24CA1831 Peo in Interest of AEM 04-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1831 Pueblo County District Court No. 23JV30262 Honorable William D. Alexander, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of A.E.M., a Child,
and Concerning K.M.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Johnson and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 24, 2025
Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, David A. Roth, Special Assistant County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Appellee
Alison A. Bettenberg, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 K.M. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-
child legal relationship with A.E.M. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Pueblo County Department of Human Services (the
Department) received a report that mother and the child tested
positive for controlled substances at birth. A hospital staff member
informed the caseworker that the child exhibited withdrawal
symptoms, such as an “increase in tone” and jitteriness. During
the caseworker’s initial meeting with mother, mother described her
history of substance use and said she had smoked
methamphetamine and taken a fentanyl pill one week before the
child’s birth. Based on the information in the caseworker’s report,
the Department filed a petition in dependency or neglect.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. Although
mother initially participated in the case, during the final ten
months of the proceedings, she stopped communicating with her
attorney and the Department, and she missed several court
appearances.
1 ¶4 The Department moved to terminate mother’s parental rights
under subsections (1)(a) and (1)(c) of section 19-3-604, C.R.S. 2024.
After a hearing, the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental
rights under both subsections.
¶5 In its ruling from the bench, the court found “the child has
been adjudicated dependent [and] neglected and abandoned” by
mother, and mother “surrendered physical custody of the child for a
period of six months or more and has not manifested during such a
period the firm intention to resume physical custody of the child or
make permanent legal arrangements for the care of the child.” The
court further found there was an appropriate treatment plan for
mother, but that she had not “reasonably complied with [it] or has
not been successful.”
¶6 Further, in its oral ruling, the court noted that mother
• “ha[d] not attended visits with the child as set forth in the
treatment plan without good cause”;
• “exhibit[ed] the same problems addressed in the
treatment plan without adequate improvement, including
but not limited to improvement in the relationship with
the child”;
2 • was “unable or unwilling to provide nurturing and safe
parenting sufficiently adequate to meet the child’s
physical, emotional, and mental health needs and
conditions, despite the earlier intervention and treatment
for the family”; and
• was unfit and that her conduct or condition was “unlikely
to change within a reasonable period of time.”
II. Applicable Law
¶7 Section 19-3-604 sets forth “three separate bases under which
the court may terminate the parent-child legal relationship
following a child’s adjudication as dependent and neglected.”
People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 19, 433 P.3d 114, 118.
Two of those grounds are relevant to this appeal.
¶8 First, the relationship may be terminated if (1) the child has
been adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has
surrendered physical custody of the child for six or more months;
and (3) the parent has not manifested the firm intention to resume
physical custody or make permanent legal arrangements for the
care of the child. § 19-3-604(1)(a)(I). Second, the relationship may
be terminated if (1) the child has been adjudicated dependent or
3 neglected; (2) an appropriate treatment plan has not been
reasonably complied with or has not been successful; (3) the parent
is unfit; and (4) the conduct or condition of the parent is unlikely to
change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c).
III. Analysis
¶9 Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings at the
termination hearing that she abandoned the child under section
19-3-604(1)(a). Rather, she alleges that the juvenile court erred by
terminating her parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c)
because (1) the Department did not make reasonable efforts to
reunify her with the child and (2) the court failed to consider less
drastic alternatives to termination. We discern no basis for
reversal.
¶ 10 As noted, mother does not address the court’s decision to
terminate mother’s parental rights on the grounds that mother
abandoned the child. When a juvenile court terminates parental
rights based on abandonment under section 19-3-604(1)(a), the
court need not consider whether the department of social services
made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent. See People in
Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 37, 524 P.3d 1209, 1218 (“[A]
4 court can make an abandonment finding under subsection (1)(a)
regardless of whether a treatment plan was adopted or services
were provided.”).
¶ 11 In any event, the court expressly found that the Department
made reasonable efforts “to reunite this family” but that such
“efforts have been unsuccessful.” The record supports the court’s
findings. Contrary to mother’s argument that the Department failed
to provide her with family time with the child, the Department
offered mother a number of opportunities to attend in-patient
treatment for substance abuse and to have the child placed with
her at the treatment facility after she had demonstrated a period of
successful engagement in the program. Although mother entered
in-patient treatment on several occasions, she left the treatment
program each time.
¶ 12 Thus, even if the Department’s reasonable efforts to reunify
the family were relevant in abandonment cases, such as this one,
the record supports the court’s finding that the Department made
reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the child.
¶ 13 Similarly, the requirement that a court consider less drastic
alternatives to termination does not apply to abandonment cases.
5 See People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 19, 480 P.3d
682, 687 (noting that consideration of less drastic alternatives is
implicit in the termination criteria under section 19-3-604(1)(c));
People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122-23 (Colo. 1986)
(describing how consideration of less drastic alternatives is germane
to the subsection (1)(c) analysis).
¶ 14 Even so, the record shows that the Department also
considered less drastic alternatives to termination. Although the
child was initially placed with maternal grandmother in Huerfano
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
24CA1831 Peo in Interest of AEM 04-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1831 Pueblo County District Court No. 23JV30262 Honorable William D. Alexander, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of A.E.M., a Child,
and Concerning K.M.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Johnson and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 24, 2025
Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, David A. Roth, Special Assistant County Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Appellee
Alison A. Bettenberg, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 K.M. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-
child legal relationship with A.E.M. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Pueblo County Department of Human Services (the
Department) received a report that mother and the child tested
positive for controlled substances at birth. A hospital staff member
informed the caseworker that the child exhibited withdrawal
symptoms, such as an “increase in tone” and jitteriness. During
the caseworker’s initial meeting with mother, mother described her
history of substance use and said she had smoked
methamphetamine and taken a fentanyl pill one week before the
child’s birth. Based on the information in the caseworker’s report,
the Department filed a petition in dependency or neglect.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and
neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. Although
mother initially participated in the case, during the final ten
months of the proceedings, she stopped communicating with her
attorney and the Department, and she missed several court
appearances.
1 ¶4 The Department moved to terminate mother’s parental rights
under subsections (1)(a) and (1)(c) of section 19-3-604, C.R.S. 2024.
After a hearing, the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental
rights under both subsections.
¶5 In its ruling from the bench, the court found “the child has
been adjudicated dependent [and] neglected and abandoned” by
mother, and mother “surrendered physical custody of the child for a
period of six months or more and has not manifested during such a
period the firm intention to resume physical custody of the child or
make permanent legal arrangements for the care of the child.” The
court further found there was an appropriate treatment plan for
mother, but that she had not “reasonably complied with [it] or has
not been successful.”
¶6 Further, in its oral ruling, the court noted that mother
• “ha[d] not attended visits with the child as set forth in the
treatment plan without good cause”;
• “exhibit[ed] the same problems addressed in the
treatment plan without adequate improvement, including
but not limited to improvement in the relationship with
the child”;
2 • was “unable or unwilling to provide nurturing and safe
parenting sufficiently adequate to meet the child’s
physical, emotional, and mental health needs and
conditions, despite the earlier intervention and treatment
for the family”; and
• was unfit and that her conduct or condition was “unlikely
to change within a reasonable period of time.”
II. Applicable Law
¶7 Section 19-3-604 sets forth “three separate bases under which
the court may terminate the parent-child legal relationship
following a child’s adjudication as dependent and neglected.”
People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 19, 433 P.3d 114, 118.
Two of those grounds are relevant to this appeal.
¶8 First, the relationship may be terminated if (1) the child has
been adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has
surrendered physical custody of the child for six or more months;
and (3) the parent has not manifested the firm intention to resume
physical custody or make permanent legal arrangements for the
care of the child. § 19-3-604(1)(a)(I). Second, the relationship may
be terminated if (1) the child has been adjudicated dependent or
3 neglected; (2) an appropriate treatment plan has not been
reasonably complied with or has not been successful; (3) the parent
is unfit; and (4) the conduct or condition of the parent is unlikely to
change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c).
III. Analysis
¶9 Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings at the
termination hearing that she abandoned the child under section
19-3-604(1)(a). Rather, she alleges that the juvenile court erred by
terminating her parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c)
because (1) the Department did not make reasonable efforts to
reunify her with the child and (2) the court failed to consider less
drastic alternatives to termination. We discern no basis for
reversal.
¶ 10 As noted, mother does not address the court’s decision to
terminate mother’s parental rights on the grounds that mother
abandoned the child. When a juvenile court terminates parental
rights based on abandonment under section 19-3-604(1)(a), the
court need not consider whether the department of social services
made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent. See People in
Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 37, 524 P.3d 1209, 1218 (“[A]
4 court can make an abandonment finding under subsection (1)(a)
regardless of whether a treatment plan was adopted or services
were provided.”).
¶ 11 In any event, the court expressly found that the Department
made reasonable efforts “to reunite this family” but that such
“efforts have been unsuccessful.” The record supports the court’s
findings. Contrary to mother’s argument that the Department failed
to provide her with family time with the child, the Department
offered mother a number of opportunities to attend in-patient
treatment for substance abuse and to have the child placed with
her at the treatment facility after she had demonstrated a period of
successful engagement in the program. Although mother entered
in-patient treatment on several occasions, she left the treatment
program each time.
¶ 12 Thus, even if the Department’s reasonable efforts to reunify
the family were relevant in abandonment cases, such as this one,
the record supports the court’s finding that the Department made
reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the child.
¶ 13 Similarly, the requirement that a court consider less drastic
alternatives to termination does not apply to abandonment cases.
5 See People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 19, 480 P.3d
682, 687 (noting that consideration of less drastic alternatives is
implicit in the termination criteria under section 19-3-604(1)(c));
People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122-23 (Colo. 1986)
(describing how consideration of less drastic alternatives is germane
to the subsection (1)(c) analysis).
¶ 14 Even so, the record shows that the Department also
considered less drastic alternatives to termination. Although the
child was initially placed with maternal grandmother in Huerfano
County, two weeks later, the county’s Department of Human
Services removed the child from that home after finding him in a
car seat with “a soiled bottle, soiled diaper, cigarette burns on his
blanket, [and] dirty clothing.” The Department was subsequently
unable to find a viable relative who could provide for the child.
Mother did not identify any such relative. See People in Interest of
M.T., 121 P.3d 309, 314 (Colo. App. 2005) (A department of social
services “is not responsible for ferreting out and investigating
relatives who have not been identified as placement alternatives.”).
¶ 15 Furthermore, our analysis would not change even if mother
had identified such a relative. In determining whether there is a
6 less drastic alternative to termination, the court must decide
whether there is a legal alternative, such as a guardianship or an
allocation of parental responsibilities, that meets the child’s best
interests. See A.M., ¶ 27, 480 P.3d at 688 (“[I]f a proposed
alternative to termination is to be deemed viable, it must not only
be adequate, it must be in the child’s best interests.”). Here, the
juvenile court concluded that termination was in the child’s best
interest based on its finding that continued contact between mother
and the child was likely to result in “grave risk” to the child. See
People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38, 310 P.3d 1007,
1016 (“In determining whether placement with a relative or other
person is a viable less drastic alternative to termination, the court
may consider . . . whether an ongoing relationship with the parent
would be beneficial or detrimental to the child.”).
¶ 16 In sum, mother’s appeal fails because she does not challenge
the court’s determination that her abandonment of the child
supports termination of the parent-child relationship under section
19-3-604(1)(a). See People in Interest of D.C-M.S., 111 P.3d 559,
561 (Colo. App. 2005); S.Z.S., ¶ 30 & n.2, 524 P.3d at 1217 & n.2
(rejecting a parent’s challenge to termination under section
7 19-3-604(1)(a) based on the department’s lack of reasonable efforts
where the parent did not “challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting termination under subsection (1)(a)”).
IV. Disposition
¶ 17 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.