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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7 PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01805-JNW ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 Petitioner, DEFAULT JUDGMENT 10 v. 12 Defendant. 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 This action arises under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income 15 Security Act (“ERISA”). Petitioner, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 16 (“PBGC”), is a U.S. Government corporation established under 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) 17 to administer the pension insurance program created under Title IV of ERISA. 18 PBGC is currently investigating Defendant People Tech Group Inc. (“PTG”), a 19 Washington corporation, for the failure of its wholly owned company, Aegis 20 Company, to pay pension insurance premiums and file annual disclosures. Dkt. No. 21 1 ¶¶ 12, 17. On July 7, 2025, PBGC issued an administrative subpoena to PTG 22 under 29 U.S.C. § 1303(c). PTG did not respond, leading PBGC to file a petition to 23 1 enforce its subpoena in this Court. Id. ¶ 25. The Clerk of the Court entered default 2 against PTG on December 2, 2025, Dkt. No. 9, and PBGC moves for default
3 judgment. Dkt. No. 10. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion. 4 2. LEGAL STANDARD 5 Before entering a default judgment, a court must confirm that it has 6 jurisdiction. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). If jurisdiction is satisfied, 7 courts consider the Eitel factors when deciding whether to grant default judgment. 8 These are: 9 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of 10 money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and 11 (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 12
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts often consider the 13 second and third factors simultaneously; together, these factors examine whether 14 the plaintiff has made a prima facie case on their claims. Waters v. Mitchell, 600 F. 15 Supp. 3d 1177, 1183 (W.D. Wash. 2022). At the default judgment stage, the court 16 takes as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, except those 17 related to damages. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) 18 (citing Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944)). 19 20 21 22 23 1 3. DISCUSSION 2 3.1 The Court has jurisdiction over this action. To begin, the Court confirms its authority to enter judgment. Under 29 3 U.S.C. §§ 1303(c) and (e)(3), jurisdiction over PBGC’s enforcement action is vested 4 in a district court where PBGC’s investigation is carried on, or where the subject of 5 the subpoena “resides or carries on business.” PTG is a Washington corporation 6 with its principal office in Redmond, Washington. Dkt. Nos. 11-1 at 1; 1-2 ¶ 2. This 7 Court accordingly has jurisdiction, and PTG—having been properly served and 8 having failed to appear—has not contested it. 9 10 3.2 The first three Eitel factors support default judgment. 11 The first factor supports entering default against PTG because PBGC will 12 suffer prejudice absent default judgment; it has no other means of obtaining 13 information from PTG if its subpoena is not enforced. 14 The second and third factors, which consider whether PBGC has made out a 15 viable claim, also support default judgment. In agency subpoena enforcement 16 proceedings, “[a] court determines only: (1) whether Congress has granted authority 17 to investigate; (2) whether procedural requirements have been followed; and (3) 18 whether the evidence is relevant and material to the investigation.” Su v. Starbucks 19 Corp., 697 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1081 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Fed. Exp. 20 Corp., 558 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2009)). 21 Here, based on PBGC’s well-pleaded factual allegations, all three 22 requirements are met. First, PBGC has statutory authority to investigate as it 23 1 deems necessary to enforce ERISA provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 1303(b). It may subpoena 2 witnesses, take evidence, and “require the production of any books, papers,
3 correspondence, memoranda, or other records which the corporation deems relevant 4 or material to [its] inquiry.” 29 U.S.C. § 1303(b); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1303(a), (c) 5 (corporation authorized to seek district court’s aid to enforce its subpoena). 6 Second, while neither ERISA nor PBGC regulations require a specific means 7 of service for administrative subpoenas issued by PBGC, the Court finds that PBGC 8 has proceeded in accordance with due process of law and the orderly administration
9 of justice. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Panache Destination Mgmt., Case No. 10 21-mc-80147-TSH, 2021 WL 5043118, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2021). PBGC mailed 11 the subpoena to PTG’s principal street address and emailed a copy of the subpoena 12 to a PTG representative. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 25. PBGC then extended the deadline to 13 respond on PTG’s request. Id. ¶ 26. Moreover, PBGC has complied with 29 U.S.C. 14 § 1303(c) in seeking enforcement of its subpoena. That statute permits the 15 corporation to “invoke the aid of any court of the United States within the
16 jurisdiction of which such investigation or proceeding is carried on, or where such 17 person resides or carries on business, in requiring the attendance and testimony of 18 witnesses and the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and 19 other records.” 29 U.S.C. § 1303(c). PBGC has shown that PTG is a Washington 20 corporation, making this Court the appropriate court in which to seek relief. Dkt. 21 Nos. 11-1 at 1 (Washington Secretary of State documentation); 1-2 ¶ 2; see Pension
22 Benefit Guar. Corp., 2021 WL 5043118, at *3. 23 1 Third and finally, the Court finds that the documents and information sought 2 by the subpoena are relevant and material to PBGC’s investigation. Notably,
3 “courts must enforce administrative subpoenas unless the evidence sought by the 4 subpoena is plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the agency.” 5 PBGC v. Aegis, Case No. 24-cv-01793-KKE, 2025 WL 606174, at *4 (W.D. Wash. 6 Feb. 25, 2025) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1076 7 (9th Cir. 2001)) (noting in a related case that PBGC’s document requests met this 8 “low standard”). The Court agrees with PBGC that items and information
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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7 PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01805-JNW ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 Petitioner, DEFAULT JUDGMENT 10 v. 12 Defendant. 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 This action arises under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income 15 Security Act (“ERISA”). Petitioner, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 16 (“PBGC”), is a U.S. Government corporation established under 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) 17 to administer the pension insurance program created under Title IV of ERISA. 18 PBGC is currently investigating Defendant People Tech Group Inc. (“PTG”), a 19 Washington corporation, for the failure of its wholly owned company, Aegis 20 Company, to pay pension insurance premiums and file annual disclosures. Dkt. No. 21 1 ¶¶ 12, 17. On July 7, 2025, PBGC issued an administrative subpoena to PTG 22 under 29 U.S.C. § 1303(c). PTG did not respond, leading PBGC to file a petition to 23 1 enforce its subpoena in this Court. Id. ¶ 25. The Clerk of the Court entered default 2 against PTG on December 2, 2025, Dkt. No. 9, and PBGC moves for default
3 judgment. Dkt. No. 10. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion. 4 2. LEGAL STANDARD 5 Before entering a default judgment, a court must confirm that it has 6 jurisdiction. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). If jurisdiction is satisfied, 7 courts consider the Eitel factors when deciding whether to grant default judgment. 8 These are: 9 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of 10 money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and 11 (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 12
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts often consider the 13 second and third factors simultaneously; together, these factors examine whether 14 the plaintiff has made a prima facie case on their claims. Waters v. Mitchell, 600 F. 15 Supp. 3d 1177, 1183 (W.D. Wash. 2022). At the default judgment stage, the court 16 takes as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, except those 17 related to damages. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) 18 (citing Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944)). 19 20 21 22 23 1 3. DISCUSSION 2 3.1 The Court has jurisdiction over this action. To begin, the Court confirms its authority to enter judgment. Under 29 3 U.S.C. §§ 1303(c) and (e)(3), jurisdiction over PBGC’s enforcement action is vested 4 in a district court where PBGC’s investigation is carried on, or where the subject of 5 the subpoena “resides or carries on business.” PTG is a Washington corporation 6 with its principal office in Redmond, Washington. Dkt. Nos. 11-1 at 1; 1-2 ¶ 2. This 7 Court accordingly has jurisdiction, and PTG—having been properly served and 8 having failed to appear—has not contested it. 9 10 3.2 The first three Eitel factors support default judgment. 11 The first factor supports entering default against PTG because PBGC will 12 suffer prejudice absent default judgment; it has no other means of obtaining 13 information from PTG if its subpoena is not enforced. 14 The second and third factors, which consider whether PBGC has made out a 15 viable claim, also support default judgment. In agency subpoena enforcement 16 proceedings, “[a] court determines only: (1) whether Congress has granted authority 17 to investigate; (2) whether procedural requirements have been followed; and (3) 18 whether the evidence is relevant and material to the investigation.” Su v. Starbucks 19 Corp., 697 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1081 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Fed. Exp. 20 Corp., 558 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2009)). 21 Here, based on PBGC’s well-pleaded factual allegations, all three 22 requirements are met. First, PBGC has statutory authority to investigate as it 23 1 deems necessary to enforce ERISA provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 1303(b). It may subpoena 2 witnesses, take evidence, and “require the production of any books, papers,
3 correspondence, memoranda, or other records which the corporation deems relevant 4 or material to [its] inquiry.” 29 U.S.C. § 1303(b); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1303(a), (c) 5 (corporation authorized to seek district court’s aid to enforce its subpoena). 6 Second, while neither ERISA nor PBGC regulations require a specific means 7 of service for administrative subpoenas issued by PBGC, the Court finds that PBGC 8 has proceeded in accordance with due process of law and the orderly administration
9 of justice. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Panache Destination Mgmt., Case No. 10 21-mc-80147-TSH, 2021 WL 5043118, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2021). PBGC mailed 11 the subpoena to PTG’s principal street address and emailed a copy of the subpoena 12 to a PTG representative. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 25. PBGC then extended the deadline to 13 respond on PTG’s request. Id. ¶ 26. Moreover, PBGC has complied with 29 U.S.C. 14 § 1303(c) in seeking enforcement of its subpoena. That statute permits the 15 corporation to “invoke the aid of any court of the United States within the
16 jurisdiction of which such investigation or proceeding is carried on, or where such 17 person resides or carries on business, in requiring the attendance and testimony of 18 witnesses and the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and 19 other records.” 29 U.S.C. § 1303(c). PBGC has shown that PTG is a Washington 20 corporation, making this Court the appropriate court in which to seek relief. Dkt. 21 Nos. 11-1 at 1 (Washington Secretary of State documentation); 1-2 ¶ 2; see Pension
22 Benefit Guar. Corp., 2021 WL 5043118, at *3. 23 1 Third and finally, the Court finds that the documents and information sought 2 by the subpoena are relevant and material to PBGC’s investigation. Notably,
3 “courts must enforce administrative subpoenas unless the evidence sought by the 4 subpoena is plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the agency.” 5 PBGC v. Aegis, Case No. 24-cv-01793-KKE, 2025 WL 606174, at *4 (W.D. Wash. 6 Feb. 25, 2025) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1076 7 (9th Cir. 2001)) (noting in a related case that PBGC’s document requests met this 8 “low standard”). The Court agrees with PBGC that items and information
9 demanded by the subpoena will help PBGC determine the Plan’s current status, as 10 well as whether PBGC will need to take further action with respect to the Plan. See 11 Dkt. No. 1-7 at 9. 12 Thus, PBGC has stated a viable claim for enforcement of the subpoena, and 13 the second and third Eitel factors support default judgment. 14 3.3 On balance, the remaining Eitel factors support default judgment. 15 The fourth, fifth, and sixth Eitel factors also support entering default 16 judgment against PTG. The fourth factor supports default judgment, given there is 17 no money at stake in this subpoena enforcement action. As for the fifth factor, the 18 material facts are limited and straightforward, and the Court finds there is little 19 possibility of dispute. Thus, this factor, too, favors default judgment. The sixth 20 factor supports default judgment because PTG was timely served, and because no 21 aspect of the record suggests that PTG has failed to act due to excusable neglect. 22 23 1 Turning to the seventh factor, the Court recognizes that default judgment is
9 “ordinarily disfavored” and that matters “should be decided upon their merits
3 whenever reasonably possible.” Kitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. But PTG’s failure to
4 participate in this case makes a disposition on the merits impossible. See Barton v.
5 Real Innovation Inc., 792 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2025). And this
G preference, standing alone, is not dispositive. See id. (citing PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal.
7 Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). Because the remaining 8 Eitel factors favor default judgment, this factor does not preclude it.
9 4. CONCLUSION 10 Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for default judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. i No. 10. The Court ORDERS Defendant to produce all documents and records le responsive to Petitioner’s subpoena within 30 days of the date of this order. 13 Dated this 2nd day of March, 2026. 15 16 C = N. Whitehead 17 United States District Judge
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