Penghui v. Garland

Opinion

19-4214 Penghui v. Garland BIA

Douchy, IJ

A208 582 984

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 19th day of January, two thousand twenty- 5 two. 6 7 PRESENT: 8 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 9 JOSEPH F. BIANCO, 10 STEVEN J. MENASHI, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 SUN PENGHUI, AKA PENGHUI SUN, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 19-4214 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Farah Loftus, Sherman Oaks, CA. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant 27 Attorney General; Jeffrey R. 28 Leist, Senior Litigation Counsel;

1 Raya Jarawan, Trial Attorney, 2 Office of Immigration Litigation, 3 United States Department of 4 Justice, Washington, DC.

5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 8 is DENIED. 9 Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic 10 of China, seeks review of a December 3, 2019 decision of the 11 BIA affirming a March 19, 2018 decision of an Immigration 12 Judge (“IJ”), which denied asylum, withholding of removal, 13 and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In 14 re Sun Penghui, No. A 208 582 984 (B.I.A. Dec. 3, 2019), aff’g 15 No. A 208 582 984 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Mar. 19, 2018). We 16 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 17 procedural history. 18 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions 19 “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of 20 Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The 21 applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 22 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d 23 Cir. 2008) (reviewing factual findings for substantial

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1 evidence and reviewing de novo questions of law and the 2 application of law to facts). The agency did not err in 3 finding that Penghui failed to meet his burden to show past 4 persecution or an objectively reasonable fear of future 5 persecution. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 6 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 7 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004) (A well-founded fear of future 8 persecution “requires that the alien present credible 9 testimony that he subjectively fears persecution and 10 establish that his fear is objectively reasonable.”). 11 Penghui failed to show past persecution because he 12 testified that he fled a Christian meeting when police arrived 13 and alleged that police officers visited his parents’ home 14 looking for him. Accordingly, at most, he alleged a past 15 threat of harm, which does not rise to the level of 16 persecution. See Gui Ci Pan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 17 408, 412 (2d Cir. 2006); Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 18 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006). 19 As to future harm, the agency reasonably concluded that 20 Penghui failed to adequately corroborate past threats because 21 he corroborated only one of two alleged visits from the

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1 police. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (providing that an 2 IJ may require corroboration of even credible testimony); id. 3 § 1252(b)(4) (“No court shall reverse a determination made by 4 a trier of fact with respect to the availability of 5 corroborating evidence . . . unless . . . a reasonable trier 6 of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating 7 evidence is unavailable.”). Nor did he fully corroborate his 8 claim that he regularly practiced Christianity in the United 9 States because, among other deficiencies, he did not call 10 fellow church members to testify. See Wei Sun v. Sessions, 11 883 F.3d 23, 28–29 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[A]n applicant may be 12 generally credible but his testimony may not be sufficient to 13 carry the burden of persuading the fact finder of the accuracy 14 of his claim of crucial facts if he fails to put forth 15 corroboration that should be readily available.”). 16 Moreover, the record did not otherwise establish an 17 objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. See Jian 18 Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In 19 the absence of solid support in the record[,] . . . [an 20 applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”). The Chinese 21 police had not inquired about him since February 2016, and he

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1 did not submit any country conditions evidence. Id. The IJ 2 reasonably concluded that the country conditions did not 3 support Penghui’s claim because the State Department report 4 identified some persecution of Christians, but also that 5 conditions varied throughout China and that there were no 6 reports of persecution in Penghui’s home province. See Jian 7 Liang v. Garland, 10 F.4th 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2021) (upholding 8 agency’s conclusion that asylum applicant failed to meet 9 burden of proof where evidence showed “treatment of 10 Christians in China varies by locality” and evidence did not 11 reflect persecution in Fujian Province). 12 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 13 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 14 stays VACATED.

15 FOR THE COURT: 16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 17 Clerk of Court