Peo in Interest of BP

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 17, 2025
• Docket: 25CA080
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0080 Peo in Interest of BP 07-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0080 Jefferson County District Court No. 23JV30038 Honorable Lindsay VanGilder, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of B.P., a Child,

and Concerning S.P.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE YUN Tow and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 17, 2025

Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Claire M. Czajkowski, Assistant County Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 S.P. (mother) appeals the judgment allocating parental

responsibilities for B.P. (the child) to S.A. and P.F. (the intervenors),

who served as the child’s physical custodians for much of the case.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After receiving reports that the child tested positive for illicit

substances at birth, the Jefferson County Division of Children,

Youth and Families (the Department) worked with mother to place

both her and the child at a residential treatment facility. However,

after mother was discharged due to behavioral concerns, the

Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect, citing

concerns about mother’s substance abuse and mental health.

¶3 The juvenile court granted the Department’s request for

temporary legal custody of the child, who was then placed with a

family friend. The juvenile court also adjudicated the child

dependent and adopted a treatment plan for mother. The treatment

plan required her to (1) meet the child’s needs, including the need

for permanency; (2) address her mental health issues; and

(3) maintain a substance-free lifestyle.

1 ¶4 After two unsuccessful placements, the child was moved to the

home of the intervenors. Approximately ten months later, the child

was returned to mother’s care. Mother relapsed shortly thereafter,

and the child was returned to the care of the intervenors.

¶5 The Department then moved for an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR). Following an evidentiary hearing, the

juvenile court awarded sole decision-making responsibility and

primary custody to the intervenors and awarded supervised

parenting time of up to four hours per week to mother. The court

also ordered that mother could not file a motion to modify parenting

time until she provided proof that she was receiving ongoing

substance use treatment and trauma therapy. Finally, the court

directed the Department to file a certified copy of the order in the

district court and closed the dependency and neglect case.

II. Mother’s Parenting Time

¶6 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by imposing

conditions on her ability to file a motion to modify parenting time in

the future. We discern no basis for reversal.

2 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 The Children’s Code authorizes a juvenile court to enter an

APR to a non-relative in a case involving a dependent and neglected

child. § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of E.Q.,

2020 COA 118, ¶ 10; see also § 19-3-702(4)(a)(V), C.R.S. 2024.

When doing so, a juvenile court must consider the legislative

purposes of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102, C.R.S.

2024. See People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 12. The

overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s

safety and welfare by providing procedures that serve the child’s

best interests. L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). The

court is obligated to allocate parental responsibilities in accordance

with the child’s best interests. L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G.,

912 P.2d 1385, 1391 (Colo. 1996).

¶8 The APR is a matter within the juvenile court’s discretion. See

In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63,

¶ 15. A juvenile court abuses its discretion when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on a

misapplication of the law. People in Interest of M.W., 2022 COA 72,

¶ 12. It is for the court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

3 sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and to

assess the credibility of witnesses. People in Interest of A.J.L.,

243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). And when the juvenile court’s

findings have record support, its resolution of conflicting evidence is

binding on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15. But whether the court applied the

correct legal standard in making its findings is a question of law

that we review de novo. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6,

¶ 10.

B. Analysis

¶9 The juvenile court ordered mother “to provide proof of ongoing

substance use treatment and trauma therapy before petitioning the

[c]ourt for additional family time with [the child].” Mother asserts

that this language erroneously restricted the district court’s ability

to modify the APR order. We disagree.

¶ 10 Once a juvenile court enters an APR order in a dependency

and neglect proceeding, it may require that a certified copy of the

order be filed in the district court, which ends the dependency and

neglect proceeding and transfers jurisdiction over the child to the

district court. People in Interest of M.R.M., 2021 COA 22, ¶¶ 19, 40;

see also § 19-1-104(6). At that point, any future proceedings,

4 including modifications of the APR, are governed by the Uniform

Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA). See N.G.G., ¶ 26. The UDMA

states that, with exceptions not applicable here, “the court may

make or modify an order granting or denying parenting time rights

whenever such order or modification would serve the best interests

of the child.” § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2024 (emphasis added).

Thus, any attempt to prospectively limit a modification would be of

no effect because section 14-10-129 specifically governs the district

court’s authority to modify APR orders.1

¶ 11 We therefore conclude that the APR order does not prevent the

district court from granting, if appropriate, a modification to the

APR.

III. Treatment Plan Compliance and Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 12 Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred by

determining that she did not comply with her treatment plan and

could not become fit within a reasonable time. We discern no error.

1 For the same reason, we also reject mother’s assertion that the

juvenile court’s order “effectively introduced the best interests- standard from the Children’s Code into a proceeding governed by the UDMA.”

5 ¶ 13 Although a juvenile court must find that a parent cannot

become fit within a reasonable time before it may terminate

parental rights, see § 19-3-604(1)(c)(III), C.R.S. 2024, no such

finding is required before a court may allocate parental

responsibilities. In fact, while parental unfitness “clearly

constitutes a compelling reason not to return a child home,”

parental deficiencies less serious than unfitness can still provide a

compelling reason to deny the child’s return when considered in

light of the child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and

needs. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1283 (Colo. App.

2005). Thus, the fact that a parent may become fit within a

reasonable time is not dispositive of whether an APR is in the

child’s best interests, particularly if there are other compelling

reasons not to return a child to the parent.

¶ 14 Though not required, the juvenile court found that mother was

unfit at the time of the APR hearing. While the court did not make

any specific findings about mother’s treatment plan compliance or

ability to become fit within a reasonable time, the court did review

each of mother’s treatment plan objectives and expressed concerns

regarding her stability, mental health, and substance use. The

6 court found that mother needed to focus on her trauma and

sobriety in the long term “in order to be able to be present for [the

child] in a meaningful or healthy way.”

¶ 15 The record supports these findings. Both ongoing caseworkers

testified that they had concerns about mother’s stability. Their

concerns were based, in part, on mother’s verbally aggressive

behavior that resulted in conflicts with various supportive

individuals and professionals, including (1) staff at a drug testing

facility; (2) staff at the family time supervision facility; (3) the

guardian ad litem; (4) a caseworker; (5) the child’s pediatrician;

(6) the maternal grandfather; (7) a family friend; (8) the intervenors;

and (9) mother’s alcoholics anonymous sponsor. Due to the

ongoing discord, several of these individuals declined to continue

supervising mother’s family time. And the child’s pediatrician

refused to continue treating the child. The caseworkers expressed

concern about mother’s pattern of high-conflict behavior and its

impact on her and the child’s stability.

¶ 16 One caseworker also expressed concerns about mother’s

ability to control her emotions. Mother’s therapist testified that

mother had experienced trauma, which materialized as anger and

7 fear, and that they were working to prepare mother for trauma

therapy. While her therapist acknowledged the progress mother

had made, she also explained that the process “takes a while” and

there was no way to know when mother would be ready to begin

trauma therapy.

¶ 17 Finally, several witnesses described mother’s history of

substance abuse, including that mother relapsed twice during the

case while the child was in her care. The first relapse occurred

approximately eight months after the petition was filed, during a

time when mother was exercising unsupervised family time without

authorization. The second relapse occurred about nine months

later, after the child had returned home. One of the intervenors

testified about the unsanitary conditions of mother’s residence

during her second relapse and described finding the then-eighteen-

month-old child with a vape pen in her mouth.

¶ 18 Mother correctly asserts that the record contains some

evidence of her treatment plan compliance. For example, she

(1) maintained contact with the caseworkers; (2) attended family

time; (3) worked with her mental health provider for more than four

months prior to the APR hearing; (4) had a support network at the

8 time of the hearing; (5) engaged in treatment for substance use; and

(6) provided consistent, negative drug tests for four months before

the hearing. However, as one caseworker summarized, the case

was open for almost twenty-two months and, during that time,

mother (1) was in several different treatment facilities with only one

successful completion; (2) lost supportive individuals due to

conflicts; and (3) experienced two relapses while the child was in

her care. The caseworker explained that, for mother to be

successful with her treatment plan, she needed to demonstrate

compliance over time. Further, after the close of evidence but prior

to the entry of the APR judgment, the Department submitted

documentation that mother had tested positive for cocaine two

weeks earlier and missed three subsequent drug tests.

¶ 19 Mother asserts that, had the case remained open, she could

have participated in additional treatment to reunite with the child.

But mother had twenty-two months to engage in treatment and, at

the time of the APR judgment, still suffered from the same concerns

that precipitated the petition. A reasonable time is not an indefinite

time, and it should be determined by considering the child’s

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. People in

9 Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). And where,

as here, a child is under six years old, the court must also consider

the expedited permanency planning provisions, which require that

the child be placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as

possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 20 Because the juvenile court’s findings are supported by the

record, and because the court applied the correct legal standards,

we discern no error.

IV. Disposition

¶ 21 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.