Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Swift & Co.
This text of 4 F.2d 61 (Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Swift & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
On the trial of this case the court below gave binding instructions in favor of the defendant. Its action in so doing is here assigned for error, and raises the sole question involved. The nature of the case and the facts pertinent thereto are fully set forth in the opinion of this court at 258 F. 290, 169 C. C. A. 305, when the case was heretofore before us. We save needless present repetition by reference thereto.
Froln an examination of the part of that opinion printed in the margin,1 and the [62]*62pleadings of the case, it will be seen that of the 250 pounds of bay fed by the Pennsylvania Railroad. to Swift & Co.’s cattle at Pittsburgh, the latter voluntarily paid for 100 pounds. They also paid for 50 pounds additional as a result of the judgment and its affirmation by this court in the opinion referred to. This 150 pounds covered all the hay fed in the pens. After that opinion was filed, the railroad amended its pleading, alleging Swift & Co. had agreed to' pay also for the 100 pounds of hay the railroad had placed in the cars as they were leaving Pittsburgh, under the circumstances and for the reasons set forth in the excerpt of the opinion in the margin.
There had been, and 'was' at the time of the feeding here in controversy, a dispute between Swift & Got and the government bureau, as to the proper feeding of their cattle in transit. The railroad had no part, interest, or volition in that dispute; its duty as a common carrier forced it to act; meanwhile it had to transport the cattle,' and in doing so, to comply with the directions of the bureau as to feeding, or subject itself to threatened prosecution and the consequent imputation tjiat it was starving cattle in transit. The outcome of the dispute shows that Swift & Co. were wrong in their construction of the law, and that the 100 pounds of hay they would have allowed to be fed at Pittsburgh was but1 a little over one-third of what it is now adjudged was a proper feeding at Pittsburgh for cattle in transit 28 hours. But the outcome also shows the railroad was mistaken in its course, in that it had no. statutory right to feed any of the hay at Pittsburgh, elsewhere than in the pens.
The statute (Comp. St. §§ 8651, 8652) printed in the margin,2 provides, in the case of 28-hour cattle, for “unloading the same in a humane manner, into properly equipped pens for rest, water, and feeding. * * * Animals so unloaded shall be properly fed and watered during such rest, either by the owner or person having the custody thereof, or in ease of his default in so doing, then by the railroad * * * at the reasonable expense of the owner.”
Had the railroad placed the 100 pounds here in question in the pen racks, they would have complied literally with the statute and could have recovered therefor. But, instead of doing so, they, as the cattle were leavJ ing Pittsburgh, after the 5-hour rest, put in the pen racks of the outgoing cars the 100 pounds here in controversy. Under such circumstances, the railroad could not recover therefor as an obligation imposed by the statutory provision “at the reasonable expense. of the owner,” for the literalism of the statute only provided for the cattle being in “properly equipped pens for rest, water, and feeding,” and that “the animals so unloaded shall be properly fed and watered during such rest.”. Consequently, although the railroad complied with the spirit of the statute, and gave Swift’s cattle the lawful 250 pounds of food at Pittsburgh, yet, as the last 100 pounds were placed in the feed racks of the outgoing cars, and not-in the pen racks, and in view of the fact that Swift & Co. were protesting against the cattle being fed this 100 pounds and the other 50 pounds of contested feed, the railroad was bound to show an agreement on the part of Swift & Co. to pay for this 100 pounds which were fed otherwise than the statute provided.
We have carefully examined the proofs, which are now before us in their entirety, and we are unable to see how the minds of these parties ever met in an agreement that Swift & Co. should pay for this" car-fed feed.
The judgment below is therefore affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
4 F.2d 61, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2892, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pennsylvania-r-co-v-swift-co-ca3-1925.