F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 5 1997 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
WILLIAM J. PENNINGTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-5177 (D.C. No. 93-CV-1135-J) SHIRLEY S. CHATER, (N.D. Okla.) Commissioner, Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and CAUTHRON, ** District Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. ** Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, District Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. Claimant William J. Pennington appeals from an order of the magistrate
judge, sitting for the district court by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(1), affirming the denial of his application for social security disability
benefits. Claimant alleges disability due to the pain and debilitating aftereffects
of ocular migraine headaches. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found
claimant’s testimony only partially credible and determined that he was not
disabled at step four of the five-step sequential evaluation process. See Williams
v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988). The only issue on appeal is
whether the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and, for
the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand for an immediate award of
benefits.
Claimant was born in 1943 and holds two associate’s degrees, one in
business administration and one in middle management. Prior to 1991, when he
claims to have become disabled, he had worked continuously since at least 1975,
in either data processing, computer programming, or telecommunications. He was
employed with Amoco, his last employer, for a period of approximately eleven
years and, in his last position there, as a staff telecommunications analyst
responsible for the southeastern United States, he traveled 90-95 percent of the
time, worked 70-80 hours per week, and made approximately $50,000 a year.
-2- Although there is some confusion in the record as to the precise date in 1991
when he last worked, the evidence is uncontroverted that he did not quit, but was
“put . . . out on disability.” II Appellant’s App. at 53. Claimant explained that
“[t]hey didn’t want [him] driving . . . [or] travelling any more,” which “was part
of [his then-current] job,” id. at 53, and that the in-house doctor discussed with
him the possibility of a transfer to an accounting function or something similar
but thought that the eye strain would probably “set [the headaches] off,” id. at 60.
At the time of his administrative hearing, he was receiving long term disability in
the amount of $2,670 a month.
Claimant filed his application for social security disability benefits in 1992,
alleging disability from March 1991 due to ocular migraines. He testified at his
administrative hearing that his headaches started “[n]ot too long after” an
accident in 1987 involving a battery explosion which resulted in the loss of his
left eye, id. at 53, and have gradually worsened since then. He further testified
that he suffered migraine headaches four to seven times a week, each lasting from
three to five hours and accompanied by five to twenty minutes of blindness in his
right eye and by debilitating aftereffects lasting up to 24 hours. See id. at 52.
Among the aftereffects claimant described were tenderness of the head, dizziness,
nausea, and grogginess. See id. He also testified that although the doctors “can’t
-3- nail down exactly what’s causing [the headaches],” eye strain and reading a
computer screen “seem[] to be” factors. Id. at 59.
Claimant characterized approximately 15 to 20 percent of his time as “good
days,” when he is “not having a headache or any side effects” and “can do a few
things, go to the laundry, [and] go to the grocery store.” Id. at 50. He described
20 percent of his time as “bad days,” when he has “extreme headaches” and
“stay[s] in bed with a pillow over [his] head, the drapes closed,” when he “can’t
stand light, can’t stand noise, [and] cannot function at all.” Id. The rest of his
time he characterized as “a transition period,” when he is “either going
into . . . [or] coming out of [a] headache[]” and suffering from the aftereffects of
the headache and his headache medication. Id. During these transition periods,
claimant testified that he is in a “recuperation mode”and can “fend for [him]self, .
. . fix [him]self a meal, maybe do a load of laundry, [and] take care of the dogs,”
but “spend[s] most of the day on the couch” and “can’t function.”
Id. at 50-51.
Rejecting much of this testimony, the ALJ determined that claimant had the
residual functional capacity to perform light work limited only by monocular
vision, lack of depth perception, and occasional blind episodes, and the resulting
inability to climb, balance, or work around heights or moving machinery.
Although he found that “claimant has occasional bouts of headache pain,” id. at
-4- 19, and credited claimant’s complaints of episodes of accompanying blindness,
the ALJ found that claimant’s testimony “exhibit[ed] embellishment,
exaggeration, and a strong secondary gain motive” and found it credible “only to
the extent that it is reconciled with the objective medical evidence and the
claimant’s [residual functional capacity],” id. at 24. Accordingly, the ALJ
determined, at step four of the sequential evaluation process, that claimant could
return to his past relevant work and thus was not disabled.
On appeal, claimant challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination.
“[C]redibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, ‘the individual
optimally positioned to observe and assess witness credibility.’” Adams v.
Chater, 93 F.3d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Casias v. Secretary of Health
& Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991)). Accordingly, this court
ordinarily defers to the ALJ on that issue. See Casias, 933 F.2d at 801.
However, “deference is not an absolute rule.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d
1482, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993). To be sustained, credibility determinations must be
supported by substantial evidence. See Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391
(10th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Soliz v. Chater, 82 F.3d
373, 375 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971) (further quotation omitted)).
-5- Having carefully reviewed the record, we do not find substantial
evidentiary support for the ALJ’s credibility determination in this case. Without
much elaboration, the ALJ found that claimant’s testimony was “not always
consistent with the documentary evidence or with itself.” II Appellant’s App.
at 21. The ALJ cites Dr. Dawson’s July 1992 treatment notes purportedly to the
effect that “claimant was doing well with his migraine headaches.” Id. The July
1992 notes make no reference to claimant’s headaches, however, but appear to
relate only to claimant’s status following an endoscopy which found claimant to
have a hiatal hernia. See id. at 149. More importantly, a review of Dr. Dawson’s
records in their entirety reveal that since at least early 1990, claimant has
consistently sought relief from headaches and received medication for that
purpose. See id. at 160 (3/6/90), 159 (5/22/90), 158 (5/29/90), 157 (1/14/91 &
1/31/91), 156 (2/26/91 & 5/3/91), 155 (9/4/91), 154 (12/18/91), 153 (4/1/92), 150
(6/18/92), 148 (9/17/92), 203 (2/1/93). Among the medications he has
consistently received is Tylox, a semisynthetic narcotic analgesic, indicated for
the relief of moderate to moderately severe pain. See Physicians’ Desk Reference
1593-94 (51st ed. 1997).
In May of 1990, Dr. Dawson diagnosed claimant as suffering from
“[p]robable ocular migraines, possibly induced by the trauma of the battery
accident to his left eye.” II Appellant’s App. at 159; see also id. at 124 (Dr.
-6- Dawson’s hospital discharge report noting claimant’s “[c]hronic headaches of a
vascular migraine type”). Neither of the other doctors who examined claimant
during the relevant period questioned the existence of his headaches, see id. at
170 (record of 2/1/91 exam by in-house physician of claimant’s former employer
indicating diagnosis of “MIGRAINE NEC” and “VISUAL LOSS NOS”), 204
(consulting physician’s report referencing claimant’s “history of severe migraines
with loss of vision”), and there is other medical evidence in the record supportive
of claimant’s testimony, see id. at 164 (2/26/91 report from Dr. Dawson
indicating that claimant has an ocular migraine and cannot return to work until
2/28/91), 176 (5/22/90 report by Dr. Dawson indicating claimant “[r]estricted
from driving until migraines under control), 165 (in-house physician’s
recommendation that claimant not drive company vehicles, owned or rented, and
that “he be put in a position where he does not have to drive or do a great deal of
traveling”), 148 (notation in Dr. Dawson’s treatment notes of 9/17/92 reiterating
that “Pt. should not be driving”). Although the record includes no medical
opinion of disability, the medical evidence is certainly not inconsistent with
claimant’s testimony of severe migraine headaches with debilitating aftereffects.
The ALJ notes that “[t]he only restrictions placed upon the claimant by his
treating or examining physicians, in the past, have been those of operation of
machinery, such as cars, and limitations placed upon his ability to travel.” Id.
-7- at 21. Given claimant’s uncontroverted but unexplored testimony that he left
Amoco because “[t]hey put me out on disability,” id. at 53, it is unclear whether
this is correct. Furthermore, although it is appropriate for the ALJ to consider the
extent to which the medical evidence corroborates the existence of a claimed
impairment, its severity, and the accompanying functional limitations, see Luna v.
Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 165 (10th Cir. 1987), we note that the documented
restriction corroborates claimant’s testimony, and the absence of other medically-
imposed restrictions is not necessarily inconsistent with the claimed impairment
in this case.
The ALJ further states, again without elaboration, that “[t]he medical
findings are not consistent with a significant pain causing etiology.”
II Appellant’s App. at 22. The statement indicates that the ALJ may have relied
on the lack of conclusive laboratory-type findings to confirm claimant’s diagnosis
and/or symptomatology. We are aware of no medical procedures to objectively
evaluate either the severity of a migraine or pain; and where no such conclusive
tests exist, the failure to produce such test results is surely an improper basis for
discrediting a claimant’s uncontroverted testimony. See Sisco v. United States
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 10 F.3d 739, 743-44 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
-8- that the ALJ improperly impeached a claimant’s unrebutted testimony because of
the lack of a conclusive “dipstick” laboratory test for chronic fatigue syndrome). 1
The ALJ also relied on claimant’s reported daily activities to discredit his
testimony, finding that they contradicted his claims concerning disabling pain and
significant functional limitations. In so concluding, the ALJ stated that “[t]he
claimant leads a rather active lifestyle. He fishes, he camps, and he drives when
he wants to.” II Appellant’s App. at 22. We do not consider this a fair
characterization of the record. At his administrative hearing, claimant testified to
a fairly sedentary and circumscribed lifestyle. See, e.g., id. at 56-57 (claimant’s
testimony concerning an average day). There is nothing in the record to indicate
that he drives “when he wants to.” Id. at 22. On the contrary, claimant testified
that he drives “pretty much” “only on good days” “[u]nless I’m awfully desperate
for a cigarette, and then I don’t go far away. . . . I feel like I’m totally drunk when
I’m out there in a transitional period, and if I’m having a headache there’s no
1 Although conceding that credibility is the crucial issue in this case, see Appellee’s Br. at 17, the Commissioner makes a similar argument in her brief, contending that claimant has failed to establish a “medically determinable impairment” because of the absence of “objective medical findings,” id. at 19. However, just as claimant’s testimony cannot be discredited because of the absence of a conclusive laboratory-type test, his treating physician’s unchallenged diagnosis cannot be ignored for that reason. See Sisco, 10 F.3d at 743-44 (ALJ erred in discrediting treating physician’s unchallenged diagnosis because of lack of “dipstick” laboratory test for chronic fatigue syndrome where no such test existed).
-9- way.” Id. at 58; see also id. at 176 (5/22/90 report of Dr. Dawson that claimant
“[r]estricted from driving until migraines under control), 165 (company doctor’s
recommendation on 2/6/91 that claimant not drive company vehicles). There is
some indication in the record that claimant still fishes, see id. at 110, 113, and
one unexplored reference in Dr. Dawson’s treatment notes to a
two-week camping trip, see id. at 150, which claimant apparently took over a year
after he claims to have become disabled. We do not believe that claimant’s
apparent participation in these activities, as established on this record, are
sufficient in and of themselves to warrant discrediting claimant’s testimony. The
ALJ focused in particular on claimant’s fishing, noting that “[f]ishing would be
an extremely hazardous occupation if the claimant were actually suffering from
loss of [vision] four to seven times a week.” II Appellant’s App. at 22. While the
ALJ’s observation might be accurate under certain circumstances, the evidence
seems to indicate that claimant does not fish often, id. at 113 (“1 day every other
month”), that he goes only when he expects a “good day,” id. at 59, and that he
does not go alone, id. at 205.
The ALJ also appears to have relied heavily on the fact that claimant lives
alone and, for the most part, takes care of his own personal and household needs.
Claimant’s testimony indicates, however, that his particular activities in this
regard vary depending on whether he is having a good day, a bad day, or is in a
-10- so-called transition period. See id. at 57 (able to make his own breakfast and
lunch during transition periods, but not on a bad day), 58 (drives “pretty much”
“only on good days” and “weed eat[s] on [his] good days”), 59 (“hold[s]
[vacuuming] off to good days”). We find claimant’s account of his daily
activities substantially consistent with the kind of disability he claims to be
suffering, i.e., one that does not bother him 20 percent of the time, completely
incapacitates him 20 percent of the time, and results in debilitating aftereffects
the rest of the time. See Keller v. Shalala, 26 F.3d 856, 859 (8th Cir. 1994)
(testimony concerning daily activities not inconsistent with disabling headache
pain where claimant testified she did not engage in these activities when she had a
headache).
In discrediting claimant’s testimony, the ALJ also relied on a conclusion
that “[t]he evidence indicates that the claimant’s migraine headaches, and his pain
in general, is adequately controlled with this current pain relief regimen.”
II Appellant’s App. at 22. Our review of the record does not reveal substantial
evidentiary support for this conclusion. There is certainly no medical opinion to
that effect. Although an examining doctor noted the “[claimant] has some relief
from his headaches with Tylenol #3 and Midrin” and that he is having “fair
results” with Calan, id. at 204, claimant testified that “his headaches were getting
more frequent until the doctor put [him] on Calan,” but that now “they’ve leveled
-11- out, stayed pretty consistent [at four to seven per week] since then,” id. at 52. He
also testified that although the Tylox will help the headaches “ease away,” it does
not stop them, explaining that “[i]t seems like they have to run their course.” Id.
at 54-55.
Finally, the ALJ relied on purported inconsistent statements made by
claimant to his doctors concerning his use of alcohol and, without elaboration, the
fact that “claimant reacted in a harsh and an excited manner when he was told he
was no longer going to be given narcotic pain relief remedies by Dr. Dawson.”
Id. at 22. Our review of the record revealed no significant inconsistencies
regarding claimant’s purported use of alcohol, and we note that claimant’s
reaction to the possible withdrawal of narcotic pain medication is not inconsistent
with claimant’s testimony that his headaches cause him significant pain.
We are left then with the ALJ’s observation that “claimant is suffering from
no loss of muscle mass or signs of atrophy,” and his conclusion that “claimant is
not lying in bed recuperating from migraine headaches as often as he alleges.” Id.
at 22. This is a legitimate observation, peculiarly within the province of the fact-
finder, but given the other errors in the ALJ’s credibility determination, it is not
sufficient to sustain that determination.
The ALJ’s credibility determination must therefore be reversed. “When a
decision of the Secretary is reversed on appeal, it is within this court’s discretion
-12- to remand either for further administrative proceedings or for an immediate award
of benefits.” Ragland v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 1056, 1060 (10th Cir. 1993). Remand
for an immediate award is appropriate when additional fact finding would serve
no useful purpose. See Sorenson v. Bowen, 888 F.2d 706, 713 (10th Cir. 1989).
Here, the vocational expert testified that if claimant’s testimony was credible, he
would not be able to work. See II Appellant’s App. at 68-70. Accordingly, we
find no reason for additional administrative proceedings in this case, now five
years old, and instead exercise our discretionary authority to remand for an
immediate award of benefits.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED with directions to
remand the case to the Commissioner of Social Security for an immediate award
of benefits.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge
-13- No. 96-5177 -- Pennington v. Chater
BRORBY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
As the majority recognized at the outset, the only issue on appeal is
whether the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Mr. Pennington's
testimony was "not always consistent with the documentary evidence or with
itself" is supported by substantial evidence in the record. However, while
purporting to apply a substantial-evidence standard to its review of the
Administrative Law Judge's credibility determination, the majority transgressed
the well-established boundaries of that standard by dissecting the record,
reweighing the evidence, and ultimately substituting its conclusions for those of
the trier of fact.
This court has long recognized the Administrative Law Judge is "'optimally
positioned to observe and assess witness credibility.'" Adams v. Chater, 93 F.3d
712, 715 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
933 F.2d 799, 801(10th Cir. 1991)). Thus, while we do not afford absolute
deference to an Administrative Law Judge's credibility determination, Thompson
v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993), we "recognize that some
claimants exaggerate symptoms for purposes of obtaining government benefits,
and deference to the fact-finder's assessment of credibility is the general rule."
Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 517 (10th Cir. 1987); see also Gay v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1339 (10th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we are free to overturn a fact
finder's credibility determination only where there is a conspicuous absence of
credible evidence to support that determination. See Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d
1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1992). We cannot overturn a credibility determination
simply because there is evidence in the record that supports a finding other than
the one the Administrative Law Judge made. Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. In reviewing the record, we may not reweigh the evidence nor
substitute our judgment for that of the Administrative Law Judge. Glass v.
Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1395 (10th Cir. 1994). Reviewing the record with these
important boundaries in mind, I conclude there is substantial evidence to support
the Administrative Law Judge's credibility determination.
The Administrative Law Judge found Mr. Pennington's testimony regarding
disabling pain from ocular migraine headaches to be "credible only to the extent
that it is reconciled with the objective medical evidence." More specifically, the
Administrative Law Judge noted Mr. Pennington's testimony regarding the
disabling effect of his pain was inconsistent with his own testimony concerning
his daily activities and sleep patterns, as well as the documented medical evidence
-2- itself. These objective observations and the resulting determination that Mr.
Pennington's credibility was limited plainly are supported in the record.
For example, Mr. Pennington testified he is significantly functionally
restricted eighty per cent of the time -- he cannot function at all on days when he
has a headache (twenty per cent of the time) and can undertake only very limited
activity on days when he is either going into or coming out of a migraine
headache (sixty per cent of the time). Yet, he testified and documented on
various disability reports he regularly makes his own meals, keeps house, does
laundry, goes shopping, tends his pets, and sleeps eight to ten hours per night. In
addition, he occasionally goes fishing, enjoys nighttime photography, visits with
relatives, and drives his car on a weekly basis. On a Reconsideration Disability
Report completed in September 1992, Mr. Pennington represented he is unable to
do yardwork; however, on a pain questionnaire he completed in 1992, he
indicated his daily activities included household chores and mowing the yard.
Medical records indicate Mr. Pennington went camping and slept on the ground
for two weeks in 1992, after he had filed an application for Disability Insurance
benefits. This evidence amply supports the Administrative Law Judge's
determination Mr. Pennington's testimony concerning the nature and severity of
-3- his disability was credible only to the extent it was supported by objective
medical evidence.
The Administrative Law Judge further noted Mr. Pennington's testimony
exhibited "embellishment, exaggeration, and a strong secondary gain motive."
Mr. Pennington's unsolicited statement that he believes he has paid his dues as
compared to those people who are drawing social security benefits but have never
paid anything into the social security program supports a reasonable conclusion
Mr. Pennington is motivated by secondary gain. The Administrative Law Judge's
observation that Mr. Pennington's testimony was embellished or exaggerated
reflects the claimant's demeanor as a witness. A claimant's demeanor is uniquely
apparent to the Administrative Law Judge -- it is not the type of observation we
can readily evaluate on the basis of a bare record. Since we have no basis on
which to question this subjective, yet important, conclusion, questions of
demeanor are correctly left for the fact finder. See Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d
1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1991) (subjective measure of credibility peculiarly within
the Administrative Law Judge's judgment is one relevant factor to consider when
evaluating credibility of pain testimony).
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.
-4-