Peo in Interest of ANR

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 24, 2025
• Docket: 25CA1260
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1260 Peo in Interest of ANR 12-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1260 Arapahoe County District Court No. 24JV204 Honorable Bonnie H. McLean, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.N.R., a Child,

and Concerning R.L.R., SR.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Dunn and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 24, 2025

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Kiley Schaumeleffel, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, R.L.R., Sr. (father)

appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child legal

relationship with A.N.R. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency or neglect alleging that the child was born

substance exposed. The juvenile court granted temporary custody

of the child to the Department for placement in foster care. Seven

months later, the Department transferred placement to a kinship

provider, who was caring for two of the child’s siblings and with

whom the child stayed for the remainder of the case.1

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for father. The Department

later moved to terminate father’s parental rights. A year after the

petition was filed, the juvenile court granted the motion and

terminated father’s legal relationship with the child.

1 The kinship provider is the biological aunt of one of the child’s

siblings.

1 II. Analysis

¶4 Father’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court

erred by finding that there was no less drastic alternative to

termination. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan was not

successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or

condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. Implicit in these criteria is the

requirement that the juvenile court consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives to termination. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M.,

2021 CO 14, ¶ 19. In considering less drastic alternatives, a court

must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

¶6 A juvenile court may consider and weigh various factors in

determining the availability of a less drastic alternative, including

(1) any benefit or detriment to the child of an ongoing relationship

2 with the parent, People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81;

(2) whether an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) would

adequately meet the child’s need for permanence and other needs,

People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910 (Colo. App. 2005);

and (3) the placement’s preference for adoption over an APR, People

in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 31.

¶7 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s

best interests. A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the juvenile court considers

a less drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the

child’s best interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and

order termination. Id. at ¶ 32.

¶8 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings

for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34, aff’d

sub nom., R.W. v. People in Interest of E.W., 2022 CO 51.

Accordingly, when a juvenile court considers a less drastic

alternative but instead finds that termination is in the child’s best

interests, we are bound to affirm the court’s decision so long as the

record supports its findings. B.H., ¶ 80.

3 B. The Court’s Less Drastic Alternatives Finding Is Not Clearly Erroneous

¶9 The juvenile court found that there was no less drastic

alternative to termination that would meet the child’s physical,

emotional, and mental health needs. It also found that an APR was

not appropriate for the child. In so finding, the court considered

the child’s young age, need for permanency, placement in a home

with her siblings, and father’s lack of “meaningful” participation in

family time.

¶ 10 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker, qualified as an expert in casework with an emphasis in

child protection, testified that the child needed permanency. Based

on father’s lack of consistent contact with the child, the caseworker

expressed concern about his ability to bond with the child. In the

eight months before the termination hearing, father had only seen

the child three times — once in person and twice virtually. And he

had not seen her at all in the three months leading up to the

hearing. Thus, the caseworker opined, father had not sufficiently

interacted with the child to build an attachment with her or

demonstrate nurturing behaviors. Ultimately, the caseworker

4 testified that, in her view, an APR would not be appropriate for this

child and adoption was in the child’s best interest.

¶ 11 Father’s arguments do not convince us that the juvenile

court’s less drastic alternatives findings were clearly erroneous.

Father asserts that an APR to the kinship provider was in the

child’s best interest because (1) his visits with the child were

positive; (2) an APR would preserve family ties; (3) the kinship

provider supported his continued relationship with the child; and

(4) there was no evidence that the kinship provider would refuse an

APR. To be sure, a juvenile court can consider these factors when

deciding if there is a viable less drastic alternative to termination.

See, e.g., People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App.

2009). But they are just some of the relevant factors a court may

consider when deciding whether a less drastic alternative is in the

child’s best interests. See People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA

195M, ¶ 38 (noting that the court “may consider various factors” in

its analysis of less drastic alternatives). In this case, the court

considered, and rejected, an APR based on father’s unfitness, lack

of relationship with the child, and the child’s need for permanency.

It is not our role to reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment

5 to reach a different conclusion. See People in Interest of S.Z.S.,

2022 COA 133, ¶ 29. And because the record supports the court’s

less drastic alternatives finding, we are bound to affirm it. See

B.H., ¶ 80.

III. Disposition

¶ 12 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.