Peo in Interest of AP

Opinion

25CA2244 Peo in Interest of AP 07-02-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2244 Mesa County District Court No. 22JV68 Honorable Douglas S. Walker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Av.P., Ai.P., and Al.P., Children,

and Concerning J.J.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK Welling and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 2, 2026

Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, John R. Rhoads, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Tara Jorfald, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Lakewood, Colorado; Joel Pratt, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 J.J. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationships with Av.P., Ai.P., and Al.P. (the children).

She contends that the juvenile court erred by (1) finding that the

Mesa County Department of Human Services (the Department)

made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and (2) admitting

hearsay testimony at the termination hearing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Department opened a voluntary case for mother and the

children — then aged five, three, and one — after receiving multiple

referrals with concerns about the children’s environment with

mother. Among other things, there were reports that mother had

left alcohol and cigarettes within the children’s reach, claimed to

have seen aliens in her home, and overdosed on medication. At

first, the children remained with mother. But after mother told a

therapist she could no longer care for the children, the Department

placed the children in kinship care and created a safety plan.

¶3 The Department later filed a petition in dependency or neglect

based on continued concerns about mother’s mental health and

failure to take her medication as prescribed. Mother entered a no

contest plea to the injurious environment allegation in the petition,

1 and the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and

neglected. The court then adopted a treatment plan for mother,

which included a family time component that was “[c]ontingent on

the recommendations of the parenting time assessment.” The

treatment plan was later amended to require mother to engage in

child-parent psychotherapy and parent-child interactional therapy.

¶4 Six months after the petition was filed, the children were

returned to mother, and she moved to Oklahoma with the children

without permission from the court. While in Oklahoma, mother

was placed on a psychiatric hold. The Department removed the

children again and placed them in foster care in Colorado, where

they remained for the rest of the case. Mother stayed in Oklahoma.

¶5 After the children returned to Colorado, the Department began

providing supervised virtual family time, which the court later

modified to therapeutic family time. Nearly a year later and about a

year before the termination hearing, the court restricted family

time, finding “that the kids [were] showing trauma around visits

including outbursts and other behaviors.” Although the court later

lifted the suspension and ordered the Department to provide

therapeutic family time, mother had no further family time.

2 ¶6 More than two years after the petition in dependency or

neglect was filed, the Department moved to terminate the parent-

child legal relationships between mother and the children. The

juvenile court held a ten-day evidentiary hearing over three and a

half months, after which it entered an order terminating mother’s

parental rights — three and a half years after the petition was filed.

As relevant to this appeal, the court found that the Department had

made reasonable efforts to facilitate family time but that its

attempts to set up family time were “thwarted by the children.”

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶7 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department made reasonable efforts because she did not

receive adequate family time and therapeutic services. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶8 To terminate a parent-child legal relationship, the juvenile

court must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child

has been adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has

not reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved

treatment plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is

3 unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change

within a reasonable period of time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶9 In determining whether a parent is unfit, the court must

consider whether a department of human services has made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent. §§ 19-3-604(2)(h),

19-3-100.5(1), C.R.S. 2025. Reasonable efforts means the “exercise

of diligence and care.” § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025. This

standard is satisfied by the provision of services in accordance with

section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025, including, as relevant in this case,

family time services. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV).

¶ 10 In determining whether a department satisfied its reasonable

efforts obligation, the juvenile court should consider whether the

services were “appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan.”

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011).

But it is the parent who is ultimately responsible for using those

services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the plan.

People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 11 Whether a department of human services satisfied its

obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and

law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the

4 court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal

determination based on those findings as to whether the

department made reasonable efforts. Id. The credibility of the

witnesses; the sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the

evidence; and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the

evidence are all matters within the juvenile court’s discretion.

People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010).

B. Analysis

¶ 12 Mother first argues that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts to provide family time because she received no

family time for long periods and the children were allowed to choose

whether family time occurred. But the juvenile court found that the

Department made substantial efforts to arrange family time and

“rehabilitate the relationship between [the] children and mother.”

Notwithstanding those efforts, the children “steadfastly refused to

have contact with [mother] for a least a year.” The court explained

that “[t]he fact that the services were unsuccessful does not render

the Department’s efforts unreasonable.” And it concluded that the

Department had made reasonable efforts to provide family time.

5 ¶ 13 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that the Department “tried hard over and over

and over again for many months to get these visits to occur.” The

caseworker’s supervisor similarly testified that the Department

“tried to do everything [it could] for these visits to take place.” For

example, the Department communicated with the children to

encourage visitation; communicated with “every party in the case”

to arrange visits; “contracted with agencies to have these visits

happen”; arranged transportation for the children and mother; and

asked the children’s therapist to prepare them for visits.

¶ 14 The children’s therapist testified that she did “a substantial

amount of work” and tried “lots of different things” to prepare the

children for visits with mother. She worked through “trauma

narratives” with the children and attempted “various types of play

therapy,” “attachment work,” and eye movement desensitization

and reprocessing. She also contacted other professionals for help,

including visitation specialists and experts in reunification therapy.

¶ 15 But both the caseworker and the therapist testified that these

efforts were unsuccessful in getting the children to attend family

time. The caseworker testified that the children refused to attend

6 family time, and the supervisor testified that they had “said for the

last . . . two years that they do not want to see their mother.” The

therapist likewise testified that the children were “refusing to even

show up” for visits and “expressed throughout . . . that they did not

have a desire to visit with [mother].” Indeed, the therapist

explained that when therapy began, the children were “absolutely

not” able to “even tolerate . . . the sound of [mother’s] name” and

had a “very large trauma response.” If they heard mother’s name or

anything that reminded them of her, “they would massively destroy

property,” scream “at the top of their lungs,” and rip their hair out.

¶ 16 The therapist also testified that the children “were making

great progress in their work with trauma,” and that attempted

family time with mother would be a “setback” in this work because

“whenever visits [were] presented, there [was] a lot of regression

from the [children].” She concluded that the attempts at family

time were causing “trauma” and “harm” to the children.

¶ 17 A different therapist, an expert in child attachment and

therapy who worked with the oldest child early in the case, testified

that the child felt scared of mother and opined that forcing children

to engage in a relationship under these circumstances would be

7 “re-traumatizing” and “an ongoing onslaught to their mental

health.” And a therapeutic visitation supervisor agreed that “it

would do damage to the children to coerce them or otherwise make

them feel tricked into participating in the visits with [mother].”

¶ 18 The caseworker’s supervisor also testified that mother being

out-of-state was an additional barrier that interfered with family

time. To overcome this barrier, the Department “provided

significant financial support” to help mother travel to Colorado for

family time, including paying for her flights and hotel rooms. But

although mother traveled to Colorado multiple times for scheduled

family time, the children continued to refuse to visit mother.

¶ 19 This record supports the court’s finding that the Department

made reasonable efforts to arrange family time and that the

breakdowns arose from factors beyond the Department’s control.

¶ 20 Mother also contends that the Department did not make

reasonable efforts to provide child-parent psychotherapy (CPP) and

parent-child interactional therapy (PCIT). The juvenile court

rejected this argument, finding that mother needed to be in

Colorado for CPP and PCIT to be completed because “the treatments

needed to be provided in a single state.” The court also found that

8 the Department attempted to provide the services in Colorado, but

that the services could not be provided without the children’s

cooperation — which it found “clearly . . . was not going to happen.”

¶ 21 Again, the record supports these findings. The caseworker’s

supervisor testified that the Department attempted to authorize

CPP, but that mother needed to live in Colorado to complete that

therapy with the children. She also testified that the Department

authorized PCIT, but mother needed to be in Colorado for that

therapy as well. The caseworker explained that providers could not

conduct the therapies “over state lines” because of a licensing issue.

¶ 22 The caseworker testified that the Department offered to help

mother pay for a short-term rental so she could come to Colorado

for “ninety days or so,” to engage in these services. And at first,

mother told the caseworker she would. But she later backtracked,

saying “it wasn’t a reasonable request at that time for her.” The

supervisor also testified that mother offered several times in court

to move back to Colorado, only to retract her offer days later.

¶ 23 To the extent mother argues the Department should have

modified her treatment plan earlier to add CPP and PCIT, she does

not argue that her treatment plan was inappropriate. And as the

9 juvenile court explained, “all parties confirmed to the [c]ourt [at the

termination hearing] that they believed that the treatment plan[]

[was] appropriate.” In any event, the court noted that “[t]he

[j]udicial officers hearing this case over the past three years have

expressly found that the treatment plan was appropriate,” and the

court “reaffirm[ed] that finding” in its termination order. Moreover,

while mother laments the delay in adding CPP and PCIT, she had

fourteen months after those components were added to the

treatment plan to come to Colorado and complete that therapy.

¶ 24 Thus, because the record supports the juvenile court’s

findings, we discern no error in its conclusion that the Department

made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother. See A.S.L., ¶ 8.

III. Hearsay

¶ 25 Mother next contends that the juvenile court reversibly erred

by admitting hearsay testimony about statements one of the

children made to the court appointed special advocate (CASA) under

the excited utterance hearsay exception. We are not persuaded.

¶ 26 Hearsay is “a statement other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

10 the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). Hearsay is generally

inadmissible unless an exception applies. CRE 802. Two such

exceptions are an “excited utterance” and a statement of the

declarant’s then existing state of mind or emotion. CRE 803(2),(3).

¶ 27 We review a juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 32.

A court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law or if its

decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.

¶ 28 An error is harmless, and is not a basis for reversal, when it

“does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” C.R.C.P. 61.

“An error affects a substantial right only if ‘it can be said with fair

assurance that the error substantially influenced the outcome of

the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself.’” People in

Interest of C.C., 2022 COA 81, ¶ 20 (citation omitted).

¶ 29 Mother identifies three categories of purported hearsay to

which the CASA testified: (1) the child’s statements about how she

was feeling, including that she was “afraid,” after being hospitalized

11 for a mental health incident;1 (2) the child’s angry call after a visit

with mother did not happen, in which the child said she was “tired

of being asked to visit” mother; and (3) a call from the child “in a

rage,” saying she had ripped up a letter her mother had written her.

¶ 30 We need not decide whether these statements were properly

admitted because, even if they were not, any error would be

harmless. The statements were brief and not a substantial focus of

the CASA’s testimony. See People v. Salas, 902 P.2d 398, 401

(Colo. App. 1994) (holding that testimony about child’s statements

was not unduly prejudicial where statements were “simple, brief,

and contained no outrageous facts”). More importantly, they were

cumulative of other admitted evidence that is not challenged on

appeal. See People v. Burgess, 946 P.2d 565, 569 (Colo. App. 1997).

¶ 31 As detailed above, a substantial focus of the termination

hearing was the children’s emotional reactions to visits with mother

and desire not to visit mother. This topic was explored extensively

through the testimony of caseworkers, therapists, and family time

1 Mother asserts that all the statements were admitted under the

excited utterance exception. But the GAL argued at the termination hearing that the first statement was also admissible as a statement of the child’s then existing mental state under CRE 803(3).

12 supervisors. Indeed, mother’s own witness, a therapeutic family

time supervisor, acknowledged that the children are “very against

the idea of visits at this time.” The CASA’s testimony that the child

said she was angry about the attempted visits and mother’s attempt

to contact her was not substantially different than other accounts of

the children’s emotional reactions and refusal to visit mother.

¶ 32 Given the admission of this other evidence, we cannot say that

the challenged statements “substantially influenced the outcome of

the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself.” C.C., ¶ 20

(citation omitted). Thus, even if the statements were improperly

admitted — an issue we do not decide — their admission did not

affect mother’s substantial rights, and reversal is not required.

IV. Disposition

¶ 33 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE LUM concur.