Peo in Interest of AG

Opinion

24CA1959 Peo in Interest of AG 06-05-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1959 Logan County District Court No. 21JV20 Honorable Stephanie M.G. Gagliano, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.G. and J.G., Children,

and Concerning E.G.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Harris and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 5, 2025

Koy Dingboom Oates, LLC, Jeffrey C. Koy, Lauren Dingboom, Jordan Oates, Englewood, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for A.G.

Josey McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem, for J.G.

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 E.G. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationships with A.G. and J.G. (the children). We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In August 2021, the Logan County Department of Human

Services received a report of domestic violence between mother and

father. Caseworkers went to the family home and spoke with the

parents, the children subject to this appeal, and the children’s older

half-sibling. When a caseworker returned to the home later, she

found the older half-sibling home alone; he told the caseworker that

he did not know where the rest of the family had gone or when they

would be back. The Department obtained temporary legal custody

of the children, who were later located and removed from a home in

Texas.

¶3 The Department then filed a petition in dependency or neglect.

Mother admitted to the allegations in the petition, and the juvenile

court adjudicated the children dependent or neglected. The court

then adopted a treatment plan for mother, which required her to

(1) meet the children’s needs; (2) improve her relationship with the

children; (3) cooperate with the Department and other

1 professionals; (4) address her mental health issues; (5) maintain a

substance-free lifestyle; and (6) provide a home free of violence.

Mother eventually separated from father, after which the court

amended objective six of her treatment plan to focus on “domestic

violence victimization.”

¶4 In May 2024, the guardian ad litem moved to terminate

mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court held a termination

hearing over three days in September 2024. After hearing the

evidence, the court terminated the parent-child legal relationships

between mother and the children.

II. Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

¶5 Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred by

concluding that it had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child-custody

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). We disagree.

¶6 We review de novo whether the juvenile court had subject

matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. People in Interest of S.A.G.,

2021 CO 38, ¶ 21. But we review the court’s factual findings

related to its determination that it has subject matter jurisdiction

for clear error, and we will not disturb those findings unless they

lack record support. Id.

2 ¶7 The UCCJEA “establishes a comprehensive framework that a

Colorado court must follow to determine whether it may exercise

jurisdiction in a child-custody matter or whether it must defer to a

court of another state.” People in Interest of M.M.V., 2020 COA 94,

¶ 17. The UCCJEA prescribes two ways for a Colorado court to

issue an initial child-custody determination: temporary emergency

jurisdiction, § 14-13-204, C.R.S. 2024, and non-emergency

jurisdiction, § 14-13-201, C.R.S. 2024. In this appeal, mother

asserts that the juvenile court could not exercise either temporary

emergency or non-emergency jurisdiction.

¶8 At the initial shelter hearing, the juvenile court found that

Colorado had non-emergency jurisdiction under the home-state

provision in section 14-13-201(1)(a). Under that provision,

Colorado is a child’s home state when the child has lived in

Colorado “for at least one hundred eighty-two consecutive days

immediately before the commencement of a child-custody

proceeding,” including any “period of temporary absence.” § 14-13-

102(7)(a), C.R.S. 2024. The court determined that Colorado was the

children’s home state because the record established that the

3 children had “lived in the State of Colorado for over two years,

although they are currently out of the state temporarily.”

¶9 Despite the juvenile court’s findings at the initial shelter

hearing, it later held a second shelter hearing and made oral

remarks that it would maintain temporary emergency jurisdiction

because home-state jurisdiction could not be asserted at that time.

Still, the court’s written order said nothing about temporary

emergency jurisdiction, stating only that “[o]ngoing jurisdiction”

was “taken under advisement pending additional hearing and/or

consultation” with other states. See People in Interest of O.J.S., 844

P.2d 1230, 1233 (Colo. App. 1992) (“[T]he court has the authority to

supplement and modify the opinions it expressed in its oral

remarks until the date judgment formally enters.”), aff’d sub nom.,

D.A.S. v. People, 863 P.2d 291 (Colo. 1993).

¶ 10 After a series of conferences with judicial officers in other

jurisdictions, the juvenile court ultimately found “that Colorado

ha[d] exclusive[,] continuing jurisdiction” because Colorado was the

children’s home state. See R.W. v. People in Interest of E.W., 2022

CO 51, ¶ 24 (holding that, once a court has obtained initial

4 jurisdiction, it maintains jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, even if all

parties leave the state).

¶ 11 In a prior appeal, the children’s father raised the same or

similar UCCJEA arguments to those mother raises here. See People

in Interest of A.G., slip op. at ¶ 5 (Colo. App. No. 24CA0868, Dec.

19, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (A.G. I). A

division of this court determined that the juvenile court properly

asserted home-state jurisdiction — not temporary emergency

jurisdiction — at the first shelter hearing and then maintained that

jurisdiction throughout the proceeding. See id. at ¶¶ 13, 17. It also

concluded that any other erroneous jurisdictional findings made

between the juvenile court’s first assertion of home-state

jurisdiction and its final jurisdictional orders were harmless

because “nothing about those subsequent findings undermines the

propriety of the court’s initial finding of home-state jurisdiction.”

Id. at ¶ 17.

¶ 12 Because we are persuaded by the division’s analysis in A.G. I,

we reject mother’s contentions for the same reasons articulated in

that opinion. See Fire Ins. Exch. v. Sullivan, 224 P.3d 348, 352

(Colo. App. 2009) (although one division of the court of appeals is

5 not bound to follow the decision of another, we generally give

considerable deference to the decisions of other divisions).

III. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 13 Mother next asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding

that she was unfit and unlikely to become fit in a reasonable time.

We disagree.

¶ 14 To terminate a parent-child legal relationship under section

19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, the juvenile court must find, among

other things, that (1) the parent is unfit and (2) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c)(II), (III). Whether the court properly terminated

parental rights is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s

factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

¶ 15 A parent is unfit if their conduct or condition renders them

unable or unwilling to give their child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

6 provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s

physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions. People in

Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 16 When deciding whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, the juvenile court may

consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding,

the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of

the parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70

P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003). What constitutes a reasonable

time is fact-specific and varies from case to case. People in Interest

of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 17 The juvenile court found that mother was unfit to parent the

children. In finding mother unfit, the court noted that she had not

substantially complied with her treatment plan for most of the case.

See People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008)

(because a parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan generally

“demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs,”

it can be considered in determining parental fitness). It also noted

that mother could not provide reasonable parental care for these

“high needs” children because she was not honest about domestic

7 violence in the home, could not place the children’s needs above her

own, and did not display adequate parental protective capacity. See

People in Interest of K.T., 129 P.3d 1080, 1081 (Colo. App. 2005) (in

considering a parent’s fitness, the court must consider the specific

physical, emotional, and mental needs of the children).

¶ 18 The juvenile court also found that mother’s conduct or

condition was unlikely to change in a reasonable time, given that

the case had been open for three years, and mother had “failed to

maintain [the] progress” she achieved after separating from father.

See People in Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. App.

1998) (noting that even “increased compliance” over the course of a

case may not justify more time).

¶ 19 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. Mother

remained in a relationship with father until September 2023, and

during that time, she denied that domestic violence occurred in the

home. The caseworker testified that mother did not substantially

comply with any part of her treatment plan during this period. And

mother conceded that she could not provide the children with a safe

and stable home while she remained in a relationship with father.

8 ¶ 20 When mother separated from father, however, she began to

engage in the case. Among other things, mother returned to

Colorado, began consistent in-person family time with the children,

engaged in individual therapy, and participated in domestic violence

treatment.

¶ 21 However, the caseworker testified that mother’s progress did

not last long. In December 2023, mother left Colorado, moving

several hundred miles away from the children to live with a friend

in Kansas. Mother said that she previously had a romantic

relationship with this friend, but she claimed that their relationship

was no longer romantic. Still, based on the evidence before the

juvenile court, including mother’s own testimony about her living

situation in Kansas, the court found that mother had “once again

put herself in a living situation with someone who controls the

house she lives in.” In other words, the record shows that, despite

mother’s progress from September to December 2023, she had not

sufficiently addressed the main issue that brought the family to the

Department’s attention.

¶ 22 The evidence also shows that mother could not appropriately

manage the children’s needs or provide for their safety. The

9 caseworker reported that mother had only recently begun

community visits, and she did not believe that mother could care

for the children without the Department’s support. Mother also

completed two parent-child interactional (PCI) evaluations during

the case, one before she separated from father and one after. The

evaluator testified that there were no meaningful changes in

mother’s parenting abilities between the first and second PCIs and

that she had not improved her ability to redirect the children or give

them structure. He also opined that, because mother continued to

minimize her own trauma, she could not provide for the children’s

emotional and mental health needs. The evaluator concluded that

mother could not meet the children’s needs “outside of a supervised

limited time period” and that it require an “impossible leap” for the

children to return home to mother.

¶ 23 Mother submits that she was a fit parent or could become fit

in a reasonable time because she had left father and substantially

complied with her treatment plan, including achieving stable

housing, maintaining sobriety, attending domestic violence victim

classes, and cooperating with the Department. We are not

persuaded for two reasons. First, the record supports the juvenile

10 court’s findings that mother did not substantially comply with her

treatment plan, and we cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute

our judgment for the juvenile court. See People in Interest of S.Z.S.,

2022 COA 133, ¶ 29. Second, even if mother substantially

complied with her treatment plan, the record still shows that the

treatment plan did not successfully rehabilitate her. See People in

Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 26; see also D.P., 160 P.3d at 354

(affirming a finding of unfitness despite the father’s “maximum

effort” and completion of his treatment plan where he still could not

consistently meet the child’s needs).

IV. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 24 Mother last argues that the juvenile court erred by concluding

that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and

reunify her with the children. We disagree.

¶ 25 Before a juvenile court may find a parent unfit under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the county department of human services must

make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the

family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024.

Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make reasonable

efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of

11 A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the court’s factual findings

for clear error and review de novo its legal determination, based on

those findings, as to whether the department satisfied its

reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

¶ 26 The reasonable efforts standard is satisfied by the provision of

services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).

Such services may include, as necessary and appropriate,

screenings, assessments, and individual case plans; home-based

family and crisis counseling; information and referral services;

family time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). The services

must be “appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan,”

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011),

but the parent is responsible for using those services to obtain the

assistance needed to comply with the plan, People in Interest of

J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 27 The juvenile court’s termination order recognized that, in

March 2022, it found that the Department had not made

reasonable efforts, based, in large part, on the Department “failing

to address the barrier of [mother] residing in Texas while [the]

children [were] placed in Colorado.” Yet, the court found that, by

12 November 2022, the Department had corrected those issues and

made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify the

family thereafter.

¶ 28 The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that the

Department made reasonable efforts from November 2022 forward.

For example, the caseworker testified that, after mother returned to

Colorado, the Department provided housing and transportation,

and paid for her groceries and laundry services. The Department

also referred mother to individual therapy and domestic violence

services in Colorado and provided in-person supervised visitation.

When mother moved to Kansas, the Department continued to

provide mother with individual therapy and domestic violence

services, as well as arranging and supervising in-person visits.

¶ 29 Mother does not assert that, when considering the totality of

the circumstances, the Department failed to provide her with

reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022

CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35 (a juvenile court should consider the totality of the

circumstances and account for all services and resources provided

to a parent, measuring them holistically rather than in isolation

with respect to specific treatment plan objectives). Instead, she

13 identifies two discrete areas in which she believes that the

Department “should have and could have done more.” We are not

persuaded.

¶ 30 First, mother asserts that the Department did not make

reasonable efforts because “[t]he children had never been to Kansas

to spend time with” her, even though Kansas authorities had

approved her home as a potential placement for the children. But

the record shows that mother’s friend did not have any relationship

with the children and did not participate in any of mother’s visits

(even though the Department had offered him this opportunity), and

the children did not do well with unfamiliar individuals. And the

caseworker said that, considering the children’s special needs, the

Department needed to observe the children’s reactions to the people

living in mother’s home before allowing visits to occur there.

Finally, as noted above, mother only had two community visits with

the children, and the caseworker did not believe that mother could

have managed those visits without the Department’s staff.

¶ 31 Second, mother asserts that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because only one of the children was in family

therapy and the therapist did not have the “training recommended.”

14 The record belies mother’s assertion. To begin, the PCI evaluator

testified that he recommended that family therapy begin only with

A.G., not J.G., until mother made sufficient progress. The record

shows that mother had yet to address her relationship with A.G., so

family therapy had not moved forward. As for mother’s assertion

that the therapist did not have adequate training, the record shows

that the PCI evaluator recommended someone with training in

Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA), parent-child interactional therapy

(PCIT), or something “similar.” And he clarified that ABA and PCIT

training were not necessary if the Department provided some

“therapeutic intervention.” Because the Department did so, we

reject mother’s argument.

V. Disposition

¶ 32 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.