23CA1928 Peo in Interest of APR 04-16-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1928 Weld County District Court No. 22JD52 Honorable Marcelo A. Kopcow, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of A.P.R.,
Juvenile-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Harris and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 16, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Casey Mark Klekas, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant ¶1 A.P.R. appeals his adjudication of delinquency for sexual
assault. He argues that we must reverse his adjudication because
depriving a juvenile charged with a felony of the right to a jury trial
is unconstitutional under the federal and state constitutions. He
alternatively argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his request for a jury trial and erred by denying his motion
to suppress a pretextual conversation. And, finally, he contends
that we must vacate the restitution order. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After the victim reported to her father that A.P.R., then a
juvenile, sexually assaulted her at school, her father contacted the
police. The victim met with the investigating officer and agreed to
engage in a pretextual conversation with A.P.R. With the officer’s
help, the victim texted A.P.R. to talk about “what happened.”
During the conversation, the victim asserted that A.P.R. had raped
her and that she had told him “no a million times before [he] even
touched [her].” A.P.R. responded, “I realize that n I’m sorry . . . I
didn’t mean to do that to u.” He later added, “I really am sorry I
shouldn’t have done that to u.”
1 ¶3 At the investigating officer’s request, A.P.R. agreed to an
interview. A.P.R. admitted that he and the victim — who he had
recently dated — had sex at school but said the sex was
consensual. When confronted with the text messages, A.P.R.
explained that he apologized in the text messages because the
victim regretted having sex.
¶4 The prosecution filed a petition in delinquency charging A.P.R.
with one count of sexual assault. The district court denied A.P.R.’s
request for a jury trial and his motion to suppress the text
messages.
¶5 After a bench trial, the court found A.P.R. guilty and
adjudicated him delinquent. The court sentenced A.P.R. to two
years of probation and later imposed restitution.
II. Right to Jury Trial
¶6 Though A.P.R. recognizes that the Colorado Supreme Court
has ruled that a juvenile does not have a state or federal
constitutional right to a jury trial, see A.C. v. People, 16 P.3d 240,
241, 243, 245 (Colo. 2001), he argues at some length that we
should reach a different conclusion largely based on out-of-state
authority, see In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 169-70 (Kan. 2008).
2 ¶7 But A.C. is still good law and is thus binding on us. See
People v. Porter, 2015 CO 34, ¶ 23. Because we are not at liberty to
overrule the Colorado Supreme Court, we assume A.P.R. is simply
preserving his ability to ask the Colorado Supreme Court to revisit
and overrule A.C.1 See People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 26 (The
supreme court “alone can overrule [its] prior precedents concerning
matters of state law.”).
¶8 We therefore conclude that the district court was not required
to grant A.P.R.’s request for a jury trial.
III. Discretionary Grant of Jury Trial
¶9 A.P.R. alternatively argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his request for a jury trial. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 10 A juvenile has a statutory right to a jury trial in two
circumstances — when charged as an aggravated juvenile offender
or with a crime of violence. See § 19-2.5-610(1), C.R.S. 2025; A.C.,
1 A.P.R. also argues that “depriving juveniles charged with felonies
of the right to jury trial violates Colorado statutes and rules of procedure.” We do not address arguments that are presented in a “cursory . . . and undeveloped manner.” People v. Gingles, 2014 COA 163, ¶ 29.
3 16 P.3d at 242-43. When — as here — a juvenile has been charged
with a felony that does not fall within those two circumstances, the
court “has discretion to grant a jury trial.” A.C., 16 P.3d at 243.
This discretion allows the court to “balance the benefits of informal,
speedy and rehabilitative proceedings against the severity of the
offense, the nature of the consequences and the particular facts of
the case.” Id. at 244.
¶ 11 We review a district court’s denial of a juvenile’s request for a
jury trial for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only when the
court’s decision was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.
People in Interest of A.B.-B., 215 P.3d 1205, 1209 (Colo. App. 2009).
B. The Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion
¶ 12 The district court denied A.P.R.’s request for a jury trial,
concluding that a jury trial “would not be necessary or appropriate
in this case,” considering “the purpose of the juvenile code, and the
individual facts and circumstances.” A.P.R. says this was reversible
error because, in his view, the “particular facts of the case,” the
“severity of [the] felony offense[,] and the potential consequences of
a finding of guilt” outweighed the “benefits of informal, speedy[,]
and rehabilitative proceedings.”
4 ¶ 13 But we disagree that the court abused its discretion. The case
involved a single felony count. The facts were simple and centered
on whether the victim consented to sex or not. There were few
witnesses, and the trial was short. And while the consequences of a
sexual assault adjudication are serious, the same is generally true
of any felony. Yet the General Assembly mandated jury trials for
only two types of felonies.2 See id. at 1210 (upholding denial of
request for a jury trial in a sexual assault on a child case when the
case “was not a factually complex case” and the number of
witnesses was limited).
¶ 14 Because the district court considered the appropriate
factors — albeit briefly — we cannot say it abused its discretion
even if we might have reached a different result. See People in
Interest of T.B., 2016 COA 151M, ¶ 60, aff’d, 2019 CO 53.
¶ 15 To the extent A.P.R. argues that the court was required to
grant a jury trial because the judge made pretrial rulings and
purportedly formed unfavorable credibility opinions, we disagree.
2 While A.P.R. was concerned about sex offender registration, the
court held that “registration for this crime when [A.P.R.] was a juvenile, would not be appropriate.”
5 The court’s rulings and knowledge of the case are insufficient to
establish bias. People in Interest of S.G., 91 P.3d 443, 448 (Colo.
App. 2004) (“Unfavorable rulings and a court’s alleged personal
opinion formed from the judicial proceeding are insufficient to
establish bias.”); see also People v. Roehrs, 2019 COA 31, ¶ 21
(discussing the scope of the extrajudicial source doctrine). And
A.P.R. points to nothing in the record to suggest that the court
prejudged the case or that A.P.R. did not receive a fair trial.
¶ 16 We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion by denying the request for a jury trial.
IV. Motion to Suppress
¶ 17 Before trial, A.P.R. moved to suppress the text messages
between himself and the victim in which he acknowledged her rape
accusation and apologized to her several times. The motion argued
that the text messages should be suppressed because they were a
product of custodial interrogation, and, even if not in custody, his
statements were involuntary.
¶ 18 After a hearing, the court denied the motion, finding the text
messages were not the product of a custodial interrogation and
were voluntary.
6 ¶ 19 A.P.R. says this was reversible error. While he doesn’t appear
to challenge the court’s ruling that he wasn’t in custody during the
text exchange, he argues that the court should’ve suppressed the
text conversation because it was coerced through the victim and
elicited through outrageous governmental conduct.3
A. Standard of Review
¶ 20 The district court’s denial of a motion to suppress presents a
mixed question of fact and law. People v. Ashford, 2020 CO 16, ¶ 9.
We defer to the court’s factual findings if they are supported by
competent evidence, but we review the legal effect of those findings
de novo. Id. “[T]he ultimate determination of whether a statement
is voluntary is a legal question and is reviewed de novo.” Effland v.
People, 240 P.3d 868, 878 (Colo. 2010).
B. The Text Conversation Was Voluntary
¶ 21 Even if a defendant is not in custody, statements that are
involuntary or coerced are inadmissible. People v. Medina, 25 P.3d
1216, 1221-22 (Colo. 2001). A statement is involuntary only if
3 To the extent that A.P.R. argues that the police violated his
reasonable expectation of privacy by directing the text conversation, he doesn’t develop that argument, and we will not address it. See Gingles, ¶ 29.
7 “coercive governmental conduct played a significant role in inducing
the statement.” Effland, 240 P.3d at 877. The voluntariness
inquiry focuses on the conduct of law enforcement and whether
that conduct was of such nature as to overbear the defendant’s will.
Id.
¶ 22 To determine whether police behavior was coercive, the court
considers the following nonexhaustive list of factors:
• whether the defendant was in custody;
• whether the defendant was free to leave;
• whether the defendant was aware of the situation;
• whether the defendant had an opportunity to confer with
counsel or anyone else prior to or during the interrogation;
• whether the statement was made during the interrogation
or volunteered later;
• the method or style of the interrogation;
• the defendant’s mental and physical condition just prior to
the interrogation;
• the length of the interrogation; and
• the location of the interrogation.
8 People in Interest of Z.T.T., 2017 CO 48, ¶ 13.
¶ 23 The record here does not indicate governmental coercion. To
be sure, though A.P.R. wasn’t in custody, he also wasn’t aware that
the police were involved in directing the text conversation between
himself and the victim. But he was very much aware of the rape
allegation. And he was free to choose whether to acknowledge or
respond to the victim’s text messages. That is, he wasn’t forced to
respond, let alone apologize to the victim. See People v. Nkongolo,
2025 CO 20, ¶ 27. And A.P.R. had control over the duration of the
conversation and could have stopped responding at any point. See
id. Beyond that, nothing in the record suggests that A.P.R. was in
emotional or physical distress, the text messages contain no threats
or promises, and it “isn’t inherently coercive for police officers to
use an agent” to attempt to get information from a suspect. Id. at
¶ 24 (citing Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990)); see also
People v. Zamora, 940 P.2d 939, 942 (Colo. App. 1996) (“[T]he
limited use of ruses is supported by the overwhelming weight of
authority.”).
¶ 24 While A.P.R. says that “[h]ad police questioned him without
deception, he’d be entitled to his parents[’] presence and a lawyer,”
9 that’s not accurate. A juvenile has the right to have a parent
present during a custodial interrogation. § 19-2.5-203(1), C.R.S.
2025. But the text exchange was not a custodial interrogation.
¶ 25 We also disagree with A.P.R.’s assertion that the police
involvement with the text conversation constituted outrageous
governmental conduct, which is “conduct that violates fundamental
fairness and is shocking to the universal sense of justice.” People v.
Medina, 51 P.3d 1006, 1011 (Colo. App. 2001), aff’d sub nom.,
Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003). While the police
worked with the victim to direct the text conversation, A.P.R. was
free to respond or ignore the text messages. And A.P.R. doesn’t
explain how police involvement violated fundamental fairness or
shocked the universal sense of justice. See People v. Burlingame,
2019 COA 17, ¶ 12 (“Instances where trial courts have found
outrageous government conduct in Colorado are vanishingly rare,
and the threshold for such a finding appears to be exceedingly
high.”).
¶ 26 Finally, we decline A.P.R.’s request to abandon the totality of
the circumstances voluntariness inquiry and craft a new rule in
juvenile cases that prohibits police from using pretextual
10 communications “without the child’s awareness and parent’s
presence.” We are aware of no authority — and A.P.R. directs us to
none — to suggest that the multifactor voluntariness inquiry should
be different depending on the age of the defendant. See Nkongolo,
¶¶ 23-31 (examining coercion “from the suspect’s perspective”
based on the totality of the circumstances).
V. Restitution
¶ 27 Finally, A.P.R. asks us to vacate the restitution order because
(1) the court did not enter a valid restitution order at sentencing;
(2) the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to prove the
amount of restitution owed; and (3) the court imposed restitution
without supporting documentation or disclosure. We affirm the
restitution order.
A. Additional Background
¶ 28 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated that “there
[wa]s some crime victims compensation for some of the medical bills
that the victim received,” and while “a crime victim’s application”
had been received, the prosecution did not “have the information”
about “how much was paid out.” The prosecution requested “to
11 reserve [restitution] for 45 days so [it] c[ould] file that notice with
the [c]ourt.”
¶ 29 A.P.R. objected under People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, arguing
that restitution must be entered at the time of sentencing unless
there was good cause shown and that the defense had not been
“provided any information in discovery about the content or amount
of any crime victim compensation record.”
¶ 30 The court ruled,
As it relates to restitution, the [p]rosecutor is indicating that they have not received an award letter yet from Crime Victim Compensation, but that they see that an application was filed. I’m going to give the [p]rosecution 30 days from today’s date to file that Notice of Restitution. I’m finding pursuant to 18-1.3[-]603[,C.R.S. 2023,] based on the representation of [the prosecutor] that restitution may be requested. The specific amount of restitution for the benefit of the Crime Victim Compensation Fund has not yet been determined. They have not received an award letter. You may want to relay to them that you have 30 days to do that. It may be that there’s future treatment that’s going to be requested. If so, that needs to be made within 30 days pursuant to 18-1.3[-]603[, C.R.S. 2023,] for future restitution payments for treatment.
If I get a Notice of Restitution within 30 days, I’ll give the [d]efense an opportunity to file an
12 objection pursuant to People v. Weeks as cited by [defense counsel]. We’ll have a hearing within 91 days of today’s date unless good cause exists. But today the [c]ourt also is finding that there is good cause and extenuating circumstances to allow the [p]rosecutor to have 30 days to file a Notice of Restitution since her file does not reflect any awards that were made by Crime Victim Compensation, which is a different body than the District Attorney’s Office.
¶ 31 The mittimus entered the day of sentencing stated,
“[R]estitution [is] reserved for 30 days, [and the] court finds ongoing
restitution under crime victim compensation fund.”4
¶ 32 Less than a week after the sentencing hearing, the prosecution
filed a notice of restitution, requesting $4,851 for the crime victim
compensation fund. A.P.R. objected to the requested restitution,
again arguing it should have been presented at sentencing.
¶ 33 At the restitution hearing, the director of victims’ services and
manager of the district attorney’s crime victim compensation
program testified that the program paid $4,851 for the victim’s
4 The summary of the sentencing hearing in the register of actions
stated, “[R]estitution reserved for 30 days, makes findings pursuant to [section] 18-1.3-603, [C.R.S. 2023,] to allow defense finds good cause to address restitution after sentencing.”
13 medical expenses.5 The program manager explained that the
“details of the claim” are confidential but that she reviewed the
claim, that it was for medical expenses paid directly to providers,
and she described what the program reviewed to determine that the
expenses were proximately caused by A.P.R.’s conduct.
¶ 34 It was also established during the hearing that the prosecution
had the payment information before the sentencing hearing and
that it had been provided in discovery to defense counsel.
¶ 35 A.P.R. asked the court to deny restitution because it was
untimely under Weeks and because without the confidential victim
compensation records, he had no meaningful opportunity to test
proximate cause.
¶ 36 The court imposed the requested restitution. It found that the
prosecution proved through the manager’s testimony that “there
were medical expenses that were directly and proximately caused”
5 At the restitution hearing, the prosecution admitted an exhibit
through this witness. That exhibit, however, is not part of the appellate record. “It is the appellant’s responsibility to designate the record on appeal, including those parts of the trial proceedings that are necessary for purposes of the appeal, and to ensure that the record is properly transmitted to an appellate court.” People v. Duran, 2015 COA 141, ¶ 12. We presume that material portions omitted from the record would support the order. See id.
14 by A.P.R. Because the restitution order was entered “well within”
the statutory deadline, the court found that it was timely under
Weeks.6
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 37 If a juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent has caused
personal injury to a victim, the court shall require the juvenile to
make restitution per the restitution statute. § 19-2.5-1104(1),
C.R.S. 2025. The restitution statute provides that “[e]very order of
conviction of a felony . . . [or] misdemeanor . . . shall include
consideration of restitution.” § 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. 2023.7
¶ 38 The restitution statute then identifies “four options — and only
four options — related to the types of restitution orders [district]
courts may enter.” Weeks, ¶ 3. One of these options — relevant
here — is an “order that the defendant is obligated to pay
restitution, but that the specific amount of restitution shall be
6 Restitution was imposed fifty-three days after the court sentenced
A.P.R. 7 Though the restitution statute, including the statutory deadline to
enter restitution, has since been amended, see Ch. 307, sec. 1, § 18-1.3-603(1), (1)(b), 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1606, we cite — throughout this opinion — the statute in effect at the time of A.P.R.’s sentencing.
15 determined within the ninety-one days immediately following the
order of conviction, unless good cause is shown for extending the
time period by which the restitution amount shall be determined.”
§ 18-1.3-603(1)(b).
¶ 39 Thus, while a court may not reserve the issue of restitution in
its entirety at sentencing, an order under subsection (1)(b) permits
“a finding of restitution liability at sentencing and postponement of
the determination of the amount of restitution until after
sentencing.” Snow v. People, 2025 CO 32, ¶ 28. And the liability
finding may be “implicit.” Id. at ¶ 29; see also Weeks, ¶¶ 11, 16
(recognizing an implicit finding of restitution liability when, among
other things, the prosecution informed the court at sentencing that
it would be seeking restitution but hadn’t yet filed the motion).
¶ 40 A sentence that does not adhere to the requirements of section
18-1.3-603(1) constitutes an illegal sentence and must be corrected.
Snow, ¶¶ 2-5.
¶ 41 We review the legality of a sentence de novo. Tennyson v.
People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 23.
16 C. The Restitution Order Is Valid
¶ 42 A.P.R. does not dispute that the restitution order was entered
within the statutory deadline, thus he no longer maintains that the
restitution order is untimely under Weeks. And though the
prosecution did not submit the restitution information before
sentencing — as it should have under section 18-1.3-603(2)(a) —
A.P.R. does not argue any prejudice from that delay. See People v.
Martinez Rubier, 2024 COA 67, ¶ 49.
¶ 43 Instead, A.P.R. argues that the court did not enter a valid
restitution order because it reserved restitution entirely. That’s so,
he says, because the court said that “restitution may be requested.”
¶ 44 But A.P.R. reads that phrase in isolation. Reading that phrase
in context with the discussion of restitution at the sentencing
hearing, we do not agree that the court reserved restitution entirely.
Indeed, at the sentencing hearing, the prosecution represented that
a crime victim’s application had been filed for “medical bills” and
that she didn’t know the amount. In that context, and under
section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), the court allowed the prosecution
additional time to determine “the specific amount of restitution.”
Given this specific extension to determine the amount of restitution
17 owed, we infer that the court at least implicitly (if not explicitly)
determined restitution liability and reserved only the determination
of the amount owed. See Weeks, ¶¶ 11, 16; see also Tennyson,
¶¶ 9-10 (inferring an implicit determination of restitution liability
when the court gave the prosecution ninety days to determine the
amount of restitution due).
¶ 45 That makes this case unlike Snow. In that case, at
sentencing, “the prosecution did not request restitution or give any
indication that it intended to seek restitution.” Id. at ¶ 7. Rather, it
asked the court to simply reserve restitution. The court agreed and
entered an order reserving restitution for sixty days without any
distinction between liability and the amount owed. Id. Under those
circumstances — when the court “deferred the issue of restitution
in its entirety” — the supreme court concluded that the sentence
was illegal. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 22-23.
¶ 46 We therefore reject A.P.R.’s contention that the restitution
order was not valid under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b).
18 D. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 47 A.P.R. next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove
“the amount payable” to the crime victim compensation board
(CVCB).8
¶ 48 Crime victims may seek compensation from the CVCB for
losses caused by criminal conduct, including medical expenses.
See §§ 24-4.1-102(1), -108(1), -109(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. When a
CVCB pays a victim compensation claim, it is a “[v]ictim” for
purposes of the restitution statute. § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV), C.R.S.
2025. Therefore, “[i]f a CVCB awards compensation to a victim or
other qualifying person, the CVCB is eligible to seek and obtain
restitution from a defendant in [a] criminal proceeding.” People v.
Martinez-Chavez, 2020 COA 39, ¶ 13.
¶ 49 “The prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the
victim’s loss and the amount of that loss.” People v. Fregosi, 2024
COA 6, ¶ 44. For CVCB claims, however, the restitution statute
8 A.P.R. does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to show
that his conduct proximately caused the victim’s injuries. He challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the amount of restitution owed.
19 creates a rebuttable presumption that the amount paid by the
CVCB is a direct result of the defendant’s criminal conduct. See
§ 18-1.3-603(10)(a). The rebuttable presumption shifts the burden
to the defendant to present evidence to show that the amount paid
was not the direct result of their criminal conduct. People v. Henry,
2018 COA 48M, ¶ 19.
¶ 50 To trigger the rebuttable presumption, however, the
prosecution must establish the amount of assistance provided.
Martinez-Chavez, ¶ 20. The restitution statute prescribes two ways
of establishing this amount: (1) “[a] list of the amount of money paid
to each provider”; or (2) “[i]f the identity or location of a provider
would pose a threat to the safety or welfare of the victim, summary
data reflecting what total payments were made for” by category.
§ 18-1.3-603(10)(b)(I), (II)(A)-(E).
¶ 51 But the prosecution need not rely on the statutory
presumption to establish the amount of restitution; rather, it can
also rely on “other means.” § 18-1.3-603(2)(a); see also Fregosi,
¶ 47 (rejecting the defendant’s sufficiency challenge to the
restitution order, by noting, in relevant part, that the record showed
the prosecution “did not rely solely on the CVCB summaries”).
20 ¶ 52 A.P.R. argues that the prosecution failed to comply with the
statutory criteria to establish the rebuttable presumption. But the
prosecution didn’t rely on the statutory presumption to establish
the amount of restitution owed. Instead, it presented direct
testimony from the crime victim compensation program manager,
who testified independently about the victim’s claim. She confirmed
that the CVCB reviews the police report, the itemized bills showing
the dates of service, and the services provided. The program
director also explained that the CVCB would not pay for expenses
that were not directly related to A.P.R.’s criminal conduct and that
it does not pay for evidence gathering, including sexual assault
nurse examinations. And she confirmed that the process was
followed in this case to determine that the victim’s medical
expenses were proximately caused by A.P.R. and were statutorily
eligible expenses. See Fregosi, ¶¶ 46-49 (rejecting the defendant’s
sufficiency challenge because the record provided sufficient
evidence to uphold the restitution order without relying solely on
the CVCB summaries).
¶ 53 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that it was sufficient to prove by a
21 preponderance of the evidence the amount of restitution owed to
the CVCB.
E. Document Disclosure
¶ 54 A.P.R. also asserts — with no citation to any legal authority —
that the district court violated his constitutional right to due
process because it imposed restitution “without supporting
documentation or disclosure.”
¶ 55 Although a CVCB’s records relating to the claimed amount of
restitution are confidential, § 24-4.1-107.5(2), C.R.S. 2025, a
defendant may seek information in the CVCB’s records by first
requesting the district court to conduct an in camera review of the
records, § 24-4.1-107.5(3); see People v. Hernandez, 2019 COA 111,
¶¶ 16-17.
¶ 56 A.P.R. does not allege that he requested an in camera review
and, if he did, how the court erred by denying his request. Beyond
his failure to seek CVCB records, A.P.R. does not dispute that he
received sufficient notice of the prosecution’s intent to seek
restitution, the basis of its claim, and an opportunity to contest it.
Thus, due process was satisfied. See People v. Perez, 2020 COA 83,
¶ 49 (due process is satisfied, in the restitution context, when the
22 defendant receives notice of the factual basis for the restitution
order and an opportunity to contest that basis), overruled in part on
other grounds by, Weeks, ¶ 47 n.16, and cert. granted, judgment
vacated on other grounds, and case remanded, (Colo. No. 20SC559,
Dec. 6, 2021) (unpublished order).
VI. Disposition
¶ 57 We affirm the judgment and the restitution order.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.