Peninsular Bank v. Citizens National Bank

186 Iowa 418
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedMay 21, 1919
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 186 Iowa 418 (Peninsular Bank v. Citizens National Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peninsular Bank v. Citizens National Bank, 186 Iowa 418 (iowa 1919).

Opinion

Weaver, J.

The Denby Motor Truck Company, doing business in Michigan, consigned one motor truck to its own order to Knoxville, Iowa, and delivered it to the Grand Trunk Railway Company, a common carrier, for transportation to Knoxville. For this shipment the truck company took from the carrier a receipt and bill of lading, stating its own name as consignee, and marked, “Notify S. L. Collins Oil Company, Knoxville, Iowa.” It also provided in terms that the surrender of the original bill of lading, properly endorsed, should be a condition precedent to the delivery of the shipment by the carrier, and that inspection of the [420]*420property should not be permitted unless provided by wire, or unless written permission so to do was endorsed on said bill. Having received the bill of lading, the truck company drew its draft upon S. L. Collins Oil Company for $848.50, which draft, accompanied by the bill of lading, they negotiated and delivered to the plaintiff, and received credit for the full face thereof. On the same day, the plaintiff bank forwarded both draft and bill of lading to the defendant, Citizens National Bank of Knoxville, for collection, with instructions to “deliver bill of lading on payment of draft only.” Lafe Collins, who was president of the defendant bank, was also president of the S. L. Collins Oil Company. On receipt of the draft and bill of lading by the bank at Knoxville, Collins took possession of the bill, presented it to the carrier, and obtained possession of the truck for the oil company, by which it has since been retained. At some time, whether before or after taking possession of the bill of lading does not appear, Collins 'made and delivered his check to the defendant for the full amount of the draft, $848.50, but instructed the bank not to pay or remit it to plaintiff until he should so direct. Neither draft nor bill of lading has ever been returned or accounted for by the defendant. Payment having been demanded by the plaintiff and refused by the defendant, this action was brought to recover the amount of the draft as damages for its conversion. The defendant’s answer admits receiving the draft and bill of lading, but denies all other allegations of the petition. The facts above set forth are wholly undisputed.

At the close of the plaintiff’s testimony, and again when both parties had rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict in its favor. The grounds assigned for the motion are:

(1) Insufficient evidence to sustain a recovery. . '

(2) That, under the law applicable to the case, the oil company was the consignee in fact, and was-entitled to de[421]*421mand and receive delivery of the truck without presentation of the bill of lading.

(3) That plaintiff had failed to prove the value of the truck described in the bill of lading.

The motion having been denied, defendant offered to prove, by competent testimony, that the value of the truck represented by the bill of lading at the time the bill was surrendered to Collins, did not exceed $600; and, the offer being overruled, defendant rested, without tender or offer of other evidence. Plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict in its favor was thereupon sustained, and from the judgment thereupon, defendant appealed.

In argument to this court, the appellant relies on the single proposition that the measure of plaintiff’s damages, if any, is the actual value of the truck described in the bill of lading, and that, if there be no evidence of such value, there can be no recovery; or, if there be any right of recovery upon the showing made, it is for nominal damages only, and it was, therefore, error for the trial court to overrule the defendant’s offer to prove such value to be less than the amount of the draft.

l. carriers: bills of ladcbaserUof ' recourse* oCne<J: noSafcnepta°nnce. [422]*4222. Trover and conversion : nature and grounds: sufficiency of allegations. 3. trover and CONVERSION : damages: presumption: face converted.arait [421]*421Counsel’s argument proceeds upon the theory that this action, in legal effect, is one for the recovery of damages for the loss of the truck described in the bill of lading, and such being the case, the measure of damages is necessarily the value of the truck, the ac- ' companying draft being, at most, mere prima-facie evidence of such value. Now, may be admitted, as counsel contend, that the endorsement and .transfer of the bill of lading serve to vest the title to the truck in plaintiff, but it by no means follows that this is an action to recover its value. Plaintiff did not buy the truck; it bought the Truck Company’s draft on the Oil Company for $848.50, and took the legal title to the truck as security for its accept[422]*422anee and payment. It sent both bill and draft to the defendant to collect, not the reasonable or market value of the truck, but the amount of the draft. If the draft had been dishonored upon presentation, and the security had been surrendered or lost by the defendant, plaintiff could have sued and recovered the value of it, but this was not the plaintiff’s only recourse. As between itself and the truck company, the draft was a bill of exchange, and upon its dishonor by nonacceptance, plaintiff had immediate right of recourse thereon against said company. The petition not only charges the unauthorized surrender of the truck and defendant’s failure to collect the draft before such surrender, but, also alleges defendant’s refusal to return the draft upon demand. This is a sufficient allegation of a conversion of the instrument. P'roof of the conversion is undisputed, and plaintiff is presumed to have been damaged to the extent of its face value. Hubbard v. State L. Ins. Co., 129 Iowa 13; Dean v. Nichols, 95 Iowa 89. Evidence showing the value of the truck to be less than the amount of the draft had no tendency to rebut the presumption that the draft was worth the sum for which it was drawn.

i. Banks and banking : collections : duty to remit proceeds oí draft: face value. [424]*4245. Carriers : bills oi lading': purchaser of draft attached : carrier’s liability to purchaser limited to value of goods lost. [422]*422There is still another aspect to the case Which necessitates an affirmance of the judgment below. It was shown by the cashier of the defendant bank, not only that it received the draft for collection, but also that it received from the president of the Oil Company, who was also its own president, a check for the full amount of the draft, which it still holds, and says, in excuse of its failure to remit, that said officer ordered its nonpayment until he should direct otherwise. In other words, defendant has collected the full amount of the draft, but withholds its [423]*423remittance to the payee at the request of the debtor. This being admitted, it is bound in law to account to plaintiff for the full face of the draft, or to affirmatively plead and prove some fact or facts which excuse or avoid performance of that duty. No such defense is pleaded, and none is proved. In other words, the defendant confesses the truth of the averments of the petition, but neither alleges nor proves any new matter which tends to deprive the admitted facts of their ordinary legal effect.

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Bluebook (online)
186 Iowa 418, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peninsular-bank-v-citizens-national-bank-iowa-1919.