[31] GILLETTE, J.
This case involves a request that this court exercise its discretionary authority to award attorney fees to the prevailing parties in a case involving school funding. Petitioners were designated as the prevailing parties in that case, Pendleton School Dist. v. State of Oregon, 345 Or 596, 200 P3d 133 (2009). Petitioners (several Oregon public school districts and certain minors who would be attending public schools in Oregon) there asserted that the legislature had failed to perform a constitutional duty to adequately fund the state public school system. Petitioners sought alternative forms of relief, based on three theories: (1) a declaratory judgment, holding that the legislature had violated Article VIII, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution,1 because it had failed to appropriate sufficient funds for the 2005-07 biennium to ensure that the state public school system would meet the quality goals established by law; (2) a similar declaratory judgment, stating that the legislature had a similar duty under Article VIII, section 3, of the Oregon Constitution,2 but had failed to perform that duty; and (3) a mandatory injunction requiring the legislature to appropriate sufficient funds for the 2005-07 biennium to ensure that the state public school system would meet the quality goals previously described. Pendleton School Dist., 345 Or at 601. The state successfully moved for summary judgment and, on petitioners’ appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. This court then allowed petitioners’ petition for review.
On review, this court reversed the trial court’s judgment in part and affirmed it in part. The court began by observing that Article VIII, section 8, “presents two seemingly contradictory concepts.” Id. at 608. That is, the [32] constitutional provision directs the legislature to fund the public school system at a certain level, but it then establishes a reporting requirement that, by its terms, contemplates that the school system may not be funded at that level. Id. at 607-OS. This court concluded, however, that it could give effect to both concepts by considering whether each form of relief that petitioners had requested was consistent with both concepts. Id. at 609.
Proceeding on that basis, the court concluded that the trial court should have granted petitioners a declaratory judgment to the effect that the legislature had failed to appropriate sufficient funds for the 2005-07 biennium to meet the quality goals established by law:
“Because the state admits that the legislature failed to fund the public school system for the 2005-07 biennium at the levels required by Article VIII, section 8, we can determine and declare that the legislature failed to act in accordance with the constitutional mandate. The trial court should have entered a declaratory judgment on that limited ground.”
Id. at 610. The court further concluded, however, that the courts could not grant a declaratory judgment that the legislature must appropriate in each biennium sums sufficient to ensure that the public school system meets the quality goals established by law. Id. at 610-11. Similarly, the court concluded that the courts could not grant an injunction requiring the legislature to fund the public school system to meet those goals. Id. Those rulings were based on petitioners’ theory under Article VIII, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. The court then went on to reject petitioners’ additional argument that the legislature’s failure to meet the quality goals established by law constituted a violation of Article VIII, section 3. Id. at 612-16.
The outcome of the case may be summarized briefly as follows: The court concluded that petitioners’ contention that the Oregon Constitution directs the legislature to fund public primary and secondary education at certain levels is correct. (Indeed, the state essentially conceded the point.) However, the court also ruled that the provision in Article VIII, section 8, contemplating a report from the legislature [33] explaining its failure to fund education at the required level (when and if that was the case) is a permissible constitutional alternative to following the constitutional mandate. Thus, this court declined to provide petitioners with the affirmative relief that they requested, viz., a judicial direction to the legislative branch to alter its budgetary choices and fund education at the appropriate level.
At the close of its opinion, the court stated:
“The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with this opinion and for a declaration that Article VIII, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution does not authorize the injunctive relief that [petitioners] sought.”
345 Or at 617. In spite of the fact that petitioners’ request for a court-ordered appropriation had eluded them, however, the court designated them the prevailing party in the case — a designation justified by the fact that petitioners had succeeded in obtaining a direct statement that Article VIII, section 8, imposed a duty on the legislature to fund primary and secondary public education at a certain level, a result that the circuit court and the Court of Appeals had refused to give them.
Petitioners now seek attorney fees solely under the inherent power of this court to award fees, as that concept has evolved since it first was announced in Deras v. Myers, 272 Or 47, 65-66, 535 P2d 541 (1975). That power allows a court in equity to award fees when a party to a proceeding in effect acts in a representative capacity to protect certain rights of others, and not just the party’s own rights. This court articulated the elements of a Deras award in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 287, 959 P2d 49 (1998), as follows:
“First, the proceeding must be one in equity. Second, the party requesting attorney fees must be the prevailing party. Finally, in filing the action, the party requesting attorney fees must have been seeking to vindicate an important constitutional right applying to all citizens without any gain peculiar to himself, as opposed to vindicating [34] individualized and different interests, or any pecuniary or other special interest of his own aside from that shared with the public at large.”
(Internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted.)
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[31] GILLETTE, J.
This case involves a request that this court exercise its discretionary authority to award attorney fees to the prevailing parties in a case involving school funding. Petitioners were designated as the prevailing parties in that case, Pendleton School Dist. v. State of Oregon, 345 Or 596, 200 P3d 133 (2009). Petitioners (several Oregon public school districts and certain minors who would be attending public schools in Oregon) there asserted that the legislature had failed to perform a constitutional duty to adequately fund the state public school system. Petitioners sought alternative forms of relief, based on three theories: (1) a declaratory judgment, holding that the legislature had violated Article VIII, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution,1 because it had failed to appropriate sufficient funds for the 2005-07 biennium to ensure that the state public school system would meet the quality goals established by law; (2) a similar declaratory judgment, stating that the legislature had a similar duty under Article VIII, section 3, of the Oregon Constitution,2 but had failed to perform that duty; and (3) a mandatory injunction requiring the legislature to appropriate sufficient funds for the 2005-07 biennium to ensure that the state public school system would meet the quality goals previously described. Pendleton School Dist., 345 Or at 601. The state successfully moved for summary judgment and, on petitioners’ appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. This court then allowed petitioners’ petition for review.
On review, this court reversed the trial court’s judgment in part and affirmed it in part. The court began by observing that Article VIII, section 8, “presents two seemingly contradictory concepts.” Id. at 608. That is, the [32] constitutional provision directs the legislature to fund the public school system at a certain level, but it then establishes a reporting requirement that, by its terms, contemplates that the school system may not be funded at that level. Id. at 607-OS. This court concluded, however, that it could give effect to both concepts by considering whether each form of relief that petitioners had requested was consistent with both concepts. Id. at 609.
Proceeding on that basis, the court concluded that the trial court should have granted petitioners a declaratory judgment to the effect that the legislature had failed to appropriate sufficient funds for the 2005-07 biennium to meet the quality goals established by law:
“Because the state admits that the legislature failed to fund the public school system for the 2005-07 biennium at the levels required by Article VIII, section 8, we can determine and declare that the legislature failed to act in accordance with the constitutional mandate. The trial court should have entered a declaratory judgment on that limited ground.”
Id. at 610. The court further concluded, however, that the courts could not grant a declaratory judgment that the legislature must appropriate in each biennium sums sufficient to ensure that the public school system meets the quality goals established by law. Id. at 610-11. Similarly, the court concluded that the courts could not grant an injunction requiring the legislature to fund the public school system to meet those goals. Id. Those rulings were based on petitioners’ theory under Article VIII, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. The court then went on to reject petitioners’ additional argument that the legislature’s failure to meet the quality goals established by law constituted a violation of Article VIII, section 3. Id. at 612-16.
The outcome of the case may be summarized briefly as follows: The court concluded that petitioners’ contention that the Oregon Constitution directs the legislature to fund public primary and secondary education at certain levels is correct. (Indeed, the state essentially conceded the point.) However, the court also ruled that the provision in Article VIII, section 8, contemplating a report from the legislature [33] explaining its failure to fund education at the required level (when and if that was the case) is a permissible constitutional alternative to following the constitutional mandate. Thus, this court declined to provide petitioners with the affirmative relief that they requested, viz., a judicial direction to the legislative branch to alter its budgetary choices and fund education at the appropriate level.
At the close of its opinion, the court stated:
“The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with this opinion and for a declaration that Article VIII, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution does not authorize the injunctive relief that [petitioners] sought.”
345 Or at 617. In spite of the fact that petitioners’ request for a court-ordered appropriation had eluded them, however, the court designated them the prevailing party in the case — a designation justified by the fact that petitioners had succeeded in obtaining a direct statement that Article VIII, section 8, imposed a duty on the legislature to fund primary and secondary public education at a certain level, a result that the circuit court and the Court of Appeals had refused to give them.
Petitioners now seek attorney fees solely under the inherent power of this court to award fees, as that concept has evolved since it first was announced in Deras v. Myers, 272 Or 47, 65-66, 535 P2d 541 (1975). That power allows a court in equity to award fees when a party to a proceeding in effect acts in a representative capacity to protect certain rights of others, and not just the party’s own rights. This court articulated the elements of a Deras award in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 287, 959 P2d 49 (1998), as follows:
“First, the proceeding must be one in equity. Second, the party requesting attorney fees must be the prevailing party. Finally, in filing the action, the party requesting attorney fees must have been seeking to vindicate an important constitutional right applying to all citizens without any gain peculiar to himself, as opposed to vindicating [34] individualized and different interests, or any pecuniary or other special interest of his own aside from that shared with the public at large.”
(Internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted.)
Petitioners contend that all three Armatta requirements are met here. The state does not dispute the first requirement (that the proceeding be one in equity), and we agree that it is met. The state does dispute whether petitioners meet the second criterion {viz., that they are the prevailing party), but we reject the state’s argument. First, this court designated petitioners as the prevailing party. Moreover, and even assuming that such designation does not end the matter, petitioners meet the classic requirement to be a prevailing party: They obtained a substantial modification of the judgment, which makes them a prevailing party. See ORS 20.077(3) (stating that standard).
The state makes a contrary argument, relying on Lewis v. Dept. of Rev., 294 Or 139, 653 P2d 1265 (1982), but that case is distinguishable. There, the party claiming fees had sought to be included, on equal privileges grounds, within a class of taxpayers that was entitled to a certain tax exemption. However, the Tax Court ultimately denied the exemption to the group that the party had sought to join, rather than extending the exemption to him. Under such circumstances, this court observed, the party claiming fees arguably was not a prevailing party under any definition, because the only consequence of his claim was the precise opposite of what he had sought. Id. at 143-44. In this case, we hold that, consistent with this court’s designation at the time, petitioners were the “prevailing party’ in the litigation and therefore eligible for a discretionary ¿eras award of attorney fees.
This brings us to the third criterion: Petitioners must have been seeking to vindicate an important constitutional right that applied to the broad spectrum of citizens, rather than trying to vindicate a more narrow (often pecuniary) interest of their own. See Armatta, 327 Or at 287 (so noting). Some might argue that the “narrow interest” disqualification [35] applies here. As it happens, however, we need not even consider whether that disqualification ever would extend to public entities (like the petitioner school districts here), because — in our view — petitioners’ claim for an award of attorney fees fails for a different reason.
In our view, the public interest that petitioners were trying to vindicate — the one that was pivotal to their reason for entering into the litigation — was the understandable desire to obtain a mandatory injunction requiring the legislature to reallocate available funds so that the amount assigned to public primary and secondary education would be sufficient to ensure that educational goals established by law would be met. Petitioners did not obtain that result. Instead, as already noted, they received a declaration from this court that told them (and the public at large), in effect, that the constitutional provision requires the legislature either to fund education adequately or to explain in a public report why it had not done so. Petitioners’ success in obtaining a judicial declaration that the legislature had failed to fund the public school system at the appropriate level amounted to a Pyrrhic victory, because Article VIII, section 8, effectively allows the legislature to choose to provide less than adequate funding as long as it reports its failure.
Petitioners assert that they “have vindicated the constitutional right of every Oregonian to a Legislative Assembly that follows the law.” Perhaps. But the path that the legislature must follow does not necessarily take it where petitioners wish it to go, and — as we made clear in our opinion on the merits — there is no available judicial mechanism to force that body in one direction as opposed to another. When the nature of the declaratory judgment that this court ordered is understood in that light, we think that it is clear that the result that petitioners have obtained is not the kind of result for the public at large that calls for the award of attorney fees under the rationale of Deras and the cases that have followed it. Petitioners’ request for an award of attorney fees is denied.
Petitioners also have sought an award of costs against the state. The state has objected to the award. We overrule the state’s objection and award the requested costs.
[36] Petitioners are awarded their costs in the amount of $1,056.55, payable by the State of Oregon. Petitioners’ petition for an award of attorney fees is denied.