Pendleton v. Acuff-Rose Publications, Inc.

605 F. Supp. 477, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 935
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedOctober 31, 1984
Docket82-3668
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 605 F. Supp. 477 (Pendleton v. Acuff-Rose Publications, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pendleton v. Acuff-Rose Publications, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 477, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 935 (M.D. Tenn. 1984).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

JOHN T. NIXON, District Judge.

This action for copyright infringement was originally filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on July 25,1980. The original defendants subsequently moved for dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction, and plaintiff was granted a voluntary dismissal of the complaint. On February 13, 1981, the complaint was re-filed, and defendants renewed their motions to dismiss. After an amended complaint was filed naming additional defendants, the case was transferred to this Court by order of the North Carolina court dated July 28, 1982. Currently pending before this Court are independent motions for summary judgment from (1) defendants Acuff-Rose Publications, Inc., Fred Rose Music, Inc., Elizabeth Jane Anderson, James E. Cason, Buzz Cason Publications, Inc., Let There Be Music, Robert C. Jennings, Bob Montgomery, and Southern Writers Group, Inc., (2) defendants Billy N. Sherrill and Algee Music Company, and (3) defendant CBS, Inc. Defendants Scorpio Enterprises, Bradley L. Williamson, and George A. Robertson, Jr. adopt and join in the motions and supporting documents filed by other defendants. This cause came on to be heard on October 4, 1984. For the reasons that follow, defendants’ motions for summary judgment are hereby GRANTED, and this case is ORDERED DISMISSED.

Plaintiff, Howard Leslie Pendleton, is a citizen and resident of Jacksonville, Onslow *480 County, North Carolina. In 1974, plaintiff wrote three compositions entitled “Just a Blue Box,” “Dear Dolly,” and “Angel.” In 1975, plaintiff played a tape recording of the songs for defendant George Robertson and in 1976 played a similar recording for defendant Robert C. Jennings. The gravamen of plaintiffs complaint is that defendants Robertson and Jennings, as well as numerous recording artists, producers, publishers, and record companies, illegally appropriated the lyrics of the three songs. Plaintiff does not allege infringement of the music accompanying these songs.

Plaintiff contends that, in 1977, defendant Elizabeth Jane Anderson wrote and assigned to defendant Fred Rose Music, Inc., the composition “Mama’s Shoe Box.” Plaintiff contends that the lyrics to this composition infringe upon the lyrics of his composition “Just a Blue Box.” Plaintiff further asserts that defendants James E. Cason and George Robertson wrote and assigned to defendants Buzz Cason Publications, Inc. and Let There Be Music the composition “Dolly,” which was written in 1978. Plaintiff alleges that the lyrics to “Dolly” infringe upon the lyrics of his composition “Dear Dolly.” Lastly, plaintiff maintains that, in 1978, defendants Billy Sherrill and Johnny Paycheck wrote and assigned to Algee Music Corporation the composition “Friend, Lover, Wife.” Plaintiff asserts that the lyrics of “Friend, Lover, Wife” infringe upon the lyrics of his composition “Angel.” It is the position of the defendants that the lyrics in question contain no similarities other than the idea or theme about which the compositions are written.

FED.R.CIY.P. 56 provides for the entry of summary judgment in a case where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R. CIV.P. 56(c). A court must view the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-09, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The summary judgment procedure is used to eliminate unnecessary trials, curb the threat of coercive settlement, eliminate claims which lack merit, and provide a just, speedy, and efficient disposition of a lawsuit. Federal Procedure, L.Ed. § 62:532. A defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a copyright claim may be granted “if, after assuming copying, the Court finds that any similarity between the works is insubstantial.” Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F.Supp. 1297, 1302 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (quoting Musto v. Meyer, 434 F.Supp. 32, 36 (S.D.N.Y.1977), aff’d, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir.1979)).

In order to establish a prima facie case of wrongful appropriation of expression by copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove substantial similarity and access. Walker v. University Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir.1979). “Ordinarily, wrongful appropriation is shown by proving a ‘substantial similarity’ of copyrightable expression.” Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841, 101 S.Ct. 121, 66 L.Ed.2d 49 (1980). Copyright protection extends only to the expression of the idea; it does not protect the idea itself. O’Neill v. Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 685, 686 (1st Cir.1980). “It must be remembered that copyright protection does not extend to ideas, plots, dramatic situations, and events. Rather, it is limited to the arrangement of words the author uses to express his ideas.” Scott v WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832, 88 S.Ct. 101, 19 L.Ed.2d 91 (1967). See Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.1977) (protection granted to a copyrighted work extends only to the particular expression of the idea and never to the idea itself); Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.) (although the writer’s monopoly exceeds an exact reproduction of the words, the copyright extends not to the ideas disclosed but *481 to their expression), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980, 97 S.Ct. 492, 50 L.Ed.2d 588 (1976); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217, 74 S.Ct. 460, 470, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954). Obviously, no principle may be enunciated that will reveal when an imitator has gone beyond copying the “idea,” and has infringed upon its “expression.” Decisions must, therefore, necessarily be ad hoc. See Reyher, 533 F.2d at 91; Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.1960).

Plaintiff argues that substantial similarity necessarily presents a close factual issue that cannot be disposed of on summary judgment. See Hoehling,

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605 F. Supp. 477, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 935, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pendleton-v-acuff-rose-publications-inc-tnmd-1984.