Pennsylvania Co. v. Cincinnati & L. E. R. Co.

43 F. Supp. 5, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2268
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedSeptember 22, 1941
DocketNo. 323
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 43 F. Supp. 5 (Pennsylvania Co. v. Cincinnati & L. E. R. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pennsylvania Co. v. Cincinnati & L. E. R. Co., 43 F. Supp. 5, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2268 (S.D. Ohio 1941).

Opinion

NEVIN, District Judge.

Leave of court having been first sought and obtained, intervenors, Herman R. Klauser and (14) others, filed their intervening petition herein on July 27, 1940. They seek to have title, which they claim, to certain real estate quieted and possession thereof restored to them from the receivers herein.

In their petition (after the formal allegations as to the appointment of the receivers in this cause) they allege in substance that they have a legal estate in and are entitled to the possession of the real estate described in the petition; that they acquired title to the property by way of inheritance from their ancestors, and that they are now the owners of the fee; that the predecessor in title to the Cincinnati & Lake Erie Railroad Company acquired an easement in the real estate by condemnation proceedings for the [6]*6sole and only purpose of operating a railroad over and across the same; that the defendant, Cincinnati & Lake Erie Railroad Company, and the Receivers thereof, have abandoned the premises for any and all the uses for which the same were appropriated by the condemnation proceedings, and thereby they have abandoned the easement therein, and that the title has reverted to the intervenors free from any claims of the railroad company.

Intervenors pray “that this Court declare an abandonment of said premises by said Cincinnati & Lake Erie Railroad Company, for the uses and purposes for which the same was appropriated and that said intervenors’ title to said premises be quieted in and to said real estate as against said Cincinnati & Lake Erie Railroad Company; that the possession thereof be restored to your intervenors, and said Cincinnati & Lake Erie Railroad Company be ordered and directed to surrender possession of said premises to these intervenors * *

On November 20, 1940, the receivers filed their answer. In the answer all formal allegations as to the incorporation of defendant, Cincinnati and Lake Erie Railroad Company, and as to the receivership are admitted.

It is also admitted that in 1907 the Lima & Toledo Traction Company, an Ohio (railroad) corporation, acquired by condemnation proceedings in the Probate Court of Lucas County, Ohio, certain rights and interests in and to the real estate described in the intervening petition, and that the Ohio Electric Railroad Company, an Ohio corporation, acquired from the Lima & Toledo Traction Company certain rights and interests by way of leasehold, with reference thereto.

The receivers allege that thereafter Cincinnati & Lake Erie Railroad Company acquired all the rights and interests in and to the real estate of both the Lima & Toledo Traction Company, and the Ohio Electric Railroad Company, and that the Cincinnati & Lake Erie Railroad Company is the owner of an indefeasible title in fee simple of and to the premises described in the intervening petition.

The receivers deny that Cincinnati & Lake Erie Railroad Company and its Receivers have abandoned the premises, and their easement and interests therein or that the intervenors are entitled to the cancellation of the easement or to the restoration of the premises, or' to the possession thereof. They allege that the intervenors have no right, title, or interest in or to the premises described in the intervening petition, and pray that the intervening petition may be dismissed.

On January IS, 1941, an agreed statement of facts was filed. Subsequently (on April 22, 1941) the cause came on for hearing. At the hearing a number of exhibits were offered and admitted in evidence and the oral testimony of one witness — Mr. Howard Lowe, Chief Engineer of Cincinnati and Lake Erie Railroad Company — introduced. He was not cross-examined. As appears, therefore, there is no dispute as to the basic facts. The exhibits in evidence and the records of this court show the action taken by the receivers, under the authority of the court, in connection with the abandonment of its right of way for railroad purposes by the defendant, Cincinnati and Lake Erie Railroad Company.

Abandonment as a railroad is conceded. As to this, the record (pp. 1836, 1837) shows:

“The Court: * * * Now the road as a railroad has been ordered abandoned.
“Mr. Martin (Of counsel for receivers) : That is true."

It is so stipulated, also, in Paragraph 17 of the “Agreed Statement of Facts" (Intervenors Ex. 1 — Receivers Ex. A).

The receivers claim, however, that ever since the discontinuance of rail operations they have been negotiating with the City of Toledo, Ohio, for the sale to it of the entire tract involved herein, portions thereof to be incorporated by the City into its public highway system, and that the negotiations have not been completed because of the inability of the City to finance the purchase and improvement of the land. Mr. Lowe testified (Rec. pp. 1839 et seq.) regarding these negotiations.

They also assert that from the time this land was first used for railroad purposes, a part of those purposes had consisted in the transmission of electrical energy by means of the pole line which was used for the operation of the railroad, and that the energy transported was sold at wholesale or retail to municipalities and private users along the right of way as far south as the City of Lima. This transmission of electrical energy, independently of the operation of the Railroad, they submit, was a normal use of the property, and testimony [7]*7(of Mr. Lowe) was introduced in order to show that this land might be sold for purposes of transmission of electrical energy, in view of the fact that this was one of the uses to which it had been devoted. This, the receivers say, would also be a public or quasi public use.

In addition, the receivers claim that certain private interests have offered to purchase the land though they concede (T3r. P. 3) that “if the Railroad owned only an easement, it could not sell the land for private purposes, but could only sell it for some public or quasi public use.”

At the outset of the hearing counsel for the receivers (Mr. Martin) made the following statement (Rec. pp. 1835, 1836) as to the questions presented: “The issues which are raised are two. The first is whether the railroad has the fee ownership in the land by virtue of the deed from Klauser and Hager to Wiltsie Realty Company and then from Wiltsie Realty Company to the railroad. That is one issue, and the primary issue in so far as the receivers are concerned. The second issue is, even admitting that the railroad does not own the fee by virtue of those conveyances but owned simply an easement or right-of-way, the issue is whether there is any power in the railroad or its receivers to convey that right-of-way for any other use than a strictly railroad use. * * * The receivers take the position that this real estate, this right-of-way, is a potential or is an actual asset of the receivership estate, and that it can be conveyed by the receivers for purposes within the scope of the original grant so that the original easement will not be lost or abandoned or destroyed or extinguished.”

Mr. Campbell (Counsel for petitioners) stated (Rec. P. 1845) : “This intervening petition is based on the fact that the railroad company has ceased operation and abandoned the object and purposes for which the land was condemned, and that therefore the easement is terminated and that therefore the property is that of the intervenors, free from the condemnation easement.”

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Bluebook (online)
43 F. Supp. 5, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2268, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pennsylvania-co-v-cincinnati-l-e-r-co-ohsd-1941.