PennyMac Loan Services, LLC v. Charles L. Hawkins, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. Tennessee
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00601
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES, LLC, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No.: 3:25-CV-601-TAV-JEM ) CHARLES L. HAWKINS, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On December 9, 2025, plaintiff filed its complaint [Doc. 1]. The next day, summonses were issued as to all defendants [Docs. 3, 4]. More than 90 days passed without any evidence in the record that plaintiff had achieved service upon defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Accordingly, on June 9, 2026, the Court entered a show cause order, instructing plaintiff to provide evidence that defendants had been properly served or otherwise show good cause as to why service had not been achieved [Doc. 13]. Plaintiff subsequently filed summonses returned executed for defendant Donna K. Hawkins and defendant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development [Docs. 14, 15]. As to defendant Charles L. Hawkins (“Mr. Hawkins”), plaintiff filed a Suggestion of Death and attached a death certificate [Docs. 16, 16-1]. Plaintiff then filed a response to the show cause order [Doc. 17]. In its response, plaintiff submits that it was recently notified that Mr. Hawkins is deceased, and thus, plaintiff is currently attempting to contact the heirs of Mr. Hawkins [Id. at 2]. Plaintiff states that it intends to seek a stay of the matter to determine the status of Mr. Hawkin’s estate, but in the meantime, plaintiff requests an extension of time to serve Mr. Hawkins, or presumably, his estate [Id.]. According to the death certificate submitted by plaintiff, Mr. Hawkins died on June

23, 2025 [Doc. 16-1], more than 5 months before this instant action was filed. “[I]t is ‘self-evident’ that ‘a dead person, qua a dead person (as opposed to the dead person’s estate . . .) cannot sue, be sued, or be joined to a lawsuit.’” Harris v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Tr. for Structured Asset Inv. Loan Tr. Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-2, No. 20-2005, 2021 WL 7542603, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 2021) (quoting LN Mgmt., LLC

v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 957 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2020)). Accordingly, an action asserted against a person who is already deceased at the time the action is brought is a nullity. Porter v. Washington, No. 1:22-CV-311, 2022 WL 2037942, at *6 (W.D. Mich. June 7, 2022). Moreover, the Court could not substitute “the proper party” under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 25 for Mr. Hawkins because “[s]ubstitution is not possible if one who was named as a party in fact died before the commencement of the action, because Rule 25 presupposes that substitution is for someone who was a party to a pending action.” City of Harriman v. Hester, No. 3:22-cv-77, 2025 WL 1341891, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 15, 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Flick v. Vadlamudi, No. 1:09-CV-647, 2010

WL 3061096, at *1 (W.D. Mich. July 16, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:09-CV-647, 2010 WL 3061021 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 2010)); accord Watkins v. Hansford, No: 3:17-CV-69, 2017 WL 4159401, at *1 (W.D. Ky. June 27, 2017) (“Rule 25 2 is not applicable here because Hansford was not a proper party to the action, having died six months before [the plaintiff] filed the complaint[.]”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-69, 2017 WL 4158647 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2017); Gavitt v. Ionia

Cnty., No. 14-12164, 2014 WL 5666943, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2014) (“According to its plain language, . . . Rule 25 does not permit substitution when a claim is being asserted against someone who died before the plaintiff filed his complaint. Rather, it permits substitution when a party dies after the action has already commenced.” (emphasis in original)), on reconsideration in part sub nom. Gavitt v. Devries, No. 14-12164, 2014 WL

7157193 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2014). Given plaintiff’s action against Mr. Hawkins is a nullity, and substitution would not be possible, there is no need to extend the time for service as to Mr. Hawkins. Rather, for the same reasons, the Court hereby DISMISSES defendant Charles L. Hawkins from this action. The show cause order issued by the Court on June 9, 2026 [Doc. 13] is otherwise

DISCHARGED based on plaintiff’s filings [Docs. 14, 15]. IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Thomas A. Varlan UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE