Peo in Interest of AC

Opinion

24CA1970 Peo in Interest of AC 04-10-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1970 Delta County District Court No. 23JV30008 Honorable Steven L. Schultz, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.C., a Child,

and Concerning E.M. and R.C.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Freyre and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 10, 2025

John F. Baier, County Attorney, Adriana Hartley, Assistant County Attorney, Delta, Colorado, for Appellee

Robert G. Tweedell, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant E.M.

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant R.C. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, E.M. (mother) and

R.C. (father) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child

legal relationships with A.C. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Delta County Department of Human Services (the

Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect raising

concerns about substance use and lack of supervision.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected and adopted treatment plans for the parents. Among

other things, the parents’ treatment plans required them to (1)

maintain a drug-free lifestyle; (2) cooperate with the Department; (3)

meet the child’s needs; (4) maintain a safe and stable home; (5)

address all mental health concerns; and (6) refrain from engaging in

criminal activity.

¶4 The Department later moved to terminate both mother’s and

father’s parental rights. The juvenile court continued the

termination hearing for six months, in part to allow mother

additional time to comply with her treatment plan. Following the

termination hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion and

terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights.

1 II. Reasonable Efforts

¶5 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them

and reunify their family. We disagree.

A. Preservation

¶6 The Department and the guardian ad litem dispute

preservation, asserting that the parents didn’t challenge the

reasonableness of the Department’s efforts before the termination

hearing. Compare People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 355-56

(Colo. App. 2007) (declining to review a reasonable efforts finding

because the parent failed to object to services before the

termination hearing), with People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911,

914-18 (Colo. App. 2011) (holding that a parent’s failure to object to

services doesn’t bar appellate review of a reasonable efforts finding).

However, we need not determine whether the parents preserved

their arguments, or were required to, because even if we assume

they did, we discern no basis for reversal.

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 In deciding whether to terminate parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, the juvenile court must consider

2 whether the county department of human services made reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate the parents and reunite them with the child.

§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.

2024. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and

care” to reunify parents with their children. § 19-1-103(114).

Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy the

reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶8 Among the services required under section 19-3-208 are

screenings, assessments, and individual case plans for the

provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;

information and referral services to available public and private

assistance resources; family time; and placement services. § 19-3-

208(2)(b).

¶9 In assessing a department’s reasonable efforts, the juvenile

court should consider whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d

at 915, by “considering the totality of the circumstances and

accounting for all services and resources provided to a parent to

ensure the completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in

Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. But the parent is

3 ultimately responsible for using the services to comply with the

plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App.

2011). The court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to

participate in treatment in determining whether the department

made reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA

210, ¶ 12.

¶ 10 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate a parent and reunify the family is

a mixed question of law and fact. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022

COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for

clear error but review de novo its legal determination as to whether

the department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

C. Analysis

¶ 11 The juvenile court rejected the parents’ suggestion that a lack

of reasonable efforts contributed to their failure to comply with their

treatment plans. The court specifically concluded that the

Department “made every possible effort to rehabilitate [the parents]

to no avail.” The record supports this finding.

4 1. Reasonable Efforts as to Mother

¶ 12 Mother argues that the Department didn’t facilitate family time

for the three months immediately preceding the termination

hearing.

¶ 13 The record shows that family time was set up and remained in

place for the duration of the case. However, according to the policy

of the family time provider incorporated into the visitation order,

family time would be suspended if a parent missed three visits, at

least until the parent reengaged or spoke to the caseworker.

Generally, mother’s visits were sporadic but fairly continual until

the last few months of the case.

¶ 14 Three months before the termination hearing, mother was

incarcerated and unable to engage in family time. Mother was

released approximately two months before the hearing, but she

didn’t seek to resume her visits.

¶ 15 Mother asserts that it was the Department’s obligation to

contact her to resume visits. But the caseworker didn’t have

mother’s phone number or know where she was residing.

Additionally, in the two months between her release and the

termination hearing, mother failed to contact the caseworker. The

5 caseworker testified that, had she been able to communicate with

mother, she would have reinstated her family time. Thus, the

record reflects that it was mother’s failure to contact the caseworker

after her release from custody, not the Department’s failure to

arrange or provide family time services, that led to the lack of family

time immediately preceding termination. See J.C.R., 259 P.3d at

1285.

¶ 16 Other than this lack of family time, mother doesn’t identify

any services or referrals she needed that the Department failed to

provide.

2. Reasonable Efforts as to Father

¶ 17 Father argues that the Department failed to properly locate

and communicate with him, which resulted in a failure to provide

him with vital services under section 19-3-208(2)(b). He relies on

the caseworker’s testimony regarding her attempts to locate and

communicate with him. While we agree that it is generally helpful

for a caseworker to have regular contact with a parent, nothing in

section 19-3-208 requires that a caseworker meet with a parent a

certain number of times throughout the case, nor does it delineate

6 the methods a caseworker must use to attempt communication with

a parent.

¶ 18 Father asserts that the Department’s lack of reasonable efforts

led to his lack of progress and attendance at treatment and

services. But he doesn’t explain how additional communication

with the caseworker, on its own, would have helped rehabilitate him

or reunify the family. Even so, the caseworker testified that she (1)

met with father approximately three or four times; (2) went over the

treatment plan with father; (3) explained that father needed to be

engaged in services; and (4) sent out referrals and instructed father

how to engage in those services. Father testified that he was aware

of the referrals but didn’t engage because it was “hard to make

time” and he was “lazy.” See People in Interest of A.H., 736 P.2d

425, 428 (Colo. App. 1987) (the parent bears responsibility to

assure compliance with, and the success of, treatment plan

objectives).

¶ 19 Moreover, we aren’t persuaded by father’s argument that the

Department unilaterally restricted his family time. In particular,

father contends that the caseworker reduced the length of his visits

from two hours to one hour.

7 ¶ 20 The juvenile court’s family time order allowed each parent a

minimum of one hour of supervised visitation per week. While

there were times when father also attended mother’s one-hour

visits, thus receiving two full hours in a one-week period, the

visitation order was never modified. At one point during the case,

father’s visits were suspended for lack of consistent attendance.

When family time was reinstated, it was for one hour per week as

ordered. Father confirmed that his visits were scheduled for one

hour. Thus, there was no “restriction” of father’s family time as

contemplated by 19-3-217(3), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 21 Accordingly, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s

determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parents and reunite them with the child.

III. Disposition

¶ 22 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.