Peo in Int of VRL

Opinion

25CA2136 Peo in Interest of VRL 09-03-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2136 El Paso County District Court No. 23JV30709 Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of V.R.L., a Child, and Concerning V.L., Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV

Opinion by JUDGE LUM

Welling and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 3, 2026

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Senior County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Genevieve Manco, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Thornton, Colorado, for Appellant

¶1 V.L. (father) appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child legal relationship with V.R.L. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect, alleging, among other things, that the child was born exposed to substances.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected. The court also adopted a treatment plan for father.

¶4 Later, the Department moved to terminate parental rights. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the motion.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶5 Father argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to move for or otherwise request appropriate accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) for father’s disabilities.1 We are not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law

¶6 A parent has a statutory right to effective assistance of counsel in dependency and neglect proceedings. §§ 19-1-105(2),

1 It is undisputed that the ADA applies to father.

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19-3-202(1), C.R.S. 2026; A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶ 47. We employ the same Strickland test that is used in criminal cases to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims in dependency and neglect proceedings. A.R., ¶¶ 48-49, 60 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Under this test, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a parent must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient because it fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A.R., ¶ 48, 60.

¶7 We must remand for an evidentiary hearing if the parent’s allegations are sufficiently specific and compelling to constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at ¶ 63. But if the parent’s allegations lack specificity, we may summarily deny the ineffective assistance claim. Id.

B. Analysis

¶8 Even if we were to assume, without deciding, that counsel’s performance fell below the range of professionally competent assistance, father has not shown that he was prejudiced by the

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alleged deficient performance. Father’s assertions do not specifically show that, but for his counsel’s failure to move for or otherwise request ADA accommodations, the result of the termination hearing would have been different.

¶9 For example, father does not identify the reasonable accommodations he needed but did not receive because his counsel failed to advocate on his behalf, nor does he explain how those accommodations would have rendered him a fit parent in a reasonable time for the child.

¶ 10 In short, father’s allegations lack the requisite specificity to demonstrate prejudice, and thus, he has not made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at ¶ 60. Consequently, this claim doesn’t satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test and therefore fails. Id.

III. Due Process Rights

¶ 11 Father contends that the juvenile court judge erred by (1) declining to have a different judge preside over his motion for conflict free counsel and (2) not disqualifying herself from the termination proceedings after she presided over the conflict motion. He asserts that these errors created an appearance of bias and

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deprived him of fundamentally fair proceedings. The Department and guardian ad litem argue that father has not preserved this due process argument for appeal. However, we need not decide whether father preserved his arguments because even if we assume, without deciding, that he did, we discern no reversible error.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 12 Because “[p]arents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children,” People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 17, termination of the parent-child legal relationship must satisfy due process by providing “fundamentally fair procedures,” People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 20 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982)). “Under this principle, a parent must be provided with ‘notice of the allegations in the termination motion, the opportunity to be heard, the opportunity to have counsel if indigent, and the opportunity to call witnesses and engage in cross examination.’” People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 16 (quoting A.M., ¶ 18).

¶ 13 We review procedural due process claims de novo. People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 26. But a parent may not obtain

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relief on a due process claim absent a showing of harm or prejudice. People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo. App. 2007).

B. Analysis

¶ 14 Even if we assumed, without deciding, that the juvenile court’s decision to preside over both hearings violated father’s due process rights, he has not shown he was prejudiced as a result. See id. While father argues that his reasons for wanting different counsel were “intertwined with the issue of father’s disabilities” and the failure to receive accommodations, father doesn’t cite anything the court learned solely by presiding over the conflict hearing that it later considered or relied upon when it terminated his parental rights.

¶ 15 Moreover, father’s argument is unsupported by existing case law. A division of this court recently rejected a party’s claim that a judge who presided over a criminal defendant’s conflict hearing was inherently barred from presiding over the subsequent trial or sentencing. People v. Palermo, 2026 COA 12, ¶¶ 14-18. We agree with the Palermo division’s reasoning and see no basis to depart from it here.

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¶ 16 To the extent that father appears to argue the juvenile court’s decision to preside over both hearings created an appearance of bias or impropriety, that argument is undeveloped. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address undeveloped argument). And we may not question the reliability of a proceeding’s result unless the judge was “actually biased.” People in Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24, ¶ 29. To show actual bias, the record must “clearly demonstrate” that the judge had a “substantial bent of mind” against a party. Id. at ¶ 30 (citation omitted). Bare assertions and speculative statements do not meet this burden. Id. While father generally asserts that the judge was “required to disqualify itself,” he offers no supporting argument and references no record support that “clearly demonstrate[s]” the judge was actually biased against him. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30.

IV. Disposition

¶ 17 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.