Peo in Interest of AOL

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 11, 2025
• Docket: 25CA1075
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1075 Peo in Interest of AOL 12-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1075 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV30718 Honorable Lisa M. Gomez, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.O.L., a Child,

and Concerning D.A.W.B.,

Appellant,

and

A.R.L.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE YUN Freyre and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 11, 2025

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee the People of the State of Colorado

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee A.R.L. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, D.A.W.B. (father)

appeals the allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) for A.O.L.

(the child) to A.R.L. (mother).1 We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 Denver Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in

dependency and neglect, raising concerns about mother’s mental

health and both parents’ failure to follow safety plans. Father is an

enrolled member of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, and the child is

eligible for enrollment. Accordingly, this case is governed by the

Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and the matter was transferred to

the Denver County Juvenile Court’s ICWA docket after the shelter

hearing.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected, after mother entered an admission and father had a jury

trial. The court then adopted treatment plans for both parents.

1 Both parents identify as nonbinary and generally asked the

juvenile court to use gender-neutral pronouns for them. D.A.W.B. referred to themself as “father” in pleadings, testified that the child knew them as “daddy,” and identified as the child’s father for the parentage determinations. A.R.L. identified as the child’s mother for the parentage determinations. Accordingly, we adopt their use of “father” and “mother” to distinguish the parents in this opinion.

1 Father appealed the adjudication, and a division of this court

affirmed the judgment. See People In Interest of A.O.L., (Colo. App.

No. 23CA1360, Feb. 22, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R.

35(e)).

¶4 Meanwhile, the juvenile court returned custody of the child to

mother four months after the petition was filed. However, the child

was moved in and out of mother’s care due to concerns about

mother’s mental health and domestic violence between the parents.

The court returned custody of the child to mother for the last time

five months before the APR hearing.

¶5 Two and a half years after the petition was filed, the juvenile

court granted mother’s motion for an APR.

II. Fitness

¶6 Father contends that the juvenile court “erred by issuing an

APR awarding custody and decision-making to [mother] without

first requiring the Department to demonstrate that [mother] was,

indeed, a fit parent.” But father does not explain, and we cannot

discern, why the Department would have such a duty when

mother — and not the Department — moved the court for an APR.

2 ¶7 The juvenile court was not required to make parental fitness

findings when it determined that mother’s proposed APR served the

child’s best interests. See § 19-3-507(1)(a). Nevertheless, the court

found that placement with mother was “well-founded, supported by

the evidence and in the best interests of the minor child . . . and in

the public interest.” Although the court acknowledged “concerns

around risk,” it determined that the underlying safety issues

regarding mother no longer persisted. As a result, the court found

it appropriate to close the case with an APR to mother.

¶8 The record supports these findings. The caseworker —

qualified as an expert in social casework with an emphasis in child

protection — opined that mother was a fit parent at the time of the

APR hearing. Father did not present any evidence to refute the

caseworker’s testimony that mother had successfully completed all

objectives in the treatment plan. The caseworker also noted that

the child had been placed with mother “for five, almost six months,”

during which time mother was “very consistent in meeting [the

child’s] needs.” The caseworker opined that the child’s return home

to mother had been successful. The caseworker testified that the

Department approved the safety plan mother created to address

3 risks after the Department’s involvement ended, and that any

lingering concerns were not significant.

III. Active Efforts

¶9 Next, father claims that the Department failed to make active

efforts to reunify him with the child, as required by ICWA.

¶ 10 Whether ICWA applies to a dependency and neglect case is a

question of law that we review de novo. People in Interest of O.S-H.,

2021 COA 130, ¶ 15.

¶ 11 ICWA establishes “minimum Federal standards for the removal

of Indian children from their families and the placement of such

children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique

values of Indian culture.” 25 U.S.C. § 1902. In other words, ICWA

establishes minimum federal standards for an “Indian

child” involved in a “child custody proceeding.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1),

(4); People in Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42, ¶ 2.

¶ 12 But ICWA does not apply when the court awards custody of a

child to a parent. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1); 25 C.F.R. § 23.103(b)(3)

(2025) (ICWA does not apply to “[a]n award of custody of the Indian

child to one of the parents including, but not limited to, an award in

a divorce proceeding.”); § 19-1.2-103(2)(a)(VI), C.R.S. 2025 (defining

4 “[c]hild custody proceeding” as including an “allocation of parental

responsibilities to a nonparent”).

¶ 13 The child remained in mother’s custody for at least five

consecutive months prior to the issuance of the APR order. And no

party disputes that the court awarded the APR to mother — the

child’s biological parent. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (defining a

“parent” as “any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or

any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child”).

Therefore, the APR proceeding was not a child custody proceeding

that required the juvenile court to consider whether active efforts

were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. See

25 U.S.C. § 1903(1); 25 C.F.R. § 23.103(b)(3); In re Marriage of

Stockwell, 2019 COA 96, ¶ 15 (“ICWA does not apply to an award of

custody to one of the parents . . . .”).

¶ 14 Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court did not err by

omitting active efforts findings from the APR judgment.

¶ 15 Father appears to acknowledge that such findings were not

required as part of the APR judgment but nevertheless contends

that the Department was required to comply with ICWA for the

times when the child was not in either parent’s custody. While this

5 is undoubtedly true, our review is confined to the APR judgment.

We therefore cannot review the juvenile court’s active efforts

findings during those limited periods when the child was in out-of-

home placement and not with mother. See In re Marriage of Roosa,

89 P.3d 524, 529 (Colo. App. 2004) (we will not engage in a

“[p]iecemeal review of orders and judgments that do not fully resolve

an issue or claim”); see also C.A.R. 1(a) (explaining that our

jurisdiction is limited to a review of final, appealable judgments or

orders).

IV. Disposition

¶ 16 The judgment allocating parental responsibilities to mother is

affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.