Peo in Interest of AR

Opinion

23CA2220 Peo in Interest of AR 12-19-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2220 Fremont County Court No. 22JV30075 Honorable Kaitlin B. Turner, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.R., a Child,

and Concerning C.H.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM* Román, C.J., and Hawthorne*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 19, 2024

Eric Bellas, County Attorney, Sean Biddle, Assistant County Attorney, Canon City, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024 ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, C.H. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment adjudicating A.R. (the child)

dependent or neglected. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In October 2022, the Fremont County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect regarding the

then-eight-year-old child. The Department alleged that mother and

the child were living out of their car and that the child was not

attending school. The Department also alleged concerns about the

child’s suicidal ideations and the possibility of physical abuse. The

child was placed with his maternal grandparents on an emergency

basis.

¶3 Mother appeared virtually from Kansas at the initial shelter

hearing. She testified that she and the child lived in Kansas and

were visiting Colorado when the child was removed. But she also

testified that she lived at her parents’ Colorado address and that

she was planning to move to Florida. The juvenile court granted

temporary legal custody to the Department, and the child remained

with maternal grandparents.

1 ¶4 In February 2023, mother asserted that the Colorado court did

not have subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform

Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because

she and the child had moved to Kansas more than a year before

this case commenced, which made Kansas the child’s home state.

Three months later, a district court magistrate held an evidentiary

hearing regarding jurisdiction. At the end of the hearing, the

magistrate called a judge from the Sedgwick County, Kansas court.

After informing the Kansas court that Kansas was “likely” the

child’s home state when the petition in this case was filed, the

magistrate asked what the Kansas court’s position was regarding

the appropriate jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The Kansas court

stated that it did not “believe it would make sense for Kansas to

exercise jurisdiction” and that “Kansas would like to cede

jurisdiction over this matter to Colorado.” The magistrate then

found that the Kansas court’s decision to decline jurisdiction was

“dispositive” and determined that Colorado had jurisdiction over

this case under the UCCJEA. Mother petitioned for judicial review

of the magistrate’s order, and the juvenile court judge adopted it,

2 agreeing that “because Kansas ceded its jurisdiction, jurisdiction

rest[ed] with Colorado.”

¶5 After a jury trial, the juvenile court adjudicated the child

dependent or neglected. The court later entered a dispositional

order adopting a treatment plan for mother.

¶6 Mother appealed, arguing that the juvenile court failed to

comply with requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)

and lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA when it

adjudicated the child and entered the dispositional order. We

granted the parties’ joint request for a limited remand to allow the

court to address ICWA compliance. Thereafter, mother withdrew

her appellate argument regarding ICWA, stating that the

“supplemental record makes clear that the [juvenile] court has now

complied with the notice and inquiry requirements of ICWA.”

II. Discussion

¶7 Because mother withdrew her ICWA argument, her sole

contention on appeal is that the juvenile court erred by finding that

Colorado had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. She asserts that

even if Colorado had temporary emergency jurisdiction when this

case commenced, it lost such jurisdiction because of the lengthy

3 delay in reaching adjudication had removed the emergency nature

of the situation and Colorado did not have non-emergency

jurisdiction because Kansas was the child’s home state.

¶8 We disagree with all parties’ jurisdictional analyses for the

reasons explained below. But we ultimately conclude that the

juvenile court had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA when it

adjudicated the child and entered the initial dispositional order.

A. Standard of Review and Legal Authority

¶9 “Whether a trial court has jurisdiction over a child custody

proceeding presents a question of law, which we review de novo.”

People in Interest of S.A.G., 2021 CO 38, ¶ 21 (quoting Brandt v.

Brandt, 2012 CO 3, ¶ 18). But we may not disturb any factual

findings upon which the existence of jurisdiction turns unless they

are clearly erroneous. Id.

¶ 10 The UCCJEA sets out a detailed and comprehensive

framework that Colorado courts must use to determine whether

they may exercise jurisdiction in child custody matters. People in

Interest of C.L.T., 2017 COA 119, ¶ 16. The UCCJEA offers courts

two ways to exercise jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody

determination — temporary emergency jurisdiction under section

4 14-13-204, C.R.S. 2024, and non-emergency jurisdiction under

section 14-13-201, C.R.S. 2024. S.A.G., ¶¶ 24-26. A Colorado

court may exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction to enter an

initial child-custody determination if a child is present in Colorado

and has been abandoned, or it is necessary in an emergency to

protect the child because the child, sibling, or parent of the child, is

subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.

§ 14-13-204(1). A Colorado court may exercise non-emergency

jurisdiction to enter an initial child-custody determination if it

successfully navigates one of the four paths to jurisdiction from

section 14-13-201(1): (1) home-state jurisdiction; (2)

significant-connection jurisdiction; (3) more-appropriate-forum

jurisdiction; or (4) last-resort jurisdiction. S.A.G., ¶ 26.

¶ 11 However, if a Colorado court with proper jurisdiction has

already entered an initial child-custody determination, then it

retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to modify that

determination until either (a) the Colorado court determines that

the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do

not have a significant connection with Colorado and that

substantial evidence is no longer available in Colorado concerning

5 the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or

(b) the Colorado court or a court of another state determines that

the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do

not presently reside in Colorado. § 14-13-202(1)(a)-(b), C.R.S. 2024.

If a Colorado court that has entered an initial child-custody

determination loses exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, then it must

find that it has jurisdiction under section 14-13-201 before it may

modify its determination or enter further orders regarding the child.

§ 14-13-202(2).

B. Analysis

¶ 12 After the UCCJEA hearing, the magistrate found that when

this case commenced, Colorado had temporary emergency

jurisdiction to enter orders regarding the child under section

14-13-204. The parties disagree about whether the juvenile court

had temporary emergency jurisdiction at that time. But we

conclude that the court did not need temporary emergency

jurisdiction to act because, prior to the commencement of these

proceedings, a Colorado court had already entered an initial

child-custody determination, which gave the Colorado court

exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 14-13-202.

6 ¶ 13 Specifically, in October 2019, maternal grandparents opened

Fremont County Case No. 19DR168 by filing a petition for

allocation of parental responsibilities for the child, and we take

judicial notice of the court records and orders from that proceeding.

See Medina v. People, 2023 CO 46, ¶ 5 n.1 (“A court may take

judicial notice of the contents of court records in a related

proceeding.” (quoting People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 56 (Colo. App.

2004))). In that case, maternal grandparents and mother entered a

written stipulation which stated that the Colorado court had

jurisdiction to enter a child-custody determination because

Colorado was the child’s home state at the commencement of those

proceedings. They further agreed that mother would have sole

custody of the child, while maternal grandparents would have

visitation. In August 2020, the district court adopted the

stipulation as an order of the court.

¶ 14 Regardless of the parties’ and juvenile court’s erroneous belief

that no prior child-custody determination existed at the time these

proceedings commenced it is clear that the district court’s August

2020 order qualified as an initial child-custody determination under

the UCCJEA. See § 14-13-102(3), C.R.S. 2024 (a “child-custody

7 determination” includes any judgment, decree, or order allocating

parental responsibilities with respect to a child or providing for

visitation, parenting time, or grandparent family time with respect

to the child). And at the time these proceedings commenced, no

court had determined that Colorado had lost continuing, exclusive

jurisdiction under section 14-13-202(1). Therefore, when the

petition in this case was filed, Colorado had continuing, exclusive

jurisdiction over the child custody issues, and temporary emergency

jurisdiction was unnecessary.

¶ 15 Nonetheless, when mother asserted that she and the child had

lived in Kansas for the year leading up to these proceedings, the

question of whether Colorado had lost its continuing, exclusive

jurisdiction arose. As noted above, either the Colorado or Kansas

court could have determined that Colorado had lost continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction by finding that the child, his parents, and any

person acting as his parent no longer resided in Colorado. See

§ 14-13-202(1)(b). But neither court made such a finding.

Assuming, without deciding, that Colorado lost continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction when mother and the child moved to Kansas,

the record establishes that the juvenile court had jurisdiction under

8 the UCCJEA by the time it adjudicated the child and entered the

dispositional order.

¶ 16 At the UCCJEA hearing, the parties agreed that Colorado was

not the child’s home state because the child had not lived in

Colorado for at least one hundred eighty-two consecutive days

immediately before the filing of the petition. See § 14-13-102(7).

And, although the parties agreed that Kansas was the child’s home

state when this case commenced, the question of whether the

juvenile court had significant-connection, more-appropriate-forum,

or last-resort jurisdiction to adjudicate the child turned on whether

Kansas still had home-state jurisdiction at the time of adjudication.

See S.A.G., ¶¶ 41-42 (where Arkansas was the child’s home state at

the time the Colorado proceedings commenced, the Colorado court’s

ability to enter a termination order turned on whether Arkansas

still had home-state jurisdiction at the time of termination, and the

court’s focus on whether Arkansas was the home state at the

commencement of the proceedings was contrary to the plain text of

the UCCJEA).

¶ 17 By the time of adjudication, the child had lived with maternal

grandparents in Colorado for approximately one year. Thus, the

9 question of whether Kansas was still the child’s home state at that

time turned on whether the child’s time in Colorado had been a

“period of temporary absence” from the state of Kansas. See id. at ¶

43; see also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-37,102(8) (2024) (“home state”

means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person

acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months, including

any periods of temporary absence, immediately before the

commencement of a child-custody proceeding). Similar to the

circumstances in S.A.G., the juvenile court here did not determine

whether the child’s time in Colorado was a “period of temporary

absence,” and in turn, whether Kansas was still the child’s home

state at the time it adjudicated the child and entered the

dispositional order. But unlike the circumstances in S.A.G., we do

not need to remand this case for the juvenile court to determine if

Kansas was still the child’s home state at the time of adjudication

because, either way, we conclude that the juvenile court had

significant-connection jurisdiction when it adjudicated the child

and entered the dispositional order.

¶ 18 Under section 14-13-201(1)(b), a Colorado court has

jurisdiction to make a child-custody determination when another

10 state does not have home-state jurisdiction or the child’s

home-state court has declined to exercise jurisdiction, and Colorado

meets the requirements for significant-connection jurisdiction

under subsections (b)(I) and (b)(II).

¶ 19 First, if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the child’s

time in Colorado leading up to adjudication was not a “period of

temporary absence” from the state of Kansas, then it follows that

Kansas was not the child’s home state at the time of adjudication.

See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-37,102(8). If that was the case, then when

the court adjudicated the child, the first requirement of section

14-13-201(b) was met because a court of another state did not have

home-state jurisdiction. Further, the juvenile court adopted the

magistrate’s order in which it found that the child had lived in

Colorado from 2017 through 2021; that the child had a significant

connection with Colorado; and that substantial evidence related to

the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships was

available in Colorado. And those findings are supported by the

record. Thus, the second requirement of section 14-13-201(b) was

also met because significant connections and substantial evidence

existed in Colorado. See 14-13-201(b)(I)-(II). Therefore, if Kansas

11 was not still the child’s home state at the time of adjudication, the

juvenile court had significant-connection jurisdiction to adjudicate

the child and enter the dispositional order section 14-13-201(b).

¶ 20 Second, if we assume, for the sake of argument, that child’s

time in Colorado leading up to adjudication was a “period of

temporary absence” from the state of Kansas, then it follows that

Kansas was still the child’s home state at the time of adjudication.

See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-37,102(8). If that was the case, then the

Kansas court would have needed to decline jurisdiction on the

ground that Colorado is a more appropriate forum before the

Colorado court could exercise significant-connection jurisdiction.

See § 14-13-201(b). Here, the Kansas court did just that — it

declined to exercise jurisdiction and ceded jurisdiction to Colorado.

Thus, the first requirement of section 14-13-201(b) was met

because the child’s home-state court declined jurisdiction. And

again, the second requirement of section 14-13-201(b) was met

based on the magistrate’s findings regarding significant connections

and substantial evidence in Colorado. See § 14-13-201(b)(I)-(II).

Therefore, if Kansas was still the child’s home state at the time of

adjudication, the juvenile court had significant-connection

12 jurisdiction to adjudicate the child and enter the dispositional order

section 14-13-201(b).

¶ 21 We acknowledge mother’s argument that the Kansas court

declined to exercise jurisdiction without properly considering the

inconvenient forum factors. See Kan. Stat. Ann.

§ 23-37,207(b)(1)-(8) (2024) (stating that before determining

whether Kansas is an inconvenient forum, a Kansas court must

consider all relevant factors, including those listed in subsections

(b)(1)-(8)). And we agree that the Kansas court never referred to the

inconvenient forum factors when it declined to exercise jurisdiction

in this case. But, although the UCCJEA requires a court to

“consider” the enumerated factors when determining whether it is

an inconvenient forum, it does not require a court to make specific

findings regarding each factor. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-37,207(b)

(a court “shall consider” all relevant factors, including those

enumerated in the statute); see also § 14-13-207(2), C.R.S. 2024 (a

court “shall consider” all relevant factors, including those

enumerated in the statute). We will not assume that the Kansas

court failed to “consider” the inconvenient forum factors simply

because it did not explicitly refer to them in its ruling.

13 ¶ 22 Moreover, when a Colorado court contacts an out-of-state

court, the out-of-state court can decline jurisdiction in any manner

that conveys its intent not to exercise jurisdiction over a child in

connection with a child-custody proceeding, even including inaction

or refusal to discuss the issue of jurisdiction at all. S.A.G., ¶ 55.

Certainly, if a refusal to discuss jurisdiction would have been

sufficient to decline jurisdiction, then the Kansas court’s express

decision to decline jurisdiction was sufficient, regardless of mother’s

disagreement with its reasoning.

¶ 23 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court

had significant-connection jurisdiction pursuant to section

14-13-201(b) when it adjudicated the child and entered the initial

III. Disposition

¶ 24 The judgment is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.