Pennsylvania Chocolate Co. v. Lewellyn

27 F.2d 762, 6 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 7935, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1373, 6 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 7935
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 20, 1928
Docket3276
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 27 F.2d 762 (Pennsylvania Chocolate Co. v. Lewellyn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pennsylvania Chocolate Co. v. Lewellyn, 27 F.2d 762, 6 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 7935, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1373, 6 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 7935 (W.D. Pa. 1928).

Opinion

THOMSON, District Judge.

This action is brought to recover the sum of $71,-916.75, with interest, being income and excess profits taxes under protest by the plaintiff for the fiseal year ending January 31, 1919. A claim for refund having been refused, this action was brought to recover the amount so paid.

The issue arises on an affidavit of defense raising questions of law, the facts of the case being in no way disputed. The plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation, prior to the law in question, had uniformly filed its income and excess profits tax returns on the fiseal year basis, ending January 31; the last return being filed on that basis being on or about March 15, 1919, for the fiscal' year ending January 31, 1919. That return showed a net income of $167,884.17, and 'an income and excess profits tax of $75,132.06, which taxes were paid to the defendant on or about March 15, 1919. On June 30, 1919, the plaintiff requested permission of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to change its taxable period from a fiseal to a calendar year basis, and in October, 1919, the Commissioner granted plaintiff’s request.

Pursuant to the permission so granted, plaintiff filed its income and excess profits’ tax return on or about March 15, 1920, for the period beginning February 1, 1919, and ending December 31, 1919, which return showed a net loss of $172,090.24, and no tax due. At that time plaintiff had no knowledge of the provisions of section 204 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 (Comp. St. § 6336%ce (b), but in October, 1920, the plaintiff became informed of the provisions of said act, and on December 31,1920, did file an amended income and excess profits tax return for the fiscal year beginning February 1, 1918, and ending January 31, 1919, in which return plaintiff deducted from its net income for said fiscal year its said net loss of $172,090.-24, sustained during the period from February 1, 1919, to December 31, 1919.

On December 3, 1920, plaintiff filed its claim for refund of the sum of $78,705.58, being the corrected amount of income and excess profits taxes paid by the plaintiff for the fiseal year ending January 31, 1919. In the claim for refund, plaintiff stated that it was entitled to deduct the said loss of $172,-090.24, sustained during the period from February 1,1919, to December 31,1919, from its net income for the fiseal year ending January 31, 1919, the result of which would be-that no tax whatever would be due for the fiseal year ending on the latter date.

The Commissioner allowed said claim for refund in the sum of $3,215.31 on a readjustment of several small items of plaintiff’s net income and invested capital, but denied plaintiff the right to set off the loss sustained in 1919 against the net income for the fiscal year ending January 31, 1919.

The following questions of law were-raised by the defendant in his affidavit of defense;

“(1) Plaintiff’s income and profits tax return for the period beginning February 1,1919, and ending December 31,1919, showing a net loss of $172,090.24, did not constitute a return for a taxable year, as defined in section 200 of the Revenue Act of 1918.
“(2) That in determining the correct in *763 come and profits tax liability for the fiscal year beginning February 1, 1918, and ending January 31,1919, section 204 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 authorizes no deduction from the net income of the plaintiff for said period of a net loss for the 11-months period commencing February 1, 1919, as averred in plaintiff’s statement of claim.”

A single question of law is thus raised, involving the proper interpretation of the relevant sections of the aet of Congress. The question is: Is a return for the period of 11 months on a voluntary change from a fiscal to a calendar year basis, which was approved by the Commissioner, a return for a taxable year, within the meaning of section 204 (b) of the Revenue Aet of 1918. Section 204 (b) of the Revenue Aet of 1918, is as follows :

“(b) If for any taxable year beginning after October 31, 1918, and ending prior to January 1,1920, it appears upon the production of evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner that any taxpayer has sustained a net loss, the amount of sueh net loss shall under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary be deducted from the net income of the taxpayer for the preceding taxable year; and the taxes imposed by this title and by title III for sueh preceding taxable year shall be redetermined accordingly. Any amount found to be due to the taxpayer upon the basis of sueh redetermination shall be credited or refunded to the taxpayer in accordance with the provisions of section 252. If such net loss is in excess of the net income for such preceding taxable year, the amount of sueh excess shall under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary be allowed as a deduction in computing the net income for the succeeding taxable year.”

Under section 200 of that aet (Comp. St. § 6336%a) the term “taxable year” is defined as the calendar year, or the fiscal year ending during such calendar year, upon the basis of wiheh the net income is computed. The term “fiscal year” means an accounting period of 12 months, ending on the last day of any month other than December. The first taxable year, to be called the taxable year 1918, shall be the calendar year 1918, or any fiscal year ending during the calendar year 1918.

It is provided in section 212 (b) that, “if a taxpayer changes his accounting period from fiscal year tor calendar year, from calendar year to fiscal year, or from one fiscal year to another, the net income shall, with the approval of the Commissioner, be computed on the basis of sueh new accounting period subject to the provisions of section 226.” Comp. St. § 6336ysf (b).

Section 226 (Comp. St. § 6336%m) provides for a separate return, where the basis of computing net income has been changed from a fiscal to a calendar year, from a calendar to a fiscal year, and from one fiscal year to another, the net income in each case being computed on the basis of sueh period for which the separate return is made, the tax being paid thereon at the rate for the calendar year in which sueh period is included; the credits provided in subdivision (e) and (d) of section 216 (Comp. St. § 6336%h (e) (d) being reduced, respectively, to amounts which bear the same ratio to the full credits provided in sueh subdivision as the number of months in sueh period bears to 12 months.

It is the contention of the defendant that, inasmuch as the loss sustained by the plaintiff occurred in a period of only 11 months, the return for that period does not constitute a “taxable year” within the meaning of the aet, and hence that the loss cannot be allowed against the income for the preceding taxable year.

It is the position of the plaintiff that the term “taxable year” is not restricted to a period of 12 months; that, inasmuch as the aet authorizes a taxpayer to change from a fiscal to a calendar year basis with the approval of the Commissioner, the intervening period, which would be less than a 12-month period, would constitute a “taxable year;” that Congress, by inserting section 226 in the aet, gave the taxpayer the right to bring itself within the provisions of section 204 (b); and that there is no intent upon the part of this taxpayer to evade a just tax.

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Bluebook (online)
27 F.2d 762, 6 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 7935, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1373, 6 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 7935, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pennsylvania-chocolate-co-v-lewellyn-pawd-1928.