Penn v. David, C.O.

Ninth Circuit

Penn v. David, C.O.

323 F. App'x 575

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedApril 23, 2009

DocketNo. 07-15376

StatusPublished

This text of 323 F. App'x 575 (Penn v. David, C.O.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Penn v. David, C.O., 323 F. App'x 575 (9th Cir. 2009).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM

**

Tony Penn, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir.2003), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the action because Penn did not properly exhaust prison grievance procedures prior to filing suit in federal court. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (holding that exhaustion under § 1997e(a) must occur pri- or to commencement of the action); see also Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion is a valid grounds for dismissal.”).

We do not consider Penn’s remaining contentions because they do not address the basis of the district court’s ruling.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM

**

Tony Penn, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir.2003), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the action because Penn did not properly exhaust prison grievance procedures prior to filing suit in federal court. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (holding that exhaustion under § 1997e(a) must occur pri- or to commencement of the action); see also Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion is a valid grounds for dismissal.”).

We do not consider Penn’s remaining contentions because they do not address the basis of the district court’s ruling.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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Bluebook (online)

323 F. App'x 575, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/penn-v-david-co-ca9-2009.

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