion in which she asserted

that the Department had improperly scheduled some of her visits

7 during the child’s medical appointments. But shortly after mother

filed that motion, the juvenile court ordered the Department to

ensure that mother’s family time was not scheduled during the

child’s medical appointments. Mother does not point us to any part

of the record indicating that the Department did not abide by that

order during the remaining nineteen months of the case. Thus, the

record simply does not support mother’s assertion that her family

time was inadequate because it “often occurred” during the child’s

medical appointments. Accordingly, we reject this argument.

3. Family Time While Incarcerated

¶ 18 Finally, we are not persuaded that the juvenile court erred by

determining that the Department made reasonable efforts even

though the caseworker failed to make a new family time referral or

arrange visits while mother was in jail. By the time of the

termination hearing, mother had been in jail for about a month and

a half. However, the caseworker testified that she did not have any

information about mother’s whereabouts until late October 2025,

when she initiated an online search for mother and discovered that

she was in jail. Shortly thereafter, about two weeks before the

termination hearing, the caseworker went to the jail to meet with

8 mother. During that meeting, the caseworker did not offer to

arrange family time or make a new family time referral.

¶ 19 Even assuming that the caseworker should have discussed

family time with mother during their meeting or made a new family

time referral thereafter, mother does not explain how two weeks

without a family time referral rendered the Department’s overall

efforts unreasonable. We are not convinced that it did, especially

when considering (1) the juvenile court’s finding that mother’s

engagement with the child had been “inconsistent throughout the

case”; (2) the caseworker’s testimony that mother had not attended

any family time in the fourteen months leading up to her

incarceration; and (3) the ample evidence showing that the

Department provided numerous services, including family time, to

mother throughout the case. See My.K.M., ¶ 33 (to analyze

reasonable efforts, the court must look at the totality of the

circumstances).

¶ 20 Based on the foregoing, we reject mother’s argument that the

juvenile court’s reasonable efforts determination was erroneous

based on the caseworker’s failure to make a family time referral

while mother was in jail. Because we reject all of mother’s family

9 time arguments, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s

determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate mother and reunite her with the child.

IV. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 21 Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that she could not become fit within a reasonable time. We discern

no error.

¶ 22 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a

treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates their parental

rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App.

2007). The determination of a reasonable period is necessarily fact

specific, and thus, what constitutes a reasonable time to comply

with a treatment plan may vary from case to case. Id. In

determining whether a parent can become fit in a reasonable time,

the juvenile court may consider whether any change has occurred

during the pendency of the proceeding. K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d

695, 700 (Colo. 2006). A reasonable time is not an indefinite time,

and it must be determined by considering the physical, mental, and

10 emotional conditions and needs of the child. People in Interest of

S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 24.

¶ 23 Additionally, when a child is under six years old, the juvenile

court must consider the expedited permanency planning (EPP)

provisions, which require that the child be placed in a permanent

home as expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,

19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 24 The juvenile court considered whether mother could become fit

within a reasonable amount of time but ultimately concluded that

she could not. The court noted that because of the child’s age, the

EPP provisions applied and the case could not be “extended

indefinitely.” Also, it found that the child needed the permanency

that adoption would provide.

¶ 25 Further, the juvenile court found that because of mother’s

minimal engagement throughout the case, “the same issues that

caused the case to open continue[d] to be present nearly two years

later.” To that end, the court found that concerns about mother’s

ability to meet the child’s heightened needs remained at the time of

the termination hearing. It also found that mother did not have

11 stable housing and had not addressed her mental health and

medical issues. Thus, it concluded that “additional time [would]

likely not change [mother’s] conduct or condition.”

¶ 26 The record supports these findings. By the time of

termination, the child was almost two years old, and she had been

in out-of-home placement for her entire life. Further, over a year

had passed since the court adopted mother’s treatment plan.

During that year, mother did not engage in the services offered to

mitigate the concerns about her ability to meet the child’s

significant needs.

¶ 27 The caseworker testified that mother had not complied with

her treatment plan or addressed any of the concerns that brought

the family to the Department’s attention. Specifically, the

caseworker testified that mother had not engaged in substance use

or mental health treatment, had not addressed her medical issues,

and did not have stable housing. The caseworker also testified that

in the year leading up to the hearing, mother had not attended any

family time or any of the child’s medical appointments. Thus, the

caseworker opined, as an expert in social casework with an

emphasis in child protection, that mother could not safely care for

12 the child because she did not understand the child’s medical needs.

The caseworker also opined that mother could not become fit within

a reasonable time because in the two years that the case had been

open, “nothing ha[d] changed,” and mother was “basically starting

from the very beginning” in terms of her engagement in services.

¶ 28 To the extent that mother argues that the court should have

allowed more time because her family time had gone well and she

was working on obtaining stable housing, we are not persuaded.

The juvenile court heard testimony about mother’s family time and

recent efforts to obtain stable housing. But it still found, in sum,

that a further delay in permanency would not be in the child’s best

interests based on mother’s overall lack of engagement, the child’s

young age, and the child’s high needs. The court’s finding was

supported by the record, and we cannot reweigh the evidence. See

People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62 (it is not our role to

reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the

juvenile court).

¶ 29 Further, to the extent that mother argues that the juvenile

court should have allowed more time for the Department to provide

reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities

13 Act (ADA) and additional services for her “special needs,” we

conclude that her argument is undeveloped. On appeal, she does

not identify any specific services or accommodations that were

lacking during the year leading up to termination. Nor does she

explain how more services or accommodations would have rendered

her fit within a reasonable time, particularly when considering the

juvenile court’s extensive findings about mother’s overall lack of

engagement and the child’s need for permanency based on her

heightened needs. Accordingly, we decline to address mother’s ADA

argument. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo.

App. 2004) (declining to address an appellate contention that lacked

supporting facts and specific arguments).

¶ 30 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court

properly analyzed whether mother could become fit within a

reasonable time. Because the court’s findings are supported by the

record, we decline to disturb its determination.

V. Disposition

¶ 31 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE BERGER concur.