Pennsylvania R. R. v. Montgomery County Passenger Railway

31 A. 468, 167 Pa. 62, 1895 Pa. LEXIS 862
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 25, 1895
DocketAppeal, No. 139
StatusPublished
Cited by55 cases

This text of 31 A. 468 (Pennsylvania R. R. v. Montgomery County Passenger Railway) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pennsylvania R. R. v. Montgomery County Passenger Railway, 31 A. 468, 167 Pa. 62, 1895 Pa. LEXIS 862 (Pa. 1895).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Williams,

Our system of street passenger railways had its origin in the days of special legislation. Each company then had its own act of incorporation in which its route was described and its powers defined. These companies were confined to the cities and large towns of the state, and their ears were moved by horse power, and were a substitute for the omnibus and other vehicles devoted to the carriage of passengers which had been previously in common use. After the adoption of the new constitution the practice of separate legislation for each company became impracticable, and in 1878 a general law was passed providing for the organization of street railway companies for the purpose of “ constructing, maintaining and operating a street -railway for public use in the conveyance of passengers.’’ No power of eminent domain was conferred on these companies, [69]*69but the several provisions of the act show that such railways were to be constructed upon the -streets, conforming to the grade of the streets, and subject to the regulation of the municipal authorities. The act of 1876 gave to street railway companies in cities of the first class the right to “use other than animal power” in the movement of their ears. The act of May, 1878, conferred the like right upon street railway companies in cities of the second and third classes. The general law further provided that any company organized under its provisions should maintain an office for the transaction of its business “ in the city ” where its railway was located. All these provisions show that the street railways contemplated by the general act of 1878 were intended for the accommodation of the crowded streets of cities and for no other purpose. The present general law relating to these corporations was passed in 1889. It was intended to bring together the valuable provisions of several acts of assembly into one comprehensive statute, and to make some changes that experience had shown to be desirable. It authorized the incorporation of five or more persons for the purpose of “ constructing, maintaining and operating a street railway on any street or highway upon which no track is laid or authorized to be laid” under existing charters, with the privilege of occupying “any street ” . . . . by any power other than by locomotive. It required the route to be set out in the application for incorporation, stating the streets and highways upon which it was to be built, and showing “ the circuit of the route, the amount of the capital stock of the compan}'-,” and other particulars. It required all companies incorporated under its provisions to maintain an office where the railroad was located. Section 15 provided that “ no street passenger railway shall be constructed by any company incorporated under this act within the limits of any city, borough or townships without the consent of the local authorities thereof, nor shall any street passenger railway be incorporated hereunder which shall not have a continuous route from the beginning to the end, forming a complete circuit with its own track, excepting the five hundred feet to be used under section fourteen hereof.”

From these provisions we think it is apparent that the attempt now being made to convert these city conveniences [70]*70into long lines of transportation connecting widely separated cities and towns by electric railways traversing country roads, was not anticipated or provided for by the legislature. The failure to confer upon these companies the power of eminent domain would, if it stood alone, be sufficient to justify this conclusion. The land taken for streets in cities and boroughs is in the exclusive possession of the municipality, which may use the footway as well as the cartway for any urban servitude without further compensation to the lot owners: Provost v. The Water Company, 162 Pa. 275; Reading v. Davis, 153 Pa. 360; McDevitt v. The Gas Company, 160 Pa. 367. Nor does the construction of a street passenger railway upon the surface of the street impose any additional servitude upon the property fronting on the street so occupied: Rafferty v. The Traction Company, 147 Pa. 579. But the easement acquired by the public by proceedings under the road laws is an easement for passage only. The owner is entitled to the -possession of his land for all other purposes. We held therefore in Sterling’s Appeal, 111 Pa. 35, that the occupancy of a country road by a pipe line imposed an additional servitude upon the farm owner; while in McDevitt v. The Gas Company, supra, we held that a pipe line, laid within the limits of the street by authority of the city did not impose any additional servitude on the lot owner.

The reason for the distinction is fully stated in the opinion in the latter case. The same distinction exists, and for the same reasons, between urban and suburban property as to the right of corporations to occupy a highway for a street passenger railway. This, as will be seen by the cases cited above, is an urban servitude to which suburban property has not been subjected by law up to this time. The consent of township authorities justifies an entry upon the public road so far as the public is concerned, but the supervisors of the townships have no power to bind private property or subject it to a servitude for the benefit of any person or corporation other than the township and the public it represents. The carriage of passengers through the township on their journey from one city or borough to another by rail is in no sense a township purpose ; and whether these passengers make their journey in cars drawn by a locomotive over a steam railroad, or in those propelled by [71]*71electricity over tracks laid upon the highways, is immaterial both to taxpayers and to landowners along the route traveled except as the adoption of one or the other of these modes of transportation may affect the township roads or the private property of citizens. When the supervisors give their consent to the occupation of the township roads by a street railway they speak as the representatives of-those who build, and those who use the roads, but not as the representatives of the private property over which the roads pass. The street railway companies cannot reach the property owners either through “ the local authorities ” or by the right of eminent domain, as the law now stands ; and it is not easy to see how such a company can protect itself in the use of country roads except by contract with every owner of property along the roads they wish to occupy.

The trouble is that the supposed needs of. the country have outgrown its legislation, and an effort is now being made to adapt street railways to purposes for which they were never intended, and for which the existing legislation relating to them was not framed.

Cities and boroughs possess the necessary power over their streets to enable them to authorize their use by a street railway. Townships do not possess municipal powers, and under existing laws their control -over the - public roads is limited. Butin this connection another interesting question suggests itself. How is the assent of “the local authorities” to be obtained in any given case, and what is the proper evidence that it has been given ? The township books in the custodj' of the town clerk are the records of the township, and should afford evidence of the action taken by the supervisors in all matters of public importance. A paper in the pocket of a contractor or of some officer of a corporation is not the proper evidence of action by the township, or the school district. The action needed is not that of the individuals who compose the board, but of the official body.

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Bluebook (online)
31 A. 468, 167 Pa. 62, 1895 Pa. LEXIS 862, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pennsylvania-r-r-v-montgomery-county-passenger-railway-pa-1895.