25CA1594 Peo in Interest of Baskerville 12-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1594 Pueblo County District Court No. 25MH30077 Honorable Amiel Markenson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of Christon Baskerville,
Respondent-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Gomez and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 4, 2025
Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, Kate H. Shafer, Special Assistant County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Respondent, Christon Baskerville, appeals the district court
order authorizing staff at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in
Pueblo (CMHHIP) to medicate him against his will. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Baskerville, also known as Christon X, was admitted to
CMHHIP after being found incompetent to proceed on criminal
charges. According to the affidavit of Dr. Hareesh Pillai,
Baskerville’s treating physician, Baskerville has a history of
psychiatric hospitalizations and suffers from psychosis – not
otherwise specified.
¶3 CMHHIP began administering psychiatric medications to
Baskerville against his will on an emergency basis after he
challenged a peer to a fight, posturing with his fists up and
threatening “I’ll fuck you up.” The People then petitioned for a six-
month order authorizing the continued involuntary administration
of Zyprexa, Depakote, and Thorazine — Zyprexa and Depakote on a
scheduled basis, and Thorazine only as needed for episodes of acute
agitation or refusals of oral Depakote.
¶4 Both Dr. Pillai and Baskerville testified at the evidentiary
hearing. Dr. Pillai testified about each of the four elements required
1 for involuntary administration of medication under People v.
Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985).1 Dr. Pillai described
Baskerville’s symptoms, his agitated and aggressive behavior
toward his peers in CMHHIP, and the need for an order authorizing
the involuntary administration of both antipsychotic and mood-
stabilizing medications. Baskerville testified that he objected to
taking psychiatric medications because, among other reasons listed
in Part III.B below, he didn’t need them, doing so is against his
religious beliefs, and they cause sedation. He preferred to treat
himself with yoga and dancing.
¶5 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found
Dr. Pillai’s testimony to be credible and persuasive. It found that
the People had provided clear and convincing evidence for each of
the Medina elements, and it issued an order authorizing CMHHIP
1 When the state seeks to administer antipsychotic drugs to a
mentally ill criminal defendant involuntarily so that he can stand trial, a reviewing court applies the Supreme Court’s test in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178 (2003). However, reviewing courts apply state law tests if the state, as here, seeks to administer antipsychotics involuntarily for “a different purpose,” including a purpose “related to the individual’s dangerousness, or . . . the individual’s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk.” Id. at 181-82.
2 staff to administer all of the requested medications for a period of
six months.
¶6 On appeal, Baskerville challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the court’s order.
II. Legal Authority and Standard of Review
¶7 A district court may authorize the involuntary administration
of medication to a patient if the treating facility establishes each of
the following Medina elements by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) the patient is incompetent to participate effectively in the
treatment decision; (2) treatment by medication is necessary either
to prevent a significant and likely long-term deterioration in the
patient’s mental condition or to prevent the likelihood of the patient
causing serious harm to himself or others in the institution; (3) a
less intrusive treatment alternative is not available; and (4) the
patient’s need for treatment with medication is sufficiently
compelling to override his bona fide and legitimate interest in
refusing medication. Id.; see People in Interest of Strodtman, 293
P.3d 123, 131 (Colo. App. 2011). A physician’s testimony alone
may constitute clear and convincing evidence. See People v.
Pflugbeil, 834 P.2d 843, 846-47 (Colo. App. 1992).
3 ¶8 When, as here, a patient challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, we review the record as a whole and, viewing it in the light
most favorable to the People, determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to support the court’s decision. People in Interest of
Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 23. We review the court’s conclusions of
law de novo and defer to its findings of fact if supported by evidence
in the record. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, ¶ 8. We also defer
to the district court’s resolution of evidentiary conflicts and its
determinations of witness credibility, the weight of the evidence,
and the inferences to be drawn from it. See People in Interest of
R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7.
III. Analysis
¶9 Baskerville challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for only
the first and fourth Medina elements. He argues that Dr. Pillai’s
testimony didn’t show (1) that he was incapable of effectively
participating in treatment decisions; or (2) a sufficiently compelling
need to override his interests in refusing the requested medications.
See Medina, 705 P.2d at 973-74. We conclude that the record
provides ample support for the court’s findings.
4 A. The First Medina Element
¶ 10 Baskerville argues that the evidence offered by the People falls
short in light of his testimony acknowledging that he has a mental
illness. We disagree.
¶ 11 A patient is incompetent to effectively participate in treatment
decisions when his “mental illness has so impaired his judgment as
to render him ‘incapable of participating in decisions affecting his
health.’” Id. at 973 (citation omitted). Although the first Medina
element may be satisfied if a patient fails to recognize that he has a
mental illness, see People in Interest of C.J.R., 2016 COA 133, ¶ 32,
the converse isn’t necessarily true.
¶ 12 Dr. Pillai testified, and the district court found credible, that
Baskerville lacked insight into his mental illness and that he was
incompetent to effectively participate in his treatment decisions
because his mental illness causes paranoia, delusions, impulsivity,
and agitation.
¶ 13 Baskerville’s testimony provided support for Dr. Pillai’s
opinions. Although Baskerville acknowledged that he suffers from a
mental illness, his inconsistent assessment of his illness — when
first asked, he reported that he suffers from mild schizophrenia,
5 and, on reconsideration a few minutes later, bipolar disorder —
demonstrated a lack of insight. Baskerville further demonstrated
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
25CA1594 Peo in Interest of Baskerville 12-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1594 Pueblo County District Court No. 25MH30077 Honorable Amiel Markenson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of Christon Baskerville,
Respondent-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Gomez and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 4, 2025
Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, Kate H. Shafer, Special Assistant County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant ¶1 Respondent, Christon Baskerville, appeals the district court
order authorizing staff at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in
Pueblo (CMHHIP) to medicate him against his will. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Baskerville, also known as Christon X, was admitted to
CMHHIP after being found incompetent to proceed on criminal
charges. According to the affidavit of Dr. Hareesh Pillai,
Baskerville’s treating physician, Baskerville has a history of
psychiatric hospitalizations and suffers from psychosis – not
otherwise specified.
¶3 CMHHIP began administering psychiatric medications to
Baskerville against his will on an emergency basis after he
challenged a peer to a fight, posturing with his fists up and
threatening “I’ll fuck you up.” The People then petitioned for a six-
month order authorizing the continued involuntary administration
of Zyprexa, Depakote, and Thorazine — Zyprexa and Depakote on a
scheduled basis, and Thorazine only as needed for episodes of acute
agitation or refusals of oral Depakote.
¶4 Both Dr. Pillai and Baskerville testified at the evidentiary
hearing. Dr. Pillai testified about each of the four elements required
1 for involuntary administration of medication under People v.
Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985).1 Dr. Pillai described
Baskerville’s symptoms, his agitated and aggressive behavior
toward his peers in CMHHIP, and the need for an order authorizing
the involuntary administration of both antipsychotic and mood-
stabilizing medications. Baskerville testified that he objected to
taking psychiatric medications because, among other reasons listed
in Part III.B below, he didn’t need them, doing so is against his
religious beliefs, and they cause sedation. He preferred to treat
himself with yoga and dancing.
¶5 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found
Dr. Pillai’s testimony to be credible and persuasive. It found that
the People had provided clear and convincing evidence for each of
the Medina elements, and it issued an order authorizing CMHHIP
1 When the state seeks to administer antipsychotic drugs to a
mentally ill criminal defendant involuntarily so that he can stand trial, a reviewing court applies the Supreme Court’s test in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178 (2003). However, reviewing courts apply state law tests if the state, as here, seeks to administer antipsychotics involuntarily for “a different purpose,” including a purpose “related to the individual’s dangerousness, or . . . the individual’s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk.” Id. at 181-82.
2 staff to administer all of the requested medications for a period of
six months.
¶6 On appeal, Baskerville challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the court’s order.
II. Legal Authority and Standard of Review
¶7 A district court may authorize the involuntary administration
of medication to a patient if the treating facility establishes each of
the following Medina elements by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) the patient is incompetent to participate effectively in the
treatment decision; (2) treatment by medication is necessary either
to prevent a significant and likely long-term deterioration in the
patient’s mental condition or to prevent the likelihood of the patient
causing serious harm to himself or others in the institution; (3) a
less intrusive treatment alternative is not available; and (4) the
patient’s need for treatment with medication is sufficiently
compelling to override his bona fide and legitimate interest in
refusing medication. Id.; see People in Interest of Strodtman, 293
P.3d 123, 131 (Colo. App. 2011). A physician’s testimony alone
may constitute clear and convincing evidence. See People v.
Pflugbeil, 834 P.2d 843, 846-47 (Colo. App. 1992).
3 ¶8 When, as here, a patient challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, we review the record as a whole and, viewing it in the light
most favorable to the People, determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to support the court’s decision. People in Interest of
Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 23. We review the court’s conclusions of
law de novo and defer to its findings of fact if supported by evidence
in the record. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, ¶ 8. We also defer
to the district court’s resolution of evidentiary conflicts and its
determinations of witness credibility, the weight of the evidence,
and the inferences to be drawn from it. See People in Interest of
R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7.
III. Analysis
¶9 Baskerville challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for only
the first and fourth Medina elements. He argues that Dr. Pillai’s
testimony didn’t show (1) that he was incapable of effectively
participating in treatment decisions; or (2) a sufficiently compelling
need to override his interests in refusing the requested medications.
See Medina, 705 P.2d at 973-74. We conclude that the record
provides ample support for the court’s findings.
4 A. The First Medina Element
¶ 10 Baskerville argues that the evidence offered by the People falls
short in light of his testimony acknowledging that he has a mental
illness. We disagree.
¶ 11 A patient is incompetent to effectively participate in treatment
decisions when his “mental illness has so impaired his judgment as
to render him ‘incapable of participating in decisions affecting his
health.’” Id. at 973 (citation omitted). Although the first Medina
element may be satisfied if a patient fails to recognize that he has a
mental illness, see People in Interest of C.J.R., 2016 COA 133, ¶ 32,
the converse isn’t necessarily true.
¶ 12 Dr. Pillai testified, and the district court found credible, that
Baskerville lacked insight into his mental illness and that he was
incompetent to effectively participate in his treatment decisions
because his mental illness causes paranoia, delusions, impulsivity,
and agitation.
¶ 13 Baskerville’s testimony provided support for Dr. Pillai’s
opinions. Although Baskerville acknowledged that he suffers from a
mental illness, his inconsistent assessment of his illness — when
first asked, he reported that he suffers from mild schizophrenia,
5 and, on reconsideration a few minutes later, bipolar disorder —
demonstrated a lack of insight. Baskerville further demonstrated
how some of his symptoms may interfere with his treatment
decisions by (1) interrupting the hearing multiple times,
(2) objecting to taking psychiatric medications because “they’re DNA
altering chemical substances,” and (3) explaining that he was being
targeted for these medications by a “wicked cabal . . . blind[ly]
acquiescing to . . . the devil himself” because he is a very dangerous
“master teacher.” Moreover, despite his acknowledgement that he
suffers from some sort of mental illness causing “outbursts,”
Baskerville considered yoga and dance to be sufficient therapy.
¶ 14 We defer to the district court’s impressions at the evidentiary
hearing and decline to reconsider its assignment of weight to
certain evidence and its resolution of evidentiary conflicts. See
R.C., ¶ 7. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
People, we conclude that the foregoing evidence is more than
sufficient to support the court’s finding by clear and convincing
evidence that Baskerville is incompetent to effectively participate in
his treatment decisions. See Ramsey, ¶ 23. Thus, we won’t disturb
the court’s decision.
6 B. The Fourth Medina Element
¶ 15 In assessing the sufficiency of evidence for the fourth Medina
element, a court must determine (1) “whether the patient’s refusal
is bona fide and legitimate” and, if so, (2) “whether the prognosis
without treatment is so unfavorable that the patient’s personal
preference must yield to the legitimate interests of the state in
preserving the life and health of the patient placed in its charge and
in protecting the safety of those in the institution.” Medina, 705
P.2d at 974.
¶ 16 The district court found that Baskerville’s interests in avoiding
sedation and observing his religious beliefs were bona fide and
legitimate. This finding is undisputed. Baskerville challenges only
the court’s finding that his prognosis without treatment is so
unfavorable that his interest in refusing medication must yield to
the State’s interests in preserving his health and in protecting the
safety of those in CMHHIP. He offers only a conclusory argument
that the court erred in finding that Baskerville’s interests were
outweighed by his need for treatment. We perceive no error.
¶ 17 Dr. Pillai testified that during his most recent visit to CMHHIP,
Baskerville had been agitated and attempted to incite fights with his
7 peers on multiple occasions, requiring CMHHIP staff to intervene.
He further testified that the aggressive incidents were decreasing
with the administration of Depakote and that without psychiatric
medications, Baskerville was likely to suffer a significant and long-
term deterioration in his condition. As to the side effect concerns,
Dr. Pillai acknowledged that Baskerville had complained of sedation
and that some level of sedation could continue. But Dr. Pillai
opined that Baskerville’s need for medication to avoid more frequent
and intense agitation and aggressiveness toward his peers in
CMHHIP outweighed his interest in refusal.
¶ 18 Based on this evidence, the district court found that
Baskerville’s need for treatment was sufficiently compelling to
override his religious and side effect concerns. Because the record
supports the court’s finding on this element, we won’t disturb it,
see Ramsey, ¶ 23, and to the extent Baskerville asks us to re-weigh
the evidence, we decline to do so, see R.C., ¶ 7.
IV. Disposition
¶ 19 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.