Penna v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Penna v. City of New York

248 A.D.2d 692, 671 N.Y.S.2d 274, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3444

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 30, 1998

StatusPublished

This text of 248 A.D.2d 692 (Penna v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Penna v. City of New York, 248 A.D.2d 692, 671 N.Y.S.2d 274, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3444 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

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Opinion

—In Em action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Hyster Co. appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Steinhardt, J.), dated April 29, 1997, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

Since the appellant made a prima facie showing that there was no defect in the product in question, the opponents of its cross motion for summary judgment were required to submit evidentiary facts by expert affidavit demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact (see, Powles v Wean United Corp., 126 AD2d 624). The opponents failed to do so, and the appellant’s motion should have been granted.

O’Brien, J. P., Ritter, Thompson, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

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—In Em action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Hyster Co. appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Steinhardt, J.), dated April 29, 1997, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

Since the appellant made a prima facie showing that there was no defect in the product in question, the opponents of its cross motion for summary judgment were required to submit evidentiary facts by expert affidavit demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact (see, Powles v Wean United Corp., 126 AD2d 624). The opponents failed to do so, and the appellant’s motion should have been granted.

O’Brien, J. P., Ritter, Thompson, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

248 A.D.2d 692, 671 N.Y.S.2d 274, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3444, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/penna-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-1998.

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