Peng Lin v. Attorney General of the United States

556 F. App'x 138
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedFebruary 24, 2014
Docket12-2291
StatusUnpublished

This text of 556 F. App'x 138 (Peng Lin v. Attorney General of the United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peng Lin v. Attorney General of the United States, 556 F. App'x 138 (3d Cir. 2014).

Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Peng Lin is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China who arrived in the United States in 2006. The Government charged him as removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) for being present without having been admitted or paroled. Lin conceded the charge but sought asylum, withholding, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), claiming that he had been persecuted as a homosexual in China.

After a hearing, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his applications for relief. Lin took an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which remanded the case on the basis that the IJ’s decision did not include clear findings regarding credibility or past persecution. R. 343. In 2009, a different IJ held a hearing and denied Lin’s applications for relief. In doing so, the IJ made an adverse credibility finding, noted a corroboration problem, rejected a claim of a pattern and practice of discrimination, and separately ruled that there was no evidence to support a CAT claim. Lin again appealed to the BIA, which adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.

Lin, through appointed counsel, presents a petition for review. He argues that the adverse credibility finding and the ruling against him cannot stand because of the IJ’s conduct 1 and the evidence in the case. *140 He also argues that the agency erred in concluding that he did not show a pattern and practice of persecution of homosexuals in China. The Government counters that substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility finding and denial of relief and that Lin failed to establish his pattern-and-practice claim.

We have jurisdiction over Lin’s petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We consider questions of law de novo. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 302 n. 2 (3d Cir.2002). We review factual findings, such as an adverse credibility determination, for substantial evidence. See Butt v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 430, 433 (3d Cir.2005). We evaluate whether a credibility determination was “appropriately based on inconsistent statements, contradictory evidences, and inherently improbable testimony ... in view of the background evidence of country conditions.” Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir.2004). We afford an adverse credibility finding substantial deference, so long as the finding is supported by sufficient, cogent reasons. See Butt, 429 F.3d at 434. After reviewing the matter, we cannot say that the record compels a conclusion different from the one reached by the agency in regards to the credibility determination.

First, we reject Lin’s argument that his is a case in which “[t]he conduct of the IJ by itself would require a rejection of his credibility finding.” Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 411 F.3d 135, 155 (3d Cir.2005). In considering the record in this case, we have read the transcript of the entire hearing, and we discern no evidence of IJ bias or prejudice. Neither the IJ’s demeanor nor his questions in service of his duty to develop the testimony, see Toure v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 443 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir.2006), suggest any misconduct.

Second, as the IJ and BIA noted, there were omissions, or inconsistencies between Lin’s testimony and his written evidence, relating to each of the major underlying events in Lin’s story. These problems, highlighted in the agency, support the adverse credibility finding. For a post REAL ID Act case, such as Lin’s, “an IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’ establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.” Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii)).

In his affidavit, Lin stated that his problems began in middle school, when he fell in love with his classmate. He and the other boy became a couple, and, in June 2001, 2 after they hugged and kissed in the school lounge, they were called to the principal’s office. There, the principal “severely condemned [them] for [their] activities.” R. 587. Also, Lin’s father was called to school. Lin’s father apologized to the principal and dragged Lin from the room. Lin stated that he lost his balance on the way home and hit his head on a wall. Later, people in his village found out about *141 his sexuality, and his classmates made fun of him.

In his testimony at his second hearing, 3 Lin added that the principal told him that he was dismissed, which, according to Lin, meant that he could not go back to school anymore. R. 13B. However, he also testified that he was able to graduate a couple of weeks later. R. 134. In addition to not mentioning any dismissal in his affidavit, Liris testimony was inconsistent with his father’s report of what happened. His father did not mention any dismissal from school, either. Instead, he wrote that after he was called to Liris school and was told of Liris sexual relationship with his classmate, Lin “was also crying every day, being aware of the situation of [the] family. Then his grades were even worse. He went out to work after he left the junior middle school.” R. 460. 4

There are inconsistencies in Liris account of what happened after the incident at school, too. In the written submissions from Lin, his father, and Lin’s boyfriend, there are reports that his father considered sending Lin to a psychiatric hospital. R. 460, 574, 587-88. In his testimony, Lin repeated that his father wanted to send him to a psychiatric ward. R. 135. But, in his testimony, Lin also augmented his claim by stating that he was not allowed to leave his room for six months. R. 135. That detention was not mentioned in any of the written submissions. The only explanation that Lin had for the omission was that he did not know what to include or not in his affidavit because of his education level. 5

The employment problems he claimed to have suffered were variously reported as well. In his affidavit, Lin testified that he *142 got a job as a chef in a supermarket in Fuzhou city in January 2004. He stated that he was fired, however, because his boyfriend came to see him 6

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556 F. App'x 138, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peng-lin-v-attorney-general-of-the-united-states-ca3-2014.