Penner v. Chase Bank USA Na

Ninth Circuit

Penner v. Chase Bank USA Na

457 F. App'x 693

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedNovember 4, 2011

Docket06-35726

StatusUnpublished

This text of 457 F. App'x 693 (Penner v. Chase Bank USA Na) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Penner v. Chase Bank USA Na, 457 F. App'x 693 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiffs sued Chase Bank for its practice of increasing cardholders’ interest rates upon default or delinquency and retroactively applying the increased rates to the beginning of the latest payment cycle.

1. As plaintiffs concede, their Truth in Lending Act and breach of contract claims have been foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 871, 178 L.Ed.2d 716 (2011).

2. Plaintiffs’ declaratory relief, uncon-scionability and illegal penalty claims are foreclosed because Delaware law permits Chase’s practices. See McCoy v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA Nat. Assoc., 654 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir.2011).

3. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA), Wash. Rev.Code § 19.86.020. To succeed under the WCPA, plaintiffs must show that Chase’s actions had “the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public.” Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash.2d 778, 719 P.2d 531, 535 (1986) (emphasis omitted). Here, however, “Chase openly and expressly notifies cardholders of the actions it reserves the right to take in the event of a default.” McCoy, 654 F.3d at 975.

The parties’ October 6, 2008 and October 20, 2008 motions for judicial notice are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiffs sued Chase Bank for its practice of increasing cardholders’ interest rates upon default or delinquency and retroactively applying the increased rates to the beginning of the latest payment cycle.

1. As plaintiffs concede, their Truth in Lending Act and breach of contract claims have been foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 871, 178 L.Ed.2d 716 (2011).

2. Plaintiffs’ declaratory relief, uncon-scionability and illegal penalty claims are foreclosed because Delaware law permits Chase’s practices. See McCoy v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA Nat. Assoc., 654 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir.2011).

3. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA), Wash. Rev.Code § 19.86.020. To succeed under the WCPA, plaintiffs must show that Chase’s actions had “the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public.” Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash.2d 778, 719 P.2d 531, 535 (1986) (emphasis omitted). Here, however, “Chase openly and expressly notifies cardholders of the actions it reserves the right to take in the event of a default.” McCoy, 654 F.3d at 975.

The parties’ October 6, 2008 and October 20, 2008 motions for judicial notice are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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457 F. App'x 693, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/penner-v-chase-bank-usa-na-ca9-2011.

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