25CA0283 Peo in Interest of HHM 09-18-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0283 Douglas County District Court No. 22JV30075 Honorable Ben L. Leutwyler III, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of H.H.M., a Child,
and Concerning A.R.M. and A.A.M.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 18, 2025
Jeffrey A. Garcia, County Attorney, Valerie Brewster, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellee
Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem
Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant A.R.M.
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant A.A.M. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, A.R.M. (father) and
A.A.M. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child
legal relationships with H.H.M. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2020, the Douglas County Department of Human Services
(the Department) received a referral after the then-newborn child’s
umbilical cord tested positive for illegal substances. The child was
adjudicated dependent or neglected and the family participated in a
dependency and neglect action. In February 2022, the dependency
and neglect action closed successfully with the child in the custody
of her parents. However, just one month later the Department
received another referral due to a domestic violence incident
between mother and father. The Department opened a non-court-
involved voluntary case and, in September 2022, filed a petition in
dependency and neglect raising concerns that mother and father
were not following safety plans to address domestic violence
between them. The petition also raised concerns about mother’s
substance dependence and both parents’ mental health. The court
granted mother temporary custody of the child, with protective
supervision by the Department.
1 ¶3 The court again adjudicated the child dependent and neglected
and adopted treatment plans for both parents. After mother tested
positive for methamphetamine in January 2023, the juvenile court
granted temporary custody of the child to the Department.
¶4 In April 2024, the Department and the child’s guardian ad
litem (GAL) moved to terminate both parent’s parental rights. The
parties agreed to continue the hearing scheduled for August 2024
to give mother more time to continue substance dependence
treatment. Five months later, the juvenile court terminated mother
and father’s parental rights following a contested hearing.
II. Father’s Treatment Plan
¶5 Father contends that the juvenile court erred in finding his
treatment plan was appropriate. We disagree.
a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶6 The purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the parent-child
legal relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming the
problems that required intervention into the family. People in
Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 25. Therefore, an appropriate
treatment plan is one that is approved by the court, relates to the
child’s needs, and provides treatment objectives that are reasonably
2 calculated to render the parent fit to provide adequate parenting to
the child within a reasonable time. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025;
People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 13. A juvenile court
abuses its discretion in formulating a treatment plan when its
actions are manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based
on an erroneous understanding or application of the law. People in
Interest of M.W., 2022 COA 72, ¶¶ 12, 32.
¶7 The appropriateness of a treatment plan is determined by its
likelihood of successfully reuniting the family, which we assess
based on facts existing at the time the juvenile court approved the
plan. People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App.
2005). The fact that a treatment plan is not ultimately successful
does not mean that it was inappropriate when the court approved
it. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1121 (Colo. 1986).
b. Analysis
¶8 The juvenile court adopted father’s treatment plan in
November 2022 with father’s agreement. The plan required him to
(1) maintain communication with the Department; (2) complete a
domestic violence evaluation and comply with the
recommendations; (3) cooperate with probation and the courts
3 regarding his criminal cases; and (4) complete a mental health
evaluation and comply with any recommendations. The plan stated
that “if [father] becomes incarcerated, his treatment plan will be
reassessed and then modified to include the treatment programs
available through the DOC facility or jail, if necessary.”
¶9 In January 2023, father’s probation was revoked, and he was
sentenced to the Department of Corrections (DOC).
¶ 10 The juvenile court found that the treatment plan was
appropriate. Because father questioned whether the terms of the
treatment plan became inappropriate after his incarceration, we
may presume that the court considered his argument and
applicable evidence when making this finding. See In re Marriage of
Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 329-30 (Colo. App. 2007) (appellate court
may presume that the district court considered evidence presented,
even if the order does not expressly reflect consideration of all
relevant circumstances). The court recognized that domestic
violence treatment was not available to father after his incarceration
but nonetheless found that the need for participation in domestic
violence assessment and treatment remained “significant” given the
risk of physical and emotional harm to the child.
4 ¶ 11 The record supports these findings. Father was incarcerated
due to a domestic violence incident that occurred in front of the
child. This incident resulted in the Department re-engaging with
the family after the first dependency and neglect case closed. The
requirements that father engage in domestic violence and mental
health evaluations were designed to mitigate the risk of future
domestic violence incidents and facilitate the safe reunification of
the family. Although “changed circumstances may render a
treatment plan, previously approved at a dispositional hearing, no
longer appropriate,” People in Interest of Z.P.S., 2016 COA 20, ¶ 26,
the plain language of the treatment plan provides that it will be
“modified . . . if necessary,” not automatically at father’s sentencing.
The court’s finding that the child still needed father to address
domestic violence amounts to a finding that removing this
component of the treatment plan was not necessary. We discern no
abuse of discretion in this finding.
¶ 12 Father also contends that the treatment plan was not
appropriate because the Department did not fulfill its promise to
reassess the treatment plan after father’s incarceration. But a
department’s later efforts to implement the terms of a treatment
5 plan have no bearing on whether the plan was appropriate when it
was adopted. People in Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 26. We
therefore discern no error in the court’s finding that the treatment
plan was appropriate.
III. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 13 We next consider whether the juvenile court erred in finding
that the Department provided reasonable efforts where the
Department failed to follow through on its promise to reassess
father’s treatment plan. Father also contends that the court erred
in finding the Department made reasonable efforts because it did
not comply with the reporting requirements established by section
19-3-508(1)(e)(III), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 14 Whether a department has met its obligation to make
reasonable efforts to reunify a family is a mixed question of fact and
law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the
juvenile court’s factual findings related to reasonable efforts for
clear error, but we review de novo the court’s legal determination,
based on those findings, as to whether the Department satisfied its
reasonable efforts obligation. Id.
6 ¶ 15 Before a court may terminate parental rights under section
19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, the county department of human
services must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and
reunite families. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-
604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the
“exercise of diligence and care . . . for children and youth who are in
foster care or out-of-home placement.” § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 16 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy
the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). As relevant here,
section 19-3-208 requires a department to provide individual case
plans for the provision of services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). In evaluating
reasonable efforts, we also consider whether the department
complied with the terms of the case plan. A.N-B., ¶ 26.
b. The Department’s Failure to Reassess the Treatment Plan
¶ 17 When father’s treatment plan was adopted in November 2022,
father knew that he would likely be incarcerated as a result of a
pending probation revocation in a criminal case. At the
dispositional hearing, father agreed with the terms of the
Department’s proposed treatment plan but asked the court to add
an obligation that “if [father] becomes incarcerated, his treatment
7 plan will be reassessed and then modified to include the treatment
programs available through the Department of Corrections facility
or jail, if necessary.” At the hearing, the Department agreed that “if
there were to be a subsequent incarceration, we would have the
obligation to assess if the treatment plan continued to be
appropriate.” Father was subsequently incarcerated and, by the
time of the termination hearing, had been incarcerated in the DOC
for almost two years.
¶ 18 The Department and GAL contend that the terms of father’s
treatment plan did not necessarily require court action because the
treatment plan only needed to be “modified . . . if necessary.” We
agree. However, the plan did require the Department to, at a
minimum, internally reassess father’s treatment plan. The
caseworker’s testimony made clear that she made no efforts to do
so. While the Department began providing therapeutically
supervised family time six months after father was incarcerated, the
caseworker did not make any attempts to talk to father’s case
manager at the DOC facility until just one month before the
termination hearing. Even then, the caseworker never asked the
8 DOC case manager what programs were available to father through
the facility.
¶ 19 Father’s treatment plan did not require him to participate in
any treatment unless doing so was recommended by a domestic
violence or mental health evaluation. He testified that he was in the
community for nine months before his incarceration. Uncontested
testimony established that father did not engage in any evaluations
or treatment during this time.
¶ 20 The Department could have — but failed to — communicate
with the DOC facility to determine if the facility either (1) offered the
mental health and domestic violence evaluations required by the
treatment plan or (2) permitted a provider contracted with the
Department to enter the facility to administer the necessary
evaluations.
¶ 21 Nevertheless, the juvenile court could have reasonably
determined that the Department’s failure to reassess the treatment
plan after father’s incarceration was mitigated by his earlier failure
to complete the evaluations before his incarceration. See People in
Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12 (the court may consider a
parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment when evaluating
9 whether a department made reasonable efforts). Furthermore, the
record contains no evidence that funding was available for the
Department to provide a mental health evaluation or services that
might be recommended by an evaluation at the DOC facility. See
§ 19-3-208(2)(d)(IV) (“[d]iagnostic, mental health, and health-care
services” to be made available based on the availability of funding
and as determined necessary and appropriate by individual case
plans).
¶ 22 In any event, whether a department made reasonable efforts
“must be measured holistically rather than in isolation with respect
to specific treatment plan objectives.” People in Interest of My.K.M.
v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 35. Father does not contend that the
Department’s efforts to meet other terms of his treatment plan were
not reasonable. The juvenile court, with record support, found that
the Department maintained contact with father during his
incarceration and provided therapeutic family time.
¶ 23 Furthermore, father does not explain what he believes should
have resulted from the Department’s reevaluation of the treatment
plan, given the limited resources available at the DOC facility. At
the termination hearing, father agreed that domestic violence
10 impacted the child and was the basis for the dependency and
neglect case. The treatment plan could not be “modified to include
the treatment programs available through the Department of
Corrections” because testimony from father, his DOC case manager,
and the Department’s caseworker suggested that domestic violence
and mental health evaluations were not available. The lack of
resources at the DOC facility did not invalidate the child’s need for
father to address domestic violence. See K.B., ¶ 14 (A treatment
plan must “adequately address the safety concerns identified during
the assessment of the family.”); see also § 19-1-103(12) (A treatment
plan must “relate[] to the child’s needs.”). Moreover, father never
explained why he was unable to engage in domestic violence and
mental health evaluations during the time preceding his
incarceration.
¶ 24 Given this record, we discern no error in the court’s
conclusion that the Department provided reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate father and reunify the family.
IV. Compliance with Section 19-3-508
¶ 25 The Department and GAL contend that any violation of section
19-3-508(1)(e)(III) falls outside the Department’s reasonable efforts
11 obligation under section 19-3-208 and, therefore, should not be
considered as a reasonable efforts issue. We need not decide
whether father’s closing statement was sufficient to preserve this
issue; regardless of whether father failed to preserve the issue or
whether we address it on the merits, the outcome is the same. See
L&R Expl. Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530, 536 (Colo. App. 2011)
(declining to resolve an issue where outcome would not change);
People in Interest of R.R., 607 P.2d 1013, 1015 n.2 (Colo. App.
1979).
¶ 26 If, after disposition is entered, a child’s parent becomes
continuously incarcerated for more than thirty-five days, “the
caseworker assigned to the case, upon knowledge of incarceration,”
shall provide information detailing either (1) “the services and
treatment available to a parent at the facility or jail where the
parent is incarcerated” or (2) “the caseworker’s efforts to obtain the
information at the next scheduled court hearing.” § 19-3-
508(1)(e)(III).
¶ 27 Father was sentenced to the DOC in January 2023. The
statutory provision at issue took effect January 2024. Ch. 191, sec.
6, § 19-3-508(1)(e)(III), 2023 Colo. Sess. Laws 957. The next
12 dependency and neglect hearing was in February 2024. In her
court letter for that hearing, the caseworker reported that father
was “working to complete offered services while in DOC” including
anger management. In the next court letter, filed in April 2024, the
caseworker reported that father “engages in services as he is
permitted through the correctional facility” including the Reimagine
program, Reading for Success, psychiatry, and family time. As
father points out, the caseworker admitted that she did not attempt
to obtain information directly from the DOC facility. Instead, she
relied on information provided by father and included that
information in the court reports submitted after section 19-3-
508(1)(e)(III) took effect. This fulfills the statute’s narrow
obligations.1
1 Father’s contention highlights a key difference between section 19-
3-508(1)(e)(III) — applicable here because father’s incarceration occurred after the dispositional order was entered — and section 19-3-508(1)(e)(I), which applies when a parent is incarcerated while a treatment plan is being developed. While section 19-3-508(1)(e)(I) requires a caseworker to “communicate with the facility or jail where the parent is incarcerated regarding the requirements of the court-ordered treatment plan,” section 19-3-508(1)(e)(III) contains no such requirement.
13 V. Fit in a Reasonable Time
¶ 28 Mother contends that the court erred by finding that she was
unfit and unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time. We
discern no basis for reversal.
¶ 29 An unfit parent is one whose condition or conduct renders him
or her unable to give a child reasonable parental care. People in
Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). Reasonable
parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide
nurturing and protection adequate to meet the child’s physical,
emotional, and mental health needs. People in Interest of A.J., 143
P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 30 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is
likely to change within a reasonable time, “the court may consider
whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the
parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the
parent’s conduct or condition.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022
COA 133, ¶ 24. What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific
and must be determined by considering the physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs of each particular child. Id. at
¶ 25. When, as here, a child is under six years old at the time of
14 the filing of the petition, the action is subject to the expedited
permanency planning provisions and the court must consider the
child’s need to be placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as
possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 31 The juvenile court found mother unfit in large part because of
her continued use of substances. The court noted that this was the
child’s second dependency and neglect action and found that
mother consistently failed to follow through with recommended
services. The court found mother’s testimony to be “less than
credible” regarding her plan to begin an intensive outpatient
program for substance dependence the day after the termination
hearing, noting she had made similar unfulfilled promises before.
¶ 32 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified
that the Department was involved in all but one month of the
child’s life. While acknowledging that mother and the child “have a
great bond,” the caseworker testified that “substance use is my
number one concern.”
¶ 33 Mother contends that she demonstrated “consistent,
significant changes” during the case. The juvenile court found that
mother successfully completed inpatient substance dependence
15 treatment, and the testimony was uncontested that mother last
used methamphetamine four months before the termination
hearing. These are significant achievements. But at the
termination hearing, mother agreed that she had not consistently
participated in sobriety monitoring, had not engaged in treatment
for four months, and would test positive for marijuana if tested that
day.
¶ 34 The caseworker, a child protection expert, opined that
marijuana alone “can be a harmful substance when you have a
young child, especially with high needs,” because a parent under
the influence of marijuana is “not as attentive to the child’s needs.”
And the evidence was uncontested that the child had unusually
high needs. The child’s pediatric nurse practitioner testified that
the child was born with congenital anomalies and regularly saw a
team of specialists to address issues with eating, breathing, and a
developmental delay. The pediatric nurse practitioner testified that
the child needed to be closely monitored at all times for potential
complications with her feeding tube, feeding pumps, and breathing.
¶ 35 Notably, mother received additional time to become fit. Recall,
the termination hearing was originally scheduled for August 2024.
16 In the month before the scheduled hearing, mother went to, and
successfully completed, inpatient treatment for her substance
dependance. But after that, mother did not continue substance
dependence treatment or follow through with other services.
¶ 36 We therefore conclude that the juvenile court did not err by
declining to give mother even more time to achieve fitness. See
S.Z.S., ¶¶ 24, 28-29 (the court need not give a parent additional
time, even when there has been recent progress on the treatment
plan).
VI. Less Drastic Alternative
¶ 37 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred in finding
that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. More
specifically, she argues that “despite the availability of family
placements who wanted to provide permanency for the child, the
[juvenile] court rejected these less drastic alternatives.” Again, we
discern no error.
¶ 38 The juvenile court must consider and eliminate less drastic
alternatives before it terminates the parent-child legal relationship.
People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008). In
considering less drastic alternatives, the court must base its
17 decision on the best interests of the child, giving primary
consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs.
§ 19-3-604(3); People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1126
(Colo. App. 2006). Notably, it is not enough for a placement to be
“available”; instead, any less drastic alternative must also be in the
child’s best interests. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14,
¶¶ 30-32.
¶ 39 Even when a placement provider or potential placement
provider is willing to enter into an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) with a parent, the court may properly
determine that such an arrangement does not adequately meet the
child’s needs. See People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910
(Colo. App. 2005) (permanent placement with a relative may not be
a viable alternative if it does not provide adequate permanence or
otherwise meet the child’s needs); People in Interest of D.B-J., 89
P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (a proposed placement is not a less
drastic alternative to termination if the placement provider lacks
appreciation of a child’s needs and conditions); A.M., ¶ 31 (“Primary
consideration of the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs requires more than a mere assessment of
18 adequacy in order to satisfy the overall intent of the Children’s
Code.”).
¶ 40 The juvenile court found that an APR was “not reasonable”
and there was no less drastic alternative that would serve the
child’s best interests. In so doing, the court noted testimony
regarding the possible availability of the child’s maternal
grandparents, paternal grandparents, and paternal aunt as
potential placements. However, the court credited the caseworker’s
opinion that an APR was “not viable” because the child was “only
four years old and needs a stable home with caregivers who can
meet her needs until at least age [eighteen].” The court found that
the child needed the “stability and finality” that only termination
could provide.
¶ 41 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified
that the child had high medical needs and needed consistency and
diligence in following through on medical procedures, therapeutic
programs, and educational services. The caseworker opined that
termination best served the child’s needs and conditions, and that
the child deserved permanency and stability. The caseworker
opined that termination was in the child’s best interests.
19 ¶ 42 Mother emphasizes her “loving and bonded relationship” with
the child, and the positive relationships that the child had with her
extended biological family. The court may weigh a number of
factors when determining if a less drastic alternative is appropriate,
including the child’s relationship with a parent. People in Interest of
A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38. However, no single factor is
dispositive. Id. (noting that the court may consider “various
factors,” such as whether an ongoing relationship would benefit the
child). Because we cannot reweigh the evidence, we reject mother’s
assertion. S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
VII. Disposition
¶ 43 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.