Peo in Int of MELR

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 17, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0231
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0231 Peo in Interest of MELR 07-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0231 Arapahoe County District Court No. 23JV447 Honorable Bonnie H. McLean, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of M.E.L.R., a Child,

and Concerning A.R.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Gomez and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 17, 2025

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Kiley Schaumleffel, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, A.R. (mother) appeals

the judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationship with

M.E.L.R. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services

(Department) became involved with the family due to concerns

about child neglect and substance abuse. Based upon these

reports, the Department initiated a petition in dependency and

neglect for the child.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected. The court then adopted a treatment plan for mother.

¶4 Later, the Department moved to terminate mother’s rights.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the motion.

II. Criteria for Termination of Parental Rights

¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent didn’t comply

with, or wasn’t successfully rehabilitated by, an appropriate, court-

approved treatment plan; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

1 § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA

79, ¶ 10.

¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights is

a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M.,

2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the juvenile court’s findings of

evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data underlying the

controversy — for clear error and accept them if they have record

support. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

¶7 The credibility of the witnesses; the sufficiency, probative

effect, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are all matters within the

province of the juvenile court; thus, we won’t disturb findings on

these issues unless they are so clearly erroneous as to find no

support in the record. People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911,

912 (Colo. App. 2011). But determining the proper legal standard

to apply in a case and applying that standard to the particular facts

of the case are questions of law that we review de novo. M.A.W. v.

People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 31.

2 III. Mother’s ADA Reasonable Efforts Claim

¶8 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that the

Department provided reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her when it

failed to accommodate her mental health and physical disabilities in

violation of the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. We discern no reversible error.

A. Applicable Law

¶9 A department of human services must make reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the parent with the child.

§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. The

reasonable efforts standard is satisfied if the department provides

services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).

Section 19-3-208 requires a department to provide screenings,

assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;

home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral

services to available public and private assistance resources; family

time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

¶ 10 In assessing the department’s reasonable efforts, the juvenile

court should consider whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d

3 at 915, by “considering the totality of the circumstances and

accounting for all services and resources provided to a parent to

ensure the completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in

Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. The parent is

ultimately responsible for using the services to comply with the

plan, People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App.

2011), and the court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to

participate in treatment in determining whether the department has

made reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA

210, ¶ 12.

¶ 11 A department has an affirmative duty under the ADA to make

reasonable accommodations for a parent with a qualifying disability

when providing rehabilitative services. People in Interest of S.K.,

2019 COA 36, ¶¶ 25, 34. Therefore, when determining whether the

department made reasonable efforts, the juvenile court must

consider whether the department made reasonable

accommodations for the parent’s disability. Id. at ¶ 34; see also

§ 19-3-208(2)(g) (requiring rehabilitative services to comply with the

ADA’s provisions). However, “[t]he [d]epartment can accommodate,

and the juvenile court can address, only disabilities that are known

4 to them.” S.K., ¶ 22. “In other words, before a public entity can be

required under the ADA to provide reasonable accommodations, the

entity must know that the individual is disabled, either because

that disability is obvious or more likely because that individual, or

someone else, has informed the entity of the disability.” Id. For a

parent to benefit from a reasonable accommodation they must raise

the issue of the ADA’s application as early in the proceedings as

possible. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 16.

¶ 12 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts presents a mixed question of fact and law. People

in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.

B. Mother’s Mental Health ADA Claim

¶ 13 The Department and the guardian ad litem (GAL) assert that

mother failed to preserve her mental health ADA claim. We agree.

See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (“[A]ppellate

courts review only issues presented to and ruled on by the lower

court.”)

¶ 14 We have not found any indication in the record that mother

ever provided notice to the Department or the juvenile court that

she had a qualifying mental health disability under the ADA. Nor

5 did she suggest any modifications to her treatment plan to

accommodate her alleged mental health disability or challenge the

plan’s appropriateness during the termination hearing. See id. at ¶

14. Notably, neither on appeal nor during the pendency of the case

in the juvenile court did mother identify any specific

accommodations or modifications related to her alleged mental

health disorder that could have been implemented in her treatment

plan.

¶ 15 Nevertheless, mother contends that, because she had

previously been reported to have bipolar disorder, she suffered from

a mental health disability of which the case professionals were

aware. See S.K., ¶ 22 (noting that, if a disability is “obvious,” a

department may be required to accommodate the disability, even if

the parent does not inform the department about the disability).

True, the record reveals various reports that mother had bipolar

disorder. However, the record also shows that mother was provided

a referral for a dual diagnosis that would have evaluated her mental

health issues, but she never completed it.

¶ 16 Because mother failed to raise this issue during the case, the

juvenile court did not have an opportunity to determine whether

6 mother had a mental health disability, and in the event she had

such a disability, to order the Department to provide her with

reasonable accommodations. See S.Z.S., ¶¶ 16-17; see also S.K., ¶

35 (“What constitutes a reasonable accommodation will be based on

an individual assessment.”).

¶ 17 Given this record, we decline to address mother’s unpreserved

ADA claim related to her alleged mental health disorder.

C. Mother’s Physical Disability ADA Claim

¶ 18 The Department and the GAL further assert that mother also

failed to preserve her ADA claim for a physical disability, because

“mother never raised the ADA issue, even by implication.” But the

record shows that the Department knew mother had “some physical

restrictions” that significantly impeded her ability to walk.

¶ 19 Additionally, at a hearing early in the case, while the parties

discussed scheduling, mother briefly mentioned that she had a

disability. The court, however, made no findings with regard to

whether mother had a qualifying physical disability under the ADA,

requiring the Department to make reasonable accommodations.

See S.Z.S., ¶ 21 (“[W]hether a parent is a qualified individual with a

7 disability under the ADA requires a fact-specific determination that,

if disputed, the court should resolve.”); see also S.K., ¶ 22.

¶ 20 On appeal, mother generally argues that the Department failed

to provide her the necessary accommodations, but she never asked

for specific accommodations during the case and does not describe

on appeal any additional accommodations, aside from

transportation assistance, that she needed for her purported

disability. See S.K., ¶¶ 49-50 (rejecting parents’ arguments that

their treatment plans failed to include necessary accommodations

because they did not identify what accommodations should have

been included in the plans). Specifically, mother asserts that the

Department should have provided transportation accommodations,

such as Uber or other alternatives, to ensure she had access to

necessary services. She further argues that her lack of

transportation prevented her from making progress on her

treatment plan.

¶ 21 We conclude that even if the Department and juvenile court

were, or should have been, on notice of mother’s physical disability,

the court did not err by finding that the Department made

reasonable efforts. As relevant to the issue of transportation, the

8 court found that it did not “believe that [mother] would have been

successful on her treatment plan even if she had better

transportation.” The record supports the court’s findings.

¶ 22 The record reveals that transportation alternatives were

considered by the Department, but efforts to implement them were

largely hindered by mother’s lack of engagement in the case. The

caseworker testified that she gave mother bus passes and inquired

about Department approval for gas cards, Uber, or the disability

bus for mother. Indeed, mother’s counsel noted in closing that the

caseworker “went above and beyond” in her efforts in this case.

While the Department ultimately did not give approval for Uber, the

caseworker testified the Department would have approved gas cards

had they been able to get the necessary information from mother.

¶ 23 Besides transportation, the Department also provided family

time and referrals to treatment services. During the thirteen

months the case was open, mother attended only three visits

despite the offer of virtual family time. Mother never completed a

dual diagnosis evaluation, sobriety monitoring, parenting classes,

or employment or housing verification as required by her treatment

plan. She also did not remain in consistent contact with the

9 caseworker and missed all but three court hearings, including the

termination hearing, despite many of those hearings being virtual.

In the caseworker’s opinion, which the court found credible, mother

was unsuccessful in every component of her treatment plan, and

she had not “even had one good week or good . . . month where she

has shown any type of stability or any type of consistency.”

¶ 24 Therefore, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts.

IV. Inappropriate Treatment Plan

¶ 25 Mother briefly asserts that her treatment plan was

inappropriate because it failed to describe any accommodations for

her physical disability, in violation of the ADA. However, because

she failed to sufficiently develop this argument on appeal, we

decline to address it. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530,

531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an appellate argument

presented without supporting facts, specific argument, or specific

supporting authorities); see also C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) (argument

section of appellant’s brief must contain “citations to the authorities

and parts of the record on which the appellant relies”).

10 V. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.