Pennsylvania Electric Co. v. United States

133 Ct. Cl. 314
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedNovember 8, 1955
DocketNos. 47012, 48938, 50202 and 50203; No. 50201
StatusPublished

This text of 133 Ct. Cl. 314 (Pennsylvania Electric Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pennsylvania Electric Co. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 314 (cc 1955).

Opinion

Madden, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff Pennsylvania Electric Company, hereinafter called Penelec, was an operating electric utility company in Pennsylvania. It was a member of a highly complex hierarchy of which the Associated Gas and Electric Company, Ageco, was the top holding company, and there were a number of intermediate holding companies between Ageco at the top, and Penelec and the numerous other operating companies.

About July 1931, Penelec issued and sold to the public through bankers some $9,000,000 principal amount of its 31^% Gold Notes due August 1, 1932. As the due date of these Gold Notes approached, Penelec did not have the money, nor the capacity to borrow at banks, to pay them. Other operating companies in the Ageco system also had large debts falling due in 1932.

The parent, grandparent, and great grandparent of Penelec, in the holding company system, had their bonds outstanding in the hands of some 190,000 investors. The parent companies solicited these holders of their securities to buy additional bonds, but were able to sell only $7,600,000 worth of bonds to them out of an offer of $40,000,000.

[316]*316The parent companies held large quantities of bonds of their operating companies, which they had taken for the purpose of marketing if a situation arose in which it was necessary to raise cash and the holding companies’ own. bonds would not sell to advantage. Among bonds so held by parent companies were $13,551,000 principal amount of Penelec’s Series E and G bonds. But these bonds were not as readily saleable as was necessary, and it was decided that Penelec should exchange to its parent companies for these bonds, bonds more attractive to investors because they had a shorter maturity and a higher interest rate. For this exchange Penelec issued its Series H bonds. But it issued only $12,000,000 of Series H bonds in exchange for the $13,551,000 of Series E and G bonds which were surrendered. This made Penelec’s balance sheet look $1,551,000 better, and made its Series H bonds look still more attractive to potential purchasers of the H bonds from the parent companies.

Penelec’s parent companies then offered the Series H bonds to the holders of the $9,000,000 of Gold Notes, whose maturity was impending, at bargain prices. They offered $6,000 of Series H bonds, plus $200 in cash, for each $5,000 of Gold Notes. Only $852,000 face value of the Series H bonds were disposed of on this basis. They next offered new Penelec One, Two, and Three Year Gold notes, which contained the privilege of conversion of each $1,000 of such notes into $1,200 of Series H bonds. This offer did not bring in all of the 1932 Gold Notes, and the rest of them were bought in for cash which was raised by selling the new convertible Gold Notes to bankers.

As we have said, only $12,000,000 of Penelec Series H bonds were given by it to its parent companies in exchange for $13,551,000 face value of its Series E and G bonds. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue held that Penelec had made a profit out of this transaction. The profit was not the entire $1,551,000 difference between the two figures, because Penelec, when it had originally issued the E and G bonds, had not received their face value, but only 95% of their face value. After allowing for this discount, the profit which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue attributed to the exchange of H bonds for E and G bonds was $873,450. This alleged [317]*317profit was called a “premium” and, for income tax purposes was to be “amortized” or distributed in equal parts over tbe 30-year life of tbe bonds. Thus Penelec was held to have a profit of $29,115 for each year of the life of the bonds.

For the years 1932 and 1933 consolidated federal income tax returns were filed by Ageco, the top holding company of the affiliated group, for all the members of the group including Penelec and the parent companies involved in the exchange of the bonds. In such a consolidated return no gain or loss on inter-group transactions was permitted to be taken into account. Therefore, for the years 1932 and 1933 the alleged profit of $29,115 was not taxed. But the law permitting consolidated returns for such groups was changed, and for the years 1934 to 1938 inclusive and for the years 1940 and 1941, Penelec filed its separate return and was required to pay the tax on the $29,115 of profit for each of those years. For the year 1942, the top holding company of the system filed a consolidated return for the whole group. The H bonds then held by persons other than the group covered by the consolidated return were retired in that year, and the unamortized “premium” was taxed.

The Commissioner of Internal Bevenue, in concluding that Penelec had made a profit on the exchange of the bonds, merely subtracted the face value figure of the II bonds put out from the face value figures of the E and G bonds taken in, with an appropriate adjustment for the fact that the latter bonds had originally been issued at a 5% discount. The plaintiff Penelec says that the difference between the figures was not profit, but was a capital contribution to Penelec by its parent companies for the purpose of improving its financial situation and making its newly issued securities more marketable. Our findings show that, in our view, it was such a capital contribution and not a taxable profit.

Penelec’s parent companies, which owned its stock, could, of course, have dictated any terms which they chose for the exchange of the bonds. They chose to make the capital contribution because Penelec was their property, and its financial integrity and credit were valuable to that proprietary interest. The situation was unlike that in Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U. S. 28, and Marshall Drug Co. v. United [318]*318States, 118 C. Cls. 532, where creditors having no proprietary-interest in the debtor made the best settlement they could get of insecure debts. In those cases the debtor, as taxpayer, was claiming that the reduction was a non-taxable gift. It was not, because there was no donative intent. But a contribution to capital does not require a donative intent, in the sense that there should be no business motive in making it. There is always the proprietor’s business motive of making his property more valuable.

In Penelec’s accounting, it treated the difference in the face value of the bonds involved in the exchange as a capital contribution. Then the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission required it to change its accounting so as to amortize the amount, as a premium, over the life of the bonds. The system of accounting imposed upon a public utility by a regulatory commission is “not binding upon the Commissioner (of Internal Revenue), nor may he resort to the rules of that body, made for other purposes, for the determination of tax liability under the revenue acts”. Old Colony Railroad Company v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552, 562.

If the difference in the face value of the bonds which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue designated as a premium was not, as we have found, a capital contribution, it would seem to us to have been a situation for the application of the doctrine of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1, and Commissioner v.

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Related

United States v. Kirby Lumber Co
284 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1931)
Old Colony Railroad v. Commissioner
284 U.S. 552 (Supreme Court, 1932)
Commissioner v. Jacobson
336 U.S. 28 (Supreme Court, 1949)

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133 Ct. Cl. 314, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pennsylvania-electric-co-v-united-states-cc-1955.