Peninsula Forest Products Co. v. Earle

89 F. Supp. 749, 39 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 307, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1861
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedSeptember 27, 1949
DocketCiv. Nos. 4171, 4172
StatusPublished

This text of 89 F. Supp. 749 (Peninsula Forest Products Co. v. Earle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peninsula Forest Products Co. v. Earle, 89 F. Supp. 749, 39 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 307, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1861 (D. Or. 1949).

Opinion

McCOLLOCH, District Judge.

Trial was had without the intervention of a jury, the jury having been waived in the manner provided by Rule 38(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. Witnesses were sworn and testified and exhibits were introduced in evidence and an offer of proof was made by the defendants accompanied by an exhibit offered in evidence, and based upon the facts admitted in said pre-trial order, said testimony, evidence, said offer of proof and accompanying exhibit, after due consideration, the court makes the following findings of fact:

I.

That each of the above actions is a civil action and arises under the laws of the United States providing for Internal Revenue, particularly Sections 23(a), 322, 3770 (a), 3772 and 3797(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 23(a), 322, 3770 (a), 3772, 3797(a), and with respect to civil action No. 4172 also Sections 23(s) and 122 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 23(s), 122; and jurisdiction of action No. 4171 rests upon Section 41, subd. 5 of the Judicial Code of the United States, 28 U.S.C.A., revised by Title 28 United States Code Annotated, § 1340, and jurisdiction of civil action No. 4172 rests upon Section 41(20) of the Judicial Code of the United States, Title 28, U.S.C.A., revised by Title 28 United States Code Annotated, § 1346.

II.

Plaintiff was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Oregon, having its principal office and place of business in the City of Portland in said state. Plaintiff was dis[750]*750solved on January 12, 1948, but is still in existence under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Oregon for the purpose of suing and being sued. The word “plaintiff” as used in this paragraph and as hereinafter used means the Peninsula Forest Products Co. as plaintiff in each of the above mentioned actions.

III.

At and during all times herein mentioned the defendant, United States of America, was and now is a Sovereign Power and body politic.

IV.

At and during all times from some date in the year 1943 to September 3, 1947 James W. Maloney was the duly commissioned, qualified and acting United States Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of .Oregon, and is hereinafter referred to as the former collector. ■

V.

At and during all times from September 3, 1947 the defendant,. Hugh H. Earle, was and now is the duly commissioned, qualified and acting United States Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Oregon and is hereinafter sometime referred to as the collector.

VI.

On or about March 13, 1944 plaintiff filed with the former collector its Corporation Income and Declared Value Excess-Profit's Tax Return, Form 1120, for the calendar year 1943, showing a total income and declared value excess profits tax liability for said year in the sum of $1,479.60, and at said time also filed’ with the former collector its Corporation'Excess-Profits Tax Return, Form 1121, for said calendar year, showing no excess profits and no liability for a tax on the excess profits for said yeár.

VII.

On or about March 15, 1945, plaintiff filed with the former collector its Corpqration Income and Declared Value Excess-Profits Tax Return, Form 1120, for the calendar year 1944, showing-a total income and declared value excess profits tax liability for said'year in the sum of $2,441.83. On or about March 15, 1945, plaintiff also filed with the former collector its Corporation Excess Profits Tax Return, Form 1121, for said calendar year, showing no excess profits and no liability for a tax on excess profits for said year.

VIII.

Plaintiff paid to the former collector the full amount of the tax liability shown on said returns.

IX.

On or about March 15, 1946 plaintiff filed with the former collector its Corporation Income and Declared Value Excess-Profits Tax Return, Form 1120, for the calendar year 1945, showing a net operating loss for said year as defined by Section 122 of the Internal Revenue Code in the sum of $1,-436.07. Included in the computation of that loss was a deduction for contributions made by plaintiff in the sum of $125.00. On or about March 15, 1946 plaintiff also filed with the former collector its Corporation Excess-Profits Tax Return, Form 1121, for said calendar year, showing no excess profits 'tax liability for said year.

X.

On or about June 12, 1946 plaintiff filed with the former collector an amended Income and Declared Value Excess-Profits-Tax Return, Form 1120, for the calendar year 1943, in which plaintiff claimed a net operating loss deduction in the sum of $1,-311.07, based upon the 1945 net operating: loss above mentioned ($1,436.07-$125.00— $1,311.07). Said amended return shows a net income for declared value excess-profits tax and a normal tax net income in the sum of $4,539.29 for said calendar year instead of $5,850.36 as shown on the original return, and a total income and declared value excess-profits tax liability for said calendar year in the sum of $1,134.82 instead of $1,479.60 as shown on the original return, the difference in said net incomes and tax liability resulting from the said net operating loss deduction claimed on the amended return.

[751]*751XI.

Plaintiff paid to its officers during the calendar years 1943, 1944 and 1943 the total amount of $31,200.00 per year as salaries for personal services actually rendered to it by said officers, and on its said returns for each said year deducted from its gross income said amount of $31,200.00 as an ordinary and necessary expense paid during each said year in carrying on its business. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue of the United States of America disallowed $9,000.00 of each said amount of $31,200.00 paid by the plaintiff as officers’ salaries as aforesaid. The following is a tabulation of the amounts paid by plaintiff during each of the said years to each of its officers and the portions of the amounts so paid that the Commissioner allowed and disallowed.

Officer Amount Paid Amount Allowed Amount Disallowed
3. 11. Smith $12,000.00 $ 9,000.00 $3,000.00
T. W. Baker 9,600.00 6,600.00 3,000 00
Ora Slyter 9,600.00 6,600.00 3,000.00
$31,200.00 $22,200.00 S9.000.00

XII.

Thereafter the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed against plaintiff deficiencies in income, declared value excess-profits and excess profits taxes, together with interest thereon to November 23, 1947, as follows:

For the calendar year 1943 Additional income and declared value excess-profits taxes $ 688.27
Interest thereon 152.32
Additional excess-profits tax $6,605.88
less post war credit of 660.59 5,945.29
Interest thereon 1,387.45
$8,173.33
For the calendar year 1944
Additional income tax $ 667.98
Interest thereon 107.75

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Adoption expenses
26 U.S.C. § 23(a)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
89 F. Supp. 749, 39 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 307, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1861, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peninsula-forest-products-co-v-earle-ord-1949.