Peo in Interest of ALG

CourtColorado Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 3, 2025
Docket25CA0162
StatusUnpublished

This text of Peo in Interest of ALG (Peo in Interest of ALG) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Colorado Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peo in Interest of ALG, (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

25CA0162 Peo in Interest of ALG 07-03-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0162 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 24JV30076 Honorable Lisa Gomez, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee,

In the Interest of A.L.G., a Child,

and Concerning A.R.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Tow and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 3, 2025

Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Christina R. Kinsella, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Elizabeth A. McClintock, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 A.R.M. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationship with A.L.G. (the child). Specifically, mother

asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that the Denver

Department of Human Services made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate her and reunify her with the child. We disagree and

therefore affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 In February 2024, the Department filed a petition in

dependency or neglect, alleging that the child had tested positive for

illicit substances at birth. Mother admitted the allegations in the

petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected. The court then adopted a treatment plan that required,

among other things, that mother address her substance abuse

issues and engage in family time.

¶3 After the dispositional hearing in April 2024, mother never

appeared again at any court hearings in the case, and the

Department didn’t have any contact with her. In November 2024,

the Department moved to terminate mother’s parental rights,

alleging that mother hadn’t participated in her treatment plan. The

juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing in January 2025. After

1 hearing the evidence, the court granted the motion and terminated

the parent-child legal relationship between mother and the child

under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

II. Discussion

¶4 On appeal, mother asserts that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts to contact her and engage her in the treatment

plan. We aren’t persuaded.

¶5 In deciding whether to terminate parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider whether the

department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and

reunite the parent with the child. See §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208,

19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. Whether a department satisfied its

obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and

law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the

court’s factual findings for clear error and review de novo its legal

determination, based on those findings, as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

¶6 The juvenile court determined that the Department had made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify her with the

child. Specifically, the court found that the caseworker had

2 attempted to engage mother in the case by sending her text

messages and reaching out to family members. But it concluded

that, despite these efforts, the caseworker couldn’t “force [mother]

to engage in a treatment plan.” See People in Interest of A.V., 2012

COA 210, ¶ 12 (the court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to

participate in determining whether the department made

reasonable efforts).

¶7 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. Mother

appeared at a family team meeting in February 2024, and the

Department set up referrals for a substance abuse evaluation and

supervised family time, but mother didn’t engage in either service.

Mother appeared virtually at the dispositional hearing in April

2024, using the same phone number that the caseworker had been

using to try to contact her. The caseworker said that she called and

texted mother immediately after the dispositional hearing, but

mother didn’t respond. The caseworker continued to call and text

the same phone number without success. After April 2024, the

Department didn’t have a current address for mother, so the

caseworker ran a diligent search to try to locate one. The

caseworker contacted relatives, including the children’s placement

3 and a family member with whom mother had previously lived, to see

if anyone knew mother’s whereabouts. Despite these efforts, the

caseworker was unable to locate mother.

¶8 Mother argues that we should reverse the judgment because

the caseworker didn’t do enough to try to contact her. She

maintains that the caseworker should have texted her more than

three times, sent her emails, and visited her physical address. But

the caseworker testified that she texted mother more than three

times, even though she only documented three instances in her

notes. Cf. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 82 (affirming the

judgment where the caseworker testified that “she thought [family

finding letters had] been sent notwithstanding the fact that she

didn’t have a record of it”). As for the email address, the caseworker

wasn’t sure whether it belonged to mother or father. Finally, the

caseworker said she didn’t visit the physical address the

Department had on file because the family member living there told

her that mother was no longer there.

¶9 In sum, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings

underlying its determination that the Department made reasonable

efforts. We can’t reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment

4 to reach a different conclusion. See People in Interest of S.Z.S.,

2022 COA 133, ¶ 29. And based on those findings, we agree with

the juvenile court that the Department satisfied its reasonable

efforts obligation.

¶ 10 Mother hasn’t directed us to any legal authority supporting

her position that the Department needed to do more to satisfy its

reasonable efforts obligation, especially considering that mother

never reached out to the caseworker, updated her contact

information, or engaged in any services available to her. See People

in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011) (the

parent bears responsibility to ensure compliance with the treatment

plan). We therefore reject mother’s assertion.

III. Disposition

¶ 11 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE YUN concur.

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Related

in Int. of B.H
2021 CO 39 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2021)
People ex rel. A.V.
2012 COA 210 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 2012)

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Bluebook (online)
Peo in Interest of ALG, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peo-in-interest-of-alg-coloctapp-2025.