Peo in Interest of AHF

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 8, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1360
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1360 Peo in Interest of AHF 01-08-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1360 Mesa County District Court No. 23JV19 Honorable Brian J. Flynn, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.H.F., a Child,

and Concerning M.F.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Freyre and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 8, 2026

Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, Brad Junge, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee

Josie Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Hensen, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, M.F. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment terminating her parent-child

legal relationship with A.H.F. (the child). We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 After mother gave birth to the child in February 2023,

urinalysis testing on mother revealed positive results for

methamphetamine, amphetamines, and marijuana. Based on those

results, along with the child’s subsequent hypoxia, congenital heart

failure concerns, and unsuitable living conditions, the Mesa County

Department of Human Services filed a petition in dependency or

neglect. A few months later, the court adjudicated the child

dependent or neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother.

¶3 In March 2024, about nine months after the court entered the

treatment plan, the Department moved to terminate mother’s

parental rights. The court held a two-day hearing in June 2025

and issued a written order terminating mother’s parental rights in

early July 2025.

¶4 Mother now appeals the termination judgment, asserting that

the juvenile court erred by finding that (1) the Department provided

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunify her with the child;

1 and (2) her conduct or condition was unlikely to improve within a

reasonable time.

II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably

complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan, or

the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the

parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a

reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. To determine

whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court must consider whether

the department of human services made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. See 19-3-100.5(1),

19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d

911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). Whether a juvenile court properly

terminated parental rights is a mixed question of law and fact

because it involves the application of the termination statute to

evidentiary facts. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 17.

We review the court’s factual findings for clear error, but we review

de novo its legal conclusions based on those facts. People in

2 Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. In particular, we review

de novo the juvenile court’s ultimate determination of whether the

Department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. The credibility of the

witnesses; sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence;

as well as the inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom are

matters within the discretion of the juvenile court. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶6 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunify

her with the children. Specifically, she argues that the Department

failed to provide her with adequate transportation and housing

assistance, and, as a result, she was unable to comply with the

other terms of her treatment plan. We disagree.1

1 The Department and the GAL note that divisions of this court are

split regarding whether raising a lack of reasonable efforts argument for the first time in closing argument properly preserves the issue for appeal. Compare People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 354-55 (Colo. App. 2007) (a parent waives any perceived deficiency in reasonable efforts not raised before the termination hearing) with S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 913-18 (an appellate court may consider a perceived deficiency in reasonable efforts not raised until

3 A. Applicable Law

¶7 A human services department must make reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate parents and reunite families following out-of-home

placement of abused or neglected children. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-

100.5, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. The reasonable efforts

standard is satisfied when services are provided in accordance with

section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025. § 19-1-103(114).

¶8 To evaluate whether a human services department made

reasonable efforts, the juvenile court should consider whether the

services provided were appropriate to support the parent’s

treatment plan. S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915. So, whether a department

made reasonable efforts “must be measured holistically rather than

in isolation with respect to specific treatment plan objectives.” Id.

at ¶ 35.

¶9 The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services

provided to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the

treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285

the termination hearing). However, we need not determine whether mother preserved her argument, or was required to, because even assuming she did, we discern no basis for reversal.

4 (Colo. App. 2011). The court may therefore consider a parent’s

unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining whether

a department made reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of

A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

B. Transportation

¶ 10 Mother contends that the Department erred by not “offer[ing]

the same [transportation] services to [her] that it did to [f]ather.”

Initially, we note that the record contains conflicting evidence

regarding whether the Department was aware of mother’s purported

transportation difficulties. One caseworker testified that mother

requested assistance with transportation. However, another

caseworker testified that mother had transportation and did not

recall mother reporting transportation as a barrier. Mother herself

provided conflicting reports about her transportation needs. At one

hearing, she testified that she had a plan for transportation and

was able to take the bus to get to family time visits. At the same

hearing, however, mother changed course and reported that she

lacked transportation and had “hitchhiked” to attend court that

day. Nevertheless, the record shows that both mother and father

5 were offered bus passes, but mother did not appear to take

advantage of the offer.

¶ 11 True, mother asked that her substance use testing be moved

to a closer location. But the caseworker testified that no facility

was available near mother’s home. Moreover, the caseworker noted

that mother was near the testing facility “two to three times a week

already anyway” for family time and “it was easy enough to just

stop in and, and [sic] get a [test] done.” And while mother asserts

on appeal that her lack of transportation prevented her from

participating in urinalysis (UA) testing, she testified at the

termination hearing that she was “scared” of UA testing because

she knew it would be positive.

¶ 12 The record likewise contains conflicting evidence regarding

mother’s family time assertions. While mother contends that the

“main reason” she missed family time visits was lack of

transportation, the caseworker testified that mother had

transportation and requested meetings be coordinated around days

she had family time visits because she would already be in the area.

Notably, the record does not reflect that mother ever requested her

6 family time visits be moved to a closer location or that she asked

the court to modify her family time treatment plan provisions.

¶ 13 It is for the court to resolve conflicting evidence. People in

Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 27. And because the court

determined the Department made reasonable efforts, it implicitly

credited evidence supporting Department. Because it is supported

by the record, we will not disturb it on appeal.

C. Housing

¶ 14 We are similarly unpersuaded by mother’s challenge to the

Department’s efforts to provide mother with housing. The juvenile

court specifically considered the Department’s efforts to assist

mother with housing and found that adding her to a housing

waitlist satisfied the reasonable efforts requirement.

¶ 15 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings that the

Department met this obligation. The caseworker testified that she

helped mother apply for housing and that mother was added to the

waitlist. Even still, mother demonstrated that she was able to

obtain and maintain her own housing for several months but chose

to leave the home because she was “lonely.” Furthermore, the

Department provided mother with a referral for a life skills worker

7 that could have helped her access other benefits. But mother

declined because “she didn’t feel it was a service that was needed.”

¶ 16 We reject mother’s argument that a department is required to

provide housing or direct financial assistance as part of its

reasonable efforts obligation. Rather, the Children’s Code only

provides that, if deemed necessary and appropriate by a parent’s

individual case plan, a department must provide “[i]nformation and

referral services to available public and private assistance

resources.” § 19-3-208(2)(b)(III).

D. Cumulative Effect

¶ 17 Lastly, we reject mother’s argument that the “cumulative

effect” of the Department’s alleged lack of reasonable efforts with

respect to transportation and housing prevented her progress in

other aspects of her treatment plan. As discussed, the juvenile

court’s findings that the Department made reasonable efforts with

respect to transportation and housing are supported by the record.

Accordingly, we will not disturb the court’s findings and legal

conclusions on reasonable efforts.2

2 For the first time on appeal mother asserts that the Department

violated her due process rights by failing to provide reasonable

8 IV. Additional Time to Become a Fit Parent

¶ 18 Mother next argues that the juvenile court erred by finding

that her conduct or condition was unlikely to improve within a

reasonable time because she was engaging in inpatient

rehabilitation treatment services at the time of the termination

hearing. We are not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 19 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

D.P., 160 P.3d at 353. Reasonable parental care requires, at a

minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and safe parenting

adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs

and conditions. People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152

(Colo. App. 2006). A juvenile court can also consider a parent’s

efforts. Because it was not raised before the juvenile court, we decline to address that contention. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (in dependency and neglect cases, appellate courts do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal); see also People v. Tallent, 2021 COA 68, ¶ 11 (“[A]n appellate court has an independent, affirmative duty to determine whether a claim is preserved . . ., regardless of the positions taken by the parties.”).

9 noncompliance with a treatment plan in determining unfitness.

People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 20 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change in a reasonable time and whether the parent can

therefore become fit in a reasonable time, the juvenile court may

consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding,

the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of

the parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70

P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003). The determination of a

reasonable period is fact specific and varies from case to case.

People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 25.

¶ 21 When a child is under six years old, as in this case, the

juvenile court must also consider the expedited permanency

planning (EPP) provisions, which require that the child be placed in

a permanent home as expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-

102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025. In EPP cases, no

parent shall be found to be in reasonable compliance with, or have

been successful at, a treatment plan when the parent (1) has not

attended family time as set forth in the treatment plan, unless good

cause is shown for failing to attend, or (2) exhibits the same

10 problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate

improvement. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I).

B. Analysis

¶ 22 The juvenile court determined that mother remained unfit and

that her conduct or condition was unlikely to change within a

reasonable period of time. The court based this determination on,

among other things, mother’s use of intoxicating controlled

substances, see § 19-3-604(2)(e), and the termination of mother’s

parental rights in two prior cases.

¶ 23 The court further noted the child’s young age and determined

that the child “needs permanency as soon as possible.” The court

found that the child “needs stability and waiting a longer period and

not giving her the opportunity to be adopted and gain the

permanent stability that she needs is unnecessary and would

therefore be unreasonable.” The record supports the court’s

findings.

¶ 24 The caseworker, who testified as an expert in child protection,

opined that mother was not fit because she “continued to use illegal

substances during this case,” was “in and out of incarceration,” and

“had inconsistent family time with [the child].” The caseworker

11 believed that mother would need “a substantial amount of time

before [the child’s] return home could be considered.” While mother

reportedly engaged in substance use and mental health treatment

early in the case, her participation stopped in October 2023.

Ultimately, the Department was not able to verify mother’s

participation in the program. And throughout the case, mother

took only two of 171 required UA tests. As described above, mother

admitted that she was “scared” of testing because she knew it

would be positive for illicit substances. She further agreed that she

struggled with substance use throughout the case. And she was

incarcerated during the pendency of the case after her probation

was revoked.

¶ 25 With respect to the child’s mental and emotional needs, the

caseworker opined that the child had been in foster care her entire

life and that the child needs “safety and stability, and to have a

permanent home.” She testified that mother had missed about fifty

percent of her family time and that the Department previously had

been involved with two of mother’s other children. She explained

that all of mother’s treatment plans were “fairly similar,” and yet the

same concerns that led to Department involvement remained. She

12 testified that she believed termination of parental rights was in the

child’s best interests.

¶ 26 Lastly, the record shows mother had ample time to become fit.

The termination hearing was originally set for July 2024, but did

not take place until June 2025. In all, mother had nearly two years

to engage in substance use treatment and services, yet she did not

meaningfully engage in any treatment until just a month before the

termination hearing.

¶ 27 Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err by

declining to give mother more time. See S.Z.S., ¶¶ 24, 28-29 (the

court need not give a parent additional time, even where there has

been recent progress on the treatment plan.)

V. Disposition

¶ 28 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE YUN concur.