Peo in Interest of AH

Opinion

26CA0291 Peo in Interest of AH 08-27-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0291 Arapahoe County District Court No. 24JV4 Honorable Bonnie McLean, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of A.H., a Child, and Concerning S.W., Appellant, and G.M., Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 27, 2026

John Christofferson, Interim County Attorney, Alison A. Bettenberg, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee People of the State of Colorado

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for Appellant

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee G.M.

¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, S.W. (mother) appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for A.H. (the child) between herself and G.M. (father). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect, alleging that the then-newborn child’s umbilical cord tested positive for substances and alleging concerns about domestic violence between mother and father. The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and adopted treatment plans for both parents. With the exception of two brief emergency removals, the child remained in the parents’ custody, first with mother and then with father for the remainder of the action.

¶3 Eight months after the petition was filed, the parties requested an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) between mother and father. The court set but then continued the hearing after significant changes occurred related to mother’s care of the child’s medical needs, and again after mother requested a new attorney.

¶4 Nineteen months after the petition was filed, the juvenile court allocated sole decision-making to father and awarded father

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primary residential custody of the child. The court also granted mother unsupervised parenting time every other week from Thursday night to Sunday night.

II. Parentage and Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶5 Mother first contends that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it didn’t follow the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), sections 19-4-101 to -130, C.R.S. 2025.

¶6 True, failure to follow the procedures outlined in the UPA “deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction to decide paternity.” People in Interest of J.G.C., 2013 COA 171, ¶ 11 (emphasis added). But here, the juvenile court didn’t make any parentage findings because no party asked it to do so. Mother claims that the Department raised this issue because the petition alleged that father’s name wasn’t on the child’s birth certificate. But including a name on a birth certificate isn’t a factor in determining parentage. See § 19-4-105, C.R.S. 2025 (listing factors that provide presumptions of parentage). In any event, without a motion for a determination of parentage by any party, we can’t say on this record that the juvenile court erred by not conducting proceedings under the UPA.

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¶7 Mother appears to suggest that a legal parentage determination under the UPA should be required in every dependency action before an adjudication can be entered. But the Children’s Code doesn’t require such a finding, and we decline to judicially impose one. See § 19-1-102, C.R.S. 2025 (defining a neglected or dependent child); § 19-3-505, C.R.S. 2025 (listing required findings for entering adjudication).

¶8 To the extent mother claims that the child was otherwise adjudicated dependent and neglected as to father in error, she lacks standing to do so. People in Interest of C.N., 2018 COA 165, ¶ 10 (“[O]ur courts have consistently held that in dependency and neglect appeals, parents and intervenors lack standing to assert the rights of other parties.”).

III. Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)

¶9 Mother next contends that neither the court nor the Department complied with the inquiry requirements outlined in section 19-1-126, C.R.S. 2025.1

1 The General Assembly repealed section 19-1-126, effective August

6, 2025, shortly after the APR hearing in this case. Ch. 338, sec. 1, § 19-1-126, 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1779.

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¶ 10 ICWA establishes “minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.” 25 U.S.C. § 1902. The juvenile court “must ask each participant at each child custody proceeding throughout a case whether the participant knows or has reason to know that any child who is the subject of the proceeding is an Indian child.” C.R. ICWA P. 3(a); accord People in Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42, ¶ 21. But a “child-custody proceeding” under the statute doesn’t encompass every hearing held by the juvenile court. 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2025). As relevant here, a non- emergency action that may result in a child’s placement in foster care or the termination of parental rights is a “child-custody proceeding.” Id. And while an APR hearing contemplating an award of custody to a non-parent is a “child custody proceeding,” proceedings contemplating an award of custody to a child’s parent aren’t. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1); 25 C.F.R. § 23.103(b)(3) (2025) (ICWA doesn’t apply to “[a]n award of custody of the Indian child to one of the parents including, but not limited to, an award in a divorce proceeding.”); In re Marriage of Stockwell, 2019 COA 96, ¶ 15.

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¶ 11 Mother asserts that, “based upon what is available, the record does not reflect that the court asked mother if the child was Indian” at the shelter hearing. The record before us doesn’t contain a transcript or a written order from the shelter hearing. Certainly, the better practice would have been to issue clear written orders reflecting the court’s inquiry and custody determinations. But the minute order for the shelter hearing indicates that mother appeared at the hearing and the court found “there is no ICWA for either parent.” The minute order therefore suggests that the court made a proper inquiry. See Hock v. New York Life Ins. Co., 876 P.2d 1242, 1252 (Colo. 1994) (“An appellate court must presume that the trial court’s findings and conclusions are supported by the evidence when the appellant has failed to provide a complete record.”).

¶ 12 Even if the juvenile court failed to inquire at the shelter hearing, any error is harmless because the APR judgment that mother now appeals didn’t stem from a child custody proceeding. Although the parties proposed competing allocations of parental responsibilities, no party requested a placement outside the custody of mother or father. In other words, no possibility existed that the APR hearing would result in a foster care placement. As a result,

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ICWA’s inquiry requirement wasn’t applicable at the APR proceeding. 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2025).

¶ 13 Accordingly, we discern no basis for reversal based on ICWA.

IV. The APR Judgment

¶ 14 Mother next claims that the juvenile court erred by entering the APR proposed by the guardian ad litem.

¶ 15 Mother contends that the APR judgment infringed on her due process rights by limiting her freedom of association during her parenting time with the child. But mother didn’t raise this contention with the juvenile court. In fact, she didn’t raise any objection to continuing the long-time safety plan elements that limited who could be present for her parenting time with the child. We will not consider a constitutional issue raised for the first time on appeal. City & Cnty. of Broomfield v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 239 P.3d 1270, 1276 (Colo. 2010); McGihon v. Cave, 2016 COA 78, ¶ 16.

¶ 16 Next, mother contends that the juvenile court erred by entering the APR judgment because the allocation of parenting time and decision-making wasn’t consistent with the Children’s Code’s legislative purposes or the child’s safety and welfare.

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A. Standard of Review

¶ 17 Mother insists that these failures are errors of law that should be reviewed de novo. True, whether a court has applied the correct legal standard presents a question of law that we review de novo. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. But “questions concerning the child’s health and safety” require findings of fact and are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 43. And, more generally, allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the juvenile court’s sound discretion. B.R.D., ¶ 15. When the record supports the court’s findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review. Id.

B. Relevant Law

¶ 18 Although the juvenile court must allocate parental responsibilities to best serve “the interests of the child and the public,” § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, the Children’s Code doesn’t prescribe any specific factors the court must consider in making its decision. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo. App. 2005). Still, the juvenile court must “be guided by the underlying purposes of the Code.” L.A.G. v. People in Interest of

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A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1391 (Colo. 1996). Furthermore, the court must focus on the child’s protection and safety rather than on the parents’ custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13.

C. Analysis

¶ 19 Our review of the APR judgment makes clear that the juvenile court properly considered the purposes of the Children’s Code. It placed the child in the primary custody of a parent and preserved and strengthened the child’s ties to mother by granting significantly more parenting time than requested by the other parties. See § 19- 1-102(1)(a)-(d).

¶ 20 Moreover, the juvenile court found that the child “is thriving in his father’s care and it is in [the child]’s best interest to remain with father.” In contrast, the court found that mother didn’t follow up on the child’s vaccinations, physical therapy, surgery, or other medical needs. The court also found that (1) it was “very concerned about the neglect that [the child] suffered under [mother]”; (2) while it wanted the child to have a relationship with mother, placing the child with mother for a significant amount of time wasn’t appropriate; and (3) it was “very clear that [f]ather makes the

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decisions that are in the best interests of the child,” but mother “has not demonstrated that.”

¶ 21 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified that father was consistent and quick to meet the child’s medical needs. The caseworker, an expert in casework with an emphasis in child protection, recommended that father have sole decision- making and primary custody because he consistently demonstrated an ability to put the child’s needs first, while mother consistently failed to do so when the child was in her care. The caseworker also testified that mother inconsistently exercised parenting time, and longer stretches of time in mother’s care resulted in safety concerns for the child.

¶ 22 Mother claims that “the trial court completely ignored that [f]ather committed domestic violence, against mother, with the child present, and he was untreated.” But the court acknowledged concerns about father’s history and the domestic violence dynamics between father and mother. Nevertheless, the court found that regardless of father’s past, “he absolutely has done everything in this child’s best interests.” As an appellate court, we can’t reweigh the evidence. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29. Nor

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can we address mother’s implied contention that father’s treatment plan was inappropriate because it didn’t require domestic violence treatment. People in Interest of J.M.B., 60 P.3d 790, 792 (Colo. App. 2002) (one parent lacks standing to challenge the appropriateness of the other parent’s treatment plan).

¶ 23 Accordingly, we discern no basis for reversal of the APR order.

V. Disposition

¶ 24 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.